Commanding Men and Machines:  Admiralship, Technology, and Ideology in the 20th Century U.S. Navy by Hagerott, Mark Regan
Abstract 
 
Title of Dissertation:    COMMANDING MEN AND MACHINES: 
ADMIRALSHIP, TECHNOLOGY, AND IDEOLOGY IN 
THE 20th CENTURY U.S. NAVY 
Mark R. Hagerott, Ph.D., 2008 
Dissertation Directed by:  Professor Jon T. Sumida 
    Department of History 
 
This dissertation engages the important historical and sociological question:  how 
do organizations develop leaders? As technological complexity increased, the military 
struggled to produce leaders who could understand technology and yet integrate the 
operations of disparate parts of large organizations.  In the late 20th century, the senior 
leader model in the U.S. military shifted from a 'generalist' to what can be described as a 
'technical specialist' model.  The commanding elite that resulted have been criticized as 
overly technical in orientation, and the system of leader development has been subject to 
several reform efforts.  Missing from the reform debates is an historical understanding of 
how and why the officer system changed.   This study contributes to the history by 
exploring the shift in U.S. Navy leader models from 'generalist' to 'technical specialist'.  
It is widely believed in military circles that the shift in leadership models from 
'generalist' to 'specialist' was natural, an inevitable consequence of technological change.  
Among scholars, the shift in the U.S. Navy from 'generalist' to 'specialist' is typically 
associated with aviation, circa 1935-47. This dissertation challenges these notions.  The 
shift in leader models was not fated by technology,  but was the result of  highly 
contingent bureaucratic battles fought between general line officers (generalists) and 
 
nuclear reactor specialists for control of the development of young officers.  Chance 
events-- in particular, the sinking of USS THRESHER-- also shaped officer policy.   
This study argues that for four decades—from 1919 to 1963-- navy leadership 
affirmed the 'generalist' as the preferred model for commander.  But in the 1960s the 
Navy abandoned the 'generalist' model.  Admiral H.G. Rickover was largely responsible 
for the change.  In the space of a decade, Rickover restructured assignment and education 
processes to produce technically expert officers for his nuclear machines. Naval 
Academy admissions criteria and curricula were changed such that specialized technical 
majors replaced general degrees and universal language education.  The restructured 
processes encouraged officers to value specialized technical expertise over general 
knowledge, that is, integrated operational, strategic, and cultural knowledge.  Aviators 
and surface officers followed Rickover's cue and by the 1970s adopted more specialized 
models of development for their respective officers.    
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Introduction 
 
"We have been made captive of our technology." 1 
Admiral Harry D. Train, USN (retired)  
 
 
Looking out at a Norfolk harbor crowded with billion-dollar ships and 
submarines, Admiral Train pondered the question: how had the relationship between 
technology and naval officers changed during his career?  Train, who served on active 
duty from the 1940s to the 1980s, answered: "We have been made captive of our 
technology." 2    Train went on to explain that this condition was new; it had not always 
been this way.  Something had happened during his career that changed the priorities and 
values of senior officers.  High command--the senior 'line' officers-- had been molded by 
technology like never before.  The naval commander had become focused on his favored 
technologies, his 'means' of war.  In the process, naval command was losing sight of the 
'ends': operational command and victory in war.   How had this happened-- was it 
inevitable or could things have been different?-- the admiral was not sure.  However, his 
suspicion was that the seeds for the changed thinking were planted long ago, and 
involved the system by which the Navy educated and professionalized the 'line' officer 
who would command. 
                                                 
1 Harry Depue Train, ADM USN, Interview with the Author, 2 November 2007.   
2 Ibid.  Interview held at the Town Point Club, Norfolk, Virginia, home of the largest naval base in the 
world.  The windows of the club looked out at the shipyards where navy ships are repaired.  The author's 
own ship was moored across the Elizabeth River. The author is particularly appreciative of the admiral's 
frank and illuminating comments.   
1 
This is the story of how engineers, in an effort to control a dangerous technology, 
transformed the professional development of officers who would become the admirals of 
the 'line'.  The elevated influence of engineers and technology in shaping the high 
command of the U.S. Navy was not, however, preordained.  The making of the modern 
commander was the product of the confluence of personalities, contingent events, tragedy 
at sea, and the latent power of a long forgotten, elitist ideology that originated in New 
York City in the 1920s.  The transformation occurred over a two decade period from 
1953-75 at the peak of the arms race with the Soviet Union.  The changes to the system 
of officer education and professional development have remained largely in place, a 
legacy of the Cold War.  
The captivity Admiral Train described is known today as techno-centrism.  For 
our purposes, techno-centrism, and its close relative, platform-centrism, are loosely 
defined as the condition wherein technology becomes a defining influence in an officer's 
professional thinking and value system.  Platform-centrism is the more specific condition 
wherein the technology is the platform: the ship, submarine, or aircraft.3  Techno-
                                                 
3 'Techno-centrism' may have been derivative of an earlier term, 'technicism'.  'Technicism' was used to 
describe the condition in the Navy's early history wherein the material bureaus and their priorities took 
precedence over the operational forces.  See Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: the Theory 
and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 
247;  Peter Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern 
American Navalism (New York: The Free Press, 1972), 356.   The phrase 'techno-centrism' came into wider 
use beginning in the 1980s and appears to be a synthesis of the ideas of technology, egocentrism and 
ethnocentrism.  As best can be determined, 'techno-centrism' in the approximate form used in this 
dissertation, first appeared in a publication in 1987 by Seymour Papert.  Papert explains his choice of 
terminology: “I coined the word techno-centrism from Piaget's use of the word egocentrism. This does not 
imply that children are selfish, but simply means that when a child thinks, all questions are referred to the 
self, to the ego. Techno-centrism is the fallacy of referring all questions to the technology.”  Seymour   
Papert, A Critique of Technocentrism in Thinking about the School of the Future.  (MIT, 2005, accessed 11 
November 2007); available from http://www.papert.org/articles/ACritiqueofTechnocentrism.html.  Other 
definitional versions of techno-centrism that came later are similar, but not identical, to Papert's.  These 
other usages of the term often equate ‘techno-centrism’ to a form of ethnocentrism, wherein one group 
believes its technology is superior to other technologies, or its technical experts are better than experts of 
other kinds.  A subset of techno-centrism is 'platform-centrism', a condition wherein the platform 
2 
centrism and platform-centrism as phenomena in the US military are widely recognized.  
Depending on the context, it is sometimes considered entirely appropriate for an officer 
to be 'techno-centric' or 'platform-centric'.  An 'Engineering Duty Officer' working at the 
Naval Research Lab should be 'techno-centric';  a shipyard officer working in the dry-
dock should be 'platform-centric'.  However, when technology and the platform become 
over-riding considerations in the thinking and values of leaders at the higher levels of 
operational command, the drawbacks become apparent.   
 Scholars of military and security policy in the later 20th century not infrequently 
criticized senior American military commanders as ‘techno-centric’.4  Popular culture has 
portrayed American military commanders as narrow-minded technicians who measured 
success in strictly technical terms and sought technical solutions to problems better 
addressed by non-technical strategies.5   Military commanders have been described 
within their own services as ‘platform-centric’.  Platform-centric thinking has been 
criticized as resistant to new technological innovations that may threaten or divert support 
away from the favored platform.6   
                                                                                                                                                 
technology of ship, submarine, or aircraft become defining of an officer's professional thinking and 
professional value system.   
4 Critiques of U.S. military 'techno-centrism'  have become increasingly common in contemporary 
literature.   Martin Van Creveld has been a long-time critic, and most recently revisited the theme.  See  
Martin L. Van Creveld, "War and Technology," Foreign Policy Research Institute Newsletter, 12, no. 25, 
November 2007.   Similarly, historian, Alex Roland, and sociologist, Morris Janowitz, critiqued the rising 
influence of engineers and technologists in the military, a phenomenon associated with techno-centrism.    
5 Stanley Kubrick’s Dr. Strangelove offers perhaps the best known portrayal of a technocratic and techno-
centric military.  The leading military officer, Air Force General Buck Turgidson, which in Kubrick’s film 
is played by George C. Scott, appears to think only in terms of megatons and kill-rates.  The bomber 
squadron commander, played by Slim Pickens, rides a hydrogen bomb to 'ground zero' as if he is riding his 
horse to the rodeo.  Both character portrayals give the exaggerated impression of military officers so 
focused on their machines that they are oblivious or indifferent to the larger social and human costs of the 
nuclear war they are about to unleash.  
6 Critiques of a 'platform-centric' military were central to VADM Arthur K. Cebrowski's ideas of the 
primacy of the network and "network-centric warfare."  See David S. Alberts, John Garstka, and Frederick 
P. Stein, Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority, 2nd ed. 
(Washington, D.C.: Dept. of Defense, 1999).   
3 
 In the later 20th century, defense reformers acted to counter what they saw as this 
troubling trend of officers to focus too narrowly on technology or a particular platform.7  
To counteract the tendency of officers to over-emphasize technology in their education, 
political leaders urged the military to expand cultural and linguistic studies.8  Political 
leaders have been so bold as to locate this problem in the officer development system. 
Senior civilians have passed laws to promote more integrative education and then made 
such education a pre-requisite for promotion to flag rank (e.g. the Goldwater-Nichols 
legislation in the 1980s).9     
After more than two decades of reforms, however, a puzzling inertia or 
momentum sustains the condition of techno-centrism.  The military services remain 
closely identified with platform systems, and many military educational institutions 
continue to produce mostly engineering and technical officers despite the urgent demand 
for linguistically and culturally educated officers.10  While many have criticized this 
                                                 
7 A Chief of Naval Operations in the middle 1970s saw intra-service parochialism, centered on the 
platform, as a serious threat to unified effort in the Navy.  See Elmo R. Zumwalt, On Watch: a Memoir 
(New York: Quadrangle/New York Times Book Co., 1976).  But Zumwalt was not alone: Admirals John 
McCain, James Stockdale, Stansfield Turner, Arthur Cebrowski, as well as Harry Train, voiced similar 
concerns.  In the early 1990s the Navy staff was reorganized to reduce the power and influence of the 
platform advocates, advocates known at the time as the 'barons'.  
8 Since 1991, following the first Iraq war, civilian leadership has encouraged the military services to 
expand Arabic language training programs.  In spite of the civilian suggestions, Arabic was not taught at 
the US Naval Academy until 2002.  The Navy in 2007 approved an expanded program to enhance cultural 
and regional studies, though it is too early to judge the success or failure of the program. 
9 The failure known as “Desert One” in 1980 and a lack of military integration demonstrated in Grenada in 
1983 contributed to the most dramatic reform attempts, the Goldwater-Nichols legislation in the mid-80s.  
Until 2007 officers could, however, seek waivers from the legislated joint education and assignment 
requirements.  The typical reason given for a waiver request was the competing demands levied on officers 
as a consequence of their advanced technology, in particular, nuclear reactors.  
10 Rick Atkinson, "Left of Boom: The Struggle to Defeat Roadside Bombs," Washington Post, 30 
September 2007.  Atkinson interviewed several senior officers who complained of the military's tendency 
to seek technical solutions to problems that may have been more appropriately addressed with non-
technical, social, or cultural strategies.   Further indicative of techno-centric type of thinking and value 
system is the debate over curricular reform at some service academies.  As late as 2008, the Navy directed 
the Naval Academy to  re-emphasize technically specialized degrees at the expense of studies in language 
and culture.  Specifically, the Navy required approximately 65% of all midshipmen to graduate with a 
technical degree.  
4 
condition and called for officer corps reforms, what is absent in the debate is a 
comprehensive understanding of the historical origin of these phenomena.   
This dissertation will examine the history of the educational and professional 
development system that produced the senior commanders who became the admirals in 
the naval officer corps in the 20th century U. S. Navy.  This dissertation's thesis is that 
since the emergence of steam engines, naval 'line' officers have been concerned about the 
tendency of technology and technologists to shape the thinking and values of operational 
commanders.  'Line' officers acted on their concerns and in the early 20th century 
developed a 'generalist' model of officer education that mitigated the influence of 
technology and technologist in the 'line'.  But during the Cold War, an activist group of 
technical specialists successfully challenged the 'generalist' model and replaced it with 
their own model: the technical expert or specialist in command.  The specialists' Cold 
War-vintage model inculcated the values of techno-centrism and platform-centrism in 
officers who then rose to the highest levels of command.   
In the months following the end of the First World War, Navy leaders created the 
'generalist' system of officer development.  The 'generalist' model reigned for almost five 
decades.   It was designed to develop young officers into operational commanders and 
emphasized the utmost importance of 'unity of effort' in what was becoming a three-
dimensional navy.  The system defined the needs of the Navy in terms of the service as a 
whole and not in terms of a particular platform community.  For a 'line' officer, 
specialized knowledge of a technology was important but was nonetheless of secondary 
importance when compared to integrated knowledge required of those who would 
command.  Non-technical education was, moreover, highly valued in the 'generalist' 
5 
model, in particular, language and cultural knowledge.  The model commander in this 
system was called the 'generalist', or the 'general line officer'.   
Navy policy from 1920 to the middle 1960s actively encouraged the best officers 
to strive to become a 'generalist' in command.11  The cultivation of the capacity for broad, 
operational command in the Navy-- rather than cultivation of technical expertise in a 
single specialty--was a 'line' officer's ultimate goal.12  Over time, however, the label of 
‘generalist’ took on an almost pejorative connotation  that obscured the fundamental 
qualities of officer-ship it intended to convey.  To better capture the positive qualities of 
such a leader, the naval profession created new labels for the same officer model.  The 
label of 'generalist' or ‘general line officer’ was used interchangeably with "broad-
minded", “well rounded” or "versatile" officer, terms  that may connote a particularly 
positive view.  A less normative term that accurately captures the 'generalist' qualities 
would be "integrative" or "integrative officer", labels which this study will use 
interchangeably with the historical labels.13    
This model of the 'integrative' commander passed the ultimate test--the crucible of 
combat in the Second World War--but did not survive the Cold War.  It is important, 
however, to understand the demise of this model was not an indictment of the old model.  
The old model was not discarded because it 'failed' in combat, nor did the Navy reject the 
old model after a deliberative assessment.  Rather, the old 'generalist' model was eclipsed 
                                                 
11 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: a Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, Ill.,: Free Press, 
1960), 69.  Janowitz does acknowledge that the Navy was last among the services to embrace a technical 
specialist model of command, though he provides little to no explanation of how the Navy model finally 
did change.  
12 Paolo E. Coletta, The United States Navy and Defense Unification, 1947-53 (Newark: University of 
Delaware Press, 1981), 23. 
13 The qualities of the 'well rounded officer' resemble in some fashion those attributes of the 'fusionist' 
model, but for a paper that will discuss nuclear technology such a phrase poses a problem.   For a 
discussion of the 'fusionist' officer, see Huntington, 1957.  
6 
for another reason: the advocates of the 'generalist' model lost the bureaucratic battle for 
control of the education, assignment, and promotion of young 'line' officers.      
During the Cold War a new officer model and system of development displaced 
the 'generalist' ('integrative') model of command.  The new model was indeed something 
new to the Navy: the scientific-technical expert, platform-specialist officer became the 
model for senior leader.  The contrast between the two types of officer was significant.  
Whereas the 'generalist' system discouraged line officers from identifying too closely 
with technology or a platform, the new system encouraged officers to identify as 
engineering or platform specialists.  While the old system promoted broader tactical, 
operational14*, and strategic knowledge, the new model favored detailed technical 
knowledge.  This change in models became manifest in the Navy's educational 
institutions, in particular, the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis.  Whereas the 
old system had encouraged every officer to study a foreign language and to receive a 
general undergraduate education, the new model focused officer-trainees (midshipmen) 
on specialized, technical curricula.  The techno-centrism and platform-centrism that 
survives in the Navy's high command is rooted in this shift in officer models and 
educational priorities that occurred during the Cold War.  The immediate catalyst for the 
shift in models was a nuclear engineer, Hyman G. Rickover, empowered by his new 
technology, the nuclear powered ship.  
                                                 
14* The term 'operational' is problematic.  In the military services the term 'operational' is used inter-
changeably to describe a range of activities: from the most basic functions of a technician (e.g., what a 
'lathe operator' does in a machine shop, or what the 'reactor operator' does in a power plant) to the 
'operational level' of war which involves the movement of entire fleets and armies in a 'joint' environment.   
The shift in officer models in the Cold War encouraged officers to de-emphasize the study of the 
operational level of war (the integration of warfare in three dimensions, to include the consideration of 
strategic, political, and cultural factors)  and instead focused officers' attention more toward maintenance 
and 'operations' knowledge of a single machine technology (the jet aircraft, the reactor, the radar).   This 
shift in policy is captured in the changing description of what a 'line' officer should know as recorded in 
authoritative personnel documents.  These documents will be discussed in detail in succeeding chapters.    
7 
 The primary focus of this study will be on Navy officers and technology, but the 
findings will be relevant to Marine Corps officers who were members of the same 
department and graduates of the same colleges as navy officers.  Though this paper 
focuses on the Navy Department's education and development of navy and marine 
officers, it is believed that an understanding of the naval experience may shed light on the 
nature of military high command in the early 21st century.   The broader significance of a 
study of naval institutional and personnel policy history is substantiated by the fact that 
former naval personnel have occupied senior positions of government (to include several 
American presidents and at least two secretaries of defense), have risen to high rank in 
the Air Force, and have in the first decade of the 21st century dominated America’s senior 
military leadership body, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (see Figure 1-1).   It is possible, if not 
probable, that the naval education and professional development system may have 
influenced the ideas, values, and thinking of these senior leaders.  Though more difficult 
to show graphically, the presence of active duty or former naval officers in the senior 
civilian staffs of the Department of Defense was also widespread in the early years of the 
new century.15  
  
                                                 
15  The Secretary of Defense from 2001 to 2007, Donald Rumsfeld, was a former naval officer.  His closest 
personal advisor,  Larry Dirita, was a former naval officer, as were two of three of his personal military 
assistants from 2001-2006.  One of most influential voices in war policy and a senior member of the OSD 
policy staff was William Luti, a retired Navy captain and former aide to the Vice President.  Senior civilian 
advisors who surrounded the deputy secretaries of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, and Gordon England, a former 
Secretary of the Navy, were also one-time naval officers, to include Robert Earl, Jim Thomas, Lynn Wells, 
and Doman McArthur.  In addition, during much of this period, the senior intelligence advisor in the 
Department of Defense, the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, was also a naval officer, and after 
2006, both the senior Middle East commander (CENTCOM) and commander of Special Forces (SOCOM) 
were naval officers.  Many of these civilians as well as the naval officers who composed the majority of the 
Joint Chiefs were educated, trained, and professionally shaped by the Navy Department’s officer 
development system, the subject of this dissertation. 
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This dissertation will contribute to the already considerable scholarship on this 
subject in the fields of military sociology, military history, and the history of technology.  
The displacement of the generalist by the specialist model within the broader military 
profession has been noted by several military scholars, but few have explored its origins, 
its close associations with the machine, and how the specialist model perpetuated itself in 
the Cold War United States Navy.16  Sociologists and historians provide several useful 
insights and analytical tools  that will be used in this study. Scholars of non-military 
                                                 
16Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: a Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, Ill.,: Free Press, 
1960);  Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations (Cambridge,: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957); John Wesley Masland and 
Laurence Ingram Radway, Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy (Princeton,: 
Princeton University Press, 1957);  Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in 
Strategy and Analysis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989);  R. Michael Worden, Rise of the 
Fighter Generals: the Problem of Air Force Leadership, 1945-1982 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University 
Press, 1998);  Chris C. Demchak, Military Organizations, Complex Machines: Modernization in the U.S. 
Armed Services, Cornell studies in security affairs. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); Vincent 
Davis, Postwar Defense Policy and the United States Navy, 1943-1946 (Chapel Hill,: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1966); Vincent Davis,  The Admiral's Lobby, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1967).   
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technologies and organizations have produced theories that attempt to explain the nature 
of human-machine relationships and the social construction of technologies.  They have 
also sought to explain how large socio-technological systems, once created, tend to 
accumulate power,  survive for long periods, and reshape organizational values.17  This 
study will build on some of their work and will in turn provide a better understanding of 
these phenomena within large governmental and military organizations in the 20th 
century.   
The relationship between men and their machines in the 20th century is highly 
complex and defies simple explanation.  There is no one theory that can explain how 
scientific-technological systems interacted with and shaped the beliefs of the human 
masters.  What is clear is that the machines did not, by themselves, create the condition 
identified as techno-centrism and platform-centrism.  Technology and the platform came 
to occupy the most favored place in the military because the senior commanders of the 
organization were socialized to hold such a value system.  The socialization process that 
changed the high command was not predictable or neat but was highly contingent and 
varied depending on context.  This study will show that scientists and engineers were the 
catalyst for the shift in model from generalist to the "technical expert as commander".  
But it will also demonstrate that they had lots of help.   
 The metamorphosis of American command and the creation of modern 
admiralship followed a winding path.  An important pre-condition for the transformation 
                                                 
17 Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas Parke Hughes, and T. J. Pinch, The Social Construction of Technological 
Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
1987);  Thomas Parke Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983);  Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology: Technics-
out-of-Control as a Theme in Political Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977);  Jacques Ellul, The 
Technological Society (New York: Knopf: 1964); Neil Postman, Technopoly: the Surrender of Culture to 
Technology, 1st ed. (New York: Knopf, 1992). 
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was the decision in 1899 to merge the technical specialists—the steam engineers—with 
the 'line' officers who exercised overall command of the ship, to include control of 
weapons and general operations.  This merger created a privileged position for 
specialized, technical knowledge within a professional body that heretofore had been 
more operational and less technical in mindset.  Thus was established in the American 
Navy the fundamental condition for continued conflict and competition between the 
technical and the operational-minded officers, between the specialist and the generalist.  
For the next century, each advocacy group would seek to redefine naval command 
according to their respective interpretations of what a commander should be.18   
The 1899 merger of the technical specialist and the operational commander 
proved problematic from the outset.  The problems derived in no small part from the 
unbalanced political and intellectual underpinnings of the merger.  The merger was a 
political expedient, orchestrated, not by seasoned professionals, but by highly influential 
yet befuddled amateur politician-defense officials.  Secretary of the Navy, John D. Long, 
a novice on military matters, and equally inexperienced Theodore Roosevelt, the future 
"Rough Rider", did not appreciate the complexities of modern naval operations and naval 
engineering.  They both were informed by a backward-looking concept of naval 
operations and naval engineering and did not comprehend the degree to which modern 
engineering and operations would tax the mental faculties of the commander.  Naval 
operations within a matter of years became highly complex and with the innovations of 
flight and submarine warfare were to become three-dimensional.  Moreover, engineering 
                                                 
18 Little known is the fact that the main proponents of the successful plan of 'amalgamation' were not 
serving navy officers, but rather the young Under Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt, and a 
Harvard professor of engineering, Ira N. Hollis.  It is further interesting to note that most European navies 
did not follow the American pattern, but rather kept the engineering and command (line) officers separate 
and distinct.  The reason for the differences has never been adequately explained and deserves study.  
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was itself in the midst of a profound transformation from a skill-based vocation to a 
science-based profession.19  Few officers could master both operations and the science of 
the new engineering.  Professional 'line' and engineering officers doubted the wisdom of 
the merger but eventually gave their support in return for the promise of accelerated 
promotions of younger officers. The merger of 1899 thus created confusion as to what 
made up the new ‘line’ commander, what was to be his identity:  was the commander a 
technical specialist focused on his machine, or a more generally educated officer whose 
main concerns were the employment of the fleets, ships, weapons, and men?   
In the two-decade period following amalgamation, 1899-1919, senior navy 
leaders came to fear that amalgamation had enhanced the power of technologies and 
technologists to unduly influence the education and development of the ‘line’ 
commander.20  Conditions in the early 20th century favored an engineering approach to 
command.  The late 19th and early 20th century was a time of "technological enthusiasm”, 
and naval officers, like many Americans, were drawn to their pumps, pipes, turbines, and 
dynamos. The advent of submarines and aircraft in the First World War produced more 
machines around which an officer corps could organize and identify.  With a 
revolutionary reform of the promotion system in 1916, there was introduced a new 
danger: the tendency of an officer to identify with a particular platform or machine could 
be reinforced by new merit-based promotion boards.  Prior to 1916 the seniority system 
determined who promoted to admiral: there was no means to promote friends or protégés 
                                                 
19 Monte A. Calvert, The Mechanical Engineer in America, 1830-1910: Professional Cultures in Conflict 
(Baltimore,: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967). 
20 The fear of the influence of machines on the 'line' had deep roots in the Navy.  Alfred T. Mahan had first 
written of this concern as early as 1879.  Alfred T. Mahan, "Naval Education," US Naval Institute 
Proceedings, 5, December 1879.  See a more detailed discussion of Mahan’s concerns in Jon Tetsuro 
Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: the Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan 
Reconsidered (Washington, D.C.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). 
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or favored specialists to flag rank.  In the reforms of 1916, naval officers became 
empowered to choose their own successors in a system closed to outside scrutiny.  With 
this new promotion system based on 'merit', it was now possible that cabals or groups 
could gain control of the selection of future generations of officers.  It was quite possible 
that  whichever model of the ideal officer became dominant in the minds of officer-
selectors, that that new model would determine the next generation of admirals and 
perhaps perpetuate itself into succeeding generations.   
Naval leaders pondered the prospect of self-replicating, specialized officer groups 
rising to high command and took action to forestall such an outcome. One of their 
primary objectives was to maintain an officer corps unified around the Navy mission of 
command at sea and operational command of the sea.  These officers sought to prevent 
the ascendancy of a new 'line' officer model that might encourage specialized thinking 
and values.  It was not that technical specialists were inherently bad officers.  Rather, the 
Navy's senior leaders feared that to encourage technical and platform specialization in 
command risked fragmenting the service along technological lines.  Unity of action so 
necessary to effective military action would be lost.  To prevent service fragmentation, a 
positive model of officer had to be developed and made available to the newly 
empowered promotion boards.  
Before the official end of the First World War, the Navy began efforts to develop 
what would become the 'generalist' model of commanding officer.  Captain Ernest J. 
King, President of the Naval Post Graduate School, along with two other officers, was 
tasked in 1919 to devise the new model of officer development.  King and his co-
developers had learned an important lesson in the recent world war: a commander must 
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not confine his thinking to his machines and a specialty but had to cultivate the capacity 
for integrated, operational command judgment. 21  The King system of officer 
development (often known as the Knox-King-Pye Plan, but will be referred to as the 
King Plan or King System)22  thus established as its primary objective the development 
of officers capable of integrated judgment in matters of operations and strategy.  O
secondary importance to the authors was development of 'line' officers with in-depth 
technical knowledge of the machines of war, though the Navy did acknowledge the need 
for a small group of more specialized officers who did not command (a group of 
engineering specialists that were known as EDOs, or Engineering Duty Only officers).   
f 
                                                
The King system used three tools to create the integrative, generalist officer: 
general education at Annapolis followed by advanced non-technical education at the war 
colleges; assignment of officers to a breadth of billets and platforms; and general 'line' 
officer promotion examinations.  With adoption of the King System, the Navy followed a 
deliberate policy of education, assignment, and promotion that worked actively to oppose 
parochialism; a policy that worked to oppose the human tendency to focus on single 
platforms; a policy that worked to reduce the tendency of a commander from becoming 
techno-centric and platform-centric in thinking and action.  King's model guided the 
officer development system that helped produce a generation of leaders who commanded 
 
21 As further information concerning the conduct and planning by belligerent commanders of the First 
World War became available, many historians have offered critiques similar to King's.  Senior commanders 
of the Great War were deficient in their capacity to integrate the complex operations with which they were 
confronted.  See  Michael Geyer, "German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare, 1914-1945," in 
Makers of Modern Strategy, 2nd edition, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986);   
Stephen W.  Roskill, The Art of Leadership (Hamden: Archon Books, 1965);  G. A. H. Gordon, The Rules 
of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1996);  J.F.C  
Fuller, Generalship: Its Diseases and their Cure: A Study of the Personal Factor in Command (Harrisburg, 
PA: Military Services Publishing, 1936).   
22 Ernest J. King, Knox, Dudley W., Pye, William S., "Report and Recommendations of a Board Appointed 
by the Bureau of Navigation Regarding the Instruction and Training of Line Officers," US Naval Institute 
Proceedings, 46, no. 8, August 1920. 
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from 1941-1945 and well into the Cold War.    Despite the remarkable success of the 
officers produced by the King system, Navy policy would eventually reject the tenets of 
the King Plan.  By the last quarter of the 20th century, navy policy would actively 
encourage aspiring commanders not to be 'generalists' but instead encouraged the 'line' to 
become increasingly specialized technical and platform experts.  However, this inversion 
in the Navy policy and action came later than is commonly believed and was not a 
consequence of the lessons of the Second World War. 23 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, the Second World War and the rise of naval 
aviators to high command was NOT the decisive event in the evolution toward a more 
technically and platform-specialized naval commander.  The massive wartime expansion 
of the ‘line’ actually resulted in an influx of tens of thousands of broadly educated young 
men from liberal arts and technical colleges from around the country.  Moreover, actual 
combat operations placed a premium on officers who were more tactically innovative 
operators than narrow technical specialists, especially in the submarine fleet.  The war 
also propelled to high command a new breed of officers, the carrier aviator, who served 
on multiple platforms, both aircraft and surface ships, and who also endorsed King's 
model of the well-rounded officer.   
The new post-war leadership, dominated by naval aviators, embraced the idea that 
wars of the future must be fought by a highly integrated navy.  To achieve 'unity of effort' 
in combat required, therefore, an integrated and unified officer corps. Unlike the Army, 
                                                 
23 Respected scholars, to include Huntington and Janowitz, have tended to lump the three services together, 
and date the timing and attribute the causality of the shift to a more technical and specialized officer corps 
as one and the same: to the events and experiences of the Second World War.  While this is most certainly 
true of the US Air Force, and perhaps the Army, this is not the case of the US Navy.  It will be argued that 
official Navy policy did not endorse a specialist model of officer until the middle 1960s, and that navy 
'generalists' commanded at high levels until well after the publication of  Morris Janowitz, The Professional 
Soldier: a Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, Ill.,: Free Press, 1960).  
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the Navy did not fragment along lines defined by machine specialties.  On the contrary, 
the Navy promoted aviators up the ranks, pioneered joint service cooperation, and 
reaffirmed the King model of integrative education in no less than three post-war studies 
of the officer corps.   In the half-generation following the Second World War, officers 
were expected to broaden their knowledge of Navy, the other services, and the world.  To 
attain this broad knowledge, officers were expected to serve on more than one platform if 
possible; gain knowledge of the Army and Air Force through attendance at various war 
colleges; and better understand the larger world with expanded language and cultural 
education.  As late as 1956, the CNO, Admiral Arleigh Burke, established proficiency in 
a foreign language as one of his top three priorities for the ‘line’ officer!24  However, 
these policy priorities did not survive the 1960s.  
The shift in 'line' officer models from integrative (generalist) to techno-centric and 
platform-centric came in the two decades from 1953-1975.   In this period the 
foundational pillars on which King built the 'generalist' model were eliminated in quick 
succession: integrative education at the war colleges would for those who promoted to 
senior command all but cease; non-technical, general education (to include universal 
language training) at the Naval Academy would be severely restricted and replaced with 
an emphasis on highly specialized technical degrees;  the practice of assignment variety 
and duty on two platform types would become for submariners and aviators the exception 
rather than the rule; and navy-wide promotion exams for 'line' officers were terminated.  
Not coincidently, the demise of the King system of integrative education and 
                                                 
24 Arleigh A. Burke, ADM, USN, "Letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to All Line Officers," Line 
Officer Personnel Newsletter, September 1956. 
16 
development paralleled the emergence of the nuclear reactor and the nuclear specialists 
led by Hyman G. Rickover.  
The challenger to the 'generalist' model was three-sided: a highly complex, 
scientifically engineered technology; a bureaucratic genius; and an aggressive philosophy 
of technical elitism.  The technology was the nuclear reactor, a highly dangerous 
technology, which enjoyed an unprecedented organizational sponsorship: it was perhaps 
the first navy technology to belong to two independent organizations--the AEC (Atomic 
Energy Commission) and the Navy-- and this dual status conveyed to its benefactor, 
Rickover, a uniquely powerful position from which to effect reforms.  Rickover was 
himself uniquely suited to the role of reformer: he was a scientifically educated non-
conformist who had nonetheless survived the Navy's promotion system.  Lastly, unlike 
other reformers, Rickover did not derive his beliefs about men and machines from navy 
institutions but was instead inspired by a culture and set of ideas alien to the Navy: the 
ideology of technocracy that originated in the elitist engineering movements of early 20th 
century New York City. 
 Many authors have acknowledged Rickover was a genius, as does this author.  
He was the ‘Father of the Nuclear Navy’, he “…set the standard for all other technical 
endeavors…” and his progeny “…oriented the entire Navy toward the standards they had 
learned in the nuclear program.”25   Arguably the 'Father' of most nuclear power plants in 
the United States, if not the world, Rickover may well go down in history as one of the 
Navy's most important officers.  However, Rickover did more than set technical 
standards or build nuclear ships and train nuclear engineers.  He, more than any other 
                                                 
25 Randolph W. King and Prescott Palmer, Naval Engineering and American Seapower (Baltimore, Md.: 
Nautical & Aviation Pub. Co. of America, 1989), 280. 
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person, was responsible for the rise to dominance of the techno-centric and platform-
centric model of 'line' officer that came to define 20th century navy command.  Rickover, 
more than any other single officer, directly challenged the King system of officer 
development and the integrative approach to officer education and assignment.  Instead, 
Rickover advocated that man must be conformed according to the dictates of technology, 
that the modern commander must of necessity be first and foremost a specialized 
technical expert.     
Rickover did not change the model of naval command directly; his specialists did 
not as a group come from outside and displace a group of old officers in command of the 
'line'.  Rather, Rickover changed the Navy from within, by shaping the professional 
development system of line officers.  He did so in three phases: first, by gaining control 
of the personnel levers of training, education, assignment, and promotions in the 
submarine community; second, by transforming the Naval Academy into a elite 
engineering college or polytechnic; third, by diffusing his model of 'line' officer through 
the ranks in the surface and aviation communities with his personnel and technological 
exemplars.  Rickover was a revolutionary who survived long enough to serve in uniform 
two full generations (1922 to 1982), a full generation of which he wore the stars of a flag 
officer, 1953-1982.  Rickover's remarkable longevity cannot be minimized as a factor in 
the profound transformation of the officer corps that followed.   
Rickover was a revolutionary in his advocacy that a technical elite should 
command in the Navy, but he was less original in his thinking than is commonly 
appreciated.  Rickover's ideas and his new model of leadership most likely found their 
inspiration in the early engineering movements of the early 20th century in New York 
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City.    Rickover’s idea of the political primacy of technical expert was a key tenet of a 
most aggressive variant of the activist engineering ideologies in the 1920s, that of the 
Technocracy Movement.26  A close analysis of Rickover’s educational experiences and 
writings reveals that Rickover had been a graduate student in the cradle of the 
Technocracy Movement, Columbia University, and there he seems to have taken for his 
own the technocratic philosophy of leadership:  technical specialists should command.  
Rickover acted on his adopted philosophy and created the most successful military 
technocracy and technical program in history: the system that produced and manned 
nuclear warships and controlled most American civilian nuclear power plants in the 
United States.27   
However, belief in 'technocracy' and the creation of the nuclear reactor did not 
pre-ordain a transformation of the larger Navy nor the displacement of the King model of 
the integrated, operational commander.  In the early years Rickover, though he was a 
technocrat, had been willing to compromise with the advocates of King's system of 
officer development.  Moreover, in his earlier years he would publicly concede the 
benefits of a liberal education as compared to that of a narrowly trained technician.  As 
late as 1959, Rickover made a speech  in which he called for leaders to be liberally 
educated in the arts and foreign language.  Naval officers who did not continue to expand 
on their basic education and intellectual interests, including the reading of history, were 
                                                 
26 W. H. G. Armytage, The Rise of the Technocrats: a Social History (London,: Routledge and K. Paul, 
1965); Edwin T. Layton, The Revolt of the Engineers: Social Responsibility and the American Engineering 
Profession (Cleveland,: Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1971). 
27 Thomas Parke Hughes, American Genesis: a Century of Invention and Technological Enthusiasm, 1870-
1970 (New York, N.Y.: Viking, 1989), 428.  Hughes' features the most important technological system 
builders in the 20th century.  Rickover and his program are prominently featured.  
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to Rickover "...really no more than technicians."28  As a result, Rickover's first generation 
of nuclear officers was the most capable and broadly educated in the Navy.  Like 
Rickover29 himself, almost to the man, the first generation of nuclear officers spoke one 
or two foreign languages, had served on multiple platforms in addition to submarines, 
commanded both ships and submarines, and studied warfare at the war colleges.  They 
were also as a group of 'line' officers the most highly educated in the Navy: fully 60 % of 
the navy's PhD Burke Scholars in the late 1950s and early 1960s were Rickover’s 
officers.  Rickover's accommodations with the King system would not last, however, and 
his truly revolutionary plans became evident in his treatment of the traditional, non-
nuclear submarine officers.  His policy regarding the diesel officers eventually came to 
the attention of the larger 'line' community who then opposed Rickover's plans.  The 
dispute over the fate of the diesel submariners ultimately became the battleground for 
competing notions of command.  
The dispute between Rickover and the operational 'line' simmered for several 
years, but with a tragedy came revolutionary change and the highly contingent 
transformation of the navy line officer.  The tragedy was the accidental loss in 1963 of 
the nuclear powered submarine, USS THRESHER, which sank to the bottom with all 
                                                 
28 House Committee on Appropriations, Report on Russia by VADM H.G. Rickover, US Navy, 86th 
Cong., 2nd sess., August 18, 1959.  Rickover testified, page 3: “A liberal education tends to liberate the 
mind from the narrow confines of personal observation through one’s senses. …thus history familiarizes us 
with the past; anthropology, economics, foreign languages and literature with distant peoples and 
lands…..The enhancement of man’s comprehension of the world enriches his personal life….it has the 
further invaluable result of making him a better citizen because knowledge and ability to think 
independently will enable him to make wiser decisions when he…voices an opinion on important national 
issues.” He went on to condemn those officers who did not study liberal arts: "Many of the officers I have 
talked with have been devoting their energies almost entirely to the practical and material problems of their 
job, and they go on year after year with hardly an hour spent in increasing their basic education and 
maintaining intellectual interests in fields such as mathematics, science, and history, with out which they 
are really no more than technicians."  
29 Rickover served on surface ships and submarines, and before he attended graduate school he applied 
twice for flight school.  In addition, Rickover translated the German U-boat manual into English.  He took 
correspondence courses, but did not attend the War College as a resident student.  
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hands.  Hardly had the memorial services concluded, when senior 'line' officers, led by 
the CNO George Anderson, used the national tragedy as a pretext to attack Rickover’s 
personnel policies.  Rickover was a besieged man and very much alone in the Navy.  
Around the same time, the Navy had denied promotion to several of Rickover’s top EDO 
specialists.  Consequently, most of these senior nuclear EDOs retired from the Navy, 
which left Rickover a mere navy commander as his deputy, the number two officer in the 
massive nuclear power program.  However, Rickover did have political allies in Congress 
and in the Navy Secretariat.  Key congressmen and the Secretary of the Navy supported 
Rickover against CNO George Anderson and the operational 'line'.  Rickover won the 
battle the 'line' had started, and on their terms.  Since senior Navy leaders had framed the 
battle as a conflict over personnel policy and between competing models of command,  
the politicians in essence endorsed Rickover’s model when they sided with him.  
Triumphant from the battle with the 'old' line, Rickover turned his attention to 
understand the technical and human lessons of THRESHER.  Interpreting the lessons of 
THRESHER, he believed a naval officer was to be first and last, a technical specialist, 
who had to be focused on his technology.   Convinced of the necessity for specialists, he 
abandoned his prior policy of accommodation with the King model.  No longer would 
nuclear officers be the well-rounded officers as were the first generation nuclear officers.  
After THRESHER, Rickover insisted that the less scientifically capable officers, which 
included the mass of diesel submarine officers, be barred from nuclear training and 
command. The exclusion of the remaining mass of diesel officers was possible only 
because Rickover effected a massive transfusion of hundreds of scientifically minded 
surface and aviation officers into the nuclear submarine force.  It did not matter to 
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Rickover that these officers possessed no tactical or operational experience in 
submarines.  What mattered was that they had a capacity for scientific and highly 
technical work.  
Rickover, in desperate need of even more technically minded officers, had already 
embarked on a radical transformation of the navy's undergraduate officer programs.  
After the loss of USS THRESHER, he redoubled his efforts to make the Naval Academy 
into a leading polytechnic college.  At Annapolis, it was Rickover who orchestrated the 
removal of 'line' officers from the senior academic post, replacing military officers with a 
civilian academic engineer.  The new civilian dean, supported by Rickover and a nuclear-
trained superintendent, became a transformative leader of 'line' officer undergraduate 
education.  Successive civilian engineers in the dean's office used a series of curriculum 
reforms and admissions policy changes to embed a deep technocratic philosophy into the 
cradle of 'line' officer education.  Rickover's plan for undergraduate education was 
resisted by numerous commandants, superintendents, CNOs, and retired veterans of the 
Second World War.  But despite this considerable opposition, Rickover’s reforms were 
sustained by political intervention outside the Navy.     
 Rickover did not limit his transformative efforts to Annapolis and the nuclear 
navy.  Following his bureaucratic victory associated with THRESHER, he enlisted the 
support of sympathetic members of Congress to propound his technocratic officer 
requirements to the larger navy officer corps, aviator and surface officer alike.30  An 
unexpected twist, a contingent event, further facilitated the diffusion of Rickover’s ideas 
about officer education and assignment policy: a few days after Rickover’s clash with the 
                                                 
30 Chet Holifield, Chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,"Letter from Holifield to the Secretary of 
the Navy, 16 March 1965", NHC, 00 Files1965, Box 29, JCAE file; Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 
Hearings on Loss of USS THRESHER, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., 26,27 June, 23 July 1963, and 1 July 64. 
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CNO over THRESHER and personnel policy, the Secretary of the Navy fired the CNO.  
With Admiral Anderson's retirement by the end of the summer of 1963, gone was the 
strongest and most outspoken opponent of Rickover's model of command.  While later 
scholarship shows Rickover did not orchestrate the CNO's early retirement, the CNO 
believed at the time Rickover was perhaps the primary cause.31  Wary of Rickover's 
apparent power, CNO Anderson's successor and successive senior navy leaders would 
not again challenge Rickover’s authority on nuclear personnel issues for two decades. 
Secure in his position in the Navy and confident of strong support among 
congressional political leaders, Rickover challenged the larger Navy’s education and 
assignment policies.  In apparent response to congressional pressure from Rickover's 
allies on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE), the Secretary of the Navy 
acquiesced to what were in effect Rickover's recommendations for command tour lengths 
and assignment policy changes.  The net effect of these changes was to tilt further the 
entire navy officer corps away from a 'generalist' and toward a specialist model of 
command.32   
Rickover's model of commander-as-technical expert diffused through the larger 
U.S. Navy.  At the junior ranks, his emphasis on technical expertise was bolstered with 
each successive wave of Naval Academy ensigns more technically specialized (or 
                                                 
31 George W. Jr. Anderson, ADM, USN,"Tasking Notes to Executive Assistant, Captain Isaac Kidd, dtd 8 
May 1963", NHC Operational Archives, Collection 439, ADM G.W. Anderson, Jr., Box 52, "X" Folder 
(sensitive, private). Historical research would later show that McNamera fired Anderson more as a 
consequence of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the TFX aircraft program, and not because of Rickover.  But 
at the time, in May 1963, Anderson believed Rickover was the primary cause for his early termination. 
32 Chet Holifield, Chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,"Letter from Holifield to the Secretary of 
the Navy, 16 March 1965", NHC, 00 Files1965, Box 29, JCAE file; Paul  Nitze,"Letter to Chet Holifield, 
Chair, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy", Naval Historical Center, Operational Archives, CNO Records, 
1965,  Box 29, JCAE file.  Nitze agreed to abandon the policy of frequent assignment changes.  He also 
acted to promote captains much earlier to flag rank.  The 1966 flag board picked officers several years 
younger than had been past practice.  Dating from 1966, those officers who promoted to CNO would be 
consistently and dramatically younger than those who promoted to flag before 1966.  See Navy Register for 
promotion dates.  
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technocratic) than ever before.  At the more senior level, his idea of commander-as-
technical expert (or specialist) diffused through the larger Navy, telegraphed by the most 
persuasive of exemplars: a fleet of nuclear submarines, cruisers, and carriers.  Rickover's 
ships were the newest addition to an aging fleet.  His ships were the most technically 
advanced, beautifully designed, surface ships and aircraft carriers, all nuclear propelled.  
If a surface officer aspired to command a new cruiser, he would have to become one of 
the nuclear engineering elite.  If an aviator sought command of the newest carrier, he too 
would have to conform to the Rickover model of command.  Non-nuclear officers and 
enlisted men were also impressed and influenced by the powerful new nuclear ships 
spreading across the fleet.  Particularly ambitious officers did not fail to note in those 
early years that men selected to command in the nuclear navy almost all subsequently 
promoted to admiral.33  
While non-nuclear admirals did not oppose Rickover on strictly nuclear personnel 
matters, they did attempt to preserve King's system and priorities at advanced educational 
institutions.  But despite the protests and interventions of CNOs and successive War 
College presidents on broad matters of non-nuclear education, Rickover's philosophy of 
narrow technical and platform specialization proved unstoppable.  Through his reforms of 
undergraduate education and control of assignments, he had transformed in the minds of 
                                                 
33 Hayward, John T., RADM, USN was testifying with  Rickover before the JCAE and described that the 
nuclear standards in training “…spread through the rest of the ship.”  See Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy, Testimony of VADM H.G. Rickover on the U.S. Lead in Nuclear Propulsion Experience, 88th 
Cong., 2nd sess., 30 October 1963, 61.  For the larger effect of Rickover’s program on fleet standards, see 
discussion of competition for interviews and the effects of the Rickover school for captains, SOSMRC. 
James L. Holloway, III,  ADM USN (CNO), Aircraft Carriers at War:  A Personal Retrospective of Korea, 
Vietnam, and the Soviet Confrontation (Annapolis: US Naval Institute 2006);  Norman Polmar and Thomas 
B. Allen, Rickover (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982).  Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, future CNO, 
recounted that he attempted to become a nuclear officer, but was rebuffed.  He was unable even to gain an 
interview with Rickover.  The best sought to serve on nuclear ships in the early years.  Thomas B. 
Hayward, Admiral, USN (former CNO), retired, Discussion with the Author, 24 January 2008. 
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younger officers the very definition of what it meant to be a ‘line’ officer:  higher 
command was to belong to the technical expert who was deeply versed in a singular 
platform or technology; to be an integrator, tactician or strategist was of lesser 
importance.  Rickover’s new model would survive a counter-revolution in the 1970s and 
achieved further fleet-wide diffusion when a nuclear-trained CNO required all 
commanding officers and many sea-going admirals to attend engineering instruction in 
the deserts of Idaho, on the site of a nuclear reactor test facility.   
Non-nuclear surface and aviation officers would in time follow the example 
established by Rickover and focus their own officers on narrower, platform-centric career 
paths.34   By the mid-1970s both surface officers and aviators had all but abandoned the 
integrated career patterns defined by King.  The transformation of the surface navy from 
‘generalist’ to ‘specialist’ was consummated in 1975 with adoption of the 'surface 
warfare pin’.  The next major technological innovation in the surface navy (phased array 
radar) led to greater specialization and fragmentation in the surface navy: those who 
served on the early phased array ships (AEGIS) came to identify themselves as elite 
technical experts in a mold not unlike that of nuclear officers.  Inspired by Rickover's 
model, but wary of Rickover's influence that he exercised over carrier captains35, aviation 
leaders adopted a similar pattern of specialization and developed a more specialized 
model of aviator commander--commander air group, CAG-- that eschewed surface ship 
command.  This new breed of aviators themselves became even more highly specialized, 
                                                 
34 Career patterns of surface officers and aviators would follow the pattern first pioneered by the nuclear 
community.  Discursive evidence of this evolution and the leading role played by nuclear officers is 
graphically displayed in successive editions of Ageton's Naval Officers Guide, in print from 1943 to 2008, 
which will be discussed in chapter seven.  
35 Admiral Holloway explained that the command innovation of "CAG" was in direct response to the 
growing influence of nuclear power to select aviation leaders.  James L. Holloway, III,  ADM USN (CNO), 
Interview with the Author, April 26, 2007. 
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expert on aircraft and aviation operations, but less integrated with the surface ships and 
surface ship operations than the nuclear-trained carrier captains!  The surface and 
aviation communities subdivided and fragmented along the lines of different types of 
aircraft and ships as officers attempted to become even more ‘expert’ or specialized.  The 
technological platform became so determinative in officer careers that a 'glass ceiling' 
emerged to limit promotion opportunities of officers who at an early point in their career 
had the misfortune of being trained on the 'wrong' type of aircraft or assigned to the 
'wrong' class of ship.   
By the early 1970s the best officers had been persuaded that the preferred career 
for a 'line' officer was one that developed specialized expertise on a single platform.  
Consequently, a high proportion of these best officers avoided the last vestige of King’s 
system:  integrative education at the war colleges.  As the best officers avoided the war 
colleges, the transformation of the ‘line’ from broad and integrative to more specialized 
was nearly complete.  Attempts to restore non-technical and cultural components in the 
officer education system, to include interventions by a secretary of the Navy in the 1980s, 
were resisted by uniform officers who after two decades had become firmly persuaded of 
the validity of a techno-centric and platform-centric model. 
The consequences of this changed officer--from the integrative 'generalist' to the 
technical expert of the late 20th century—were manifest in a profound change in the 
educational and professional qualifications of the senior leadership of the Navy ‘line’.  
From the  Second World War until Rickover inspired the change in models, the vast 
majority of the officers who rose to the highest rank—the four star admirals—had been 
broadly educated with a foundation in general education and language.  As late as the 
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1970s, the officers destined for high rank had attended senior war colleges in great 
numbers: fully 80% of the officers who held four-star rank in the 1970s had attended a 
senior war college earlier in their career.  By the end of the Cold War, in 1990, the 
progeny of the techno-centric system had risen to high command and the ratio had been 
inverted: only 10% of four-star flag officers were graduates of ANY war college.  The 
inversion in the educational and professional experience of senior admirals--from 
integrator to specialist, from less technical to more technical-- was the result of an 
inversion in models that had occurred almost thirty years earlier marked by the sinking of 
THRESHER.   
Rickover's techno-centric transformation of line officer education and 
professional development produced within a generation a naval officer corps shaped in 
conformance to the perceived requirements of complex machines.  Those officers who 
rose to high command were increasingly technical, more platform-specialized, less 
linguistically and culturally aware and less broadly educated in the joint profession of 
arms than the generation of senior officers who had preceded them had been.  This is the 
story of how a techno-centric system of leader development, one centered on a belief in 
the deterministic role of technology in shaping men, came into being and how it remade 




Chapter One  
What is a Commander to be? Engineering Specialization, 





"Yet in reality the remedy is simple and obvious.  All that is needed is to make the line 
officer and the engineer the same man, by throwing both corps into one." 
Theodore Roosevelt, Under Secretary of the Navy, 9 December 1897 1 
 
"But we are told the naval officer to-day is a 'fighting engineer", and this mockery of 
truth has been accepted by the profession."   
Stephen B. Luce, RADM, USN (retired), 19112 
 
“…the study of problems in connection with the many possible conditions that would 
exist in time of war or threatened attack, and practice in solving these problems has not 
kept pace with the study and solution of problems arising in the single ship.” 






Technological change holds manifold implications for naval personnel systems, 
especially those associated with 'command'.  European navies had struggled for centuries 
with the command implications of technological change.  The young American Navy 
studied the European navy experience and adopted many 'old world' naval educational 
and professional practices.  When confronted with the challenge of steam engineering, 
                                                 
1 Naval Reorganization Board Report as appended to Roosevelt letter to J.D. Long, 9 December 1897.  See 
Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, vol. 1 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1951),  728. 
2 Stephen B. Luce, RADM, USN (retired), "On the Relations between the U.S. Naval War College and the 
Line Officers of the U.S. Navy," US Naval Institute Proceedings, 37, no. 3, September 1911, 788. 
3Josephus Daniels, quoted in John Wesley Masland and Laurence Ingram Radway, Soldiers and Scholars: 
Military Education and National Policy (Princeton,: Princeton University Press, 1957), pg. 83, quoted from 
the reports of Secretary Daniels, 1916-19. 
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both the American and European navies of the 19th century adopted a policy of 
'specialization': the engineers became a separate corps who stayed below decks and did 
not command while the traditional officers became the 'line' officer corps who exercised 
operational command.  The U.S. Navy operated successfully with this divided officer 
corps for most of the century, though social tensions between the two specialties did 
exist.  Despite considerable success with separate corps, in 1897 a young Theodore 
Roosevelt decided to champion a radical idea: the 'merger' of line officer and engineer.   
In 1899 senior political leaders offered inducements that persuaded reluctant naval 
officers and engineers to merge the two distinct specialties.  The merger appeared on the 
surface to have resolved a century old conflict between two social groups.  But beneath 
the surface the merger quickly proved problematic and was a source of prolonged 
professional confusion in the 'line'.   For the first two decades of the new century, the 
Navy would struggle to define the new commander and seek to strike a balance between 
the competing needs of specialized technical knowledge, on the one hand, and more 
general operational knowledge on the other.   
* 
Specialist or Generalist 
The naval commander is particularly sensitive to the effects of changing 
technology, in no small part due to the nature of the problem of command.  The senior 
officers who occupy the upper levels of the command structure are faced by issues that 
are fundamentally different than those addressed by specialists.   The senior operational 
commander, unlike the specialist, must come to possess a capacity to integrate and 
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synthesize, to make judgments about the larger whole.4   Specialized education provides 
a commander with awareness in a narrow field, but broadening education is the tool tha
enhances the commander’s capacity for synthesis in judgment.  A perennial problem, 
then, is to strike the balance between specialized education and training and more 
broadening and general education that provides the foundation for the synthesis and 
judgment of the whole, to include the non-technical and human dimension of war.  
During centuries of technological change, navies have made and remade their 
commanders using a combination of strategies and adjustments, a mix that was 
contingent upon unique circumstances of the time. 
t 
                                                
5 
Navies did not adopt any one personnel strategy in response to technological 
change.  The idiosyncratic responses, however, appear to align with one of three general 
types of responses.  Navies convey new technical knowledge to the commander via a 
strategy of specialization, merger, or some combination of strategies, to include what 
might be described as educational accommodations.  In the first strategy, specialization, 
an organization subdivided its knowledge-holders to create around the new technology a 
new group of specialists who advised but did not necessarily rise to command.  In the 
 
4 This tension between the commander’s need to balance specialized knowledge and integrative knowledge 
is a continuing issue in discussions of command.  For a recent discussion of the problem by an army 
general, see Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: the Art of War in the Modern World, 1st U.S. ed. (New 
York: Knopf, 2007), 65-67.   For a particularly insightful naval perspective,  see Stephen W.  Roskill, The 
Art of Leadership (Hamden: Archon Books, 1965), 162-163. 
5 When confronted with technological change, an organization can adopt any number of strategies to ensure 
the new knowledge is available to those who would command. My argument that naval command 
development did not conform to a single, pre-determined pattern draws inspiration from the work of 
Andrew Abbott.  In particular, see Andrew Delano Abbott, The System of Professions: an Essay on the 
Division of Expert Labor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 316.  Abbott rejects the 
deterministic models of professional development.  He explains that “…the general forces of 
bureaucratization, knowledge change, and so on have not uniform but highly idiosyncratic effects on 
professions, shaped by internal and system forces as well as by choices.”   While I am generally 
sympathetic with Abbot's idiosyncratic model, for purposes of argument, I organize the myriad naval 
officer adaptive strategies under one of three types: strategy of specialization, strategy of merger, or 
strategy of accommodative education and training.  
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second strategy, merger, the organization merged two or more groups of knowledge 
holders and created a new commander whose identity was a synthesis of formerly 
independent groups.  The command implications of merger were less clear-cut than a 
strategy of specialization and could include a shifting balance of power between the 
groups that harbored old loyalties.  Lastly, there is a mixed strategy of accommodation 
and adjustment that did not subdivide officers along specialist lines nor try to effect an 
outright merger.  A strategy of accommodation consisted of training, education, 
assignment, and promotion innovations that combined to inculcate into the existing pool 
of commanders the desired level of understanding of the new technological innovation. 
Though this last strategy may exhibit fewer outward manifestations—no dramatic 
mergers to be deliberated by Congress, no independent specialist groups emerge to 
challenge older groups—the effect on the thinking and values of the commander could be 
profound in the long run.   
In the early modern period, when faced with increased technical innovation and 
rising complexity, navies spawned multiple specialties, to include pursers (finance), 
surgeons (medicine), and chaplains.   In questions of command, however, the benefits of 
specialization were less clear, and European navies adopted different policies with 
drastically different results.  Europe of the 16th century witnessed perhaps the most 
profound challenge to long-held more specialist notions of command.  The Spanish fleet 
continued to adhere to the older pattern of specialization:  the mariner-seaman piloted the 
ship, and the warrior-commander fought from the ship.  The English, however, adopted a 
new approach: a strategy of merger of the two specialties of mariner and warrior, 
ultimately in the person of a ‘midshipman’.  The ‘midshipman’ learned both practical 
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seamanship and practical martial arts and was groomed to command both ship and the 
warriors.  The innovation of the merged commander proved a success and contributed to 
the English victory in 1588 over the Spanish Armada (though other scholars date the 
transition later in the 18th century and believe it to have been somewhat more complex 
than described here).6   Regardless, the merger (or amalgamation) of seaman and warrior 
affected more than the outcome of Anglo-Spanish naval battles.  The English strategy of 
merger became an important case that was studied by American naval reformers in the 
late 19th century.  It will be shown that the English personnel reforms of the 16th and 17th 
century  in fact guided and inspired the American decision to amalgamate two officer 
specialties in the U.S. Navy in 1899.  However, as will be discussed later in this chapter, 
it is not entirely clear that English reforms pre-dating the Industrial Revolution were an 
appropriate model on which to construct American officer policy at the beginning of the 
20th century.   
Two hundred years after the innovation of the midshipman, naval command was 
confronted with a new challenge: industrialization and steam.  With industrialization 
came increased organizational complexity.  To cope with increased complexity, military 
                                                 
6 Norbert Elias, R. Moelker, and Stephen Mennell, The Genesis of the Naval Profession (Dublin: University 
College Dublin Press, 2007).   Elias provides a fascinating insight into the early English navy as it 
vacillated between strategies of specialization and merger.  A most dramatic example of the conflict 
between specialists was the turmoil surrounding a South Seas expedition led by Sir Francis Drake.  During 
the expedition Drake's embarked military (land) commander challenged Drake's authority.  After some 
delay Drake executed his military commander, accusing him of insubordination.  But astute observers at 
that time noted that the military commander was not mutinous, rather, he held a different notion of who, in 
fact, was in command.  The conflict was rooted in the larger dispute in the English navy: who commanded, 
the mariner or the land warrior? The social innovation of the ‘midshipman’ would ultimately solve this 
problem by producing a merger of the two specialties.    For a contemporary account of this changing 
English navy, see  Sir William Monson, The Naval Tracts of Sir William Monson, 1569-1643 (London: 
Naval Records Society, 1902).   For a history of officer development in the 18th and 19th centuries, see 
N.A.M. Rodger, The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press, 1986).   While Elias dates the development of the midshipman in the 16th century, Michael Lewis 
argues that such a transition came later.  See Lewis, Michael,  England's Sea Officers: the Story of the 
Naval Profession (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1939).  
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organizations of most western nations adopted a strategy of greater specialization: the 
commander came to rely on a growing group of officer specialists.7  The US Navy 
followed this general pattern and adopted a strategy of specialization, giving rise to two 
corps of officers: the operational and tactical 'line' and the technical specialists of the 
'engineering corps'.  
* 
The Sailor vs Engineer: Mahan and Melville, 1880-1899 
 
The commander in the age of sail had to be expert in two things: ship-handling 
and combat.  He controlled the sails (the motive force of the ship), he controlled the guns 
predominantly by his maneuvers, and he could from his vantage point on the ‘bridge’ 
direct and even participate in repelling enemy boarding parties when ships grappled.   But 
the steam engine disrupted the unity of 'line' officer command perhaps more than any 
other innovation.  Secretary of the Navy Upshur writing in 1841 recognized the import of 
the development of steam ships and observed that they brought about a “…different 
order…”8  With steam engines below decks and propellers below the waterline, the 
captain could no longer control as he had with sail the motive force of his ship.  As the 
billowing sails gave way to belching engines, the 'line' officer’s status and knowledge 
was increasingly challenged by the machine specialists—the engineers.  
                                                 
7   Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: a Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, Ill.,: Free Press, 
1960), 9; Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 32. 
8 Donald Chisholm, Waiting for Dead Men's Shoes: Origins and Development of the U.S. Navy's Officer 
Personnel System, 1793-1941 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 175.  
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The rise of engineers prompted disputes with the 'line' regarding multiple 
problems, to include questions of ship design, bureaucratic organizational structures, 
finances, wardroom privilege, to name but a few. 9  But the most vexing problem area 
was over the question of command: what would be the identity of the officer who would 
command, who would lead in battle?   Masland and Radway observed:  "The rise of these 
specialists produced a crisis over command at sea.  By sending his crew aloft, the captain 
had once controlled the movement of his vessel and confirmed his authority over his 
men...the rise of a separate corps of officers who alone understood its mysteries, by 
destroying this unity of knowledge, threatened to destroy unity of command…."10   The 
officer corps would struggle for a century over the questions of how much should a 
commander trust to his engineers and how much did the commander himself need to 
study and understand of the new engineering.  
 Alfred Thayer Mahan, perhaps best known as a naval strategist, devoted 
considerable attention to the implications fossil fuel machines might pose for 'line' officer 
education and development.  During his career Mahan applauded as a naval professional 
identity emerged to displace early 19th century organizational forms constructed around 
material bureaus, what was then called 'technicism'.11  The naval officer corps, in 
                                                 
9 Elting E. Morison, Men, Machines, and Modern Times (Cambridge, Mass.,: M.I.T. Press, 1966).   Elting 
Morison describes this conflict between the ‘line’ and engineers. The most famous early example of 
conflict may have been the battle over the fate of the first ocean going steam ship, the behemoth, 
WAMPONOAG, which though a marvel of modern engineering, was ordered scrapped by non-engineering 
'line' officers who controlled the Navy.   
10 John Wesley Masland and Laurence Ingram Radway, Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and 
National Policy (Princeton,: Princeton University Press, 1957), 213. 
11 See Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations 
(Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 195-198.  Huntington explains military 
services in the early 19th century were organized around material and techniques (‘technicism’), and later 
evolved into an organization with a broader professional identity.  For discussion of the rise of 
professionalism in the naval service in the mid to late 19th century see  Ronald H. Spector, Professors of 
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particular the 'line' officers, had become by the third quarter of the 19th century a 
respected ‘profession’.   It had established several professional institutions, to include one 
of the first professional colleges in the country (Annapolis, 1845) and a professional 
society and accompanying journal (US Naval Institute, Proceedings, 1873).  Despite 
these considerable professional innovations, Mahan feared a resurgent form of 
'technicism' in the personae of coal-dusted mechanics and their machines, which were 
then proliferating across America and the sea service.   A particular danger to the 
profession, Mahan warned in an 1879 essay, was if the Navy attempted to blur the lines 
between 'line' officers and the engineers.12   
Mahan argued that naval officer education must be primarily education in the 
profession of war, a profession he interpreted to be centered on combat operations, not 
upon the technicalities of machines.  Given his operational bias, it was not surprising that 
Mahan advocated that technical specialists, especially steam engineers, remain 
subordinate to the operationally-minded ‘line’ officer.  Mahan feared an excessive focus 
on the machines and things mechanical would narrow an officer: “The necessarily 
materialistic character of mechanical science tends rather to narrowness….”13   An overly 
mechanistic and scientific approach to command, he argued, eroded the human and moral 
aspects of leadership and tended “to promote caution unduly; to substitute calculation for 
                                                                                                                                                 
War: the Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession, 1st ed. (Newport, R.I.: Naval 
War College Press 1977),  chapter 10, “Applying the Science of Naval Warfare”, 130. 
12   Alfred T. Mahan, "Naval Education," US Naval Institute Proceedings, 5, December 1879.  For a 
thorough analysis of Mahan’s thinking on this subject, see  Jon Tetsuro Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategy 
and Teaching Command: the Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered (Washington, D.C.: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). 
13 Alfred T. Mahan, "Naval Education," US Naval Institute Proceedings, 5, December 1879, 352. 
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judgment; to create trust in formulas rather than in one’s self.” 14  Mahan continued to 
hammer on the theme throughout his career and helped establish the Naval War College 
in 1884 to promote his vision of naval commander as tactician, operator, and strategist.  
In lectures in 1888 he vocalized his fears of materialistic and machine thinking.  He 
warned that one should take care that the study of the art of war not come into “...too 
close contact with that mechanical and material advance upon which its modifications 
depend.”15  Peter Kirsten, a leading authority on Mahan, wrote: “Time after time 
thereafter he warned of the debilitating and corrupting effects of ‘too exclusive attention 
to mechanical advance, and too scanty attention to the noble art of war…”16  Mahan’s 
arguments about the limits of technology, especially the steam engine, exerted a powerful 
influence on the Navy.17  His arguments were, however, not uncontested. Mahan's 
writings provoked spirited rebuttals by leaders of the engineer corps who saw their type 
of officer, the engineer, to be ascendant in the Navy and in war.  
  The most outspoken opponents of Mahan were the Engineers in Chief, the senior 
engineers in the navy, who fiercely promoted their technology and the engineers. Charles 
Loring, Engineer in Chief of the Navy, and later President of the American Society of 
Naval Engineers, levied blistering personal attacks on Mahan and those like him who did 
not embrace what he saw as the deterministic role of technology.  In considering Mahan 
                                                 
14 Ibid. 347, and as quoted in Jon Tetsuro Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: the 
Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered (Washington, D.C.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1997). 
15 Peter Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern 
American Navalism (New York: The Free Press, 1972), 343. 
16 Ibid., 345.  
17 Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 
1966).  In their later editions of their work, Sprout speculates that Mahan’s conservative views outweighed 
those of the engineers and may have influenced the Navy long after his death.  See forward to 1966 edition, 
pg. ix.    
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and others like him, Loring in the President’s Annual Address to the American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers in 1892 wrote that they failed to appreciate the decisive role of 
engineering.  Loring claimed that they had “... but scantily drawn attention to the 
immense influence upon modern history by the steam engine. They follow in the same 
well worn ruts giving dubious description of battle, names of monarchs....and the whole 
array of puppets who seem to push the cart of time, while they are only flies upon its 
wheels."18  Loring, however, retired as Engineer in Chief before the issues of personnel 
reform came to a head.  His replacement was unlikely and unexpected, one George 
Melville.  
  Melville was a naval engineer, but also a celebrated explorer made famous in the 
1880s for his Arctic expeditions.  He was plucked from the nether regions of the 
engineers' list to head the Bureau of Steam Engineering, which he would lead from 1888 
to 1903.  Melville was an outspoken and articulate advocate for the advancement of naval 
engineers.   Writing an article in 1896, entitled ‘The Engineer in Warfare”, Melville 
quoted at length a sympathetic European author:  “…there is strife between the deck and 
the engineer officer.  While the role of the former is growing less every day, that of the 
latter is constantly increasing in importance.  Everything is engines in the Navy.  We 
refuse to admit it, but strife does exist, and it is only when compelled and forced that we 
give the engineer due rank and authority.”19   Melville’s allies went further and equated 
the environment of the engine room and the duties of a technician to those of a 
                                                 
18 Charles Loring, “President’s Annual Address:  The Steam Engineer in Modern Civilization”, ASME, 
Transactions, XIV (1892-93), pg 255,  as quoted in Monte A. Calvert, The Mechanical Engineer in 
America, 1830-1910: Professional Cultures in Conflict (Baltimore,: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), 159.   See 
also Karsten, 345. 
19 Melville, quoted in Donald Chisholm, Waiting for Dead Men's Shoes: Origins and Development of the 
U.S. Navy's Officer Personnel System, 1793-1941 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 442. 
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commander in battle: “The steam engine is now as important a military feature as the 
turret-gun …As a matter of fact the duties of the two officers are very similar…the 
gunnery officer also directs machinery and thus does the work of an engineer whether he 
is one or not and whether he relishes it or not….Each is locked in a steel-clad 
compartment full of men and moving machinery….each must, if efficient at his post, 
possess the quality of command.” 20  Melville and others like him enjoyed the support of 
rapidly growing heavy industry and the legions of engineers coming out of shops and 
schools across America.  The status of engineers was on the rise throughout society.  
Thus his efforts to promote the engineer within the Navy had the sympathies of many in 
industry and the civilian engineering societies.  
  Civilian society in this period was coming to believe that technological innovation 
was increasingly the driving force in history, and that specialized technical knowledge 
was superior to general and non-technical knowledge.  The late 19th and early 20th 
century witnessed a remarkable increase in the status of engineers in the larger national 
consciousness. The enthusiasm for things technical, and for engineers in particular, 
captivated the public.  H.G. Wells, Mark Twain, Edward Bellamy all sold best sellers, 
some books destined to be classics, all heavily laden with the speculations of science, 
technology, and heroic men who understood such things.21   As a share of the population 
                                                 
20  Frank M. Bennett and Robert Walter Weir, The Steam Navy of the United States: a History of the 
Growth of the Steam Vessel of War in the U. S. Navy, and of the Naval Engineer Corps (Pittsburgh: Warren 
& Co., 1896), 848.  
21  Mark Twain, A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court (Hartford, Conn.: American Pub. Co., 1899);    
H. G. Wells, The Time Machine, an Invention (New York,: H. Holt and company, 1895);  Edward Bellamy, 
Looking backward, 2000-1887 (Boston, New York,: Houghton, Mifflin and company, 1889). All 
emphasize the wonders of science and technology, and engineers and scientists play a particularly elevated 
role.   For a discussion of the cultural influence of engineering at the time, see Cecelia Tichi, Shifting 




engineers had exploded in number, rising from 1 out of 30,000 Americans in 1880, to 1 
out of 9, 000 by 1900.22  In the largest corporate entities of the time, railroads and 
electrical power generation, technicians and engineers came progressively to command at 
higher levels of the organization.  One of these practical-minded inventor engineer-
mechanics, Thomas Edison, came to establish one of the largest corporations in the 
history of the country, what was to become General Electric.23  Moving beyond the 
machines to the people, it was in this period that Frederick Winslow Taylor developed his 
system of management which applied engineering principles to the management of 
personnel.24  As machines and engineering knowledge became the engines of American 
progress, the engineers both inside and outside the Navy agitated for increased status and 
power.   
Political and professional agitation among engineers was of such a magnitude that 
at least one scholar termed the movement a ‘revolt of the engineers’.  The revolt was a 
professional movement among technicians and was energized by what has been described 
as an 'ideology of engineering'.  Edwin Layton, a leading historian of this movement, 
explains that the engineers were elitist and “…assumed that they were morally as well as 
intellectually superior to other groups".   Engineers were, like their navy brethren, 
politically restless.  Layton explains the cause of this unrest as rooted in the idea of who 
                                                 
22 W. H. G. Armytage, The Rise of the Technocrats: a Social History (London,: Routledge and K. Paul, 
1965),  172.   The rise in engineer population was dramatic.  By 1920, there was 1 for every 2, 290 persons, 
by 1949 1 of 910.  As a percentage of the workforce the rise was even more dramatic.  From 0.4 engineers 
for every 1000 workers in 1880, to 2.4 in 1930, and 7.0 per thousand by 1950.   
23 Steven W. Usselman, Regulating Railroad Innovation: Business, Technology, and Politics in America, 
1840-1920 (Cambridge, U.K. ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002);   Robert D. Friedel, Paul 
Israel, and Bernard S. Finn, Edison's Electric Light: Biography of an Invention (New Brunswick, N.J.: 
Rutgers University Press, 1986).  
24 Robert Kanigel, The One Best Way: Frederick Winslow Taylor and the Enigma of Efficiency, Sloan 
technology series. (New York: Viking, 1997). 
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should be in command of industrial organizations: "Engineers complained that their place 
was taken by lawyers, businessmen, and politicians, while the engineer was relegated to a 
subordinate position.  The engineer was "a servant where he should be a master."    The 
unrest eventually became politicized:  "The philosophy of (engineering) professionalism 
carried engineer's ambitions beyond technology to politics and policy making 
generally."25   
The engineering movement gained strength well into the first third of the 20th 
century, and though engineers as a class of technicians did not take control of American 
industry and government, they did create for the first time the semblance of unified, 
national engineering organizations in 1918.  (The first president of one of the activist 
engineering organizations was Ira N. Hollis, a key figure in the naval engineer's battle for 
greater status, a role that will be discussed later in this chapter).  Engineers eventually 
celebrated the election to the  White House of one of their own,  the professional 
engineer, Herbert Hoover, the last engineer to be elected to the presidency until a nuclear 
engineer, James Carter,  was elected some fifty years later.    
The movement also planted its engineering ideology in campuses and professional 
organizations around the country.  One particularly noteworthy offshoot of the engineer 
movement was a radical activist group known as the Technocracy Movement.  The 
Technocracy Movement promoted the idea that an elite made up of engineers and 
technicians should lead a social and political transformation of America. Though these 
'technocrats' fell out of favor in civil society, their ideas, as will be shown in later 
                                                 
25 Edwin T. Layton, The Revolt of the Engineers: Social Responsibility and the American Engineering 
Profession (Cleveland,: Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1971), 60-61.   
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chapters, had gained an intellectual foothold with at least one naval engineering student 
who returned to the Navy.  Conveyed by this single officer, the values of Technocracy 
would play an important role in shaping the naval commander almost a half century later.   
Activist engineers did not wait a half century for their disciples to promote to high 
rank before they began to reshape the naval officer corps. Rather, by the end of the 19th 
century civilian engineers began to agitate to reform the naval officer corps.  As a 
consequence of their efforts, the 'line' officer would become, by law, as much an engineer 
as he was a tactician or operator.  The shift in 'line' officer toward a stronger technical 
and material identity came with the Act of 1899 when politicians adopted a strategy of 
merger: they merged the 'line' and the engineers to form a common officer model.  This 
model decisively linked the navy's concept of operational command with the technical 
requirements of the engineering profession. 
* 
Confusion, Merger, and more Confusion: The Act of 1899 and the Blurring 
of Operational and Technical Expertise 
 
The Navy had for almost a century struggled with the implications of the steam 
engine and the need to reconcile the competing demands of the ‘line’ operators and the 
engineers.  At the end of the 19th century a particularly ambitious and young Under 
Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt, was looking to make his mark.  Solving the 
'line' and engineer rivalry would certainly be to his credit.   Though inexperienced in the 
government and the Navy, he was well connected with the elites and professoriate.  In 
September 1897 he began a correspondence with a one-time engineer officer and then 
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engineering professor from Harvard, Ira N. Hollis, who had published in the Atlantic 
Monthly a plan for the amalgamation (merger) of the 'line' and engineering corps.26  
Roosevelt seized on the plan and, in a series of confidential letters, worked closely with 
Hollis to assemble a group of line and engineer officers believed to be supportive of 
amalgamation.  As an inducement for hesitant engineers and 'line' officers to support his 
efforts, Roosevelt linked their support of merger with an offer to accelerate officer 
promotions, perhaps the most vexing and worrisome issue faced by those in uniform.27    
Roosevelt introduced Hollis to the Secretary of the Navy, John D. Long, and not 
long after their first meeting, Long authorized Roosevelt to convene what was called the 
Naval Reorganization Board in November 1897.  Roosevelt promptly invited Hollis to 
advise the board.28  A mere four weeks later, in December 1897, despite the initial 
objections of senior engineers, including Melville, Roosevelt's board recommended to the 
Secretary a plan that mirrored in almost every respect Hollis' plan for amalgamation.29  
The board recommended amalgamation using language very similar to that used by the 
Harvard professor, arguing that "... every officer on a modern war vessel in reality has to 
be an engineer whether he wants to or not." 30   The report dismissed notions that 
amalgamation might yield negative consequences and argued instead that though for 
                                                 
26 Ira N. Hollis, "A New Organization for the New Navy," The Atlantic Monthly, no. 80, September 1897.  
Elting Morison notes that Hollis' plan was a basis for the ensuing amalgamation plan that was ultimately 
adopted.  See Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, vol. 1 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1951) 677, footnote two. 
27 Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, vol. 1 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1951).  See Roosevelt letter to Hollis, 24 September 1897.  See Edward Latimer Beach, "The Results 
of the Navy Personnel Law of March 3, 1899," US Naval Institute Proceedings, 28, no. 2, June 1902. 
28 Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, vol. 1 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1951).  See letters from Roosevelt to Hollis dated 24 September and 3 November 1897.  
29 Ibid.   See letter to J.D. Long of 9 December 1897 found on page 726.   Engineers did not enthusiastically 
support the proposal of merger.  For discussion of the hostility of Melville to the Hollis plan, see Roosevelt 
letter to Hollis, dated 3 November 1897, page 706. 
30 Naval Reorganization Board Report as appended to Roosevelt letter to J.D. Long, 9 December 1897.  See 
Ibid. , 728.  Compare to language in Hollis' article of September 1897, 315. 
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generations it seemed "... very difficult to hit upon the right expedient...Yet in reality the 
remedy is simple and obvious.  All that is needed is to make the line officer and the 
engineer the same man, by throwing both corps into one."31  The main argument for 
amalgamation was an historical analogy to the English navy in the 16th century.  The 
need for amalgamation was more asserted than analyzed or argued.  
Roosevelt and Long had every intention to quickly push for legislation in support 
of the plan, but their efforts were interrupted early in 1898 by the Spanish-American War.  
A year later, in the wake of victory in that conflict, the Secretary of the Navy presented 
the plan to Congress in 1899.  But the popularity of the war-time administration not 
withstanding, the Full House of the  U.S. Congress debated the reforms for four days, and 
when completed, the act constituted five pages in U.S. statutes.32  The Congress 
recognized that what was at stake was not mere wardroom privileges or officer titles, but 
the identity of the naval officer corps which just recently proved so critical to the nation's 
security.  Differing conceptions of the role of technology and technological knowledge 
were at the root of the debate.   A leading expert in the development of the officer corps 
in this period, Donald Chisholm, explains: “The amalgamation of engineers and the ‘line’ 
was to be sought, not because of discipline and morale problems, but to adapt to the 
changed requirements of modern warships.” 33  Congress in its lengthy deliberations 
sought to help answer the question: what type of officer should command the fleet of the 
future?   
                                                 
31 Naval Reorganization Board Report as appended to Roosevelt letter to J.D. Long, 9 December 1897.  See 
Ibid. ,  728. 
32 Donald Chisholm, Waiting for Dead Men's Shoes: Origins and Development of the U.S. Navy's Officer 
Personnel System, 1793-1941 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 462-463. 
33 Ibid. ,  451. 
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 The proposal to amalgamate was at first resisted on both sides of the 
technological divide, sailor and machine engineer alike.  Line officers feared the merger 
might result in an officer who was more engineer than a 'line' officer, a new manifestation 
of the ‘technicism’ that had in the past characterized the technical and shore-bound 
bureaus, the most influential of which was the Engineering Corps.34  Until the later 19th 
century the Navy was less a profession and more a fragmented agglomeration of 
competing bureaus.35  The establishment of the War College and the Naval Institute in 
the last quarter of the century was seen by many in the ‘line’ as important progress 
toward becoming a profession which merger with engineers might undo.36  For their part, 
many of the leading engineering specialists feared they would lose their identity with 
amalgamation, a not unreasonable fear given that the Engineering Corps in the plan was 
to be merged into the “line”. The former Engineer in Chief of the Navy, retired, RADM 
G. W. Baird, would later lament that he had “lost his identity” with amalgamation.37   
 But there was a deeper fear: the merger would be dangerous to both of the former 
professions, engineer and ‘line’ officer alike.  RADM Thomas Selfridge warned that the 
blurring of the line between operational command and specialists hazarded both corps, 
                                                 
34Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 247.   Peter Karsten, The Naval 
Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern American Navalism (New York: 
The Free Press, 1972), 356. 
35 In 1842, by Act of Congress, the Navy had been organized by technical bureaus, to include ‘Navy Yards 
and Docks’, ‘Construction Equipment and Repair’, ‘Provisions and Clothing’, Ordnance and 
Hydrography’,  and “Medicine and Surgery’.  In 1862, the number of bureaus was increased to eight by the 
addition of the Bureau of Navigation and Bureau of Steam Engineering and Bureau of Equipment and 
Recruiting. See Julius Augustus Furer, Administration of the Navy Department in World War 2 
(Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1959), 195.   
36 Ronald H. Spector, "The Triumph of Professional Ideology: The US Navy in the 1890s " in In Peace and 
War: Interpretations of American Naval History, 1775-1978 ed. Kenneth J. Hagan (West Port: Greenwood 
Press, 1978). 
37 Baird, as quote in Peter Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the 
Emergence of Modern American Navalism (New York: The Free Press, 1972),  355-356. 
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that “…mixing of the two corps would be fraught with great injury to the service”. 38 
Echoing the concern of the engineers, some lawmakers on Capitol Hill interpreted the 
Act of 1899 not as a victory but as a step backward.  In their critique, engineering was an 
increasingly complex field of knowledge that required specialization.  The amalgamation 
of engineer and ‘line’ placed excessive knowledge-demands on a single officer, and as a 
consequence, the merged officer would be both a less effective operational commander 
and a less knowledgeable engineer.  Congressman Low, NY, a vocal advocate of this 
view, portrayed merger of 'line' and engineer as a step back because “…strict attention 
paid to training the human mind in specialties is the only path that leads to higher 
attainment.”39   Though Congressman Low may have been out-voted, in the minds of 
many officers his arguments were compelling.  Apparently, most professional naval 
officers who opposed the bill were never persuaded of the wisdom of amalgamation.  
Rather, 'line' officers and engineers supported the bill only because it was politically 
expedient.  In return for naval officers' and naval engineers' support of amalgamation, the 
politicians promised to ameliorate the unrelated but urgent problem of slow 
promotions.40   
ed and 
                                                
The critically important decision to amalgamate or merge the engineers and line 
was the result of a political 'deal'; it was not a decision based on a carefully studi
 
38 Ibid. ,  355. 
39 Donald Chisholm, Waiting for Dead Men's Shoes: Origins and Development of the U.S. Navy's Officer 
Personnel System, 1793-1941 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 451, 459, 462-67.   That 
amalgamation meant a shift away from specialization was quite clear, and controversial.  
40 Edward Latimer Beach, "The Results of the Navy Personnel Law of March 3, 1899," US Naval Institute 
Proceedings, 28, no. 2, June 1902, 232:  "The reason that induced officers who condemned amalgamation 
as utterly Utopian, to hope that the bill would be made a law, was because some features of the bill would 
to a certain extent relieve conditions in the naval service that were intolerable (promotion bottleneck)".   
Beach goes on, pg. 233:  "The most important change made by this law was not, in the minds of many, this 
amalgamation, but was to officer the navy with some respect to present necessities, and to provide for a 
proper flow of promotion. " 
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coherent rationale.  The aggressive advocates for amalgamation were neophyte 
politicians under the influence of an engineer academic. The support of profession
naval officers and naval engineers was secured through the linkage to accelerated 
promotions. The persons who pushed for amalgamation were those with the lea
experience in the Navy, and their justifications for merger reveal their relative 
shortcomings of ignorance.  Their justifications were not particularly rigorous or 







t stand up to 
                                                
th and 17th century
English navy.   Secretary of the Navy, John D. Long, repeated Hollis' essay of 1897 
almost verbatim when he did not argue but asserted that amalgamation was consistent 
with the times, in consonance with the nature of things.41  Long justified the merger o
1899 with Hollis' analogy to the English merger, some three centuries before, of th
practical seaman and practical warrior: "England’s ships were once sailed by men 
especially employed for that duty and fought by soldiers who had nothing to do with the 
operation of the vessels; but the combination of these two types produced the sailor who
could not only sail his ship but who could fight it as well…..As the work of the soldier 
and the sailor gradually approached each other and finally intermingled, so has that of the 
navigator and the engineer.”42  In the end, Congressional opponents could no
the wildly popular McKinley Administration and adopted Roosevelt's board 
recommendations more or less intact.  As a consequence, the new law blurred the 
 
41  Donald Chisholm, Waiting for Dead Men's Shoes: Origins and Development of the U.S. Navy's Officer 
Personnel System, 1793-1941 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 451. 
42 Secretary Long, as quoted in Ibid.   See also, John Davis Long, The New American Navy (New York,: 
The Outlook Company, 1903), 87.   It should be noted that Long's arguments are the same as those first 
presented by Dr. Ira N. Hollis, a former naval engineer, and a Harvard engineering professor, published in 
the Atlantic Monthly in September 1897.  See Ira N. Hollis, "A New Organization for the New Navy," The 
Atlantic Monthly, no. 80, September 1897 313.   Hollis later became president of Worcester Polytechnic 
Institute.  A civilian president of another polytechnic would also prove to be an important naval reformer 
some six decades later.  
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distinction between officers who would command and those with specialized technical 
knowledge who had not previously aspired to command as a matter of course. This 
change in personnel law shifted the identity of the 'line' strongly in the direction of those
skills and qualities defined by machines and machine systems.
 
d a half century later as justification for a further technical 





require revision.” 44  Secretary Long 
was thus unsettled about his decision for merger.45  
                                                
43   The precedent of the 
Act of 1899 would be invoke
Not long after passage of the bill, however, Secretary Long had second thoughts, 
and he reconsidered the wisdom of the amalgamation that he, Roosevelt, and Hollis had
pushed upon the Navy.  He sounded a cautionary note.  He expressed doubts about the
permanence of the merger as a solution to technological and social change that might 
soon confront the officer corps. Long explained that the merger was a decision made for a
specific context, in a specific time.  The personnel law was, he wrote, "…framed to
special conditions, and so long as those conditions exist it will produce the results 
intended; but when they (conditions) change, it will 
 
43 Mcbride describes the significance of engineer amalgamation as a critical conceptual shift toward a 
machine orientation within the naval profession.  Mcbride writes: “With the delineation of the battleship 
strategy, the construction of the battleship, and the eventual subsuming of the engineering specialists, the 
naval officer corps accepted scientifically engineering artifacts as the basis of its profession.”  See  William 
Michael McBride, “The Rise and Fall of a Strategic Technology : the American battleship from Santiago 
Bay to Pearl Harbor, 1898-1941” (Thesis Ph D --John Hopkins University, 1989),  362. 
44 Donald Chisholm, Waiting for Dead Men's Shoes: Origins and Development of the U.S. Navy's Officer 
Personnel System, 1793-1941 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 466. 
45 John D. Long was perhaps a poor choice to serve as Secretary of the Navy during a time of great change.  
He was not the most insightful Secretary of the Navy to guide such momentous decisions.  As scholars 
describe him:  “For one who knew nothing about the Navy and did not bother to learn about the details, 
Long proved to be a fairly competent secretary.”  But perhaps most troublesome, was the fact that Long 
sought to avoid conflict, a predilection that may have tipped his sympathies toward amalgamation: “ He 
was conservative, loved order and peace….”  See Paolo E. Colletta, "John Davis Long, 6 March 1897 to 20 
April 1902," in American Secretaries of the Navy, ed. Paolo E.  Colletta (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press, 1980),  454.  
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Long’s anxiety sprang from perhaps his intuition that certain major conditions, 
those upon which the decision for merger had been made, were about to change.  In 
particular, the gulf separating engineering knowledge and that of operations was about to 
widen considerably.  The ability to bridge the gulf between engineering and operations, 
already strained in 1899, would become increasingly problematic as the two fields 
diverged even more greatly.   At the turn of the century, unbeknownst to many naval and 
political leaders alike and recognizable now only with historical perspective, there was 
beginning to emerge a new type of engineer, the scientific engineer, and one who would 
require increasingly advanced and scientific education.46  The engineering profession in 
this period was increasingly at odds with itself: the old engineering practitioners were 
threatened by the new, more scientific engineers, and each group struggled to define a 
new system of selection, training, and socialization of future engineers.47  The Navy 
leadership had made a profound policy decision to merge two specialties at the very 
moment engineering was itself in a state of professional confusion about what it would 
mean to be an ‘engineer’ in the future.  
An analysis of Roosevelt's 1897 Board Report and the justifications offered by 
senior leaders make clear that the Navy made its decision to amalgamate on the basis of 
confused understanding of the engineering profession.  The old, fading model of 
engineering, a model that required relatively modest intellectual and academic demands 
                                                 
46 The engineering field was undergoing its own transformation in this period, evolving from one of a ‘shop 
culture’ to that of a ‘school culture’ more closely connected with the study of science and mathematics.  
For a discussion of this evolution, see Monte A. Calvert, The Mechanical Engineer in America, 1830-1910: 
Professional Cultures in Conflict (Baltimore,: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967).  Also, for changes to American 
universities in this period, see Bruce Seely, "Research, Engineering, and Science in American Engineering 
Colleges, 1900-1969," in Technology & American History : a Historical Anthology from Technology & 
Culture, ed. Stephen H. Cutcliffe and Terry S. Reynolds (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997). 
47 Monte A. Calvert, The Mechanical Engineer in America, 1830-1910: Professional Cultures in Conflict 
(Baltimore,: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967),  277. 
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of the line officer, seems to have been foremost in politicians understanding of 
engineering.  An examination of the Navy Reorganization Board Report shows that the 
reigning conception of engineering was one more practical than scientific and therefore 
relatively easy to master by the 'line' without the need for specialized knowledge.  The 
Board recommended that all officers become engineers, a specialty, but at the same time 
they asserted that the mastery of such a profession did not require specialization: "... there 
can be no specialization in command."   The board recognized more technical training 
would be required of the amalgamated officers, but rejected the possibility that such 
training might 'crowd out' other important command qualities or experience:  " The 
increased technical training will be in no sense a substitute for those qualities of daring 
resolution, cool judgment, power of command, willingness to run risk, and readiness to 
accept responsibility which have in all ages marked the great captains.  It will merely be 
an indispensable addition." 48   The reason this indispensable engineering knowledge was 
achievable by the new line with no apparent cost to other core competencies was that 
engineering was perceived to be largely practical and easy to master.  Engineering 
knowledge was to be no more demanding or specialized than that of the "...duties of the 
navigator, the compass or electrical expert, or the torpedo officer..." 49  This practical 
idea of engineering was further confirmed when, in response to a shortage of engineers,
the Navy proposed not college educated engineers but the “…appointment of 100 warra
 
nt 
                                                 
48 Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, vol. 1 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1951), 730-731. 
49 Ibid. , 731. The Board explained that "...The actual driving of the engines, like the actual management of 
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machinists who are competent by their service and experience…” to serve as naval 
engineers.50   
To the decision makers of 1899, engineering was thus a practical trade more than 
it was scientific or mathematical.  Even expert observers of the profession identified the 
engineers by simplistic criteria, for example, by the material composition of an officer's 
surroundings.  Bennett, the leading writer on naval engineering at the time of 
amalgamation, equated the engineer tending the boilers to the line officer topside 
directing a gun battery.51   But this type of engineering, and this conception of 
engineering, was soon to be overtaken by science.  When Congress passed the laws to 
amalgamate, the larger engineering profession was in the midst of a "... a period of self 
examination and compromise from 1890 -1905, and ended with the ascendancy of the 
school (science) forces after 1905..."52    
The new culture, rising to eclipse the old, was that of the ‘school culture’ that was 
“… impersonal and stressed the importance of such external factors as examination 
scores in judging a man's worth."  The old culture of ‘hands on’ and practical engineering 
was to be replaced by a new culture centered on science and research.  As one expert on 
the movement explained, the "...The ultimate reference point, however, is that the key to 
shop culture was applied science. Engineering educators (the school culture) put 
                                                 
50 United States. Navy Dept., Annual report of the Secretary of the Navy (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. 
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emphasis on pure science and on calculus and higher mathematics as the universal tools 
which trained the mind to do any task. Intuition was linked by them with superstition and 
the Dark Ages.  Consistency was valued by them over pragmatic eclecticism." 53   What 
we know of Roosevelt's concept of the leader does not match the model of the emerging 
engineering culture.  Roosevelt was the avid proponent of the model of leader who was 
widely read and the beneficiary of a liberal education.   He exhorted aspiring leaders to 
read classical and modern history, languages, and literature.54   The adoption of a type of 
officer education and training that would 'crowd out' such broadening activities, that 
would replace intuition with calculus, would not seem to have been in consonance with 
Roosevelt's idea of leader or commander.  The only explanation for Roosevelt's 
enthusiastic advocacy for amalgamation, then, is clear:  his conception of engineering 
was more practical than scientific and thus relatively easy to 'master'.  The necessity to 
compromise one or the other areas of knowledge -- operational ability and breadth on the 
one hand, engineering expertise on the other-- was not anticipated.  
Roosevelt and Long supported amalgamation on the basis of an old understanding 
of the engineering profession.  Roosevelt and Long, the key political leaders who 
eventually 'sold' the merger to Congress, failed to appreciate that engineering training, 
education, and professionalism was on the verge of profound change and that this change 
would ultimately invalidate key assumptions upon which they made the decision to 
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amalgamate.  Amalgamation, the merger of technical specialists and the 'line' of 
operational and tactical officers, was thus attempted in a context of not clarity and 
resolution, but of continuing conflict and confusion.  
* 
Operations vs Engineering: Dueling Educational Institutions, 1900 to 1916 
 
Some historians have argued that with the Act of 1899 the 'line' officers no longer 
needed to fear the engineers, since with the merger the 'foe' was vanquished.55   But in 
fact, the professional transformation was incomplete.  The 'threat' of the engineers now 
took a different form: the engineers through education, assignment and promotion 
threatened almost like a Trojan Horse to capture the ‘line’ profession from within.  The 
architect of the merger plan, Hollis, who would later become the president of a 
polytechnic, predicted as much when he wrote: "The line officers fear that the engineers 
wish to command the ships.   Let the commanding officers become engineers, and let the 
engineers rule our ships, then all fears will be dispelled, and the Navy will quickly 
become a unit."56   The period from 1900 to 1916 was one of experimentation, 
uncertainty, and turmoil for the officer corps, a turmoil that was shared by other modern 
navies grappling with similar issues, though the US Navy was almost alone in its 
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adoption of a strategy of merger. 57  Secretary Long retired and Roosevelt moved on to 
the White House, leaving to naval officers the details of the historic merger.   
Educational changes at Annapolis came first on the reform agenda: merger of the 
engineering and ‘line’ curriculum. In the years preceding amalgamation, the share of the 
curriculum devoted to engineering and sciences had gradually increased.  In 1889 
Commander Sampson, the Superintendent and a one-time physics professor,  established 
a system of engineering specialization at the academy that allowed midshipman in their 
fourth year the choice to specialize in either the ‘line’ or in the engineering corps.  With 
the Personnel Act of 1899 this choice was made moot as the ‘line’ and the engineers were 
now, by order of the Secretary of the Navy, merged into one.  Accordingly, the 
curriculum was adjusted to include engineering course work for all midshipmen.58  The 
result was that very quickly the entire student body pursued a course of study that was 
now two specialties merged together: that of the traditional ‘line’ (focused on operations, 
to include foreign language, history, geography, seamanship, navigation) and that carried 
over from the engineering corps’ curriculum, heavily technical, populated with a majority 
                                                 
57 Professional turmoil was not limited to the US Navy.  The Royal Navy struggled on and off with similar 
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of specialized courses that prior to amalgamation the ‘line’ had most severely criticized.59  
While educational adjustments were effected with relative ease, making changes beyond 
the academy proved more problematic.  
The limitations posed by a merged curriculum at Annapolis quickly became 
evident to the professional engineers.  It was quite an impossible task for a midshipman 
to learn both the fundamentals of the ‘line’ and to keep pace with the engineering body of 
knowledge.  Melville had from the outset appreciated the dangers of amalgamation and 
actually thought it best to have kept the engineering corps separate.  But as CDR Ed 
Beach in 1902 explained to interested naval officers, Melville and other officers 
supported amalgamation as the least worst outcome: it may have confused the identity of 
the profession, but at least it provided faster promotion for his officers.60  But Melville 
was never quite convinced of the wisdom of the merger, nor was he convinced it would 
prove permanent.  After 1899, Melville implemented educational measures to 
compensate for the reduced education program of engineers.  He established a graduate 
school at Annapolis that he hoped would promote a greater appreciation of engineering 
by the line, and, with regard to amalgamation, “…might have a very important effect in 
making the experiment a success.”61 
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 The 'line' did not initially welcome Melville’s engineering educational initiatives.  
Graduate school policy became a scene of battle between differing conceptions over the 
identity of the line officer.   The traditional ‘line’ officers attempted to limit educational 
programs in order to exercise more control over the engineers while the technical bureaus 
saw this additional education as essential to the continued efficiency of the Navy.62   But 
even as the 'line' attempted to control the former engineers, the navy leaders began to 
concede that advances in the engineering profession might indeed require some naval 
officers to receive an advanced technical education. The Secretary of the Navy’s report of 
1900 observed:  “It is not certain, however, that they (the machinists) can fully take the 
place of the highly trained technical engineer, upon whom must fall the duty of 
designing, superintending, construction, instructing in engineering branches, as well as 
supervising the motive power of our great ships.  The officers of this higher type should, 
in addition to practical knowledge, be possessed of that thorough theoretical training in 
steam engineering which comes from full academic education.  The act has not yet been 
long enough in operation to warrant the Department in a more extended statement as it its 
effect.”63  Within a few years of amalgamation the older “line” officers became more 
appreciative of the value of graduate education and in fact came to the aid of the technical 
bureaus when Admiral of the Fleet Dewey, senior member of the newly constituted 
                                                                                                                                                 
recommended in 1901 the establishment of “post-graduate course of instruction in marine engineering and 
design to be started at USNA.”  In 1904, the recommendation to educate 3-4 officers yearly in ordnance or 
steam engineering was approved, and finally in 1909 Melville’s vision was manifest in physical form with 
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62 William Michael McBride, “The Rise and Fall of a Strategic Technology: the American battleship from 
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General Board, attempted to terminate naval graduate education in the first decade of the 
twentieth century.64   
Despite their temporary alliance against Dewey, the line and engineers continued 
to compete over their respective share of officer education.  To be sure, machines were 
becoming more complex, but so too were naval operations.  As a consequence of the 
Spanish-American War, the Navy had assumed new responsibilities across the globe, to 
include Asia and the Caribbean.  The rivalry between the operational ‘line’ and the 
technical engineers played out in competing educational institutions: the Naval War 
College devoted to operations and strategy, and the engineering post-graduate school 
focused on more technical subjects.  Given the general reluctance of officers to pursue 
advanced education of any type, the competition for students was acute.  The Naval War 
College remained undersubscribed throughout this period, but in the year after the 
graduate school was established, the shortfalls in students at Newport were especially 
evident:  in 1910 the War College received no voluntary applicants while almost 200 line 
officers competed to attend the new marine engineering program at the graduate school.65   
The popularity of the ‘material’ schools of engineering caused a growing unease on the 
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part of those officers convinced the mastery of integrated fleet operations was the highest 
calling for an officer.66  Retired Rear Admiral Stephen Luce, a founder of the war 
college, bitterly complained that the 'line' was unable, if not unwilling, to see the need for 
general (integrative) operational education:   
  "The point I wish to make is the lack of perception by the naval profession of the proper 
relations between the several parts of our system of naval education.  Our line officers 
seem to suffer from a species of 'mental astigmatism" or the inability of the will to focus 
the mental rays effectively upon the subject of naval education.  The rays of the mind are 
foreshortened, or they are unequal or they are divergent.  This is not uncommon with 
individual students.  But it is very rare when the great majority of the members of a 
profession are so afflicted.  Our officers fail to regard the navy as a unit, with several 
interdependent parts, just as the human body may be considered a unit made up of 
interdependent parts.  The specialist can diagnose his own particular part only, 
irrespective of all other parts and without regard to the whole.  But he only is master of 
his profession who can diagnose the entire body and discern the relations between the 
several parts and the influence on each upon the whole." 67   
 
Despite Luce's protest, Newport struggled to attract more officers.  In desperation, 
the Naval War College even began to increase the technical content of its otherwise 
operational and strategic curricula in an attempt to appeal to the machine-inclined young 
officers.68  But educational debates were only part of the transformation.  Promotion and 
assignment policies and practices remained controversial as well.   
 *  
Increases in Engineering and Operational Complexity: Unresolved 
Questions of Assignment and Promotion, 1900-1916 
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In the years following amalgamation both fleet operations and naval technical 
systems grew increasingly complex. The events of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 
reinforced the idea that the Navy needed to nurture officers versed in both engineering 
and operational knowledge.  The war evidenced the operational complexity of global 
naval operations: the Russian fleet sailed halfway around the world to do battle. The 
imperative for maximum engineering performance was equally clear: a small speed 
differential enjoyed by the Japanese helped doom the Czarist fleet.  In addition, issues of 
engineering material and engineering officer competence loomed larger in the American 
fleet as American ships in the post-amalgamation period proved prone to breakdowns.  
The falling engineering reliability was attributed to the fact that inexperienced officers 
were now replacing the retiring veterans of the old engineering corps. 69   
 The need to better determine who should command grew more urgent as the 
naval arms race accelerated in Europe.  Prior to 1916 American officers who rose to high 
command were selected by the combined processes of the assignment and promotion 
system. The promotion system had been equalized for both ‘line’ and engineer with the 
Act of 1899.  But in the century-old promotion system, equality between officers did not 
result in an active competition for promotion.  The reason: a competitive promotion 
system did not yet exist, rather the old system of promotion-by-longevity survived more 
or less intact.  As early as the 1890s younger officers, facing long periods before being 
promoted, railed against the system.  But substantive promotion reforms would be 
delayed almost a generation until 1916.  In the interim, a central contest within the ‘line’ 
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was the debate over assignment of officers: who was compelled to serve as an engineer 
and who was qualified to command. 
 The Act of 1899 did not compel any particular officer to pursue engineering, nor 
did it dictate the amount of engineering education an officer should receive.  The merged 
‘line’ officers frequently had but cursory knowledge of engineering and thus were poor 
substitutes for the Corps of Engineers of the pre-1899 period.70  Leading engineers of the 
day saw amalgamation initially as a failure, attributed to the lack of legislation that would 
compel more ‘line’ officers to pursue engineering with the necessary devotion.71   While 
‘line’ officers were going to school in greater numbers, they were not attaining 
proficiency in the increasingly complex field of engineering.   In 1904 the Chief of the 
Bureau of Engineering sounded the alarm: “So few officers of the line are taking up 
engineering seriously that the situation is becoming alarming.”72  The results of the 
professional confusion were tragic when in 1905 a steam explosion on the USS 
BENNINGTON killed several sailors in the engine room.  While boiler explosions were 
not unheard of, what caused particular concern was the perception, widely held by the 
public, that the young ‘line’ ensign who served as chief engineer was unqualified for his 
assignment. 73   The question of who was qualified for what assignments remained 
unresolved. 
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The question of fitness for command—like that of the assignment of ship's 
engineer-- also remained an issue.  In the past only those officers experienced in tactics 
and operations--the old 'line' officer-- could rise to command.  In the post-1899 period the 
educational and professional development process that led to command was unclear and 
the requirements for and methods for selection to command were subject to intervention 
by persons outside the profession.  In at least one instance a narrowly trained, non-
seagoing specialist officer was given command of a ship, an action that outraged more 
traditional 'line' officers.   In this particular case, President Theodore Roosevelt named a 
naval medical specialist to command the hospital ship RELIEF.  In protest, RADM 
Willard Brownson, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, the senior sea-going line officer in 
the Navy, promptly resigned. 74   While the medical specialist example may have been an 
extreme case, it illustrated the confusion that surrounded command qualifications.75  
Rather than a repeat of a Brownson-like dispute, line officers feared a gradual, more 
subtle threat to their concept of command:  the ascension to command of officers trained 
to think more like engineers than as an operationally-minded 'line’ officers.   
The fears of the older 'line' officers were not unfounded.  The advocates of 
engineering indeed sought a gradual professional metamorphosis of the 'line' commander.  
Senior engineers hoped that all 'line' officers would become through education and 
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experience not sailors but engineers.  Advocates of the engineering ideal confidently 
asserted their argument: "The honor and safety of the navy must hereafter depend upon 
machinery and those who know how to use it.  The mind who will supply the intelligence 
for successfully directing the many operations of the fighting ship of the immediate 
future must be engineers." 76   Melville, who remained influential in the Navy and 
continued to lecture at the Naval Post Graduate School,77  explained in a 1909 speech to 
the Society of Mechanical Engineers that the old line officer would, in essence, cease 
from commanding any ship, for it was “…no longer appropriate to speak of naval officers 
as sailors, rather, they were primarily engineers who had, in addition, acquitted 
proficiency in the military exercises which are, obviously, necessary for a fighting 
officer.”78  To Melville, if the two corps had to be amalgamated, it was better that the 
officer be more engineer than tactician.  This philosophy did not remain confined to 
speeches or books, but was put into action, and transmitted to young officers in the form 
of career planning guidelines.  The Navy's Engineer in Chief reminded his engineering 
officers in official letters that, even when doing specialized engineering work, they must 
not lose sight of the goal of command, and thus they were directed to “…keep in touch 
with those other duties which lead to command…”79    
                                                 
76 Frank M. Bennett and Robert Walter Weir, The Steam Navy of the United States: a History of the Growth 
of the Steam Vessel of War in the U. S. Navy, and of the Naval Engineer Corps (Pittsburgh: Warren & Co., 
1896), 852. 
77 Lectures Presented to Student Officers at the School of Marine Engineering (NPGS) from 1909 to 1913.  
Admiral George W. Melville lectured on engineering education.  For reproduction of lecture list and 
lecturer, see Alexander Wolfgang Rilling, “The First Fifty Years of Graduate Education in the United 
States Navy, 1909-1959” (Thesis - University of Southern California, 1972), appendix E.  
78 Donald Chisholm, Waiting for Dead Men's Shoes: Origins and Development of the U.S. Navy's Officer 
Personnel System, 1793-1941 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 451. 
79 Letter from Engineer in Chief to Prospective Line Officers students detailed for instruction, May 1905, 
reproduced in Rilling, 348. 
61 
 
At the same time the engineers were calling for a commander more specialized in 
engineering, other influential voices were calling for a contrary shift, that of a re-
emphasis on operations of squadrons and fleets.  This type of at-sea operational 
knowledge should not be confused with the knowledge needed for specialized machine 
operation.  Rather, the at-sea type of operational knowledge was known as "... the art of 
war."80   As fleets grew larger, naval responsibilities became more global and the 
development of doctrine and the education of those in higher command took on greater 
importance.  Educators and reformers, while not disparaging of engineers, insisted that 
commanders of ships, modern squadrons and fleets must be more broadly educated in the 
non-technical arts of language, culture, tactics, operations, and strategy.  A member of the 
Naval Institute Board of Control, LCDR John Hood, writing several years after 
amalgamation, discussed at length the training and experience requirements of those who 
would command, and nowhere in his twelve page essay did he make any mention of the 
need for study or experience in engineering.81  Retired Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce 
was also an outspoken critic of the tendency to neglect the study of operations and 
strategy:  "But we are told the naval officer to-day is a 'fighting engineer", and this 
mockery of truth has been accepted by the profession."82    
These operational-minded reformers were at a disadvantage when competing with 
engineers who advocated more technical training and education.  The exact reason for 
this disadvantage is difficult to determine, but some observers at the time attributed it to 
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an innate human tendency to favor the material of engineering over things conceptual or 
abstract, like operational planning and strategy.  RADM Yates Stirling, an early 20th 
century naval reformer, submarine pioneer, and war college strategist, observed that 
important requirements such as planning and strategy were at an innate disadvantage to 
the material concerns which benefited from a physical primacy. Stirling wrote that 
“...material seems more immediate and concrete.  Thinking and planning for naval war 
seems stuff of which dreams are made.” 83  As the events of the European battles of 
1914-1916 were studied by naval officers, however, the pendulum began to swing bac
to 'dreams'.  A more operational-centric identity of command, one less material o
engineering in emphasis, began to take shape.  In contrast to 1899 when civilian 
politicians pushed the officer corps toward a more technical basis, it was activist civilian 
leadership which moved the naval officer corps to a more integrated, operational, and less 
technical orientation.  
k 
r 
                                                
The new Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, one of Navy’s longer serving 
secretaries, recognized the growing mechanical narrowness in the naval officer corps and 
reemphasized the operational and strategic elements of naval commanders.  Daniels saw 
the need for the integration of the proliferating specialties if the Navy was to attain the 
paramount goal of effective and unified fleet operations.  To Daniels, officer education 
and development, more than machines and material, were of utmost importance.  Daniels 
argued that “...first attention should always be given to the personnel, for the man is 
greater than the machine.”84  The Secretary, with the support of Navy bureau chiefs, 
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promoted several changes to officer professional development, to include policies that 
encouraged the cultivation of operational thinking by the officer corps: attendance at the 
Naval War College by senior officers was made a pre-requisite for promotion.85  Daniels 
valued the education provided at the War College such that it was he was the one who 
finally gained for the institution the official recognition and permanent status it had been 
lacking.86    Daniels acknowledged that officers had attained a high level of training and 
proficiency for the duties of the individual ship, but “…the study of problems in 
connection with the many possible conditions that would exist in time of war or 
threatened attack, and practice in solving these problems have not kept pace with the 
study and solution of problems arising in the single ship.”87  Ronald Spector, a leading 
scholar on the history of the War College, concluded that it was “…Daniels, the pacifist 
editor who had never been to sea who perhaps best understood the nature and purpose of 
the War College….and did more toward furthering its mission than any of his more war-
like predecessors.”88 
In recognition of the global nature of the Navy and the need for integrative and 
operational thinking, Daniels expected officers to increase their exposure to different 
cultures as well as different operating environments.  Daniels believed that naval officers 
required education in the liberal arts and sought to upgrade the teaching of literature, 
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history, and languages at the academy.89   To promote such qualities, including foreign 
language and cultural experience, Daniels reversed prior policy and sent increased 
number of officers to naval attaché assignments.90  In further recognition of the need to 
counterbalance the appeal of desks, bureaus, and specialized duty ashore, Daniels insisted 
that first and foremost, ‘line’ officers spent most of their career at sea.  To encourage the 
attainment of greater operational expertise by 'line' officers, Daniels instituted strict sea 
time requirements for senior officers.91    As part of his efforts to expand and integrate 
the knowledge of the officer corps, Daniels pushed for more officers to attend gradua
school at Annapolis and civilian universities, both in the US and abroad, the result of 
which was a rise in attendance rates during this period.
te 
                                                
92   
Daniels was not isolated in his advocacy of non-technical and broader officer 
education and experience.  He was supported by many uniform officers, in particular the 
influential RADM Victor Blue, head of the Bureau of Navigation.  Daniels' requirement 
for time at sea, in command, was not merely a paper policy of the Secretariat, but was 
supported by the Navy’s active duty officers who made up the ‘plucking board” which 
identified poor performing or otherwise ‘less fit’ officers from the service.  The primacy 
of sea duty to the “line” officer was evident when the “plucking board” of 1915-6 retired 
both the Naval Academy Superintendent and the director of the Office of Naval 
 
89 Paolo E. Colletta, "Josephus Daniels 5 March 1913 to 5 March 1921," in American Secretaries of the 
Navy, 1913-1972, ed. Paolo E. Colletta (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1980), 527.   
90 Innis LaRoche Jenkins, “Josephus Daniels and the Navy Department, 1913-1918: a study in military 
administration” (Thesis--University of Maryland, 1960), 180. 
91 Daniel's Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1 December 1913, as quoted in Chisholm, 556.   
The rule was that at least 40% of an officer's career must be served at sea.  
92Report of the Secretary of the Navy 1914 pp. 38-39, Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1915, pp. 188-
189 as referenced in  Innis LaRoche Jenkins, “Josephus Daniels and the Navy Department, 1913-1918 : a 
study in military administration” (Thesis--University of Maryland, 1960), 181.   
65 
 
Intelligence because they had had insufficient time at sea. 93  The reorganization of 
Navy—the establishment of the office of Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) in 1915, 
which was placed above the various specialized bureaus— emphasized the need for 
mature officers who were more operators and integrators than technical experts.  The 
Navy by 1915 recognized it needed leaders who could integrate the many disparate 




The period between 1899 and 1916 was one of technological innovation that 
drove competing visions and policies of officer education, assignment, and promotion.  
The identity of the line was, on the face of it, redefined in 1899 with the stroke of a pen: 
all engineers were line officers, and all line officers were engineers.  But beneath the 
slogans, uncertainty reigned, in no small part due to the confusion of what exactly was an 
engineer.  The merger of 1899 threatened to undermine both operational effectiveness 
and engineering performance.  Engineers established the Naval Post Graduate School in 
an effort to maintain engineering standards.  At the same time the more traditional sea-
going officers feared the infusion of engineers into the heretofore operational-minded 
'line' would create a new form of 'technicism'.   If they were allowed to be distracted by 
engineering duties, some operational ‘line’ officers expressed a growing unease about 
their capacity to operate the increasingly complex fleets at sea.  There was, in short, a 
general consensus that neither engineering nor operations as fields of knowledge had 
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gained through merger, but that merger had diluted both knowledge sets.  Despite these 
reservations, the new amalgamated ‘line’ officers pressed forward and did their best to 
make the social experiment work.   Despite the boiler explosions, wiped bearings, poor 
understanding of fleet tactics or strategy, the amalgamated officer corps continued an ad 
hoc policy of preparing 'line' officers for both engineering duty and operational 
command.   
The reason for this willingness to live with confusion and ambiguity was two fold.  
Aside from the occasional boiler or turret explosion, few if anyone had or was expected 
to die as a result of command confusion or poor leadership, at least not until war girdled 
the globe in 1914.  Further, the drive for clarity lacked a compelling incentive for those 
seeking advancement:  the promotion system was still largely the same as it always had 
been, and officers were still promoted on the basis of God-given longevity, not merit.  
But the reality of global war would soon upset the old promotion system and usher in the 
most profound changes since the establishment of the U.S. Navy.  What had been 
complacent confusion gave way to an urgent necessity to reconcile the competing 
demands of technological advance, growing operational complexity, and the need for 
younger officers in command.  The years of the First World War and the early 1920s 
would witness a renewed commitment to rationalize and formalize the teaching, 




Chapter Two  
 
Integrating Commanders in Three Dimensions: Ernest 
King’s System of Officer Development, 1916-1941    
 
 
"Instruction and training for duties of command...are requisite for the thorough 
cooperation and coordination which make  'unity of action' a real and compelling factor 
in the attainment of victory...Successive periods of instruction and training occurring 
between periods of practical experience is the best means to develop judgment...” 
Ernest J. King, Captain, USN, August 19201 
 
“… all line officers should be so assigned to successive duties as to afford them a well 
rounded career in order to develop the requisite command qualities.” 
The General Board of the Navy, September 19362   
 
"The war college teaches that there is a higher and more important goal than the mastery 
of material things.  The goal is the mastery of the art of naval war..." 







American naval participation in the First World War was modest, but the 
experience nonetheless dramatically demonstrated the need for a reformed system of 
naval officer development.  Participation in major conflict required large numbers of 
younger commanders. This revelation exposed the limitations of the American system of 
                                                 
1 Ernest J. King, Knox, Dudley W., Pye, William S., "Report and Recommendations of a Board Appointed 
by the Bureau of Navigation Regarding the Instruction and Training of Line Officers," US Naval Institute 
Proceedings, 46, no. 8, August 1920.  The first quotation is drawn from paragraph 10, page 3; second 
quotation is drawn from page 7. 
2 Report of the General Board on the Selection and Promotion of Officers in the Navy, 28 Sept 1936, BG 
No 421 LDB. Records of the General Board, National Archives.  As quoted in Chisholm, 699.   
3 Donald Chisholm, Waiting for Dead Men's Shoes: Origins and Development of the U.S. Navy's Officer 
Personnel System, 1793-1941 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 138. 
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promotion-by-longevity and its progeny of geriatric commanders and admirals.   Global 
war revealed glaring strategic and operational inadequacies of American command and 
control.  Lastly, the war's three dimensional sea combat demonstrated the importance of 
submarine and aviation platforms and the concomitant need to enhance the associated 
skills in the ‘line’.   The diffusion of war into three dimensions, however, stoked fears 
that the Navy profession might fragment around two of the machine systems.  In response 
to these challenges, the Navy created a multi-faceted personnel policy of merger and 
educational accommodation.  The machine operators of the three platforms were 
maintained or merged in the 'line'.  The line officers were then educated and 
professionalized to value unity and integration over specialist skills or expertise.  The 
Navy chose a group of officer-educators led by Captain Ernest J. King to craft a plan for 
a new system of officer development.4   The Navy endorsed the plan and used it to guide 
assignment policy changes, the creation of new educational institutions, and to inform 
curricular changes at the undergraduate, graduate, and senior war colleges for the next 
five decades.  The King System produced what would be known as the 'generalist' 
officer, the integral of the three variants of line officers. While the plan was not hostile to 
engineers and engineering education, the attainment of technical expertise was manifestly 
subordinate to tactical, operational, and strategic education.   The King system was 
successful in meeting its primary goal: it produced operational 'line' officers who could 
exercise integrated command judgment in combat.  Graduates of King's system would 
help win the Second World War and would command well into the Cold War.  
                                                 
4 This plan has been in the past known most commonly as the Knox-King-Pye Plan, because Knox was 
senior at the time.  However, as research has revealed, it was King who drafted the plan, and with his rise to 
CNO, he more than any of the others had the greatest influence in implementation.  Hence, it will be 




The Implications of War: Promotion Act of 1916, Three-Dimensional 
Technology, and Global Operations  
Anglo-American naval operations of the First World War were primarily a Royal 
Navy show, and though American ships deployed to the European theater, they acted in a 
subordinate role to the British.  The war was important for the American Navy not as a 
test of hardware but as a clarion call for personnel and educational reform, the most 
urgent of which was the promotion system.  Even before the United States formally 
declared war, naval leaders had been studying events in Europe and concluded that the 
American system of promotion-by-longevity would be inadequate to the tasks of modern 
war.  The long awaited promotion reforms were enacted into law in what became known 
as the “The Line Personnel Act of 1916”5 
Prior to 1916 the promotion system had remained relatively unchanged from its 
inception in the 1790s.  The determinant of promotion for almost 125 years was God-
given longevity:  if one lived long enough, one would rise to and retire from the senior 
rank of the officer corps, that of admiral.  As such, the main objectives of an officer 
aspiring to high command was to preserve his health and attempt to matriculate at and 
                                                 
5 The most significant aspects of the 1916 reforms have survived relatively intact to the 21st century. 
Therefore a discussion of the Act is essential to understanding how navy officer development changed in 
the 20th century.  Unfortunately, the chapters that follow can only provide a partial explanation of how the 
promotion system influenced officer development.  The reason for this is quite simple: records of 
promotion boards were seldom if ever preserved.  The proceedings of boards were closed.  Furthermore, 
most officers who served on such boards refrained from recording in their memoirs matters pertaining to 
promotion decisions.   
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then graduate from Annapolis as the youngest in his class!6  This system based on 
longevity was not irrational or the product of inept naval officers.  The rationale for such 
an arrangement was that promotion-by-longevity precluded the creation of military 
cliques that could threaten the civilian leadership of the new American republic.  Despite 
its political benefits, the system had at least one major drawback: promotions came 
slowly.  By the end of the 19th century many came to believe the old system had outlived 
its usefulness, especially younger officers who were most affected by the policy of 
‘waiting for dead men’s shoes’.7 This problem of slow promotion was a target of the 
young “Line Officer’s Association”, and they broke with senior officers on this issue as 
far back as 1895.  This action by the younger officers contributed to the establishment of 
a temporary palliative, the “Plucking Board”, instituted with the Naval Act of 1899.8  The 
“Plucking Board” was driven by notions of what was “not” the ideal identity of a line 
officer.  The "Plucking Board" looked for failures and deficiencies and proved wildly 
unpopular with the officers it 'plucked'.  By equating retirement with poor performance, 
the board publicly humiliated officers who otherwise had served honorably and 
effectively for decades.  Perhaps out of fear of embarrassing too many of their former 
shipmates, the “Plucking Board” was not particularly aggressive.   
Like most large industrial organizations, the Navy had a pyramidal personnel 
structure:  a large number of lower and mid-level officers and significantly fewer officers 
                                                 
6 James O. Richardson and George C. Dyer, On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor: the Memoirs of Admiral 
James O. Richardson as told to George C. Dyer (Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973), 65-66. 
7 The leading authority on the evolution of the officer promotion system from 1790 to 1941 is Don 
Chisholm, a professor at the Naval War College.  See Donald Chisholm, Waiting for Dead Men's Shoes: 
Origins and Development of the U.S. Navy's Officer Personnel System, 1793-1941 (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2001). 
8 Peter Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern 
American Navalism (New York: The Free Press, 1972), 455, 458. 
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at the upper ranks.  With a system based on longevity, the only way a junior officer could 
‘rise to the top’ was to spend long periods in the junior ranks and then pass quickly 
through the senior ranks as mortality or the 'Plucking Board' did its work.    In the early 
20th century the fleet was expanding, but the logic of the organizational structure meant 
that the number of ensigns and lieutenants at the base grew far faster than the number of 
ship captain and admiral billets near the top of the pyramid.  This growing demographic 
imbalance, when combined with reluctant plucking boards, resulted in officers growing 
old wearing a lieutenant’s uniform.  The problem was so severe that on the eve of the 
First World War a multitude of middle-aged lieutenants and geriatric captains filled the 
ranks and the problem was only to get worse.  The Secretary of the Navy reported that 
“…junior ensigns of the Class of 1915 can not expect to be promoted to lieutenant 
commander under such conditions under 40 years, or at a time when they will have 
reached the statutory retirement age of 62….If the matter were not so serious it would be 
ludicrous.”9  Furthermore, a growing number of highly skilled officers of the old 
Engineering Corps were retiring, and line officers were not being produced fast enough to 
replace them in the design and production of ships and weapons.10    The plucking board 
could no longer solve these problems.  What was needed was a mechanism that more 
quickly retired the old and promoted the young.  
Informed by the European experience, a core of reform minded officers (William 
Sims, Dudley Knox, Victor Blue, and Roy C. Smith), supported by the Secretary of the 
Navy, created what Chisholm described as “…the pivotal point in the history of the 
                                                 
9 Josephus Daniels, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1 December 1914, as quoted in Chisholm, 
559.   
10 Donald Chisholm, Waiting for Dead Men's Shoes: Origins and Development of the U.S. Navy's Officer 
Personnel System, 1793-1941 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 589. 
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Navy.” 11   The new personnel law broke with a century of traditional practice.  The law 
of 1916 required promotion-by-selection of the most qualified officers, a true system of 
merit.  The reforms of 1916 solved one problem--the block to timely promotions of the 
younger officers—but brought with it another set of challenges: how to agree upon a 
positive concept of officer identity, a notion that would then be reinforced by “selection 
up” promotion boards.12   Officers worked to fashion a positive notion of promotion, but 
they soon realized they would replace a biological bias with a social one.  The old 
biologically-biased system, while it had its problems, had one important quality: it 
guaranteed independence of thought for each individual officer.13  An officer’s 
promotion had nothing at all to do with performance or with consonance of views with 
one’s elders.  Seldom was a junior officer’s career ruined because he challenged a senior
officer over issues of doctrine, strategy, or technological innovation.  In this way the
system guaranteed independence and militated against the development of patronage and 
factions of all types, political, ethnic, or socio-tech
 
 old 
nical.   
                                                 
11 Ibid. ,  587.  The law also made provision for and established the Engineering Duty Only officer, a field 
to which line officers could transfer and learn the detailed knowledge necessary for the design and 
construction of modern ships and weapons.  In so doing, however, the line officers gave up their 
opportunity to command, hence the somewhat deflating title: Engineering Duty ONLY.  This verbal 
reminder of engineers' command limitations wounded the pride of engineers.  They would successfully 
lobby later in the century to have the words changed: the specialists engineer would remain an EDO, but 
the letters would be renamed to become “Engineering Duty Officer” rather than “Engineering Duty Only”.   
The adjustment, while a sop to wounded engineer pride, would however further confuse the officer identity 
since the 'EDOs' still remained “line” officers, a blurring of identities originating with the Act of 1899. 
Eventually command eligible 'line' officers would become known as "Unrestricted Line Officers".       
12 Ibid.,  587.   Chisholm succinctly describes the problem;   "The act left unsaid much that would have to 
be worked out in practice by the secretary and selection boards.  Unlike seniority or 'selection out," 
"selection up" required a positive concept of the naval officer for each grade. Tremendous discretion over 
how this concept would be defined would accrue to the selection boards.  Such discretion introduced the 
potential for, if not the probability of, systematic bias in the type selected, as there was not unanimous 
agreement in the officer corps about how such an officer should look.  This, rather than idiosyncratic biases 
for or against particular individuals, would constitute the principal problem created by selection up, 
becoming especially important as submarines and aviation became more significant."   
13 James O. Richardson and George C. Dyer, On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor: the Memoirs of Admiral 
James O. Richardson as told to George C. Dyer (Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973), 66. 
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But with the reforms of 1916 the problem of factions emerged.  The factions or 
cliques were not, however,  of the political type that might threaten civilian authority.  
The cliques were those associated with a particular technology or type of engineering.  
The Navy was rapidly becoming machine-intensive and thus, earlier than the Army or 
many civilian organizations, proved fertile ground for the rise of socio-technical factions. 
RADM Yates Stirling observed, as noted previously, that officer loyalties tended to drift 
toward the material and the machine and away from the less tangible fields of naval 
operations and their associated planning.  To Stirling, material enjoyed a tendency to 
wield the "scepter of power".14   David Mindell, a leading historian on naval and military 
technologies in the interwar period, also observed the powerful draw and shaping force 
technology exerted over humans: “What people are doing, who they are, and how they 
related to each other has everything to do with what kind of technologies they build.”15  
The new system of merit promotion provided a potentially powerful tool for officers 
seeking to remake the Navy in a new image, and the image was looking increasingly 
mechanical and specialized.  
 In the first years after the change in promotion policy, many officers and civilian 
officials warned that one consequence of the change would be increased factionalism in 
the Navy.   A particularly stark warning of the possible consequences of the new 
promotion system appeared in the Naval Institute Proceedings just a few years after 
implementation of the reforms.  An experienced officer observed:  
                                                 
14 Yates Stirling, Jr., RADM USN, Sea Duty: The Memoirs of a Fighting Admiral (New York City: G.P. 
Putnam's Sons, 1939), 138. 
15 David A. Mindell, Between Human and Machine: Feedback, Control, and Computing Before 
Cybernetics (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 14. 
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“Placing in the hands of a small group the power to perpetuate themselves and their ideas 
is bureaucracy.  Selection up enables a small group of leaders in Washington to select 
those who would fill their places and eliminates any element from among the high 
ranking officers who think differently on any major subject.  To perpetuate their policies 
this group can build up around themselves a coterie of followers whose service would 
become personal service rather than independent service to country and lofty ideals.  The 
reward for servility would be promotion, the penalty of independence, oblivion….Such a 
system is un-American and a menace to national safety. It takes no wild flight of fancy to 
imagine the control of the Navy in the hands of a group of officers whose policy….born 
of prejudices, and whose actions, protected from just criticism, would plunge the nation 
into a disastrous war.”16   
Two future CNOs, Robert Carney and Arleigh Burke, also expressed concern for 
the possible negative effects of merit promotions.17  Arleigh Burke was the more critical 
of the two future CNOs and argued that the new system of promotion by selection stifled 
independence of thought.  He expressed the hope, however, that those with “...knowledge 
and confidence in their abilities...” would nonetheless challenge the orthodoxy and try out 
new ideas.18  These officers proved to be prescient in their predictions and concerns.  The 
tendency in the officer corps to form technological factions gained strength in the years 
after 1916 and became one of the major issues reformers would struggle with for decades 
to follow.19   
Two new technological innovations of the First World War--armed aircraft and 
submarines-- further threatened to fragment the navy officer corps.  Aviation, more than 
                                                 
16 W.C. Barnes, CDR USN, "Promotion by Selection," US Naval Institute Proceedings, 48, no. 9, 
September 1922, 1486-90. 
17 Robert B. Carney, LCDR, USN, "Selection, Security, and Morale," US Naval Institute Proceedings, 61, 
no. 6, June 1935.  Arleigh Burke also questioned the wisdom of such a system, and even exchanged letters 
with retired Admiral Sims in the mid-1930s on the subject.  See David Alan Rosenberg, "Officer 
Development in the Interwar Navy: Arleigh Burke--Making of a Naval Professional, 1919-1940," Pacific 
Historical Review, 44, no. 4, November 1975, 518. 
18 Burke, as quoted in David Alan Rosenberg, "Officer Development in the Interwar Navy: Arleigh Burke--
Making of a Naval Professional, 1919-1940," Pacific Historical Review, 44, no. 4, November 1975, 518. 
19 C. C. Hartman, RADM, USN, Bureau of Personnel,"Report of the Board to Study and Recommend a 
Program of Education and Training of Line Officers to Best Fit Them for High Command, dtd 8 April 
1948", NARA, RG 24-470-54-25-6, Box 6.  Three decades after the promotion reforms senior navy leaders 
explicitly addressed the deleterious effects of technological cliques that emerged around new technologies.  
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submarine technology, posed a challenge, in part because modern war seemed to require 
large numbers of flying machines and with them, legions of officer and enlisted 
personnel.  By the end of the war, the British and French had produced over 100, 000 
aircraft and numerous pilots to fly them.20  Though US naval aviation was used sparingly 
in the war, it also expanded rapidly from seven planes, nine officers, 23 men in 1914 to 
2,100 planes, 7,000 officers, and 40,000 men in 1918.21   
Aviators seemed more likely to fragment the Navy profession than submariners 
for the additional reason that many of the early aviators came from non-navy institutions; 
they were not typically navy 'line' officers.  To be sure, the very first naval aviator was a 
former ship and submarine officer.22  Furthermore, the senior aviator commanders would 
for a generation remain exclusively Annapolis graduates and regular line officers.  
However, in the lead-up to war and during the First World War, the bulk of the flyers 
were pilot-enthusiasts, in particular, wealthy New York bankers and graduates from Yale 
and Princeton.23  These outsiders, who were confident and outspoken, agitated early for 
increased recognition and benefits for the non-'line' officer flyers, who were typically 
                                                 
20 Michael S. Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power: the Creation of Armageddon (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1987).  See chapter one for a discussion of the formative experience of the First World 
War as to thinking about aviation.  
21 Ronald H. Spector, At War, at Sea: Sailors and Naval Warfare in the Twentieth Century (New York, 
N.Y.: Viking, 2001), 138.  In the 1916 Naval Appropriations Act provision was made for the establishment 
of the “…Naval Flying Corps, and also provided for the establishment of a Naval Reserve Force of six 
classes, including a Naval Reserve Flying Corps, which would come to include First Yale Group/Unit”.  
See also Roy A. Grossnick and William J. Armstrong, United States Naval Aviation, 1910-1995 
(Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center Dept. of the Navy : For sale by the U.S. G.P.O. Supt. of Docs., 
1997). 
22 Richard C. Knott and Malcolm W. Cagle, The Naval Aviation Guide, 4th ed. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval 
Institute Press, 1985),  2.   It is interesting to note that the first naval officer to be trained as an aviator in 
1910, LT  “Spuds” Ellyson, was not a technical specialist, engineer, or reservist, but a serving a line officer, 
experienced on surface ships and submarines.   
23 Ronald H. Spector, At War, at Sea: Sailors and Naval Warfare in the Twentieth Century (New York, 
N.Y.: Viking, 2001), 139.  One of the early non-USNA aviators later became the same Secretary of 
Defense Forrestal, for whom one of the first super-carriers was named.    
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naval reservists.  These ‘outsiders’ were not particularly fond of the professional ‘line’ 
officers, and in the early post-war years, they expressed doubt that the navy 'line' could  
make the necessary adjustments to accommodate aviation.24   Ronald Spector in his study 
of the naval profession observed that, indeed, aviation was too “dynamic” and required 
too many men to be “comfortably” absorbed into the traditional framework of the “line”; 
a new framework was required.25  Admiral Moffett, a surface ship officer turned aviation 
pioneer, developed a new aviation framework  that became part of the Navy’s larger 
officer development plan.  The larger Navy plan for integrated officer development 
successfully blunted the tendency toward a platform-fragmentation in the officer corps.  
As will be discussed in the next section, the plan helped ensure that regular naval 
aviators, unlike the army aviators, remained naval officers first and aviation specialists 
second, a hierarchy of priorities that would last for almost fifty years.  
The third difficulty demonstrated by the European War was the global nature of 
war and the concomitant rising complexity of operations.  To fight such a war required 
officers in large numbers to study tactics, strategy, and the integrated art of command.  
The war thus validated the purpose of the war college which was dedicated to the study 
of the art and operations of war.  A Naval War College president and future CNO, 
Admiral Veazie Pratt observed: “It took the World War to prove to the service at large 
the inestimable value…” of the war college methods of education. He went on: “In fact it 
was Admiral Benson, our CNO, who told me after the war how much he felt he owed to 
                                                 
24F. W. LT USN Wead, "The Navy and Naval Aviation," US Naval Institute Proceedings, 52, no. 5, May 
1926, 886.   
25 Ronald H. Spector, At War, at Sea: Sailors and Naval Warfare in the Twentieth Century (New York, 
N.Y.: Viking, 2001), 139.  It will be argued that the new framework included the plan to broaden all line 
officers.  (The plan, devised by Captain Ernest J. King, will be discussed at length in this chapter).  The 
new framework was one that emphasized the naval service and command over loyalties to a particular 
machine and socio-technical community.   
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the College whose doctrines, by this time, had become partially disseminated throughout 
the naval service.”26  Even Admiral Fiske, an enthusiastic advocate for engineers and 
advanced technology, recognized the need for integration and breadth of operational 
experience on the part of those who would command.  In 1911 he argued that 
organizations such as the Navy needed to work actively to "...keep down the tendency to 
subdivide".27   And, in 1916, he argued for the cultivation of the officer who could 
achieve breadth and unity of vision: "....the higher one is in position, the more imperative 
it is that he understand all elements involved, and estimate properly their various 
weights."28   A particularly important measure of the increased importance attached to the 
Naval War College and the importance of teaching operational command was the 
extension in the duration of the course from a paltry four months to a full year. 29   
The global war, the promotion reforms, and the new machines all combined to 
persuade senior navy leaders of the urgent need for a new process of officer development 
that would prepare men for command.  To win in a global war at sea would require the 
‘line’ officers to maintain the engines, drive machines in three dimensions, but also hone 
at the War College the command judgment necessary to operate a global fleet.  Relying 
on past practice and habit would no longer do.  The Navy needed to communicate to its 
officers the desired education, assignment patterns, and career milestones that should 
guide the new officer.  In response to this need, the Navy developed a new method of 
officer development that emphasized integrative education and experience.  
                                                 
26 Veazie Pratt, as quoted in Ronald H. Spector, Professors of War: the Naval War College and the 
Development of the Naval Profession, 1st ed. (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press 1977), 144. 
27 Bradley Fiske, RADM, USN "Naval power: Motto...'Sleepers Awake'," US Naval Institute Proceedings, 
37, no. 3, September 1911, 727. 
28 Bradley Fiske, The Navy as a Fighting Machine (New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1916), 200. 
29 Michael Vlahos, The Blue Sword: The Naval War College and the American Mission, 1919-1941 




Authors of the New Model of Command:   
The Architects and Inspiration for the Integrative Commander 
The Navy acted quickly to reform the officer development system.  Before the 
troops were home from Europe, the Navy tasked three captains-- Ernest King, Dudley 
Knox, and William Pye-- to make recommendations concerning the instruction and 
training of line officers.30   This group of officers produced a plan (which will be referred 
to as the King Plan) by the end of 1919.  While the plan recognized the importance of the 
technical specialties, the plan placed primary importance on the cultivation of operational 
command judgment.  The plan sought to produce what would be called the ‘generalist', 
‘rounded’, ‘well rounded’, or 'integrative' officer who could command the integrated and 
unified fleet.  King and his co-authors wanted to produce an officer who could integrate 
both the technical and the non-technical; who understood how to use the machines of 
war; but who had developed the capacity for judgment needed to command fleets at the 
operational, strategic, and potentially political level.  Lastly, the authors realized that the 
new model of command had to provide an officer with the capacity to lead and command 
for a whole career, from midshipman to admiral, for a generation.  As the future was 
unpredictable, it was best that officers be broadly educated, not narrowly specialized, so 
that the officer would have the capacity to adapt to new conditions or innovations that 
might arise.   
                                                 
30 Ernest J. King, Knox, Dudley W., Pye, William S., "Report and Recommendations of a Board Appointed 
by the Bureau of Navigation Regarding the Instruction and Training of Line Officers," US Naval Institute 
Proceedings, 46, no. 8, August 1920. 
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The authors' decision to emphasize integrative, operational knowledge rather than 
technical knowledge was a particularly important statement about the identity of the 
‘line’.  This choice of priorities did not come as an accident, nor did the choice originate 
with the three board members.  Rather, the priority placed on integrated operations was 
most likely inspired by the authors’ knowledge of Mahan’s view on this subject.  All 
three men were either students, protégés, readers or admirers of Mahan.   
Dudley Knox had the closest connection to Mahan and served as the direct link to 
Mahanian thought about the officer corps.  Knox had been one of Mahan’s students.31  
While Knox was at the time the better known of the three officers, King was already a 
rising star and was the main author of the new officer development system: both Knox 
and Pye attest that King wrote the entire multiple page report.32  Since King was both the 
main author of the plan and would rise to the highest command in the Navy, a discussion 
of his early career, his experience with technology, and his professional associations is 
critical to our understanding of his plan and his larger purpose.  
King respected both Mahan and the early engineer, Melville.  King was, one 
might argue, a synthesis of Mahan and Melville, both of whom were professionally active 
when King was a midshipman and during the first 10 years of his career.  King could 
                                                 
31 Ronald H. Spector, Professors of War: the Naval War College and the Development of the Naval 
Profession, 1st ed. (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press 1977), 112.  In the early years of the 20th 
century “…marked the transition between the ‘first generation’ of reformers associated with the War 
College and those who were to guide its fortunes up to the eve of the First World War.” The next 
generation of leaders included William L. Rodgers, Dudley W. Knox, and later William S. Sims, and 
“…nearly all of the younger men had been students of Mahan or Luce and shared their basic view about the 
nature of war and the officer’s place in society. They differed in being more technically oriented….” Knox 
was one of the most influential thinkers in the early years of the 20th century. Knox was a co-creator of the 
Applicatory System of staff work and study, and worked on tactics with Sims in 1913; and with Fiske 
helped draft the plans for the establishment of the CNO office. See pages 119, 142. 
32 Thomas B. Buell, Master of Sea Power: a Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King (Boston: Little 
Brown, 1980), 565.  King was indeed the author of the plan.  He wrote the draft and the others agreed with 
but minor changes. 
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appreciate the concerns and values of naval engineers like Melville.  King had grown up 
in a family surrounded by machines and practical engineers: his father worked in a 
machine shop that supported the railroad.  King himself dropped out of high school for a 
year and worked as a practical engineer. He respected engineers and engineering and was 
comfortable with technology.  But when King came to Annapolis in the years before 
amalgamation of 1899, he set his goal to be a 'line' commander at sea, not an engineering 
officer.  
At Annapolis King broadened beyond his mechanical roots and proved to be a 
skilled sailor, a gifted writer, and a diligent student of history.  He trained in the rigging 
of sailing ships before they were retired from service33 and was one of the few 
midshipmen to fight in the Spanish-American War off the coast of Cuba.  King ranked in 
the top five of his class and served as the Lucky Bag (the Academy’s yearbook) editor 
where he began his career as a prolific naval writer.  Young LT King was a self-avowed 
disciple of Mahan (his favorite book was Mahan’s work on admiralship, Types of Naval 
Officers, and his favorite admiral was Jervis).34   He was an avid student of strategy and 
history and "...plunged into a study of Mahan...” and other historians of war.35  A 
                                                 
33 Michael Vlahos, The Blue Sword: The Naval War College and the American Mission, 1919-1941 
(Newport: Naval War College Press, 1980), 19-20.  King was among the last of the midshipman to train 
aboard ships dating from the Civil War, in particular, the USS Monongahela, which had served with 
Admiral Farragut at Mobile Bay.   
34 Thomas B. Buell, Master of Sea Power: a Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King (Boston: Little 
Brown, 1980), 52-53.   According to Buell, King was a disciple of Luce and Mahan. King thought it was 
incumbent on a naval officer to study strategy and tactics.  King's March 1919 Proceedings article on 
battleship design was an example of King's commitment to this model of officer.  King wrote: “A naval 
officer must not let his mind stagnate.  Go to the Naval War College.  Read, Think. Write."  Buell 
explained that  King pored over Mahan's' book, and his favorite was, perhaps not surprising,  A. T. Mahan, 
Types of Naval Officers drawn from the History of the British Navy: with some account of the conditions of 
naval warfare at the beginning of the eighteenth century, and of its subsequent development during the sail 
period, 3rd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1901, 1918). 
35 Ernest Joseph King and Walter Muir Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King: a Naval Record (London: Eyre & 
Spottiswoode, 1953), 74, 86, 106.   King wrote that he "...plunged into a study of Mahan" and other 
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supporter of the War College, King took and passed every correspondence course and 
later attended the college before he promoted to flag.  Though King did not want to 
become a technical specialist, he nonetheless had an aptitude for technology: he was an 
inventor and liked to tinker.   Together with his friend and co-author, William Pye, they 
designed a range-finding instrument that was eventually adopted and used by the Navy.  
Against the advice of others, King volunteered to serve in the engineering department 
aboard ship.  As Chief Engineer on USS NEW HAMPSHIRE in 1911, he aggressively 
pursued engineering awards (though did not win).  He published articles both in US 
Naval Institute Proceedings but also in the Journal of the American Society of Naval 
Engineers in August 1913.36   
Informed with this knowledge of King's past, it is possible to see the King Plan of 
1919, which strove to balance technical training and broader education, as reflective of 
his own experience.  King was a generalist, an integrator, who served as engineer, 
designed and produced technical inventions, and thought and wrote about strategy and 
tactics.  It is not surprising, therefore, that his plan of officer development demanded 
future officers to be 'generalists', to include time spent as part-time engineers. But, as we 
shall see, when technology became increasingly complex and scientific, the capacity of 
the ‘line’ officer to be proficient at both engineering and operations became well-nigh 
impossible.  King's plan had made some provision for such an eventuality: operations and 
                                                                                                                                                 
historians of war.   King admired the NWC and Mahan, writing that "...the greatest improvements in the 
fleet before World War I were brought about by the increasing effectiveness of the US NWC...";   "By 1916 
the ablest officers were all anxious to take the course at the War College, though there were still a few die-
hards who fought against it..."; King read foreign works as well, complementing his study of Mahan with 
that of Sir Julian Corbett.  
36 Thomas B. Buell, Master of Sea Power: a Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King (Boston: Little 
Brown, 1980) , 36, 39-41, 564. 
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'command' were always favored over technical expertise and specialization, especially in 
the 'line'.  
King was also an educator, and therefore particularly qualified to draft what 
became the inter-war officer education and career plan.  King served as a Naval Academy 
instructor in 1906 and taught multiple subjects to include ordnance, gunnery, and 
seamanship.  King also served as the battalion drillmaster and in this capacity taught 
marching and infantry maneuvers, and even trained landing parties.  According to Buell, 
King's biographer, King drove the midshipman relentlessly in marine and infantry type 
drills: forced marches, amphibious landings from whaleboats, rifle and artillery 
exercises.37     He ended his string of educational assignments with the Presidency of the 
Naval Post Graduate School, an assignment that was not in the 'main stream' of officer 
career paths at the time.  More than once he infuriated those who did not support the 
advanced education of naval officers.  Apparently some admirals sought to demean King 
by referring in public to him as “the professor". 38  But despite such attacks, King was no 
blue-suited ‘Ivory Tower’ intellectual: he was cognizant of the importance of being able 
to operate the newest naval technologies and achieved perhaps the unprecedented feat of 
serving or qualifying in all three platform communities, surface, submarine, and aviation.    
King’s war-time service in Europe no doubt reaffirmed his conviction that the 
Navy required a system to integrate the officer corps and teach command.  King, who 
won the Navy Cross in the war, served on the staff of the Atlantic Fleet commander, 
                                                 
37 Ibid. ,  31. 
38 King disliked senior flags who criticized the graduate school, in particular, Admirals Henry B. Wilson 
and Hugh Rodman.  King believed these officers and their supporters were stifling intellectual growth in 
the Navy. See Ibid. , 52. 
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Admiral H.T. Mayo, USN.  King credited Mayo as the most significant senior officer in 
King’s professional and intellectual development.  In light of this close relationship, it 
was perhaps not surprising that King’s advocacy of an integrated and broadly educated 
'line' officer corps conformed to Mayo’s views of integration, in particular with regard to 
aviation.  Admiral Mayo advocated the development of naval aviation but urged that 
aviation remain part of the larger officer corps, not a specialty unto itself. 39  As a 
member of Mayo’s staff, King traveled extensively in war-time Europe and observed the 
complexity of not only naval operations but those on land as well.  This war experience 
may have informed his strong advocacy for joint integration among officers.  But his war 
experience did not leave King with a feeling of confidence about the US Navy.  Rather, 
after his European assignment, King observed that naval officer reform was urgent 
because “… prewar career patterns had been overtaken by events."40    
* 
The King Plan: Education and Assignment Policy to Foster Unity 
King drafted the new officer plan over a period of nine months in 1919.  The 
ultimate objective of King’s plan was to develop in the officer corps the capacity for 
integrated command judgment in a unified, three-dimensional, and global navy.  King’s 
plan acknowledged the need for an officer to understand the technical aspects of the 
machines of war, but prioritized the mastery of operations and strategy as the 'line' 
officer's higher goal.  The system was composed of several components:  a foundation of 
                                                 
39 William M. McBride, Technological Change and the United States Navy, 1865-1945 (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2000), 132. 
40 Thomas B. Buell, Master of Sea Power: a Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King (Boston: Little 
Brown, 1980) , 565. 
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general education at Annapolis; universal service aboard a large surface ship; practical 
experience on one or two platforms in the first seven years of commissioned service; 
further integrative education at a new “General Line Course”; further service at sea on 
multiple platforms; and two educational periods at the War College.   Lastly, promotion 
through the ranks could come only after successful completion of a series of general 'line' 
officer examinations.41    
  King’s recommendations were endorsed by Navy headquarters almost 
immediately and were commented upon and referenced by individual officers and navy 
boards for over a generation.  One of the first and more illustrious officers to endorse 
King's plan was future Admiral Thomas C. Kincaid, who in 1922 described King's 
progressive educational system as a means to make the officer corps “broader” in 
thinking and judgment.42  A decade later a board reviewed the Navy's education and 
assignment patterns and in the Taussig Report of 1929 reaffirmed King's plan.  The 
essential elements of the King plan would be revalidated and referenced repeatedly over 
the next thirty-five years in fleet messages, curriculum review boards, and by study 
groups as late as 1963.43   
                                                 
41 The manual that dictated officer qualifications in this period, the Bureau of Navigation Manual, 
embodied this significant change.  The obligatory promotion examinations were explicitly linked to the 
attainment of tactical and operational knowledge.  Prior to the King Plan of 1919 the knowledge was to be 
gained in the ‘school of the ship’, at sea.  Following this report the manual changed and allowed the explicit 
linkage of progressive education with the promotion exam: an officer could validate those sections of this 
demanding exam by attendance at the Naval War College or the successful completion of the War College 
correspondence course in tactics and operations.  For evidence of this change, see the 1921 BuNav Manual 
and compare the officer education requirements of the later manuals in the chapter on officer policy. 
42 T.C. Kincaid, LCDR, USN, "Naval Corps, Specialization, and Efficiency," US Naval Institute 
Proceedings, no. 48, Sept 1922, 1491-1500. 
43 Alfred W. Pride, ADM USN (Ret),"Criteria for Selection to Flag Rank in the USN, Report of Board 20 
February 1963", NARA RG 24-470-54-25 Box 6. 
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King's overriding goal was to develop a system that provided line officers the 
capacity to exercise integrated and unified naval command. King wrote:   
 "Instruction and training for duties of command is essential to carrying out of war 
operations in order that the whole body of commanding officers and of unit commanders 
and their staffs may have common conceptions of basic considerations and or practical 
methods which are requisite for the thorough cooperation and coordination which make  
'unity of action' a real and compelling factor in the attainment of victory.  This instruction 
is best given in two periods: the first, before attaining command rank and the second 
before attaining flag rank."44 
King's report went on to explain that the modern world was practically 
overwhelmed by specialized knowledge and specialists.  An officer had a higher 
responsibility than specialization: to integrate the knowledge from many fields of 
endeavor.  Operational knowledge was for the 'line' officer of paramount concern:   
“The present advanced state of civilization includes great development in every 
branch of the arts, industry, and science, so great that keeping abreast of developments in 
one branch of art, industry or science is practically a life-work….The requirements of the 
naval profession have an even broader scope….The naval profession is the most varied in 
the world; leadership, material, skill, judgment, operations—all are needed.  The term 
“officer” is synonymous with “leader,” which established the primary reason for the 
existence of officers.  In the earlier years of an officer’s career, he is concerned with the 
exercise of his profession in employments of limited scope.  As he advances in rank and 
experience, the performance of details becomes less important.  In the higher grades 
“operations” becomes of paramount importance, while material and its manipulation 
(management), though essential, are viewed as the means to the end, and not, as earlier, 
the end itself. The naval officer required a working knowledge of many branches of 
human endeavor.  At present, he is “educated” only in preparation for the lowest 
commissioned grade….the government should, at recurring periods in a career of forty 
years of commissioned service, provide the time and opportunity for officers to be 
instructed along the lines with which their increasing rank and consequent responsibility 
calls them to be thoroughly familiar. The extreme case appears to be: Instruction for four 
years at the Naval Academy and then none for forty years of commissioned service.  The 
Board considers recurring instruction periods as indispensable to efficiency.  Successive 
periods of instruction and training occurring between periods of practical experience is 
the best means to develop judgment, which, in positions of great responsibility, is an 
                                                 
44 Ernest J. King, Knox, Dudley W., Pye, William S., "Report and Recommendations of a Board Appointed 
by the Bureau of Navigation Regarding the Instruction and Training of Line Officers," US Naval Institute 
Proceedings, 46, no. 8, August 1920 See Part One, "Instruction of the Line Officer", 3. 
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attribute which is hardly of inferior importance to the ability to reason to a logical 
conclusion.” 45 
While such eloquence speaks for itself, several points warrant emphasis.  The 
authors saw first that the naval profession was a complex one.  For this reason, those who 
would command had to develop skill with machines, understand material, integrate 
operations, lead men, and exercise judgment.  The plan also recognized that education 
and training must be progressive, that it must match the responsibilities of each grade.  
Technology was acknowledged as important, but no where in the text was it defining of 
the profession or of those who would command: there is no mention in this summary of 
separate identities of officers as defined by machines.  Rather, the technology was seen as 
subordinate after the first years of commissioned service to the higher priority of 
operational command.   
In a review of the lengthy document, the priority on unity and coordination was 
inescapable.  The authors repeatedly used the phrases and terms of unity, coordination, 
cooperation, unify, or 'unity of action'.  The need for a certain level of technical 
proficiency was noted but was subordinated to the necessity for 'line' officers to master 
integrated operations and strategy.46   Integration was reinforced by the stipulation that 
all 'line' officers complete an assignment aboard a large surface ship prior to schooling 
duty associated with destroyers, submarines, or aircraft.
or 
                                                
47   The surface ship and the 
surface fleet were in this way envisioned as a means of integrating and building a 
common framework of understanding among 'line' officers. 
 
45 Ibid. , 6-7. 
46 Ibid., 6. 
47 Ibid., 16. 
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The authors of the plan also recognized that merger and integration could not 
solve all the problems that confronted the ‘line’, that there was a case to be made for 
some degree of specialization, and for this they developed the concept of the ‘sub-
specialty’.  The ‘line’ officer needed to specialize for part of his career so that he could 
bring specialized skills or knowledge to the larger body of officers.  King and his co-
authors justified this limited degree of specialization on the basis of the “exchange 
theory” of trade: similar to the production of commodities, knowledge too benefits from 
specialized production followed by trade.  They explained:  “The business principle, ‘that 
exchange is best which gives both parties the largest possible profit,’ has been found as 
successful in the exchange of knowledge as in commodities.” 48  Thus King and his co-
authors recognized that every officer could not know everything, but as a corporate body 
all the specialties could be mastered and the knowledge ‘traded’.  Those who rose to 
command would be responsible to integrate the various 'sub-specialties' to achieve unity 
of the larger organization's overall effort.  
King was so strongly operational in his orientation that even the ‘sub-specialty’ 
was not limited to technical fields,  but included a 'sub-specialty' in naval operations.  
King's plan made available to the 'line' three types of sub-specialties: "design and 
production" of material; "manipulation" (management) of material; and the general field 
of “operations.”49  The authors recognized that, though an officer might possess a 
material (technical) sub-specialty, his over-riding identity remained that of the 
operational 'line' officer.  King, Knox, and Pye were firm in their conviction that the 'line’ 
officer must devote his greatest energies to the mastery of operations. The ‘line’ officer 
                                                 
48 Ibid., 11. 
49 Ibid., 15. 
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was not to identify himself with specialized technology and machines on which he 
trained.  Rather, those officers who rose to command were to identify with the larger 
service and were to work to achieve unity of operational effort.  
To create the integrative commander (the generalist), the board recommended a 
policy of alternating periods of education, sea duty, and shore duty.  The process included 
assignment of all officers following graduation from the Naval Academy to a two year 
tour aboard a surface “ship of the first rate”.  This large surface ship duty was followed 
by the option of duty for three years in aviation, submarines, destroyers, and numerous 
smaller ships.  Sea duty was then interspersed within a pattern of progressively more 
integrative education, starting with a new “General Line Course” (GLC) developed by 
King in 1919.50  For those desiring a 'design' or 'production' specialty, attendance at a 
civilian graduate school was to follow completion of a year at the GLC.51   Following 
completion of a civilian degree, the officer would then return for more sea duty that was 
then followed by assignment to the junior and senior courses at the Naval War College.  
It is worth noting that with each progressive stage of education, the technical content 
quickly fell off to be replaced by progressively greater study of operations and non-
technical course work.  Even the GLC for junior officers at the seven year point included 
the study of politics, economics, and tactics which constituted a greater share of the 
                                                 
50  Ibid., 14.   It is also interesting to note that this policy of service aboard surface ships was not completely 
discarded until 1960, which will be discussed in chapters 5-7.  King’s school, the General Line Course or 
School, was terminated in 1962.  
51 John Wesley Masland and Laurence Ingram Radway, Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and 
National Policy (Princeton,: Princeton University Press, 1957), 91.  The Naval Academy educational 
program was focused at the junior officer role, and therefore deemed insufficient to provide for the 
educational needs of officers as they progressed to levels of greater and more integrated responsibilities. 
The GLC was seen as necessary to lay the foundation for the continuing broadening of naval officers as 
they prepared for increased levels of responsibility, some of which would be taught at the war college.   
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curriculum than marine engineering.52  In many ways the King plan resembled elements 
of the emerging Army system of officer training and education.  This may not have been 
coincidental, for King was influenced by the Army, not just in his tours of European 
battlefields and installations in 1917-1918, but before the war.  In particular, King credits 
his inter-service knowledge to his brother in law, Walter D. Smith.  It was Smith who 
expanded King’s interests beyond Mahan to include land campaigns of Napoleonic Wars 
and the American civil war.  Accompanied by Smith, King visited the battlefields of 
Antietam and Gettysburg.   According to Buell, an authority on King, after years of 
study, reflection and interaction with Smith, King considered "...himself as the naval 
officer most knowledgeable in the work of generals and their armies." 53 
The authors of the King plan envisioned the educational requirements as 
compulsory, similar to the Army’s educational pattern, which was enforced by a policy of 
mandatory attendance.54 The mandatory nature of the Navy system, however, was never 
fully realized.55  If the progressive education could not be made mandatory, a surrogate 
of sorts was found in compulsory written promotion examinations that were explicitl
connected to the educational requirements codified in King’s system of education.  The 
connection between the promotion exams and education were recorded in the BUNAV 
Manual shortly after the Navy’s approval of King’s plan.  The BUNAV Manual linked 
lower-level operational education (the junior war college phase) with mandatory 
y 
                                                 
52 Ernest J. King, Knox, Dudley W., Pye, William S., "Report and Recommendations of a Board Appointed 
by the Bureau of Navigation Regarding the Instruction and Training of Line Officers," US Naval Institute 
Proceedings, 46, no. 8, August 1920,  3, 9,12, 16. 
53 Thomas B. Buell, Master of Sea Power: a Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King (Boston: Little 
Brown, 1980), 34. 
54 Thomas B. Buell, Master of Sea Power: a Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King (Boston: Little 
Brown, 1980), 34. 
55 John Hattendorf, Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the Naval War College (Newport, RI: 
Naval War College Press, 1984), 129. 
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promotion exams in tactics and operations.  In this period the mandatory exams were of 
growing importance to young officers eager to present their best record to the recently 
empowered promotion boards. The content of the exam mirrored the material taught at 
the Naval War College, and if desired, an officer could validate a section of the exam by 
completion of the war college curriculum, either in resident or by correspondence 
course.56  Given the surplus of officers during much of the inter-war period, an officer’s 
promotion could well hinge on an examination grade, and a validation of the exam thus 
reduced the risk of failure.  As a consequence, war college correspondence and resident 
courses were well subscribed in the interwar period.57  The benefits that may have 
accrued to the Navy as a consequence of a policy that encouraged younger officers to 
read and write about strategy, tactics and operations is impossible to measure.  But it 
would not be unreasonable to conclude that the Navy's operational and strategic success 
in the Second World War may have had at least some connection to King's system of  
early education for young officers who would one day become the planners and 
strategists in a global war.  
 
 
                                                 
56 Louis J. Connelly, CDR USN (Ret), Sequel to the Line Officer's Examiner (Charleston, S.C.: Furlong and 
Son, 1926), 7-56.   “With the approval of the Secretary of the Navy, the Naval examining Board will accept 
certificates of the satisfactory completion of a War College correspondence course as evidence of 
proficiency in Strategy and Tactics of candidates for promotion in the ranks of Ensign, Lieutenants (j.g.,) 
and Lieutenants (Sr G), appearing for promotion to Lieutenant (j.g., and Sr. gr.) and Lieutenant-
Commander."  
57 Joseph K.  Taussig, "Secretary of the Navy Notes: Education in the Navy (Taussig Report)," US Naval 
Institute Proceedings, 56, no. 8, August 1929, 746.  In one month alone a remarkably high 520 officers 





The King Plan Tested:  Proliferating Scientific Specialties and the Rise of 
Skilled Aviators 
The Navy quickly and forcefully endorsed King's plan for officer education and 
professional development.  Within a few months the Navy published the plan in the 
leading professional periodical of the time, the United States Naval Institute Proceedings 
of August 1920.  The Navy high command lent additional authority to the plan by 
including in Proceedings a cover-page endorsement of the recommendations.   
The plan’s recommendations quickly diffused into authoritative personnel policy 
documents.  Of particular importance, the Bureau of Navigation (BUNAV) Manual was 
revised almost immediately to match the King recommendations.  The BUNAV Manual 
that pre-dated the plan made no mention of integrative education and assignment.  
However, in later versions of the publication—from 1927 to the 1960s—the manual's 
'line' officer education and assignment pattern was almost identical to that of King's plan, 
including even the timing of when each educational stage should occur.  The revised 
BUNAV manual also made note of the importance of engineering education in the career 
of a general ‘line’ officer.   Echoing King’s plan, the BUNAV manual endorsed 
engineering as a respectable sub-specialty in a ‘line’ officer’s career.  Indeed, a BUNAV 
dispatch of 1921 asserted that “…engineering is an essential feature of the duties of a line 
officer”.58    But the fact that the King Plan received an immediate welcome and survived 
                                                 
58BUNAV Dispatch of 20 July 1921, as quoted in Bureau of Navigation Navy Department,"Bureau of 
Navigation Manual, 1921", NARA RG 405, USNA Special Collections, call number VA 52.A65 1921, 
page 58.   
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and flourished for so many years did not mean integration and progressive education 
came easily to the organization.   
The Navy authorized the King study, publicly endorsed the findings, included the 
guidelines in official documents (the BUNAV manual), and then widely distributed the 
report in the leading officer publication of the day.  However, as noted previously, the 
Navy did not make the plan's requirements mandatory for all 'line' officers.  Some 
scholars have interpreted the lack of compulsory officer education to be indicative of luke 
warm support for the plan.  But an educational and development policy that refrained 
from comprehensive enforcement had benefits.  Such a policy gave personnel 
administrators additional flexibility in dealing with unique individual assignment 
situations that might arise.  There were, no doubt, some officers unqualified for the 
course work at the progressively more advanced schools.  Senior leaders may also have 
been mindful of contingencies or emergencies that might require the assignment of an 
officer to something not recommended by the plan.  The safe, bureaucratic approach to 
this plan was to publish it, support its recommendations and expect shrewd officers and 
promotion boards to follow its recommendations and standards but preserve an 
administrator's right to depart from the plan. As will be discussed later in this chapter, the 
majority of senior officers did in fact attend advanced educational institutions more or 
less as prescribed by the King Plan.  Those officers who would rise to the highest 
leadership positions in the next war almost to the man would attend the Naval War 
College, the ultimate educational requirement for the generalist officer.  
The weakest point of the King Plan sprang from the difficulties of the Act of 
1899:  that "all line officers were to be engineers".   The merger of 1899 destroyed the 
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Engineering Corps, and thus a large number of ‘line’ officers were needed to study 
engineering, and hopefully a few would choose to become a ‘sub-specialist’ in a technical 
field.  In addition to gaining a sub-specialty in engineering, engineering educated ‘line’ 
officers were expected to progress upward through the phases of integrative education at 
the General Line Course and the War College.  As engineering grew more complex it 
became increasingly difficult for the ‘line’ officer to achieve this balancing act, to 
substitute for the old engineering corps officers and at the same time prepare for  
operational command at sea.  Congressman Low’s 1899 criticisms of amalgamation as a 
step backward looked increasingly more valid as time passed and engineering became 
more scientific. The Personnel Act of 1916 implicitly recognized Low’s critique when it 
granted that some ‘line’ officers were by their studies of engineering too specialized to 
rise to command and were thus designated “Engineering Duty Only officers" (EDO).  But 
this group of EDO officers remained small. Consequently, operational, unrestricted ‘line’ 
officers were often called upon to fill numerous engineering billets while at the same time 
they attempted to remain proficient in naval tactics and operations.   
A decidedly less scientific challenge to King’s plan of integration was the 
requirement to accommodate within the ‘line’ new skill-based groups of practitioners: the 
naval aviators and submariners.  The war had raised the profile of both submarine and 
aviation technology.    Submariners constituted a relatively modest problem as the 
operators of this technology considered themselves from the outset to be a component of 
the ‘line’, and in fact shared a common ‘designator’ or identifier with surface navy 
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officers until 1970.59  Aviation, however, proved more problematic.  Early aviators 
explained that they were different than any other officers.  The aviators pointed out that 
submarine and destroyer officers were easy to integrate into the 'line' due to the simple 
fact that “…both submarines and destroyers have much in common with other naval 
surface craft. Submarines are water craft…” In contrast, airplanes are by their name 
distinct, they are not water but air-craft. 60  Though glib, such an argument had 
substance: aircraft were different than ships. They required more independence of 
operation by a single officer, required substantially greater eye and hand coordination, 
and possibly more physical strength and stamina.   
Aviation factions soon threatened the integrity of the inter-war Navy.  These 
factions may have been inspired by army aviator Billy Mitchell, but the outcome of their 
agitation was very different than the army experience.  Though King's plan was already 
in place by the time aviation factionalism peaked, navy leaders made several additional 
organizational adjustments to convince political decision makers that the Navy could 
accommodate within the profession the specialized skills of the aviation officer.  The 
accommodations included financial and bureaucratic innovations.  Aviators on occasion 
received huge financial incentives to fly in the navy, as much as 50% over base pay.61  
Bureaucratic innovations included the creation of the Bureau of Aeronautics in 1921, two 
years after completion of King's plan.  But questions of compatibility persisted, and 
                                                 
59 United States. Bureau of Naval Personnel., Register of Commissioned and Warrant officers of the United 
States Navy and Marine Corps (Washington: Govt. Print. Off. etc., 1814-2002).  See changes in designators 
from 1969 to 1971, from a ‘1100’ designation common to both  submariners and surface officers, to a split 
designation of  ‘1110’ for surface and ‘1120’ for submarine after 1971.  
60 F. W. LT USN Wead, "The Navy and Naval Aviation," US Naval Institute Proceedings, 52, no. 5, May 
1926, 886. 
61 Bureau of Navigation Navy Department,"Bureau of Navigation Manual, 1921", NARA RG 405, USNA 
Special Collections, call number VA 52.A65 1921.  See pg 61 for discussion of financial incentives.  
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President Calvin Coolidge established the “Morrow Board” to study further the question 
of aviation.  Ultimately Congress enacted legislation that in 1925 established the 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Aeronautics and also required that the commanding 
officers of carriers and naval air stations be qualified aviators.  To facilitate broader 
integration with the existing “line”, older URL officers were allowed to qualify in 
aviation, and several ultimately did.62  While the Navy recognized flight duty as the 
equivalent of ‘sea duty’, aviation was still considered to be a subordinate specialty within 
the larger navy 'line'.  Accordingly, aviation-trained line officers were guided in their 
professional development by the outlines of the King’s 1919 plan: all regular ‘line’ 
aviators were required to serve on surface ships prior to flight school; periodically rotate 
their assignments between aviation and large surface ships; and attend the Naval War 
College in order to cultivate the capacity for integrative command of a three dimensional 
fleet.  
 Not all aviators were in total agreement with all of King's integrative educational 
and assignment policies,63  but a decisive share of the new officers embraced the over-
riding idea: that of a unified navy and an integrated officer corps.  A young aviator, 
LCDR C. A. Pownall observed of the Navy and aviation in 1926:  “…attempts to divide 
                                                 
62 Yarnell and Reeves qualified as aviation observers, and King, Sherman, and Halsey as aviator pilots. See 
Ronald H. Spector, At War, at Sea: Sailors and Naval Warfare in the Twentieth Century (New York, N.Y.: 
Viking, 2001), 143.   
63 King’s plan had in fact recognized that an officer could not be expert in all things: “It is apparent that no 
one officer can be really expert in all branches of the naval profession.”    Ernest J. King, Knox, Dudley W., 
Pye, William S., "Report and Recommendations of a Board Appointed by the Bureau of Navigation 
Regarding the Instruction and Training of Line Officers," US Naval Institute Proceedings, 46, no. 8, 
August 1920, 11.  Moffett argued that an officer could not be expert at both, but Moffett did not want an 
independent navy air arm.  It seems that King and Moffett were saying essentially the same thing: there had 
to be some degree of specialization, but unity and integration had to be achieved.  In the end, aviators 
remained in the 'line' and were granted relatively wide latitude in their education and assignment patterns.  
However, almost all aviators who rose to higher command served on surface ships and studied at the War 
College, both requirements of the King's plan.   
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the Navy against itself…” had failed.  The unity of the officer corps in all three 
dimensions was the preferred course.  He went on: “Let us weigh, then venture, over the 
sea, on the sea, and under the sea, together.” 64   
* 
New Foundation for an Integrative ‘Line’: Changes in Undergraduate 
Education 
   The lessons of the Great War and new technologies (especially aviation) soon 
influenced curricular debates at the Naval Academy.  The curricular debate of the 1920s 
centered on a question that would become central to most academy reform debates for the 
next fifty years: how much time should a midshipman devote to learning about 
specialized engineering and machine technology as compared to time spent on gaining a 
more general education, which included a substantial component of non-technical, 
cultural, and linguistic education?    
The King plan recognized the importance of the Naval Academy as the 
educational foundation of all officers who would rise to command the ships, squadrons, 
and fleets of the nation.  The report explained that the issues of officer education and 
development could only be addressed as “…part of a whole scheme for instruction and 
training of naval officers during their entire careers, from midshipman to admiral, both 
                                                 
64 C. A. Pownall, LCDR, USN, "The Airphobia of 1925," US Naval Institute Proceedings, 52, no. 3, March 
1926, 461, 463. 
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inclusive.” 65  While the King plan did not stipulate specific Annapolis reforms, the 
report did acknowledge that midshipmen needed to be prepared for future leade
responsibilities and at the same time receive an adequate technical education. The report 
called for the academy to “…develop the mental capacity, principally the ability to reason 
to logical conclusion….to develop military character, including discipline, the attributes 
of leadership, and the basic virtues….and to supply knowledge of the technical 
groundwork of the profession."
rship 
                                                
66  This last goal, to supply knowledge of the "technical 
groundwork" of the profession, was contested ground in the early inter-war years.  It was 
contested because aviation-- and to a lesser extent submarines-- had expanded the scope 
of an officer's “technical groundwork”: it was now three dimensional.   
In the immediate post-war period, Naval Academy leaders wrestled with the 
technological implications of the Great War.  The academy's mission statement of 1922 
affirmed the need for a general education, which provided “…educational fundamentals 
upon which experience afloat may build the finished naval officers.”67 Some of the older 
aspects of the curriculum remained even though the passage of time and the emergence of 
new technology would seem to argue for their elimination.  Midshipmen still trained in 
the cutlass and small arms, landing party drills, and small unit land tactics, though these 
were over time increasingly conducted for ceremonial purposes.  In other areas, the 
academy was highly responsive to the new realities of war.  New courses were added for 
 
65 Ernest J. King, Knox, Dudley W., Pye, William S., "Report and Recommendations of a Board Appointed 
by the Bureau of Navigation Regarding the Instruction and Training of Line Officers," US Naval Institute 
Proceedings, 46, no. 8, August 1920, 6.  
66 Ibid.,  9. 
67 M.S. Tisdale, LCDR USN, Aide to the Superintendent,  drafted this academy  mission statement of 1922 
that was to sustain until 1934, as quoted in Charles Paul Sheppard, “An analysis of curriculum changes at 
the United States Naval Academy during the period 1959 through 1974” (Thesis Ph D --George 
Washington University, 1974), 176.   
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instruction on mine warfare, and a modern battleship fire control system was installed in 
Dahlgren Hall for training midshipmen.68  Aviation was, however, embraced more 
cautiously.  Whether or not Annapolis could accommodate aviation and aviators 
remained in doubt for several years after the war.  
 Resistance to aviation curriculum came most forcefully in the personae of a one-
time champion reformer, RADM Henry B. Wilson, class of 1881.  In the early years after 
the First World War, while he served as superintendent, Wilson refused to add any 
aviation studies to the curriculum.69    Faced with the slow pace of reforms at the 
academy, Admiral Moffett speculated that the flight school at Pensacola could become a 
new naval academy, devoted to the undergraduate education of those officers destined for 
the cockpit.70  But Annapolis reformers finally overcame traditional resistance to 
aviation, and following Wilson’s retirement, an aviation component was added to the 
curriculum.  In the summer of 1925 the academy officially recognized aeronautics as a 
field of study; in 1926 it offered a three month course in aeronautics; renamed the 
Department of Seamanship the Department of Seamanship and Flight Tactics; and 
renamed the Department of Marine Engineering and Naval Construction to the 
Department of Engineering and Aeronautics.71  By 1930s, an official training squadron 
                                                 
68 Ibid., 125. 
69 See Frank M. Hertel, LCDR USN, "The Naval Academy and Naval Aviation," US Naval Institute 
Proceedings, no. 74, Jan 1948,  37-38.  See also Karsten, 360.  
70 Peter Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern 
American Navalism (New York: The Free Press, 1972), 360; William Michael McBride, “The Rise and Fall 
of a Strategic Technology : the American battleship from Santiago Bay to Pearl Harbor, 1898-1941” 
(Thesis Ph D --John Hopkins University, 1989),  225. 
71    Charles Paul Sheppard, “An analysis of curriculum changes at the United States Naval Academy 
during the period 1959 through 1974” (Thesis Ph D --George Washington University, 1974), 177.  
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was established at Annapolis for midshipmen flight indoctrination during the summer, 
and all junior 'line' officers were expected to take and pass an exam in aviation.72    
With the addition of more technical courses in the academic curriculum, some 
officers became concerned that technical studies threatened to overwhelm the 
midshipmen’s cultural and non-technical education.  Officers argued over the balance 
between narrow technical and broader curriculum, and the resultant curricular policy sea-
sawed for a decade.  Some officer reformers were so convinced of the inferior condition 
of midshipman cultural education as compared to foreign officers that they recommended 
the relegation of all technical and engineering courses to the post graduate school.73  
Reports of several Boards of Visitors to the Naval Academy agreed that the curriculum 
was too narrowly technical.74  Not only the Board of Visitors but also respected ‘line’ 
officers called for a re-balancing of technical and non-technical.  Members of the 
academy’s own academic board called for an expansion into the fields of economics, 
government, and the addition of a second foreign language.75  In 1930 the Academy 
gained recognition as the rough equivalent of an undergraduate college, though not 
necessarily a polytechnic college, and was certified for the first time in its history to grant 
the baccalaureate degree.76    Those who advocated a broader and less technical academy 
                                                 
72 Louis J. Connelly, CDR USN (Ret), The 1930 Edition of the Naval Line Officer's Examiner (Charleston, 
S.C.: Furlong and Son, Inc., 1930). 
73 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations 
(Cambridge,: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 296. 
74 John Wesley Masland and Laurence Ingram Radway, Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and 
National Policy (Princeton,: Princeton University Press, 1957) , 92, refers to Boards of Visitors of 1923, 
1924, 1931. 
75 A.J. Chantry, CDR  (CC) USN,"Ltr from CDR Chantry, Chair of Department of Mathematics,  to 
Superintendent of the Naval Academy, dtd 11 August 1924, Subject: The Place of the Naval Academy in 
the Education of  the US Naval Officer", NARA RG 405, Record of Superintendent, General 
Correspondence,  Curriculum Studies, 1924-39, box 1, folder 1. 
76 Charles Paul Sheppard, “An analysis of curriculum changes at the United States Naval Academy during 
the period 1959 through 1974” (Thesis Ph D --George Washington University, 1974), 126.  
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education were opposed by several senior officers, to include Admiral Leigh, Chief of the 
Bureau of Navigation.  Leigh observed that the "advent of new appliances...have placed 
great burdens on all officers…"  He went on to explain, however, that this burden was 
necessary, for the Navy was an “…industrial institution as well as a fighting machine,” 
and thus naval officers "must possess a technical background". 77   
RADM Thomas C. Hart, 1931-34, a future four star admiral,78 sided with 
proponents of broader education: he championed a new curriculum that emphasized 
fundamentals in the sciences and increased the time spent on liberal arts subjects.  To 
facilitate the shift toward the non-technical subjects, Hart established the Department of 
Economics and Government.79  During this period Hart upgraded the civilian faculty, 
especially in the areas of English, history, foreign language and mathematics.  Other 
naval educators and observers of the institution followed Hart’s lead and wrote favorably 
of the changes, in one case observing that the study of foreign language was highly 
valued in the inter-war period as it made the midshipman a “…more competent 
officer…adding to the efficiency of the fleet.”80  The study of language was further 
expanded with the inclusion of German and Italian. 81  
                                                 
77 R. H.  Leigh, RADM USN, CHBUNAV, "Navy Personnel," US Naval Institute Proceedings, no. 55, Oct 
1929. 
78 Hart went on to promote to full admiral and commanded the Asiatic Fleet in the months before the Pearl 
Harbor.  His promotion would appear to confirm that he was not a naval officer with reform ideas on the 
margins of the profession, but was one of the most respected officers of his generation.  See  Thomas B. 
Buell, Master of Sea Power: a Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King (Boston: Little Brown, 1980), 
132. 
79Charles Paul Sheppard, “An analysis of curriculum changes at the United States Naval Academy during 
the period 1959 through 1974” (Thesis Ph D --George Washington University, 1974), 172. 
80Kendall Banning, Annapolis Today (New York City: Funk and Wagnalls, 1939).  Banning described the 
mandatory three years of language training in the most positive of terms: "He is a more competent officer 
because he can do it (speak language); he is adding to the efficiency of the fleet...",  69.  See also page 12 
for a description of language requirements:  one language for three years required of all midshipman. 
81 William E. Simons, Liberal Education in the Service Academies (New York: Published for the Institute 
of Higher Education by the Bureau of Publications Teachers College Columbia University, 1965).  See also 
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Coincident with enhancements of the non-technical curriculum, there was a de-
emphasis on technology training, particularly in aviation. By the middle 1930s, the actual 
time devoted by midshipmen to aeronautics declined.  Indoctrination fell to three weeks 
in the summer; aeronautical courses were integrated back into existing departments, and 
all aviation/aeronautic titles were deleted from all departments.82  The de-emphasis on 
the academic study of aviation subjects was as dramatic as it was puzzling, for in this 
same period there was an explosion of aviation technological innovation in the private 
sector, especially in Germany and England.  A more detailed analysis of why the 
academy deemphasized aviation studies is, however, beyond the scope of this study.83 
                                                                                                                                                
The Naval Academy trend toward a more general, perhaps even more liberal arts 
curricula, was confirmed in studies by leading scholars of military education.  Masland 
and Radway concluded that from the 1920s to the later 1930s the Naval Academy 
expanded the curriculum in order to broaden officers' intellectual and professional 
development.84   Huntington described the shift toward humanities in 1932 as “drastic”, a 
 
Charles Paul Sheppard, “An analysis of curriculum changes at the United States Naval Academy during the 
period 1959 through 1974” (Thesis Ph D --George Washington University, 1974), 178. 
82 Frank M. Hertel, LCDR USN, "The Naval Academy and Naval Aviation," US Naval Institute 
Proceedings, no. 74, Jan 1948, 38. 
83 Early naval aviators saw naval aviation as an academic-related pursuit such that the first pre-flight 
schools were established at the leading scientific institutions of the day, MIT.    See Richard C. Knott and 
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84 John Wesley Masland and Laurence Ingram Radway, Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and 
National Policy (Princeton,: Princeton University Press, 1957), 89-92. 
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change in the curriculum that “…increased the proportion of the midshipman’s academic 
time on cultural subjects from 21.6 percent to 31.2 percent.” 85 
All things considered, policies pursued at the Naval Academy in the interwar 
period achieved a remarkable balance which was to last for a generation.86  In 
consonance with the values and goals expressed in the King plan,  the academy produced 
officers with the capacity for immediate employment on the technologies of the day, but 
officers were also given an educational foundation to support progressive and integrative 
education later in their career.87  Though they may not have been immediately suited for 
advanced scientific engineering graduate school, they could with some remedial work 
meet the requirements of even the most demanding of graduate schools, as did young LT 
Rickover in the late 1920s.  An astute observer of the Academy described the inter-war  
Annapolis education succinctly: “Four years of combined classical and technical 
EDUCATION prepared the midshipmen for commissions as ensigns, assignment to sea 
duty, and the beginning of their TRAINING.”88  The question remained, how did the 
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King plan and the lessons of the Great War reshape more senior officer's education and 
assignment policy after they left Annapolis?   
* 
Graduate School and the Naval War College 
The Navy moved quickly in the early 1920s to align officer assignment and post-
academy education with the requirements as delineated in the King plan.89  To this end, 
the Navy established additional schools (the General Line Course/School) and added a 
new course at the Naval War College (the 'junior' course).  For line officers, the emphasis 
remained the cultivation of the capacity for integrated, operational command.  But at the 
same time the King plan emphasized operations, it also required many 'line' officers to 
obtain a technical 'sub-specialty' so that they could fill billets once held by the former 
engineering corps officers.  This split requirement--to be technically and operationally 
proficient--proved to be the most problematic aspect of the King plan.  The split 
requirement was fulfilled when an officer completed the education and assignments that 
qualified him in two specialties: a main specialty, which for 'line' officers was always 
operations at sea, and a sub-specialty that was frequently technical in nature.   
The Bureau of Navigation Manual of 1927 explained that graduate education was 
increasingly important to the attainment of a sub-specialty.  Technical sub-specialties 
                                                 
89 In quick succession over the next couple years, the officer manual (BUNAV manual) was changed to 
reflect King's recommendations. Schools and courses were established at the NPGS and NWC.  Not even 
senior officers were immune to the new requirements, evidenced in the Navy General Order number 168 
issued in 1927, wherein an advanced course for senior captains and junior admirals was established.  In a 
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time so as that the "...‘cycle in progressive education’ might be completed."  See Joseph K.  Taussig, 
"Secretary of the Navy Notes: Education in the Navy (Taussig Report)," US Naval Institute Proceedings, 
56, no. 8, August 1929. 
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earned in graduate school would allow operational officers to also fill technical billets.  
As noted previously, the manual explained that 'line' officers in graduate school could 
sub-specialize in one of three fields: further study in 'operations', material 'design and 
production', or material 'manipulation' (management).90  Those officers sub-specializing 
in operations spent one year at graduate school in the General Line Course and then 
returned directly to navy assignments ashore or at sea.  Those who chose a sub-specialty 
in material management, or the more technical specialty of 'design and production', also 
attended the GLC.  However, these officers continued their education with an additional 
year of study at a civilian university, factory, or ordnance station.91  After two years of 
education, some of these 'line' officers then worked ashore, which delayed their return to 
the operational fleet.  Some of the more technical officers successfully reconciled the 
technical and operational requirements and, despite years spent in labs or factories, still 
achieved high level operational command, for example, Admiral Arleigh Burke, an 
ordnance specialist who later became Chief of Naval Operations.  But in general, navy 
officers found it increasingly difficult to reconcile the demands of scientific engineering 
with the operational requirements of their career. The reason officers found it difficult to 
balance the two demands was that naval engineering was growing increasingly scientific 
and complex.    
In the inter-war period engineering was becoming an increasingly scientific field, 
and the associated disciplines and sub-fields were rapidly proliferating.92  With scientific 
                                                 
90 Navy Department Bureau of Navigation/Personnel United States,"BUPERS/BUNAV Manual", Naval 
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advances and increased rigor in the engineering field, the URL officers who chose a sub-
specialty in engineering had difficulty meeting the other requirements of a line officer.  In 
the middle 1920s some thoughtful observers began to express doubts that the URL could 
in fact be both engineer and a ‘line’ officer.   An educational advisor to the Naval 
Academy  Superintendent, who at the time controlled both undergraduate and  graduate 
education programs,  expressed the opinion that growing engineering complexity was 
approaching  a "...a limit to human capabilities, and efficiency of the service falls off 
rapidly when this limit is transgressed.  I believe this limit has been exceeded under the 
present expectations of the line officers. It seems logical and necessary therefore to 
relieve him of duties involving design, construction, and maintenance.”93    
In spite of such warnings, the Navy's personnel managers and educators persisted 
in the dual-tasking of the ‘line’.  Regular 'line' officers of the inter-war period shouldered 
the dual burden remarkably well, though in the later 1930s they had more help as the 
number of EDOs gradually increased, and a new category of EDO, the Aviation EDO, 
was established.  The 'line' was able to sustain such a balancing act for as long as it did 
because naval engineering remained for much of this period more practical than it was 
scientific, though the latter component was steadily increasing.  The practical nature of 
most engineering was evidenced in university engineering curriculum.  While some 
universities were moving rapidly toward a more demanding mathematical and scientific 
engineering program in the 1930s, these colleges were in the minority.  The 
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology, MIT, perhaps the leading technical university in 
the nation, did not embrace a curriculum of scientific engineering until the mid-1930s.94  
The Navy’s other civilian graduate university programs were further behind and 
remained more practical than scientific and mathematical until after the Second World 
War.   
The practical and ‘applied’ character of most naval engineering graduate 
education was evident in the graduate school manuals of the time.    In a summary 
provided to the Secretary of the Navy in the early 1920s, the list of graduate school 
programs could today be mistaken for vocational courses at a community college or a 
company training facility.95  For example, the Navy’s graduate program included work in 
non-university settings, often 'proving grounds' or factories: the study of ordnance 
engineering at the 'proving grounds' located in Indian Head, MD;  the study of ordnance 
engineering  at the torpedo station located in Newport, RI; and the study of electrical 
engineering at the General Electric Company plant located in Lynn, MA.  
While the Navy was moderately successful in the production of 'line' officers 
proficient in engineering, the service enjoyed greater success in developing integrative, 
operational commanders. This operational bias was not accidental but, as discussed 
previously, was explicitly built into the program for all 'line' officers.    Even the goal of 
technical graduate education for 'line' officers was to cultivate the capacity to ‘integrate’ 
engineering into operations, not to specialize in engineering.  That integration was the 
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primary goal of graduate education was evident in the requirement that all officers were 
to attend the General Line Course, even the engineering students.  
The General Line Course was designed to promote greater 'line' officer integration 
and admitted the first class shortly after the Navy approved the King plan.  Evidence of 
the non-specialized nature of General Line Course (GLC) is found in the Chief of the 
Bureau of Navigation report to the Secretary of 1920: “The scope and character of post-
graduate education is such that the officers who take it are of increased capability not 
only for technical work, but also for regular naval duties…..When the projected “general 
line course” is added to the field of post graduate instruction, the navy will be well 
provided with the means of improving and maintaining the efficiency (effectiveness ) of 
its officers.” 96  Accordingly, the stated goal of the General Line Course when it was 
formally established in 1927 was not to produce specialists but to “…prepare students for 
higher military assignments.”97    
To fulfill its integrative function, the GLC included the broad study of naval 
weapons and doctrines as well as the study of history and economics.  The Navy 
continued to broaden the GLC curriculum through the addition of foreign languages in 
1930s, to include Russian, Chinese, and Japanese.  Overseas study programs were also 
initiated, which provided several future flag officers years of study in Europe.98  That the 
General Line Course was not an engineering course is further evidenced by the fact that 
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students spent a substantial amount of time on non-technical subjects (humanities, social 
sciences, and international relations).99 
    Large numbers of officers in the inter-war period sought to further broaden their 
education.  To make available more opportunities for officer education and to move it 
beyond a narrow technical or parochial education, the Navy began to encourage more 
officers to study at non-navy institutions.  The rationale for moving naval officers to 
civilian colleges for advanced education was two-fold: recognition of the superior 
educational quality of civilian institutions and an appreciation of the benefits of 
broadened education outside the Navy.  Navy leaders in the 1930s were concerned that 
young officers be afforded increased opportunity to broaden out so as to avoid "in 
breeding” of ideas.  To achieve greater broadening, the Navy aggressively pursued a plan 
to relocate the entire navy graduate school from a navy installation to a civilian university 
campus. The Navy even approved plans to move the navy graduate school to the 
University of California at Berkeley in 1933, but the move was blocked at the last minute 
by a local Maryland congressman.100   
The broadening experience of graduate education represented by the GLC was not 
confined to a small minority of officers.  For several years the majority of regular officers 
                                                 
99 Ernest J. King, Knox, Dudley W., Pye, William S., "Report and Recommendations of a Board Appointed 
by the Bureau of Navigation Regarding the Instruction and Training of Line Officers," US Naval Institute 
Proceedings, 46, no. 8, August 1920.  See annex and course description. 
100 Alexander Wolfgang Rilling, “The First Fifty Years of Graduate Education in the United States Navy, 
1909-1959” (Thesis - University of Southern California, 1972),  158.  See letter from RADM F.B. Upham 
to then Superintendent RADM T.C. Hart of 15 April 1933, in which Upham complains of the danger of “in 
breeding” should graduate education continue to remain exclusively the domain of a navy institution. To 
broaden officers the Navy intended to move the NPGS to Berkeley. One can only speculate as to how UC 
Berkeley may have shaped naval officer education and thinking if it would have gained a monopoly on 
naval officer graduate education!  
109 
  
attended the General Line Course following their first sea duty.101   Even those bound for 
advanced technical and scientific specialization attended the GLC in large numbers.102  
But the GLC was only the intermediate institution in the integrative development of the 
naval commander.  After Annapolis, the Naval War College, the senior service school, 
was perhaps the most influential educational institution in the inter-war period. 
  The Naval War College (NWC) quickly conformed to the King Plan and 
expanded its course offerings to better facilitate integrative operational and strategic 
education for more ‘line’ officers.  The NWC established a junior course in 1923 and 
created the Advanced Course in 1927.103  As the most revered of post-graduate 
institutions, the War College had long been on the forefront of the effort to broaden the 
naval profession, to move it beyond the ‘technicism’ which militated against an 
integrated and unified Navy in the 19th century.104   With the rise in status of engineering 
and technology early in the new century, however, prospective students began to drift 
away from the war college to pursue more technical studies.  In an attempt to appeal to 
the young officers, the NWC mimicked some of the features and practices of a technical 
school.  In the lecture series before the Great War, technical subjects briefly dominated.  
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Michael Vlahos, a former professor and scholar of the War College, showed that at the 
end of the first decade of the 20th century the War College staff gave nine of ten lectures 
on technical subjects (engineering, mines, telegraphy, and ordnance) and only one on 
political subjects.105 This curricular pattern contravened the spirit and requirements as 
represented by the approved King plan.  Not surprisingly, the NWC in the inter-war 
period changed to become a more broadening and integrative institution that would offer 
officers the “…best means to develop judgment…” so necessary in the exercise of 
command.106   Admiral William Sims, under whom both Knox and King had worked, 
returned to the college after the war and reformed the curriculum to emphasize the 
methodology of command and placed a renewed emphasis on international relations, area 
studies, and policy.  By the 1920s, 50% of the lectures would reside in the areas of 
international relations, and in the 1930s their share would rise to 70%.107  
The college continued to adjust the curriculum to account for the lessons of both 
the Great War and changing technology.  RADM Veazie Pratt, President of the War 
College in the later 1920s, and a future CNO, recognized that the NWC had an important 
role preparing an officer for command at the highest levels, a preparation that required a 
“breadth of visions”.108   To this end Pratt emphasized in the curriculum “joint and 
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combined” aspects of war and placed renewed emphasis on International Relations.109   
Though the famous war college games of this period placed great emphasis on the 'battle 
line', the games did evolve to incorporate an increasingly broad range of naval weapon 
capabilities, to include aviation, amphibious landings, and submarines. 110 
The value of the NWC, already high when Sims returned to assume the 
presidency after the First World War, continued throughout the inter-war period.  So 
elevated was the status of a war college degree that Admiral Pratt, not himself a graduate 
of the institution, gladly received an honorary degree in 1927 when he stepped down as 
president.111   The college attracted the best and brightest officers in the navy profession 
and helped unify them through "doctrine and shared experience."112 The college’s 
importance in this period was such that attendance became a de facto prerequisite for 
promotion to high command.113   
Despite the college's inter-war popularity, some scholars pointed to Newport's 
failures of prediction (e.g., underestimation of the influence of carrier aviation in the 
Second World War) and questioned the value of college in preparing officers to 
command.  But such criticisms miss a larger point.  The important fact remains: those 
officers who were destined to command in war did not focus exclusively on their 
machines of war but attempted to broaden their understanding of war by study at the War 
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College.  An entire generation of future commanders had been taught to think about 
operations and strategies and to hone their critical and problem-solving skills.   Ronald 
Spector in his study of the Naval War College concluded that, in spite of the institution's 
failures of prediction, the college nevertheless insured that strategy and tactics would 
occupy a central place in the American officer's professional outlook.114   
* 
Assignment and Promotion Policy En Route to Command 
  King’s plan sought to develop in the ‘line’ the capacity for command judgment 
that would contribute to the organization’s overall 'unity of effort'.  In addition to class 
room education, King believed it was essential to carefully manage an officer's pattern of 
assignments.  Officer assignments needed to have a certain degree of commonality (e.g., 
universal service aboard a ship of the 'battle line') across the service so as to promote 
common understanding among fellow officers.  But perhaps more importantly, officers 
were to have a breadth of assignment experience.   
   Not long after the Navy endorsed King’s plan, officers began in significant 
numbers to move through the progressively broadening stages of advanced education.  
Most eligible officers left the academy, completed the universal requirement of duty on a 
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large surface ship, completed specialized training and service on either destroyers,  
submarines or aviation, and moved ashore for education at the General Line  Course and 
then at the Naval War College.  When officers deviated from the plan, the Navy 
investigated.  In those recorded instances where a noticeable number of officers in a 
promotion group did not attend the war college or GLC, the cause was attributed to 
demographic imbalances or ‘bottle necks’ in the personnel system, not as a result of 
officers' reluctance to attend the schools.115   
The fact was most 'line' officers conformed to all or at least a large part of King's 
requirements.  They attended King's schools and rotated assignments to various 
platforms.  As an indicator of popular appeal of the program in the 'line', it was reported 
that in a single month 520 regular officers and 20 reserve officers were enrolled taking 
the War College strategy and tactics correspondence courses.116  This constituted a 
remarkably high percentage of officers in what was then a relatively small navy, 
constrained in size as it was by the requirements of naval arms control agreements.117    
Surface officers rotated from large ships of the line to fast, small destroyers, which were, 
at the time, considered a different type of ship.   In the interwar period, and for almost 
two decades after the Second World War, regular line officers hoping to serve aboard 
submarines spent a mandatory three tour aboard a surface ship, a requirement that was 
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subsequently shortened by a year.118    A similar requirement applied to those regular 
officers who sought to earn their wings, though short service reservists and enlisted men 
were exempted from such a practice, which was an entirely logical exception to the plan 
since the reservists were excluded from exercising higher command. 
The inter-war policy on promotion exams also served to reinforce the 
development of a ‘generalist’ or 'integrative' officer identity.  Initially, the Navy took so 
seriously the ‘promotion by selection’ that all ranks of officers were examined.  Even 
those officers to be considered for promotion to admiral had, as a general rule, to report 
to statutory examining boards.119  Senior captains in later years appear to have been 
spared the examining boards, but more junior officers, from ensign to full commander, 
continued to face the exams, which included two sections in strategy and tactics and, by 
1930, a section on aviation.120  These rigorous exams, as discussed previously, contained 
a clause wherein officers who completed the correspondence course or the Junior Course 
at the War College received passing credit for that portion of the exam.121  This ‘credit’ 
was highly sought after, and the bulk of young officers attempted to gain such 
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allowances.122  The linkage between promotion and education at the War College may in 
part explain the strong propensity of officers to so readily conform to the requirements of 
King’s model and may in part explain the popularity of War College among these year 
groups.123  That these examinations had ‘teeth’ is further evidenced by the complaints 
offered by some officers: the officers recommended that the test material be expanded to 
include their area of expertise so that they could earn higher marks!124   The inter-war 
popularity of King's plan was not limited to only sea-going 'line' officers.  Rather, even 
Engineering Duty Only officers, the true technical specialists, saw the benefits of 
broadened education and experience.  One specialist wrote in Proceedings that an 
engineer should be “…almost as competent in the domains of policy….” as he is in his 
technical knowledge. 125    
Approximately ten years after King drafted his plan, the Navy revisited the 
subject of officer development.  In 1928-29 a review panel known as the Taussig Board 
affirmed that “…after a thorough study of the Knox-King-Pye board report, the study of 
the subject as then made was thorough and complete and the recommendations basically 
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sound.”126  The Taussig Board, however, had one recommendation: to further expand 
officer participation in the war college program.  The Taussig Board recommended that a 
significant number of senior officers be sent a second time to the Naval War College so 
as to take “…advantage of the advancement made in the War College since that time...” 
of their first matriculation in Newport.  The report went on to recommend that even flag 
officers who had not yet had the chance to attend the War College also be allowed to 
matriculate in order that “…the cycle of progressive instruction be completed…”127  This 
official validation of the war college in the late 1920s and early 1930s is particularly 
important to our purposes here.  The Taussig Board report suggests strongly that the 
decline in war college enrollment that occurred in the years before the Second World War 
was not due  to a retraction of official support for the King plan or indicative of a lack of 
support for the War College program.  Rather, the decline in enrollment was due to other 
factors, most likely the manpower shortage that resulted from the rapid fleet expansion 
after 1936. 
As the evidence shows, large numbers of 'line' officers in the inter-war period 
sought integrative professional education at the GLC and war college.  They also 
followed assignment patterns as described in the King plan.  But an analysis of career 
patterns of mid-grade officers does not provide a complete picture of what type of officer 
was, in the end, promoted to high rank.  Did the operational integrators promote to high 
command or did the specialists?  The answer to the question can be found through an 
analysis of the careers and assignment patterns of those officers who became the senior 
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flag officers.  Such an analysis confirms that the more broadly educated officers--the 
generalists-- did indeed rise to and come to dominate the high command of the Navy.   In 
surveying those who would lead in war, there are almost no exceptions to the pattern of 
the ‘well rounded’ (or 'generalist') officer rising to high command.  A brief summary of 
the leading admirals' biographies helps illustrate the pattern of development and 
education.   
Admiral J.O. Richardson, who was a year senior to King and who served as the 
Navy's senior fleet commander prior to King, received a general education at Annapolis, 
followed by graduate school in marine engineering, and finished his education at the War 
College.  He served in multiple assignments throughout his career, an assignment pattern 
that he credited with giving him a breadth of view.  Richardson described his career as 
constituting two phases: ‘pre-high command training’, wherein his specialty in ships and 
engineering was important to selection up to the rank of LCDR.  The second phase was 
that of widely varied assignments (six different assignments in one six year period) that 
prepared him for flag. To Richardson, the break between specialty and the cultivation of 
the qualities and abilities of higher command came as early as the rank of commander.128   
 Admiral Chester Nimitz, the senior naval commander in the Pacific during the 
Second World War, also possessed a rounded education and career.  Nimitz interspersed 
myriad sea and shore duties with graduate school and the War College.  Nimitz became a 
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leading expert on submarine diesel technology after studying in Germany, an educational 
feat he was able to achieve because of his foreign language skills.  Contrary to popular 
perception, Nimitz was not narrowly specialized in submarines.  Rather, he had alternated 
his service between surface ships and submarines and ultimately rose to command both 
types of ships. As he moved up in rank, he was broadened by alternating assignments in 
technical, personnel, and educational billets.  Like King, Nimitz was something of an 
educator and took great pride as the 'plank-owning' (the first) commander of the NROTC 
unit at University California, Berkeley.   Prior to becoming the commander of the Pacific 
Fleet after Pearl Harbor, Nimitz had held the highly influential post of the Chief of the 
Bureau of Navigation (personnel).129  
Admiral William F. Halsey, who would become a leading carrier group 
commander of the Second World War, also conformed to the model of the broadly 
educated, 'well-rounded' officer'.  Throughout his career he alternated between 
educational, over-seas, intelligence, and sea assignments, commanding numerous ships or 
squadrons along the way.  He served on both large surface ships and experimental 
torpedo boats early in his career and served in two Naval Attaché’ assignments in 
Germany and Norway.  He would be among the few senior officers who, at a relatively 
advanced age, would qualify as an aviator and later command a carrier.  Going beyond 
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the broadening requirements of the King plan, he would attend not only the Naval but 
also the Army War College. 130 
Admiral Ernest J. King conformed to the model of the generalist and ‘well 
rounded' officer.  King subscribed to and passed every correspondence course offered by 
the NWC and would attend the senior course at that same college.  Furthermore, he 
would serve or qualify in all three platforms (surface ships, aircraft, command a carrier, 
and command a submarine base).  He would serve in operations and engineering billets 
earlier in his career and in multiple officer educational assignments which culminated 
with duty as the President of the Naval Post Graduate School.131  
Admiral Raymond Spruance who rose to four stars was also a generalist.  He 
served in engineering billets, worked on early fire control systems, yet broadened out 
enough to be selected as the Navy's Deputy Chief of Naval Intelligence. He was both a 
student of and more than once served on the faculty of the Naval War College.132  
  Senior submarine and aviator commanders of the Second World War also 
conformed to the King plan.  VADM Charles A. Lockwood, who graduated a decade 
after King and later gained fame as the commander of submarines in the Pacific war, was 
an integrative officer not unlike the four star officers who commanded the fleets.  Prior to 
his duty aboard submarines, he served first on a surface ship and returned periodically to 
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large surface ships as his career progressed.  In his book on the early submarine navy, 
Down to the Sea in Subs, he described the importance for him to “round out” his career in 
the middle 1930s with an assignment to a surface ship.133  VADM John Towers, an 
aviation pioneer who promoted to four stars after the war, had served aboard surface 
ships on multiple occasions and even commanded a destroyer.  
   Arleigh Burke, a URL officer with a sub-specialty as a ‘design specialist’ in 
ordnance technology and later destined to rise to CNO in the 1950s, also adhered to many 
elements of the ‘well rounded’ career.  Burke subscribed to correspondence courses from 
the War College –though due to the disruption of the war buildup he never matriculated 
at the school--and attended graduate school at University of Michigan for a specialty in 
ordnance engineering.    Potter, biographer of Arleigh Burke, described the assignment 
policy for Burke and other officers of his period as one of “...providing junior officers 
with broad training.  Burke’s seniors in ARIZONA continued assigning him a variety of 
tasks, duties as diverse as assistant engineer and ship’s secretary, followed by duty in the 
gun’s central control station, all the while taking the Naval War College correspondence 
course”.134   
 The foregoing sampling of assignment histories provides strong evidence that the 
officers who achieved high rank conformed to the King model of integrative education 
and assignment.  This list could well extend lower in the flag ranks, for the variation in 
assignment, the desire to ‘round out’ a career,  was not unique to only the celebrated 
officers whose war records became the stuff of popular naval histories and biography.  
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The practice of rounding out career, assignment, and education was widely adhered to in 
the inter-war period such that by the early 1930s most regular line captains had attended 
the Naval War College at least once.135   
King's model of the broadly educated and ‘well rounded' line officer had become 
widely emulated by officers in the inter-war period.  Even as war clouds gathered in the 
1930s, the Navy continued to validate the model.  In 1936,  the General Board endorsed 
King’s model, explaining that “… all line officers should be so assigned to successive 
duties as to afford them a well rounded career in order to develop the requisite command 
qualities.”136   
* 
Taking Stock: Promotion of Integrators to High Command: 
One of the objectives of this research is to measure how officer development 
changed across generations, in particular, how and when the shift from the generalist 
model to that of the technical specialist (or techno-centric) model may have occurred.  
Unfortunately, detailed biographical information that was so plentiful for the 
commanders of the Second World War does not exist for many of the officers who rose 
to high command in later years.  Therefore, detailed biographical comparisons across 
generations are not possible.  But there does exist one useful metric by which to compare 
changes in officer models across generations: war college matriculation patterns for 
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senior flag officers.  Stated in another way, changes in the educational resumes of officers 
who rose to high command may provide insight about which model of officer 
development--the generalist or specialist-- had become dominant.  
In this chapter we are concerned with officer educational patterns from 1920 to 
1941.  An assistant to Admiral J. O. Richardson conducted an analysis of flag resumes 
over a several decade period.  His analysis demonstrated that over a two decade period 
from 1920 to 1941 the most successful officers in each year group showed an increasing 
propensity to conform to one of King's important educational requirements: attendance at 
the Naval War College.  The share of flag officers who had attended the Naval War 
College rose steadily: in 1924, approximately 50% of flag officers had attended the war 
college; by 1930 the share had risen to over 63%; 1941 almost 98% (83 of 84 flags). 137  
Thus, by the eve of the Second World War the officers who would lead America's fleets 
were a product of a system of progressive and integrative officer development that more 
or less conformed to the King Plan of 1919.  The validity of the generalist model is 
further confirmed by the educational statistics associated with the most senior American 
admirals: 12 of 13 four star admirals (92%) who commanded in the Second World War 
had studied at the Naval War College.138    
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Despite its drawbacks and limitations, the King system succeeded in producing 
officers who would succeed in command.  These officers were adequately specialized on 
a platform early in their career but progressively broadened in order to prepare them for 
the duties of higher command.  The Navy's system of integrative education and 
development was robust and functioned at multiple levels: general education at the 
academy, more advanced education at the GLC and War College, varied assignments on 
multiple platforms, common service aboard large surface ships, and completion of 
general 'line' promotion examinations.  The system inculcated into the American ‘line’ 
officer that delicate balance which Steven Roskill, a war veteran and historian, had 
argued was so difficult to attain, the “…balance between the essential need for 
professional competence in his own technical field and that broader understanding of 
human problems that can only be achieved from a wide… education.” 139  In the Second 
World War, commanders produced by King’s integrative system would distinguish 
themselves as America’s most successful combat leaders.  But the war exceeded in scale 
and technical complexity anything that King could have anticipated when he designed his 
generalist system of officer development.  Though American naval officers were 
victorious at sea, it was an open question whether or not the King model of officer was 
validated by the war or whether it too was, like the pre-WWI model twenty years before, 
"overcome by events".  We turn now to examine how the Second World War affected the 
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"From the beginning, however, there should be a broader education for the aspirants of 
all the services with a view of inculcating into the youngsters the general understanding 
of the uses and limitations of all weapons and services." 
Admiral William F. Halsey, 10 December 19441 
 
"...each new weapon, if only because it is new, gives prestige to the officers skilled in its 
use that acts as an incentive for that group to seek special privilege, authority and 
autonomy... it becomes incumbent that the Navy establish a training and educational 
system which constantly emphasizes the importance of high command relative to any 
specialty.” 
Bureau of Personnel Study, 19482  







The King system of officer development not only survived the Second World War 
but was validated by the war experience.  Neither technical specialists nor platform 
specialists displaced King's model of generalist commander.   As a result of a 
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combination of historical accident, environmental factors, and conscious personnel 
policy, the war years did not narrow but, on the contrary, broadened the 'line'.  Unlike the 
Army and Air Force experience, the unity of the Navy was preserved.  A massive influx 
of more narrowly trained aviators helped tip the balance to the specialists within the 
Army Air Corps and fragmented the service, producing the specialist service which 
became the U.S. Air Force.   In contrast, the massive wave of war-time naval officers did 
not narrow the navy along technical specialties but invigorated the model of the 'well 
rounded officer'.   The environment of the war reinforced the need for commanders who 
were primarily operators rather than technical experts.   In the Darwinian crucible of 
transoceanic, three-dimensional war, the most capable operators rather than the most 
technically-minded officers were promoted to command.  The post-war analysis of 
combat also validated the need for the well rounded, operationally-minded ‘line’.  No less 
than three post-war Navy studies validated King’s model of officer education and 
development.  The post-war Navy leadership went further than the King model and added 
even more integrative requirements in an officer's education: inter-service and 'joint' 
education.  The Navy’s commitment to breadth as opposed to specialization was not a 
‘hold over’ from the old ‘surface’ officers of the pre-war generation.  Rather, the new 
leaders of the Navy, combat aviation veterans, also endorsed the model of the 'well 
rounded officer'.   
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* 
Exigencies of War and Integrative Education 
King’s integrative and progressive educational system had flourished for fifteen 
years by the time Hitler occupied the Rhineland and Japan accelerated her move into 
mainland Asia. With the emergence of the German-Japanese threat, and with the failure 
to renew the naval arms limitations agreements in 1936, the Navy began an ambitious 
building and recapitalization program. The increase in shipbuilding coincided with a 
wave of technological innovations in communications, undersea warfare, aviation, and 
fire-control, all of which demanded the time and attention of increasing numbers of naval 
officers.3  Officers of this period were themselves cognizant that new ships and changing 
technology were shaping the officer corps.  LCDR Robert Carney, a future CNO, noted 
expansion and new technology were reshaping the officer corps to the “…improved 
armaments with their more numerous battle stations and increased shore activities." 4  
The building program, however, was not matched with a commensurate expansion in 
officer corps.   
the 
                                                
America’s political leadership was determined to maintain the appearance of 
neutrality and thus delayed mobilizing for war.  This meant, among other things, a tardy 
expansion of the officer corps which led to a shortage of officers.5  At the same time, 
 
3 William Michael McBride, “The Rise and Fall of a Strategic Technology: the American battleship from 
Santiago Bay to Pearl Harbor, 1898-1941” (Thesis Ph D --John Hopkins University, 1989), 284. 
4 Robert B. Carney, LCDR, USN, "Selection, Security, and Morale," US Naval Institute Proceedings, 61, 
no. 6, June 1935, 814. 
5 James O. Richardson and George C. Dyer, On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor: the Memoirs of Admiral 
James O. Richardson as told to George C. Dyer (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973).  Richardson’s 
title telegraphs the main theme of his work: that political leaders did not allow the Navy to properly, and in 
a timely fashion, prepare for war.  Richardson apparently lost his job as fleet commander  in part due to his 
confrontation with Roosevelt over delays in personnel mobilization. 
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technological-driven personnel policies internal to the Navy exacerbated the problem of 
officer shortfalls.  As an example, when the Bureau of Aeronautics (BUAER) demanded 
the Naval Academy enforce more stringent visual acuity standards for midshipman, the 
result was a massive attrition in some academy classes.6  Taken together, an expanding 
fleet manned by an inadequate officer corps meant that as early as 1936 a growing 
number of officers were diverted to ships, air stations and shipyards, while a declining 
number had the time to complete the progressive phases of King’s system of education.  
The approach of war necessitated changes in commissioning programs for both 
reserve and active duty officers.  The rapidly growing fleet absorbed the depression-era 
officer surplus.  To make up the shortfalls, the Navy increased the size of Annapolis 
classes and allowed reserve officers for the first time to serve in the ‘line’.7  The 
pressures of war and changing technology also influenced educational and physical 
requirements for midshipmen. As discussed in the last chapter, in the late 1920-30s, 
Admiral Hart and others had broadened the academy curriculum in the direction of the 
liberal arts and social sciences, adding more varied languages and the study of 
government and economics.  As the likelihood of war increased, a more practical-minded 
                                                 
6 A contributing factor in the shortage of officers had been the technologically-driven requirement of flight 
exams.  The academy classes experienced severe attrition in 1937 when vision exam standards were raised, 
most likely in support of the more demanding aviation requirements, and resulted in the loss of almost 40% 
of the Class of 1940.  With the outbreak of hostilities the Navy quickly realized its mistake and reappointed 
many of the midshipmen who had failed the eyesight exams.  A member of an earlier class who was also 
denied his commission due to failure of an eye exam proved of great service to the Navy, and became one 
of the founders of the Navy Seals.  This officer, Draper Kauffman, later promoted to flag and ultimately 
Superintendent of the Naval Academy.  Leaders recognized the high attrition as a problem.  See House 
Committee on Naval Affairs, Testimony of RADM Chester W. Nimitz on House Resolution 4368 to 
Shorten USNA Course from 4 to 3 Years Duration, 77th Cong.,  2nd sess., 21 April 1941.  
7   Prior to 1940, NROTC officers could serve only in the staff corps, usually the Supply Corps.  Faced with 
growing shortages of regular officers from Annapolis, NROTC officers were allowed for the first time to 
enter the ‘line’.  For discussion of NROTC expansion, see Arthur Ainsley Ageton, CDR, USN, The Naval 
Officer's Guide, 1st- ed. (New York,: Whittlesey House, 1943), 101;  Gene Martin Lyons and John Wesley 
Masland, Education and military leadership; a study of the R.O.T.C (Princeton, N.J.,: Princeton University 
Press, 1959), 50-53. 
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officer, RADM Sellers, took command of the academy intent on preparing midshipman 
for the immediate demands of war.  RADM Sellers scaled back some but not all of Hart’s 
expansion in the liberal arts and sciences.8  Sellars explained: "I can say without 
hesitation that in my opinion success or failure in battle with the fleet is in no way 
dependent upon a knowledge of biology, geology, ethics, social science, the literature of 
foreign languages or the fine arts." 9  Sellars had a point: the senior officer ranks already 
brimmed over with academy and war college graduates, and a temporary tilt in 
midshipman curricula toward training was not an unreasonable course of action.  And as 
it would turn out, this shift in emphasis was more rhetorical than actual, for Hart’s major 
innovations—the expanded social sciences and language program—remained largely in 
place.10   
Parallel with a shift in emphasis toward practical training at Annapolis, war 
preparations quickly made themselves felt at the graduate school and the war college, not 
so much in the curriculum—which remained fairly constant until the outbreak of 
hostilities—but in a decline in ‘line’ officer matriculation.11  As war approached, those 
officers who had not yet attended the war colleges or General Line Course would, due to 
the exigencies of fleet expansion and global conflict, never participate in the broadening 
educational programs.  The absence of these officers during the pre-war and war years 
                                                 
8 Charles Paul Sheppard, “An analysis of curriculum changes at the United States Naval Academy during 
the period 1959 through 1974” (Thesis Ph D --George Washington University, 1974), 184. 
9 Jack Sweetman, The U. S. Naval Academy: an Illustrated History (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 
1979), 191. 
10 Board of Visitors,"Report of the Board of Visitors to the United States Naval Academy", RG 405, 
Special Collections, USNA, Records of Boards and Committees, Board of Visitors, 1936-1977 Box 2. 
11 Donald Chisholm, Waiting for Dead Men's Shoes: Origins and Development of the U.S. Navy's Officer 
Personnel System, 1793-1941 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 699-700.   Chisholm 
ascribes the increased demand for specialized training as the main source of the pre-war decline in numbers 
of officers attending the post graduate school and the naval war college.  Though exact data is lacking, it is 
reasonable to assume that most of these officers were being drawn away from the education pattern of the 
King plan to the more urgent task of building and organizing the tools of war.  
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produced a demographic-educational deficit that would over the next two decades work 
its way through the ranks of navy leadership.   
* 
War-Time Officer Education:  Expansion and Acceleration, but Balance 
The pre-war period was a time of officer shortage, but the war brought a wave of 
reservists and clouds of aviators into the ‘line’.  The massive influx of new officers into 
both the Army and the Navy forced the two services to reevaluate their priorities with 
respect to integrative officer education and more narrow technical training.   While the 
Army reprioritized officer education to produce more narrow technical specialists, many 
of whom had served previously in the enlisted ranks, such was not the case in the US 
Navy.   The war did require a rapid expansion in number of reservists, acceleration of 
education and advancement (assignment) of regular officers, and the rise of aviators to 
numerical superiority. 12   However, both the regular and reserve officer cohorts of the 
war years were far more broadly educated than is commonly appreciated.   
 
                                                 
12  NAVPERS Annual Report," Navy Marines Corps Personnel Statistics, 30 June 1959", Naval Historical 
Center, Washington, D.C. as quoted in Spector,  259-261. Spector explains that the battles of 1942 and 
1943 were fought by officers who had entered the service prior to Pearl Harbor, and were predominantly 
graduates of the Naval Academy, augmented by pre-war reserve commission programs. The expansion of 
officers that followed was massive: the officer corps expanded from 21k (3.4k aviator) in 1941 to 206k 
(37k aviator) by 1944.  Over the period from 1941 to 1944 over 280k officers were added.  However, the 
effects of reserve expansion on the unrestricted line, and those who command, were relatively modest. 
Most reservists were ‘short service’. In addition, through various means, the progressively educated regular 




Undergraduate Programs: The “V” officers and Annapolis 
 
The regular officers who graduated from the accelerated Annapolis program 
enjoyed a remarkably broad baccalaureate education.  Annapolis graduating classes were 
expanded and accelerated, but unlike West Point, the source of regular Army officers, 
Annapolis adhered to a broader and more general academic curriculum.  Similarly, the 
reservists who came in greatest numbers with the waves of 1942-44 proved to be a 
broadly educated and diverse group of college educated men.  Naval aviation further 
broadened the officer corps with the emphasis it brought on yet another dimension of 
warfare. Most importantly, naval aviators did not align themselves with the narrow 
specialists but saw themselves  as naval officers, a part of the parent profession first, and 
aviation specialists second. As Admiral Yarnell, a naval aviator wrote during the war:  
"Naval aviators are seamen as well as airmen and have always prided themselves on this 
fact."13    
The outbreak of hostilities did compel the Navy to adjust the balance between two 
competing demands: that of practical training and that of a broader educational 
foundation gained from college.  Though all the services (Army, Marines, and Navy) 
accelerated their respective officer programs, the Navy’s academic policy soon parted 
company with the Army and Marines.  The Army and Marines radically deemphasized 
                                                 
13  Harry E.  Admiral Yarnell, USN (Ret),"Report on Naval Aviation, 6 November 1943", Library of 
Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Harry E. Yarnell,  Box 11,  (Author has copy provided from 
duplicates made by William McBride). 
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education and placed a priority on specialized training of large numbers of men for the 
duration of the emergency.  In the Army and USMC, "…education, as contrasted with 
training, was greatly curtailed or suspended altogether." 14  Furthermore, the Army and 
Marine Corps drew the vast majority of their officers from the enlisted men who had 
completed officer candidate school.15   In contrast to narrow training, the Navy sustained 
a program that closely approximated a college education. 16   The relatively low numbers 
of former enlisted men who became officers attest to the college-centric concept of 
officer development in the Navy: only two percent of the war-time officer expansion 
derived from the enlisted ranks, the remainder entered via direct commission from 
civilian life or through the officer college training programs.17 Thus, it was college 
programs—NROTC or its variants-- and not 'direct commissions' of technical specialists 
that flooded the ‘line’.  
NROTC, formally established in 1926, remained a numerically modest program 
for the first 15 years of its existence.  The program was built originally around six 
universities: University of California, Berkeley; Georgia Tech; Harvard; Northwestern; 
University of Washington, Seattle; Yale.  Beginning in the late 1930s as war appeared 
increasingly likely, the number of officer units expanded to encompass twenty-one more 
                                                 
14  John Wesley Masland and Laurence Ingram Radway, Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and 
National Policy (Princeton,: Princeton University Press, 1957), 100.    Masland and Radway analyze the 
results of an army study on ground troop procurement.  In particular, see Palmer, Robert R., The 
Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department 
of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1948.     
15 Ronald H. Spector, At War, at Sea: Sailors and Naval Warfare in the Twentieth Century (New York, 
N.Y.: Viking, 2001), 261. 
16 Gene Martin Lyons and John Wesley Masland, Education and military leadership; a study of the 
R.O.T.C (Princeton, N.J.,: Princeton University Press, 1959) , 101. 
17 Bureau of Personnel,"Chart: Wartime Sources of Navy Officers, Report of February 1945", Naval 
Historical Center, Washington, D.C. and USNA Collection, Nimitz Library, Micro Room Books D773.U48 
1976.  Officer trainees from the enlisted ranks numbered 5,325, whereas officer trainees from civilian life 
numbered 84, 016. Total officers procured between 7 December 1941 and 31 December 1944 numbered 
286,251 personnel. 
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colleges, essentially quadrupling the program.  However, with this expansion, the total 
NROTC officers in these universities would approach only 7,200 and produce less than 
1,500 additional naval officers a year.18    By 1940 the Navy realized that NROTC, even 
when combined with an expanded and accelerated USNA program, still fell short of fleet 
needs. To facilitate rapid officer corps expansion, the Navy established the first in a 
sequence of officer programs that became known collectively as the “Navy College 
Training Program.”  The first accelerated program (known as V7) admitted qualified 
enlisted men (who already possessed a college degree) and assigned them to one of three 
Naval Reserve Midshipmen Schools, one of which was an old, deactivated battleship, 
USS Illinois, converted to a schoolhouse and moored on the Hudson River.19   
With the outbreak of war, the demands for personnel far exceeded even the worst 
case projections formulated by the Navy’s Bureau of Personnel (before 1942, known as 
Bureau of Navigation).  Historians of the bureau vividly describe in a war-time report the 
inadequacy of preparations:  “Despite the opportunities of 20 years of peace, the Bureau 
of Navigation (Personnel) made no plans for officer procurement which did not crumble 
before the realities of the Second World War emergency.” 20   Personnel procurement 
was initially chaotic, and BUPERS frequently competed at cross purposes with 
BUAER.21  In this confusion, however, the goal of a broad and well-educated officer 
                                                 
18 Julius Augustus Furer, Administration of the Navy Department in World War 2 (Washington: U.S. Govt. 
Print. Off., 1959), 285;  Arthur Ainsley Ageton, CDR, USN, The Naval Officer's Guide, 3rd ed. (New 
York: Whittlesey House, 1946), 115.  
19 James G. Schneider, The Navy V-12 Program: Leadership for a Lifetime (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1987), 1-3.  
20 Naval Historical Center (U.S.),"U.S. Naval Administration in the Second World War", USNA 
Collection, Nimitz Library, Micro Room Books D773.U48 1976.  See page 1. 
21 Julius Augustus Furer, Administration of the Navy Department in World War 2 (Washington: U.S. Govt. 
Print. Off., 1959), 382.  Furer describes tensions between BUPERS and BUAER in procuring officers and 
personnel.  In essence, BUAER was totally independent and sometimes worked at cross purposes.  As a 
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corps was preserved, even before the Navy had developed the organization to ensure such 
an outcome, which it would do deliberately with follow-on programs.  In those early 
desperate months, the Navy did not dictate officer collegiate curricula.  Rather, the 
college degrees carried into the Navy by the first wave of ensigns were the results of 
thousands of individual choices made by students on college campuses scattered across 
the nation.  The reservist officers who engulfed the regular line were thus almost by 
accident a varied and diverse group, with the common denominator being that they were 
not narrowly trained but rather educated to meet the general, broad standards of the 
American academy. As Schneider, the leading authority on the war-time programs 
explained:   “The irregulars (those with prior college) were permitted to pursue their 
existing majors with little interference, thus demonstrating that the Navy firmly believed 
in the virtues of a liberal arts education in preparing men to assume the responsibilities of 
officers.” 22   
By later 1942 and early 1943, the Bureau of Personnel had recovered the 
bureaucratic initiative and together with Bureau of Aeronautics developed a coherent and 
cooperative officer procurement program.  The Navy remained committed to the idea that 
most officers would be college educated and dramatically expanded its program targeted 
at high school graduates.   The Navy College Training Program (V12) built upon existing 
college facilities and faculty around the country, and eventually numbered almost 300 
units, to include 121 colleges devoted to general line officer education, 136 to staff, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
result, many good officer candidates were missed, and the disorganization was such that no records were 
kept in the first months of the war so that it was difficult if not impossible to find these men at a later date.   
22 James G. Schneider, The Navy V-12 Program: Leadership for a Lifetime (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1987), 61. 
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29 to aviation line officers.23  Though the title of the overall manpower program included 
the phrase “training”, the V12 program was most clearly a “college” program.  As the 
Chief of BUPERS explained succinctly: “This is a college program.  Its primary purpose 
is to give prospective naval officers the benefits of a college education…” 24   
The young men accepted into the program were directed for the most part to 
either the V12 program, which produced non-aviation line officers, or to the V5 program 
for what were designated “Naval Aviation Cadets”.  Between the two, the V12 was the 
more academic and the V5 the more physical in focus, at least initially.   In the first 
months of the war, the Naval Aviation Cadets (V5) devoted minimal time (approx 3 
months) in college level educational curriculum and fairly rapidly progressed through a 
“flight prep”, Civil Aeronautics Administration course, “pre-flight” and finally “primary 
flight” training.  However, by 1943 the program was modified to require all aviation 
candidates to complete up to four terms of the V12 level college course work.25   
Reserve officer curriculum also remained remarkably broad and balanced. 
Masland and Radway observed the V12 program patterned itself on a college curriculum. 
Further, the curriculum was designed not by military officers, but by a group of 
distinguished academics, led by Dr. Alvin C. Eurich, a professor of Education at Stanford 
                                                 
23 Ibid.   For list of actual colleges, see page 15.   
24 V12 Bulletin No.4, “Conference on the Navy V-12 Program, at Columbia University, May 14-15, 1943, 
June 7, 1943, 4, as quoted in Schneider, 57. 
25 Arthur Ainsley Ageton, CDR, USN, The Naval Officer's Guide, 3rd ed. (New York: Whittlesey House, 
1946), 113.   The length of formal education across the programs varied from a high of 12 four month 
terms for medical, 8 terms for engineers, 4 terms for Line (deck) and originally as low as 2 terms Line 
(aviation). Interestingly, the success of war-time accelerated college degrees did not alter the Navy’s 
commitment to a longer four year degree. The aviation community initially hesitated in the post-war period, 
and for a few years allowed reservist aviators to enter flight training with less than a college degree. 
However, after some delay, even the aviators reestablished the full, 4 year college curriculum requirement.  
For discussion of this debate, see Admiral James Holloway, Jr.,  and his recollections of the Holloway 
Board deliberations of 1945, James L Holloway, Jr., ADM USN (ret) "A Gentleman's Agreement," US 
Naval Institute Proceedings, 106, no. 9, September 1980,71-77. 
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University. 26   Students studied college level English, history, mathematics, psychology, 
strategy, chemistry, engineering drawing, elementary heat and electrical engineering, (for 
engineers, physics), as well as more naval specific courses which emulated in large part 
the NROTC program, which was itself patterned after the USNA program.27     
In further contrast to the approach taken by the Army, the Navy required 
academic institutions to maintain high academic standards of both instruction and 
examination, and as such, navy reserve midshipmen and aviation cadets were educated by 
tenured professors in rigorous academic programs.28  That V12 broadened officers more 
than narrowed them was further evidenced by the range of professions into which its 
graduates would eventually, after military service, distinguish themselves.29   As Ageton 
described the program, it produced a “…general education slanted toward technical 
knowledge together with considerable basic instruction in the Naval profession.”   He 
went further to conclude:  “Taken together in conjunction with the regular college course, 
the course…produces a well-rounded, well-educated gentleman, trained for his duties as 
a naval Reserve ensign.” 30  Though the reservists would indeed exert a greater influence 
following the Second World War than after the Great War, the regular line officers who 
had graduated from Annapolis remained firmly in control of the middle and upper ranks 
                                                 
26 James G. Schneider, The Navy V-12 Program: Leadership for a Lifetime (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1987), 59. 
27 Arthur Ainsley Ageton, CDR, USN, The Naval Officer's Guide, 3rd ed. (New York: Whittlesey House, 
1946), 127. 
28 James G. Schneider, The Navy V-12 Program: Leadership for a Lifetime (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1987), 59. 
29 A list of graduates and their professions covers the range of technical to the liberal.  Its most celebrated 
career navy officer is RADM Wayne E. Meyer, USN (Ret), better known as the ‘father of aegis’.  Other 
graduates have gone on to lead companies, and two became leading educators, two college presidents, from 
USC and Illinois, Dr. James H. Zumberge and Dr. John E. Corbally.  See Schneider’s list of graduates, 
page 331.    
30Arthur Ainsley Ageton, CDR, USN, The Naval Officer's Guide, 3rd ed. (New York: Whittlesey House, 
1946), 116, 121. 
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of the ‘line’.31 Therefore, to assess the influence of war on the development of the 'line' 
requires an analysis of “regular” officer undergraduate education at Annapolis and 
programs at Newport.  
The war necessitated an expansion and acceleration of Naval Academy classes, 
but the curriculum retained a remarkable degree of its pre-war balance. The Naval 
Academy classes were enlarged by almost 50% between 1937 and 1940, an earlier and 
much more significant expansion than that pursued by West Point. 32   The program was 
further modified with the classes of 1941-2 when the student body was expanded an 
additional 30% (to reach a maximum of 1200 with the Class of ’42) and the classes of 
1941-42 were accelerated through their final months.33  Graduation date for class of 1941 
was moved to February 1941, the Class of ‘42 moved to December 1941.   
To achieve a further increase in numbers of graduates moving to the fleet, the 
Navy compressed and shortened the midshipman program. Cuts in the curriculum were 
not taken lightly, but were carefully scrutinized by the Navy and Congress. The 
                                                 
31 Harry E.  Admiral Yarnell, USN (Ret),"Report on Naval Aviation, 6 November 1943", Library of 
Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Harry E. Yarnell,  Box 11,  (Author has copy provided from 
duplicates made by William McBride). The massive numbers of young reserve officers may raise the 
question of dilution of the influence of 'regular' officers in naval aviation.  As can be seen by the numbers, 
however, the reservist dilution of the regulars was largely confined to the junior officer ranks.  The 
'regulars' remained firmly in control and were the majority of those aviators at the ranks of LT and above.  
By October 1943, regulars were  outnumbered by reservists in junior ranks: ensigns: 226 regulars vs 11000 
reservists; Ltjgs 600 regular vs 7000 reservists; but regulars held the majority of senior LTs and field grade 
officers:  LTs: only 1/3 were reservists; LCDRS: only ¼ were reservists.   For further discussion, see 
Ronald H. Spector, At War, at Sea : Sailors and Naval Warfare in the Twentieth Century (New York, N.Y.: 
Viking, 2001), 222.   
32  United States Army, US Military Academy Register, vol. 1939-43 (West Point, NY: US Military 
Academy Printing Office, 1802-2006) and U.S. Naval Academy Alumni Association., "Register of alumni, 
graduates and former naval cadets and midshipmen,"  (Annapolis, Md.: The Association).  The class size 
was also expanded and though still vastly outnumbered by the wave of short-service reservists, increased 
the number of ‘regular’ officers who would fight in the war and remain in the post-war period. And, in 
contrast to the Army, the Annapolis class expansions were significantly greater than that of West Point, 
which may explain in part why the Navy dominated the Army football team in this period!    
33 U.S. Naval Academy Alumni Association., "Register of alumni, graduates and former naval cadets and 
midshipmen," (Annapolis, Md.: The Association). 
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modification of midshipman education was of such importance that the head of Bureau of 
Navigation, Chester Nimitz, testified most of the day on April 21, 1941 before Vinson’s 
famous Naval Affairs Committee, to ensure the Navy’s plans survived intact on the 
Hill.34  Congress concurred with the navy plans, and a three year curriculum was 
established beginning with the Class of 1943.  Despite this time compression, however, 
the war-time curriculum still contained 88% of the academic elements of the prior four 
year course.35  This achievement once again stood in contrast to the Army’s approach to 
officer education in war-time.  Not only did Army ROTC displace education with 
abbreviated technical training, but so did the Military Academy: with the outbreak of war 
the academic portion of a cadet’s curriculum was cut by 25%, twice the academic 
reduction as was the case for midshipmen. 36   
To be sure, the Annapolis curriculum and faculty were not unaffected by the war. 
Professional courses were maintained current "up to the minute" and provided with the 
latest equipment. The academy received Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) simulators and 
placed particular emphasis on revolutionary breakthroughs in high frequency electronics. 
The Navy raised physical fitness standards and allotted time for 'hand to hand' combat 
training, tower jumps and diving through burning oil.37    The focus of the professional 
                                                 
34 House Committee on Naval Affairs, Testimony of RADM Chester W. Nimitz on House Resolution 4368 
to Shorten USNA Course from 4 to 3 Years Duration, 77th Cong.,  2nd sess., 21 April 1941. 
35 Kendall Banning, Annapolis today, 6th ed. (Annapolis,: United States Naval Institute, 1963), 265.  See 
also Sweetman, 1979, 195. 
36  US Military Academy Superintendent," Staff Summary of Letter dtd 11 Jan 1944 from Superintendent 
US Military Academy to War Depart; Subject: Return of the Four Year Curriculum", NARA RG 405, 
USNA Special Collections, Records of Superintendent, Curriculum 1939-1955, Box No 6, Folder No 8.  
37 "War Hits the School," Shipmate, no. 7, July 1942  and "The Academy at War," Shipmate, no. 10, 
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courses was on basic necessities that would make it possible for a junior officer to carry 
out his duties upon reporting to the fleet.   But these changes had another, unintended 
effect:  they reshaped the civilian and military faculty.   
The effect of the war was to broaden the faculty.  The regular officers who 
normally constituted a large portion of the faculty were called away to the Fleet. 38 As a 
result, a wide variety of civilian faculty members descended upon the academic buildings 
and offices of Annapolis, imparting to the war-time classes new and different outlooks.  
The new perspectives concerned not only the academic subject fields, but included new 
ways of looking at the larger world.  And this influx of civilians and reservists exerted 
more than a temporary effect on instructional practices and faculty composition.  Many of 
the ‘temporary’ faculty would remain on after the war.39 
* 
War-Time Graduate School and Naval War College 
In contrast to what happened in the First World War, the Navy operated the Naval 
Post Graduate School and War College throughout hostilities.  Navy policy constituted a 
dramatic difference with the Army, which demonstrated again a lesser commitment to 
advanced education when it shuttered all of its advanced educational institutions for the 
duration of the war.  Though the graduate school and the Naval War College remained 
                                                 
38    Charles Paul Sheppard, “An analysis of curriculum changes at the United States Naval Academy 
during the period 1959 through 1974” (Thesis Ph D --George Washington University, 1974),  229.  
Apparently, a certain number remained after the end of the war and became leading advocates for 
curriculum improvements.  Sheppard references interview with Edward J. Cook, Associate Dean, USNA, 
interview from 23 May 1972.  Cook served as Secretary of the Curriculum Review Board of 1959.   
39 William E. Simons, Liberal Education in the Service Academies (New York: Published for the Institute 
of Higher Education by the Bureau of Publications Teachers College Columbia University, 1965), 98.   
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open, the student body and curriculum were modified to support the war-time 
requirements.  As one observer noted, in the urgency of war the “… system of 
progressive education and training was no longer practicable.”  Warfare now required  
“… a vast assortment of new weapons and methods for which EDUCATION (stressed 
less as the day of action approached) and TRAINING (of increasingly greater 
importance) were required.”40  As a consequence, the work of the advanced schools took 
on a more practical flavor throughout the war years.  
Naval Post Graduate School at Annapolis not only remained open but saw a 
reversal of the pre-war decline in enrollments.  Between 400 and 700 officers were 
enrolled in the school in each year of the war.  However, the curriculum and enrollment 
patterns were different, and most students took what would be considered more technical 
training courses than genuine graduate level classes.41   Actual graduate level courses did 
continue, but these were focused not on ‘line’ officers but on producing technical 
specialists, many of which would be needed in the post-war years.  For the mass of 
reservists, the General Line Course was expanded to aide in their integration into the 
larger Navy.42  
 It is also noteworthy that not all war-time training schools were necessarily 
technical in nature. The expanded navy training also included the study of military 
government, area studies, in particular language training.  Initially, the Navy expected 
civilian specialists to fill many of these non-technical requirements, but as the end of the 
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war approached, the military saw that regular ‘line’ officers would require expanded non-
technical education.  In addition to the focused war college course discussed below, the 
Navy also formed a school of military government and administration at Princeton and 
Columbia and educated some officers in the Army’s civilian affairs schools.  Thus, not 
only did the Navy maintain the graduate school and War College throughout the war, but 
it also established additional, non-technical schools to prepare officers for the unique 
requirements of global, cross-cultural operations.43   
The decision to keep the Naval War College open was not a foregone conclusion, 
and the debate over this policy provides some insight as to Navy leaders' educational 
values.  Chester Nimitz, Chief of Bureau of Navigation in 1941, and later five star 
admiral, asserted the need to keep educational institutions fully manned. He explained his 
rationale in a speech just days before Pearl Harbor: "No matter how badly officers are 
needed afloat--no matter how scarce they may be --it is during a period of personnel 
expansion that our schools and educational institutions must be expanded, rather than 
curtailed."44 Nimitz' attitude stands in stark contrast to the views expressed later by 
Admiral Rickover when he faced manpower shortages in the Cold War, a contrast that 
will be discussed in later chapters.  Nimitz' commitment to the War College was also at 
odds with Army values and priorities. Most Army educational institutions were closed 
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even before the war; for example, the Army Industrial College course was shortened in 
1940, closed in 1941, and not reopened until in 1944. 45  
Though the Naval War College itself remained open, it could very well have been 
modified to focus on technical training for the new weapons of war, but it was not.  
Rather, Admiral Kalbfus, the war-time president,  successfully argued that officers must 
understand the fundamentals of war:  “There are fundamentals common to all, 
irrespective of whether the sphere of action has been land, sea, or air…..Technological 
evolution has always exerted great influence on methods of operation, but the extent of 
this influence cannot fully be understood and measured unless there be ability to sift 
technical details from fundamental truths…” 46  As war approached, the faculty was 
retained and the curriculum condensed, but the emphasis would remain on broader 
education in the art of war.    
With the outbreak of war the Bureau of Navigation suspended the regular year-
long courses and replaced them with abbreviated resident courses, a command course and 
a preparatory staff course.  These courses provided a background of world politics, 
economics, and geography and were considered as equivalents for promotion 
examinations in tactics and strategy.  The command course was focused at those “line” 
and staff officers with more than six years of service; the preparatory staff course was 
intended for junior naval reserve officers.  Experienced pre-war NWC instructors taught 
the command course—essentially an abbreviation of the pre-war “senior” course—and 
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carefully selected academy graduates taught the preparatory course.  In the last two years 
of the war, the NWC adopted a “joint” component of education, which had been 
suggested by General Hap Arnold.  Though the idea of the joint course did not originate 
in Newport, the Naval War College hosted numerous Army and Marine students as they 
learned about the naval service.47   
Though the curriculum may have remained in balance, the relative dearth in ‘line’ 
officer matriculation did narrow the education credentials of several promotion year-
groups.  These lesser educated year groups would work their way through the ranks, 
ultimately producing in the Navy's high command a demographic deficit of war college 
graduates.  The drop in wartime matriculation was compounded, as noted earlier, by the 
decline in junior officer attendance during the buildup for war in the later 1930s.   War 
College President Kalbfus in a letter to the Secretary of the Navy noted the declining 
share of officers who had attended the college. The 1942 Register of naval officers at 
grade of CDR and LCDR numbered 2,510, but only 241 had attended NWC.   Kalbfus 
interpreted these numbers to indicate a “…forced trend away from the guided and 
undisturbed study of war by those upon whom the burden of conducting war necessarily 
falls.”  Kalbfus further warned that without war college education the officers would be 
ill-prepared to lead, having instead attained “mere mastery of a particular technique, 
without the fundamental knowledge from which it emanates…”48    
Though Kalbfus’ warnings proved prophetic-- a demographic dip in formally 
educated officers in the higher ranks did emerge in the 1950s-- it is hard to imagine an 
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alternate course that the Navy could have followed.   The exigencies of war required most 
officers to be at sea and in the shipyards; the fall-off in attendance was the result of 
desperate times, not a change in attitude toward education.  Stated in another way, 
reduced 'line' officer attendance at the Naval War College did not represent a 
fundamentally changed attitude toward officer requirements, but rather reflected the dire 
emergency faced by personnel managers.  The fact that the college remained opened, in 
stark contrast to army practice, was a reflection of the Navy's commitment to integrative 
and non-technical education of the officer corps.   
* 
The Effects of Operational Demands: the “Skipper Problem” and the 
Rise of the Seaman-Aviators 
 The war necessitated, in addition to educational adjustments, a disruption of pre-
war promotion and assignment policies.  Line officers remained assigned to sea duty or 
over-seas staff duty throughout the war. Few officers could be spared to return stateside 
even if the Navy had desired them to continue the pre-war pattern of alternating 
educational assignments and shore duty.  Accelerated advancement aboard ship, and the 
attrition of certain types of officers in combat, exerted the greatest effect on the officer 
corps, especially in the submarine and aviation components.  For surface ship officers, 
war-time assignment patterns aboard ship followed pre-war practice, but advancement 
came at an accelerated pace.  In submarines, the exigencies of war tended to favor the 
assignment of younger and more operationally skilled officers in command.  Assignment 
and promotion patterns of aviation officers to higher command would change 
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significantly during the war and impart to the officer corps a broader range of experience 
to complement the 'black shoes' (surface officers) of the ‘battle line.’  Furthermore, the 
war disrupted promotion procedures.  Promotion boards and promotion examinations that 
had been linked to war college course work, a key component of the pre-war 
development process, were temporarily suspended.   
Almost immediately the logistical impossibility of sustaining the pre-war system 
of promotion boards and promotion exams became apparent.   Prior to the war, the 
process for promotion included completion of statutory examinations.  The pre-war 
BUPERS Manual explains at length the process for and importance of examinations as a 
means to determine those officers “best-fitted” for officer promotion.49  The written 
exams, which included subject tests of strategy, tactics, logistics, international law, 
international relations, engineering and administration among others, were not taken 
lightly.   With war, the written promotion exams were suspended.50   Instead, officers 
were promoted based upon satisfactory fitness reports (in reality, the absence of a 
negative “do not promote” report) and time in rank.  For officers above lieutenant 
commander, promotions were selected by a board, based on records in the officers file: 
board members listed those officers they felt “best fitted” for promotion, and those 
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officers who gained an adequate number of 'votes' were promoted.51   In practice, 
however, promotions for LCDR and below were often effected as a block.52   
For promotions to commander and captain, the Navy tried to preserve greater 
selectivity.  In theory, these higher level promotions would require that a board of 
officers review the fitness reports. In practice, as Furer noted, the degree of scrutiny to 
which these reports were subjected was most probably low. The Navy could accept the 
lower levels of scrutiny because the promotions were temporary.   Specifically, most if 
not all promotions between July of 1941 to June 1946 were, by regulation, “…temporary 
and subject to review and adjustment…” upon cessation of hostilities. 53   
There were other ways to promote officers during the war.  What were known as 
‘spot’ promotions were also widely used, typically made without regard to promotion 
status, seniority, and without a formal selection process.54  The use of 'spot' promotions 
was not infrequently criticized in peace-time as vulnerable to political favoritism, and 
their use in war-time did not escape such criticism.  Officers on the front line of the war 
complained that 'spots' often went to those in safe rear areas.  A post-war study of 'spots' 
found that these coveted promotions were indeed concentrated ashore.  However, a 
reason for this may not have been so much favoritism as the fact that such promotions 
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were used frequently to promote needed senior civilians who had minimal military or 
combat experience.55   
The selection for high command, for flag, was not immune to the disruption of 
war.  The traditional flag selection boards were suspended for four years due to the 
exigencies of war and a far-flung fleet, replaced by a system of votes based on service 
reputation among flags in the fleet.56  The war-time process for flag promotions was 
susceptible to great subjectivity.  As described by Furer, a mailing list was sent around 
the fleet addressed to approximately a dozen flag officers who then voted on the names.   
The rankings were then sent by the admirals back to Washington, D.C. where the 
Secretary of the Navy presided over a board of typically six persons, to include the 
Secretary, Admiral King, King’s Chief of Staff, the Vice CNO,  Chief of Bureau of 
Personnel, and Chief of Bureau of Aeronautics.  When an officer gained three quarters of 
the ‘yes’ vote, he was then placed on the list for promotion to admiral.   As for the long 
term effect of such a system, the consequences were unclear.  But it is reasonable to 
assume that the crucible of war and urgent demands for combat leaders compelled the 
admirals in the fleet to vote for the operators and the fighters.  Such a system, though 
operative for only a few years, no doubt promoted to flag a relatively large share of 
tactically and operationally innovative and aggressive officers of the ‘line’.  
Assignment patterns were also changed by the war.  Aboard all three platforms--
surface, submarine, and aviation-- the war witnessed an acceleration in the speed at 
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which officers moved up to more demanding assignments.  The surface navy's officer 
corps was the least effected by the war.  This outcome may not come as a surprise since 
the surface navy was a mature and seasoned organization when compared to submarines 
and aviation.  When war came, assignments and selection to positions of increased 
responsibility in the surface navy came rapidly, but despite the wave of reservists and 
new technologies of war, the regulars and pre-war officers remained in firm control of the 
profession.57  The possibility of a regular officer rising from new ensign to XO of a small 
ship in three years was not unheard of.  One instance of such a rapid rise was the 
promotion of young Elmo Zumwalt, a future CNO. 58  But the rapidity of promotion in 
the surface navy was due mostly to expansion.  Losses were moderate, and the captains 
groomed in the pre-war period generally performed well.  The submarine force, however, 
was marked by a different experience, and the effects of war carried with them long-term 
consequences.  
Neither new technology nor the wave of reservists influenced the assignment 
patterns of the more senior submarine officers to any appreciable degree. Most of the 
officers who commanded in war had followed the King system of officer development: 
they had served in the surface fleet first, followed by selection to submarine school.  At 
sea they proved readily able to master the latest technologies.  While the submarines were 
improved in the war-- to include radar and better fire-control computers-- these 
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innovations did not create a new class of specialist officers nor present an impediment for 
older officers as they rose to command.59  The wave of reservists also posed no threat to 
regular officers from Annapolis. Despite the large numbers of reservists in the Navy, the 
‘regular’ officers remained in near total control of the submarine community and held 
almost all submarine commands.  Not until 1945 was the first reservist officer placed in 
command of a submarine.60  It was neither the infusion of war reservists nor new 
technology that changed the submarine officer corps.  Rather, the most influential factors 
that redefined what it meant to be a submarine officer were physical environment and 
changed combat doctrine.  The immensity of the Pacific and the ethical-political decision 
to engage in unrestricted submarine warfare combined together to change operational 
conditions under which a captain commanded his boat.  The change in operational 
conditions, which occurred in the crucible of war, created a Darwinian logic that culled 
from the force those commanders who could not adapt.  Those who flourished in the 
crucible of war rose to command the submarine navy for the next two decades.    
The officers in the pre-war submarine navy had trained to operate with the 'battle 
line' of large surface ships and had not prepared for unrestricted submarine warfare.  
Further, the officers in this earlier period were often deeply involved in the development 
and fielding of new technologies and were relatively less skilled in operations. When 
hostilities came, the Navy quickly abandoned pre-war plans and sent submarines not with 
the 'battle line' but on independent operations.  One of the most crucial missions was to 
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interdict Japanese sea lines of communication where submarines sank combatants and 
merchant ships alike.  The war cruises were dangerous and demanding and resulted in an 
exceptionally heavy attrition of pre-war commanders, running as high as 30% of all 
submarine captains in 1942 alone.  But the high attrition of submarine commanders was 
not due entirely to combat deaths.   The high attrition among commanding officers was 
quietly referred to as the “skipper problem”: the return of too many commanders from 
war patrols with few or no ‘kills’.  Blair, author of several books of the submarine force, 
observed: "Over-caution was a command problem unique to submariners.  A destroyer 
skipper, operating in formation with other ships, was not apt to find an opportunity to 
slink away if he were so inclined. But a sub skipper, operating far from direct 
supervision, in absolute command of his ship (and usually manning the periscope during 
an attack) could be as brave or as cautious as he wished and could fudge patrol reports to 
cover his actions.  The over-cautious skippers were soon found out." 61       
The causes for the ‘skipper problem’ and subsequent high attrition were never 
conclusively identified, but environment appeared to play a role. The pre-war training, 
which had emphasized brief periods of operation with the battle-line, bore little 
resemblance to the prolonged submerged operations required of war patrol across the 
expanse of the Pacific.  The physically draining, prolonged periods of submerged warfare 
may have been, in balance, too much for the older officers in command.62  Others 
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attribute the ‘skipper problem’ to the effects of years of pre-war indoctrination in what 
proved to be inappropriately conservative tactics. Pre-war doctrine required a captain to 
submerge his periscope at the first sight of aircraft and to conduct acoustic-only 
approaches to targets.  Such doctrine did not prepare officers for the conditions they 
would confront in 1942-44.63  
There was another explanation for the skipper problem:   the unique conditions of 
transoceanic war had ‘selected out’ those officers most inclined to technical details of 
their machines and instead favored those more suited to aggressive tactical operations.  
Holmes, a scholar on the submarine force, explains that a technical bias among many 
officers was a significant factor in their ultimate attrition from command. According to 
Holmes, many older officers had been promoted up the ranks more on the basis of their 
capacity for technical work than on their ability to be tactically aggressive or innovative.  
Officers selected in the pre-war era on the basis of technical skill thus tended to be less 
apt in the tactics of unrestricted warfare and were replaced in war by the more tactically-
minded officers.64 Spector offers a more colorful explanation of the ‘skipper problem”: 
the pre-war process for command development was one based more on seniority, whereas 
the war would require a system that rewarded “reckless aggressiveness”.65   Years later, 
differing opinions as to the value of commanding officers 'forged in war' would occupy 
central stage in debate over what type of officer was best suited to command nuclear 
submarines.  Though questions about submarine officers would become particularly 
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significant in the Cold War, it was the rise of the aviators that posed the most problematic 
questions about models of command in the Second World War.    
Over the course of  3 ½ years of hostilities, senior aviation and fleet commanders  
engaged in a quiet debate as to what kind of officers were best suited to command at sea 
and to promote to the  senior ranks in the Navy.  By the last days of the war, the aviation-
qualified officer, perhaps the most integrative and well-rounded officer in the fleet, would 
dominate the senior sea commands.  Several factors facilitated the rise of the aviators: the 
combat environment and geography of the Pacific, the sheer number of aviators, and the 
willingness of aviators to lead an integrated Navy rather than seek their own specialized 
service.   Unlike Army aviators, when the shooting stopped in 1945 naval aviators 
concluded that they were NOT platform specialists, but were leaders of an integrated fleet 
that operated in three dimensions.  
At the start of the war, aviation was hardly a new technology. But what was new 
and unexpected was the large number of airframes required to fight in the open expanse 
of the Pacific, and the correspondingly large number of aviator officers required to fly 
these aircraft.   All pre-war plans for numbers of personnel quickly proved inadequate as 
the demand for aviator officers exploded.  Over the course of two years in the early 
1940s, aviators would rise from a minority group to that of the majority of line officers:  
in June 1940 only 16% of line officers were aviators, but by June 1942 approx 72% of 
line officers were aviators (a ratio of 2.5 to 1 aviators to all other line officers 
combined).66  With such a large percentage of the ‘line’ now made up of aviators, it was 
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natural and predictable that aviators agitated for an increased share of higher command 
posts.   If a comparison to the Army Air Corps was considered valid, then a rebalance 
was certainly in order.  Using army metrics wherein the share of general officers was 
determined by the aviator's share of the lower ranks, the aviator share of admirals should 
have been 28% instead of the 17% of admirals who were aviators. 67  Though increased 
numbers of senior command assignments and promotions would open up to aviators, it 
would be ‘regular’ line aviators, not reservist aviators, who would rise to command. 68 
The changing nature of war was also used to justify enhanced aviation assignment 
and promotion opportunities.  Aviators had championed their community before the war, 
but upon the conclusion of the Battle of Coral Sea, a battle fought in the main by carriers 
and their pilots, aviators became increasingly vocal.  After Coral Sea the leading architect 
of naval aviation, VADM John H. Towers, began to criticize the lack of aviation 
experience among 'line' commanders.69  Towers recommended as early as 1942 that 
aviation-qualified officers should command any fleet detachment that included aircraft 
carriers.  In the early years of the war, the Navy’s leaders turned a deaf ear to his 
complaints.  Tower’s arguments gained traction with civilian leaders when a surface 
officer was blamed for tactical mistakes that may have contributed to the loss of the 
escort carrier USS LIPSCOMB BAY in 1943.  Other officers began to join the chorus 
calling for more aviator command assignments and promotions.  One carrier admiral, 
                                                 
67 Ibid. 150-151, 220. 
68  Harry E.  Admiral Yarnell, USN (Ret),"Report on Naval Aviation, 6 November 1943", Library of 
Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Harry E. Yarnell,  Box 11,  (Author has copy provided from 
duplicates made by William McBride), page 7.  In  the last weeks of 1943 and early 1944, reservists made 
up only 8 captain and 26 commanders, as compared to 238 captain and 346 commanders of regular line 
aviators. 
69 William M. McBride, Technological Change and the United States Navy, 1865-1945 (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2000), 204.  John Towers, one of the leading aviation pioneers, was the officer 
perhaps most responsible for the training and organization of the winning air fleets in the Pacific. 
153 
Frederick Sherman, went so far as to call for an aviator monopoly of all senior 
operational positions in the fleet.70 
The Navy leadership responded to the growing criticism and asked retired aviator 
Admiral Harry E. Yarnell to investigate the complaints and concerns of the flyers.  
Yarnell saw his mission as two-fold: to produce recommendations that would make 
"aviation a more efficient arm of the fleet", but also to make recommendations that would 
ensure naval aviation remained part of the Navy, and not part of a separate service.71   
Yarnell made numerous recommendations to elevate aviators to positions and 
assignments of increased responsibility.  However, his recommendations to narrow the 
development of aviator officers—to make them more specialists than broadly 
experienced officers72—brought a persuasive rebuke from COMINCH, Admiral Ernest J.  
King.  King, author of the reigning model of integrative officer development, supported 
more aviator promotions. But King had conditions: the aviators would have to be 'broad-
minded' and widely experienced, not platform specialists.  King wrote:  “All line officers, 
whether qualified as aviators or not, must be fitted for high command by being given 
instruction and experience in all arms.”73  King used this opportunity to reaffirm the 
model he had worked so assiduously to establish, that of the 'well-rounded officer': “It is, 
however, a fact that officers of wide experience are those best fitted for high rank, and, 
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consequently, officers are given such opportunities as can be provided to diversify their 
duties, particularly in command.”74    
Under pressure from Secretary Forrestal, King assented to additional measures 
that enhanced aviators' status in the Office of the CNO and improved their assignment 
and promotion opportunities.  King established a Deputy CNO for Air; tightened 
assignment criteria for command of aircraft carriers to favor aviators; and required every 
carrier group be commanded by an aviator or, alternatively, the chief of staff was 
required to be an aviator.75  By the end of hostilities, aviation officers occupied favored 
leadership positions on the carriers, carrier groups, the fleet commands, and at the 
headquarters staff in Washington.   Though the next CNO would be Nimitz, who was a 
surface and submarine officer, Secretary Forrestal limited him to a two year term so that 
an aviator might soon compete for the top job.  Towers, the architect of naval aviation, 
replaced Spruance as Pacific Fleet commander in 1946, and aviator Admiral Marc 
Mitscher took command of the Atlantic Fleet. In the reorganized CNO’s office, the new 
VCNO and 40% of the deputies would be aviators.  Forrestal, himself an early naval 
aviator, declared in December 1945 that the “Navy is becoming an air Navy.”76  But as 
Yarnell observed, naval aviators saw themselves first as seaman and second as aviators.  
Naval aviator values, in contrast to Army Air Corps, reflected unity and integration, a 
reaffirmation of the essence of the inter-war officer development philosophy, rather than 
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a narrow view of officer as specialist.  This emphasis on unity and integration would 
become evident in the decisions the new leadership made in post-war officer education, 




Post-War Officer Lessons Learned: Validation of Integrative Officer 
Development, 1944-45. 
The war catapulted aviators to high command in the Navy, but these 'line' officers 
were not narrow platform specialists. They were a broadly experienced group, most of 
which had first served aboard surface ships, qualified as aviators, commanded surface 
ships, and then commanded at senior levels in the transoceanic, amphibious and carrier 
warfare campaign.  The combat environment placed a premium on three-dimensional 
warfare, amphibious operations with the Marines, and joint operations with the Army and 
Army Air Corps.  With the cessation of hostilities, senior leaders reflected on the war 
experience and pondered the implications for officer education and development.   
A series of study boards interpreted the lessons of war as validating the essential 
tenets of the King plan of integrative officer development. The goal of officer 
development remained as before: to produce officers of the ‘line’ who were not narrow 
specialists, but men of breadth and versatility, able to integrate the many specialized 
capabilities of the Navy and then exercise sound operational judgment.  Senior navy 
leaders concurred with the boards’ findings and moved quickly to reestablish, expand, 
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and improve upon the inter-war system of education.   To navy leaders, including new 
aviation flags, the experience of the war necessitated an even greater broadening, to 
include the political-military education with which to better understand the world. 
Officers of the future were expected to have more "joint" education to facilitate closer 
and more effective cooperation among all the military services.77  This reaffirmation of 
breadth as opposed to narrow specialization is found throughout navy discourse: in 
numerous studies from late 1944 to 1948; fleet commander dispatches; officer manuals 
and career management publications; curricular changes at educational institutions. 
Lastly, the Navy restored the pre-war promotion examination system which, at its core, 
adhered to and worked to sustain the goal of a 'general line officer’.  
The Pye Report, 1944 
As the prospect of victory neared, the Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, 
directed the establishment of a board to study officer education and professional 
development.  He wanted to know what three years of war experience might mean for the 
post-war officer development system.   An eclectic board,78 chaired by VADM William 
Pye, reaffirmed the continued validity of the inter-war officer development policies and 
advocated the establishment of additional joint educational institutions with which to 
further broaden the naval officer corps. 79  The report anticipated the increasing clamor 
                                                 
77 John Wesley Masland and Laurence Ingram Radway, Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and 
National Policy (Princeton,: Princeton University Press, 1957), 104. 
78 The Pye Board included an eclectic membership, across a range of ages and ranks, and was widely read 
within the Navy bureau of personnel.  Formed by Secretary Navy Knox, the board consisted of navy 
officers, marines, and a prominent civilian educator, Dr. F.B. Synder, president of Northwestern University. 
The report was parsed and studied in detail by the Bureau of Personnel, which then produced a digest in 
1947.     
79 John Hattendorf, Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the Naval War College (Newport, RI: 
Naval War College Press, 1984), 175. 
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for more technical specialists and drew a clear distinction between the technical specialist 
and the ‘line’ officer who would command. The board concluded: “For officers of the 
command branch, education and training in material is important but distinctly secondary 
to education and training for command."80   
The board report was widely read and became a key reference for Bureau of 
Personnel post-war planning.  The Navy’s personnel managers studied the Pye report 
closely and interpreted the lessons of war to reaffirm the need for progressive education 
and expanded ‘joint’ or inter-service education.  A well-worn BUPERS digest and 
planning document summarized the key recommendations of the war-time study:   
“4 a. That all Naval officers have a more thorough knowledge of the employment 
of combat aviation, surface, subsurface, ground, and  amphibious forces and means 
and methods of their logistic support.  
b. For increased attendance for officers in schools of other branches and services.  
c. Duty assignment for many officers with other branches of the naval service and 
with other services”.  
d. For a larger percentage of officers to be thoroughly and specially educated for 
the performance of operational staff duties, including joint staffs.”  
e. For a larger percentage of officers qualified in applied communications.  
f. That officers receive education for command at an earlier age.   
h. For stress upon the development of combat leadership. k. That 15% of the 
officers of the Line, 10% of the Marine Corps, and 5% of the Supply Corps and 
Civil Engineer Corps officers be at all times engaged in educational pursuits either 
as students or instructors of officer students. 
 
5. f. All commissioned officers of the combatant branches be required to take one 
period of post-graduate education (for line officers, this would be the General Line 
Course) 
                                                 
80 William S. Pye, VADM USN,"Report of Board to Study the Methods of Education Naval Officers, 
1944", Naval War College, call number V411.U56, NWC Archives, RG 3 Box 2: File 5216: Pye Board 
Correspondence, 6-7.  
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g. Provide a command and staff course for officers during their first three (3) years 
in the rank of LCDR. 
h. Provide a third educational period during the first three (3) years of service in the 
rank of commander comprising a NWC course....a certain number of graduate to 
continue at the National War college.  
 
6. b. Combined Exercises: Joint exercises in amphibious and joint operations must 
be greatly expanded.  
c. Exchange of Officers: Representative officers should be given tours of duty in 
other branches and services  
d. Faculties: Provision should be made to obtain the best available teaching staffs 
both Naval and civilian.  
e. Provide an allowance of officers for educational purposes in excess of those 
necessary to man the active ships and short billets, otherwise "catch as catch can" 
will be the basis of assigning officers to education al assignments."81 
 
 
The Pye Report constituted a powerful endorsement of the integrative model of 
officer development.  But it went further: the Pye Report was among the first documents 
to recommend the establishment of a “College of National Defense”, which would bring 
together for educational purposes officers and civilians from multiple government 
agencies.   The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed its own “General Plan for Postwar 
Education of the Armed Forces” in June 1945, which incorporated Pye’s 
recommendation for the national defense college.82  
 
                                                 
81 BUPERS-PERS122,"Digest of Pye Report of July 1944", NARA RG 24-470-54-25-6 Box 6. 
82  Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff,"General Plan for Postwar Education of the Armed Forces", JCS 962/2 of 
22 June 1945, as referenced in John Hattendorf, Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the Naval 
War College (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1984), 180.  For additional discussion of the Pye 
report, see John P. Lovell, Neither Athens nor Sparta : The American Service Academies in Transition 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979),  43;   Alexander Wolfgang Rilling, “The First Fifty Years 
of Graduate Education in the United States Navy, 1909-1959” (Thesis - University of Southern California, 
1972), 180-182. 
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Fleet Commander Perspective: Halsey’s Top Secret Message  
Pye was a traditional surface officer who served but a few months in the Pacific 
theater during the war.  As such, some could argue that his report was not representative 
of those who had commanded the large, carrier-centered fleets of that theater.  A recently 
released Top Secret document provides a fleet perspective on the issues of officer 
development.  The perspective was that of Admiral William F. Halsey and preserved in a   
3rd Fleet message sent by Halsey to the Chief of Naval Operations in the last months of 
1944.  In this extraordinary document that remained classified until the late 1980s, 
Halsey speculated as to the political and military contours of the post-war world and the 
challenge of inter-service cooperation. Second only to geopolitics and inter-service 
issues, Halsey addressed the question of officer development.  Halsey devoted almost a 
full page of a six page message to the war-time implications for officer education and 
professional development.  Reflecting on his experience of trans-oceanic war, Halsey 
strongly recommended the Navy cultivate the "broadly educated officer" who was 
capable of availing himself of expert advice when so required (the commander himself, 
by implication, should not be the 'expert' in any particular technology).  Halsey 
recommended that the broadly educated officers be identified early in their careers, at 
least by the rank of LCDR or Major.  A large share of officers not selected for eventual 
“joint command” should nonetheless, he asserted, be broadly educated to “inculcate in 
the youngsters the general understanding of the uses and limitations of all weapons and 
services.”  Halsey concluded: “By these means we may hope to build a more broad-
minded group of young Americans from which commissioned personnel will be 
selected…..and after a period of years under close observation they would be further 
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sifted to find those best qualified for the final training or grooming for joint or combined 
command and staff duties.” 83  
Halsey’s chief of staff, Robert Carney, a later CNO, and almost a generation 
younger than his four star admiral, most likely participated in the formulation of these 
recommendations.  Carney’s participation thus lends a multi-generational endorsement to 
the document and its findings. Carney’s participation is further evidence that the war 
lessons were forward-looking rather than a type of thinking resident in only the older 
generation. Furthermore, Halsey’s message was apparently welcomed by senior leaders 
in Pearl Harbor and Washington.  The CNO later in 1945 redistributed Halsey's message 
to the most influential and highly placed officers and civilians in the navy hierarchy, 
thereby acknowledging, it would seem, at least some agreement with its conclusions and 
recommendations.  In short, this text offers compelling evidence that those officers 
commanding the most technologically and operationally complex organizations in the 
Navy interpreted their experience to validate the model of the 'general line officer'.  Wars 
of the future were not to be fought by specialists in command.  Rather, what was needed 
was a ‘line' officer broadly educated in all the facets of war and its machines, capable 
ultimately of leading a joint force of ground, air, and sea forces.  
Holloway Plan, November 1945 
Within days of the cessation of hostilities, the new Secretary of the Navy, James 
Forrestal, directed the Navy to further study the education and procurement of officers in 
                                                 
83 William F. Halsey, Admiral, USN,"Future National Policy for the composition, command, training, and 
maintenance of the US Armed Forces (formerly TS), memo to ADM J. O. Richardson USN (ret), 10 Dec 
1944", NARA  RG 428-370-43-01, 2-3, box 4  (filed in Secretary of the Navy Sullivan personal papers).  
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the post-war period. The Navy convened a board that included relatively young officers 
and academic professionals: five captains, two commanders, the presidents of a liberal 
arts college and a technical school, and chaired by RADM James L. Holloway, Jr., a 
future Chief of BUPERS, four star admiral, and father of a future CNO.  This analysis of 
war-time lessons as applied to officer education and professional development became 
known as the Holloway Plan.  The Holloway Plan, like Halsey's and Pye's, recommended 
the development of a balanced and broad-minded 'line' officer corps. 84 
This highly influential report consisted of three parts: (1) the undergraduate 
education of midshipmen; (2) educational recommendations for integrating a significant 
number of reserve officers into the post-war Navy; (3) longer range plans for naval 
officer career patterns.  While the Pye Board had rejected the continuation of non-Naval 
Academy undergraduate education, the Holloway Board did indeed make permanent a 
large NROTC component of the officer corps, though it would be the better part of a 
generation before NROTC officers would promote to command at the highest levels in 
the Navy.85 
 For both reserve and regular officers, the Holloway Board recommended less 
specialized, and more broad education at the undergraduate level, with more specialized 
training to follow commissioning (section 1, pg. 3).  Most urgently, the Holloway Board 
                                                 
84  The Holloway Plan emphasized breadth and education, and the author later admitted the inspiration was 
the King Knox Pye Plan of 1919-1920.  See  James L Holloway, JR.. ADM USN (ret) "A Gentleman's 
Agreement," US Naval Institute Proceedings, 106, no. 9, September 1980, 75.      The few copies of the 
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James L. Holloway, Jr., RADM USN,"Holloway Board on Naval Training, 29 September 1945", Naval 
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85 Alfred Pride, Admiral, USN would be the first NROTC officer to rise to four stars. He was an aviation 
pioneer in the First World War.  It would be many years before other NROTC graduates would rise to the 
top, and not until 1994 would a non-academy graduate become Chief of Naval Operations.  
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pushed successfully for the reinstatement of the General Line Course at NPGS (section 3, 
pg. 4).  The explicit goal was to broaden reserve and Naval Academy officers who had 
served in specialized assignments:  “First in importance is establishment of a temporary 
General Line School (Course) to care for the pressing need to broaden the professional 
knowledge of the large number of transferred reserve and temporary officers and of 
Naval Academy graduates who, during the past four years, have served in specialized 
assignments.”  (section 2, pg. 2).  But it is important to note that this General Line School 
was slightly different from that of the 1930s--though both sought to broaden naval 
officers for increased responsibility.  This post-war version was intended to integrate and 
broaden a mass of specialized officers.  In addition, it was intended that at least 30% of 
the GLS/GLC graduates would be further broadened by attending a senior ‘branch 
school’ of the Army or USMC (section 3, pg. 2). The major function of graduate 
education of ‘line’ officers was to broaden and gain knowledge in the weapons and 
operations of war and to develop a “common experience” which should be made 
available or required of all officers, both reserve and Naval Academy.  The timing of 
education was also important and mirrored almost exactly that of King’s plan almost a 
generation before: “Make assignments in numbers that will assure graduation from the 
General Line Course of all officers by the time they have completed seven years of 
commissioned service.”86    
 The plan recognized the need to increase the number of specialist officers but 
recommended that the specialists (EDO and staff corps) be educated at specialized, 
civilian universities, not at the Navy’s graduate school.  The Holloway Plan argued for 
                                                 
86 James L. Holloway, Jr., RADM USN,"Holloway Board on Naval Training, 29 September 1945", Naval 
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the maximum use  "...of facilities of civilian colleges for graduate education of specialist 
officers."  But, perhaps most importantly, the Holloway Plan expressed great concern 
about the dangers of too closely mixing the specialists and the ‘line’.   The board 
explained that "… combination of the academic function of the schools for line and 
specialists officers is unwise…" and recommended that EDO and staff corps education 
remain separate from that of the General Line School. 87  
The Holloway Board’s exhortation to maintain specialist education and line 
education separate remains unexplained in the 1945 report.  However, in a later 
amplification of the Holloway Plan, the admiral himself revealed the reason: his goal, 
above all, was integration and synthesis in the ‘line’, and specialist education was, by 
nature, deleterious to the attainment of such a goal. Writing in 1947 in the Naval Institute 
Proceedings, Holloway stressed repeatedly the essential importance of integration and 
synthesis, and the institutions that would facilitate such goals.  In discussion of the Naval 
Post Graduate School, Holloway states: "I regard its fundamental cornerstone to be the 
General Line School for all officers, regardless of sources, upon the completion of their 
fifth to eighth year of commissioned service."   Graduate school and the GLC course 
were considered essential because it "...plays an important part in the over-all integration 
of officers from all sources." 88   
                                                 
87 Ibid.,  quotes follow in succession, Part III, pp 3-4, paragraphs 13c, 9, 15h. 
88 James L. Holloway, Jr. RADM, USN "The Holloway Plan: A summary View and Commentary," US 
Naval Institute Proceedings, 73, no. 11, November 1947, 1297.  Though the concerns with NROTC 
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to specialized education.  
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While his most immediate concern was the better integration of war reservists into 
the ‘line’, his desire for integrated education for command is unmistakable. The goal for 
overall naval education was not specialization but "Ultimate Synthesis", which he defined 
as:  “Professional competence, particularly in the role of command and in association 
with operations, is a sine qua non in the Line officer. It is of paramount importance in the 
senior officer operating at policy level and exercising high command involving naval and 
military statesmanship and important administration."  He went on:  "From the 
springboard of professional knowledge and ability, our officers , particularly upon and 
after attaining command rank, must operate effectively in manifold areas in addition to 
the technical, tactical, or operational.  To mention a few, there are personnel research, 
public relations, foreign commissions, legislative and congressional liaison, ...planning at 
high level involving historical, political, sociological, and economic perceptiveness of the 
highest order.  All these are things to which a diverse intellectual input in to the Line of 
the Navy should contribute, though creation of a synthesis of thinking, expression, and 
experience which will serve to improve the capacity of the corps of officers as a whole.  
The Navy's extensive educational plan for officers is intended to combine and further 
develop professional competence, practical experience, and a capacity for original 
thought in attaining the over-all professional synthesis."89  Holloway was calling for the 
continuation of the inter-war model, to sustain a policy of integrative officer 
development, an updated version of the 'general line officer'.   
                                                 




Post War Educational and Assignment Changes: Creating More 
Integrators 
The Holloway Plan became a guiding document for the Navy, and numerous 
recommendations of the plan were adopted and remained in place decades later.  The 
plan— in large part a  restatement of the King Plan of 1919, modified for the inclusion of 
NROTC officers and joint education—was endorsed by the most senior officers in the 
Navy and was then widely communicated across the naval profession. 90   Holloway 
published the outlines of the plan in a major article in the US Naval Institute  
Proceedings.91  Many of the board conclusions and recommendations were ultimately 
codified in the educational and professional development sections of the official 
BUPERS Manual of 1948 and later.92  
 The Holloway Plan was featured in Ageton’s Naval Officers Guide.  Ageton, an 
astute observer of naval officer policy, made a point not to clutter his books with more 
than the absolute minimum of BUPERS studies or official references. The Holloway Plan 
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was featured in all editions of Ageton's book from the 1940s until the early 1970s when, 
as will be discussed, an alternative model of officer development replaced it.   
 The Naval Officer’s Guide from 1946 to 1970 depicted a line officer who was 
progressively educated, first in his line specialty, and then more broadly as he matured.  
In explaining the Holloway Plan, Ageton discussed the role of the General Line Course 
as a means to broaden officers who had transitioned from reserve to regular status.   
Ageton included in the text several graphs that communicated the importance of 
integration and synthesis in an officer's career.  The commonality between officers was 
such that surface, aviation, and submarine trained officers shared a common educational 
sequence. All 'line' officers were expected to follow the same general educational 
progression, which included attendance at the General Line Course, post graduate school 
and war colleges.93  Ageton went on to describe the values and goals of this ‘navy 
university’: “In the course of his career, every naval officer should continuously read and 
study to further his understanding of strategy, logistics, and naval, air, and land tactics 
and their application in the field of joint operations.  …..He must be equipped to interpret 
correctly and without bias the lessons of the past in the light of new development and 
trends in the techniques of present and future warfare.”94   
Career guidance documents that carried the authority of the Navy and Defense 
department also conveyed the idea of the 'line' officer as broadly educated.  The Bureau 
of Personnel Manual of 1948 stated in clear language the importance that all officers be 
educated to understand strategy, policy and joint-service operations:    
                                                 
93Arthur Ainsley Ageton, RADM, USN (Ret), The Naval Officer's Guide, 4th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1951), 212.  
94 Ibid. , 213. 
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“A thorough knowledge of our nation’s policies and the correct 
conception of the strategy necessary to secure our national success are 
essential parts of the mental equipment for higher command.  Every 
experienced naval officer should possess, as a necessary component of his 
technical knowledge, a thorough grounding in the principles and methods 
of naval strategy and tactics and of joint operations with other branches of 
the armed forces.  Every commissioned officer should have sufficient 
knowledge to interpret correctly strategic dispositions, and the tactical 
decisions of our leaders.  Education for supplying such knowledge and for 
the development of doctrine and good military character is necessary 
throughout our naval service.”95  
 Navy policy was followed by navy action.  Officer curriculum and programs 
were changed to match Holloway's recommendations. Colleges that offered permanent 
NROTC programs were expanded substantially from 27 in 1942 to a total of 52 with 
passage of Public Law 729 in 1946. This doubling of source colleges and the variation in 
curriculum available to prospective officers further worked to broaden the input to the 
officer corps.96 
 
Undergraduate Policy: A Broad Foundation 
The Naval Academy emerged from the war with a general education program that 
incorporated new course work in joint service cooperation and the study of new 
technologies, especially aviation.  The Naval Academy leadership anticipated the end of 
hostilities and in 1944 began earnest preparations to a reinstate the four year curriculum.  
Explicit in their planning was the belief that Annapolis must provide a ‘broad’ and 
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‘general’ education: “The Naval Academy is but one link in the chain of naval education. 
It cannot produce a finished naval officer.  It can only cover the fundamental, which must 
be expanded and enriched by experience and further study throughout an officer’s 
career.”  The report went on:  “The Naval Academy has no obligation, nor even the right, 
to educate individuals for other purpose. It is an institution for the fundamental education 
of naval officers.”  The education of midshipmen to be specialists was strictly excluded 
from the vision of the undergraduate program, as the report concluded that “…the 
education of specialists is a function of other branches of the naval educational system.”  
The committee concluded that the objective of  Annapolis was to “ …to give a broad , but 
functional, basic and professional education on which the graduate may found his further 
study  and training as a naval officer…”  Finally, the review explicitly endorsed, by 
name, the continued validity and authority of the King plan of officer development as 
conceived in 1919.97    
Like King in the 1920s, Navy leaders in the 1950s continued to be wary of the 
tendency of specialization to creep into 'line' officer education.  The Naval Academy 
Superintendent wrote in a curriculum review: “The emphasis remains one of judicious 
balance between the social-humanities, scientific-engineering, and the military-
professional areas within the four year undergrad pattern.  Specialization which would 
detract from the central purpose of a thoroughly integrated program of fundamental 
education and basic professional training has been carefully avoided.”   He went on: “The 
                                                 
97 Academic Board Special Committee,"Post-War Curriculum Report ", RG 405 USNA Special 
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curriculum has long-range implications…to career considerations.  It takes into account 
the broad development of the individual…”98  
In the post-war period, the Naval Academy broadened the educational program 
with the inclusion of additional course work in the humanities and social sciences, to 
include the study of economics, ‘elements of national power’, psychology (course hours 
were doubled) and a course in public speaking.99  Reflective of the educational shift 
toward greater integration was the addition of inter-service (Joint) training programs. 
“Jointness” was affirmed both in the curriculum and the activities of midshipman.  The 
Navy and the Army instituted an ambitious exchange program between the midshipmen 
and cadets at West Point and Annapolis.100  Midshipman professional education became 
even more integrated with the creation of a two week joint amphibious training known as 
“CAMID”, for Cadet-Midshipman, which began in the summer of 1946 and apparently 
continued into the early 1950s. 101   
In this period the Navy devoted additional resources to aviation education and 
training.   Secretary Forrestal handpicked the first post-war superintendent, aviator and 
former DCNO for aviation, RADM Aubrey Fitch, and charged him with expanding the 
academy’s aviation program.  Fitch in turn selected Captain Stuart Ingersoll as 
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commandant and ensured the next two commandants were also aviators.  Fitch 
established a Department of Aviation in academic year 1945-46, but this independent 
'platform' department lasted only a decade.  By the later 1950s, aviation and aero-science 
courses became once again subordinate components of the engineering department and 
summer training program.102   Though the academic component of aviation may have 
faded, aviators remained firmly engaged in the recruitment of midshipman to their 
program. Over the next thirty years, an aviator filled 12 of the next 15 commandant 
billets from 1947-1977 and worked assiduously to 'spread the word' about aviation. 103   
 Aviators also debated the future of NROTC.  Some reservist aviators wanted to 
continue the abbreviated V12/ V5 program adapted for peace-time.   However, within a 
few years the aviators apparently recognized the benefits of a broadening experience at a 
four year college and adopted the NROTC approach to officer education. 104  In 
summary, in the post-war years aviators voted to support a broad-based officer program 
for the 'well rounded officer'.  But the undergraduate commissioning programs 
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constituted but one phase in a 'line' officers educational development. For a more 
complete picture of how the war affected officer development, it is important to examine 
changes at the graduate school and war colleges.  
 
Post-War Graduate Education and Senior War Colleges: More Joint 
 
Consistent with the Pye and Holloway Plan recommendations, the Navy elevated 
the status of the Naval Post Graduate School in the immediate post-war period.  The 
school expanded and moved from Annapolis to its own campus on the West Coast in 
Monterey, California.  Perhaps the most knowledgeable scholar of the Navy Post 
Graduate School, Alexander Rilling, captured the significance of the post-war 
deliberations and policy actions:  “It was apparent that formal education, in all of its 
existing forms, had become an integral and accepted part of the professional development 
of naval officers.  The comments of all the study groups, and the fact that so many were 
formed were indicative of such acceptance.” 105  The numbers and types of technical and 
specialized degrees also began to grow in parallel with the expanded graduate school.  
From a school dedicated to a single bureau in 1909 (steam engineering), the graduate 
school was soon to embrace a multitude of specialties and fields.  The tension between 
integration and specialization loomed yet larger, but the ‘line’ voted once again in favor 
of integration.    
The integrative and broadening function of graduate school was reaffirmed with 
the reestablishment and expansion of the General Line Course, an explicit requirement of 
                                                 
105 Alexander Wolfgang Rilling, “The First Fifty Years of Graduate Education in the United States Navy, 
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the Holloway Plan.106   As discussed previously, the goal of the GLC was to broaden 
both reserve and USNA officers who otherwise had held specialized billets during the 
war.  The graduate school continued King's practice of educating some ‘line’ officers 
with a degree in a ‘subspecialty’ outside their main field.  In response to the proliferati
of specialties in the post-war period, the graduate school increased its course offerings fo
EDOs and staff officers.  The increased production of specialists in the EDO and staff 
corps was not, however, indicative of specialization creeping into the line.  On the 
contrary, the increased specialist education (which Holloway wanted to be kept separate 
from the 'line') was to free more 'line' officers to pursue broadening education.  It may 
have been that Holloway and his war-tested generation were coming to learn the lesson 
that CDR Chantry warned of in the 1920s:  the 'line' officer was being spread too thin 




                                                
107  
 In the years immediately after the end of the war, the Navy moved decisively to 
reassert the importance of the Naval War College (NWC).  The Navy's commitment to 
the continued importance of the NWC is evidenced in the fact that one of the Navy's most 
successful officers, a hero of the war in the Pacific,  Admiral Raymond Spruance, became 
the first post-war president.   Upon taking command, Spruance immediately faced the 
question of balance between specialization and integration: where to locate the 
curriculum on a spectrum demarcated by the technical specialists, on one end, and the 
 
106 James L. Holloway, Jr., RADM USN,"Holloway Board on Naval Training, 29 September 1945", Naval 
Historical Center and USNA General Collection, V411.H65 1945.  See section two of the report for 
discussion of the General Line Course.  
107 A.J. Chantry, CDR  (CC) USN,"Ltr from CDR Chantry, Chair of Department of Mathematics,  to 
Superintendent of the Naval Academy, dtd 11 August 1924, Subject: The Place of the Naval Academy in 
the Education of  the US Naval Officer", NARA RG 405, Record of Superintendent, General 
Correspondence,  Curriculum Studies, 1924-39, box 1, folder 1.  See chapter two, section on "New 
Foundation".  
173 
advocates of joint integration on the other. 108  The ends of the spectrum, always distant, 
had grown farther apart with the development of the advanced technologies of war and 
the increased importance of ‘joint’ command.  
Under Spruance, the war college worked to be inclusive of all warfare officers 
and specialists in the navy and also embraced inter-service education. 109  Not fully 
appreciated in later years is that the Navy was a leader in joint education in immediate 
post-war period.  Though it would constitute a competitor to the NWC in some sense, the 
Navy supported the establishment of the National War College.110  Within months of the 
end of hostilities, naval officers would in large numbers attend the National War College 
and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF).  Navy leaders reflected on their 
war experience and believed that 'line' officers should receive further integrative 
education, to include joint education. The typically parochial General Board of the Navy 
not only endorsed the National War College but in a 27 July 1949 memo to Secretary of 
the Navy recommended an expansion of joint education and that the service “…keep 
naval quotas filled with carefully selected personnel.”111  Navy policy and action 
implemented the recommendations of the post-war reports and studies.  At least half of 
each promotion year group was expected to attend one of the war colleges.112 
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109 Ibid., 184. 
110 John Wesley Masland and Laurence Ingram Radway, Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and 
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111  General Board,"Ltr to Secretary Navy, 27 July 1949, Subject: Unification ", NARA RG 428-370-43-01-
1 Box 4, SECNAV Sullivan papers. 
112  Navy policy was to assign approximately 47% of each promotion group to war college: 29% to NWC, 
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Post War Assignment and Promotion Policies 
In addition to the study of officer educational programs, the Navy also examined 
the possibility that officer assignment patterns might require adjustment in the post-war 
period.   Again, the Holloway Plan findings were particularly important.  The Holloway 
Plan emphasized that officer assignments in the fleet were more than ‘work’.  Officer 
assignments were considered critical to the professional development of an officer.  The 
Holloway Board studied the practice of frequent assignment rotations and variation in 
billets and recommended the continuation of such a practice in the post-war period: "The 
opportunity for individual growth by experience in varied assignments is essential.”  
Holloway concluded that war experience showed that short assignments were ideal for 
purposes of officer development: “War experience has demonstrated that an officer can 
reach high performance on one assignment in about a year.  While high ship efficiency 
can be attained when officers remain in billets for long periods, such assignments do not 
prepare an officer for wide responsibility.  Professional development of officers is more 
important than excelling in ship competition."  The board recommended tours of modest 
length in a variety of assignments, a combination that would broaden the officer. The 
board put its credibility behind such a conclusion and bluntly recommended: "Make short 
assignments to specific billets at sea a matter of Navy Educational Policy."113    As will 
be discussed in later chapters, a differing opinion of the value of officer assignment 
rotation would prove to be one of the major points of contention between the King model 
and the Rickover model of technical specialization.   
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 While the Navy endorsed Holloway’s plan to use assignments to broaden the 
‘line’ officer, in some cases, in particular with carrier command, the post-war period saw 
a narrowing of experience.  The practice of allowing surface officers to qualify as 
Aviation Observers, a qualification that allowed them to compete for command of 
carriers or carrier battle groups, had been terminated after the war.  A large inventory of 
aviation experienced officers, almost all of whom had served on surface ships, made it 
less important for older surface officers to gain their wings.114   
Aviators did not seek to make aviation operations an insular specialty.  In this 
period all regular officers who aspired to become aviators had first to serve for two years 
on a surface ship.  Aviator admirals also took steps to make aviation tactical knowledge 
accessible to all 'line' officers.  The expanded aviation curricula at the academy and 
service schools attest to the desire of aviators to educate the non-aviators.  Most telling 
was the fact that senior aviators continued to endorse the ideal of the integrative or well-
rounded officer as the reigning model for the navy commander.   The first aviator to rise 
to be the Chief of Personnel, VADM Thomas Sprague, on  30 March 1948,  tasked one of 
his study committees to examine career structures that would ensure “…duty assignments 
                                                 
114 The assignment to command a carrier or group of ships that included an aircraft carrier was restricted to 
aviators, as it had been since 1921.  However, in contrast to the 1920s there were now additional 
administrative barriers to preclude a reprise of Halsey/King pattern: surface officers were generally 
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III,  ADM USN (CNO), Aircraft Carriers at War:  A Personal Retrospective of Korea, Vietnam, and the 
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which constitute a rounded career.”115   The first aviator CNO addressed the issue of 
balance between specialization and breadth and observed that the goal for which young 
officers should strive should be that of the “…all around highly competent combat 
officer…”116   
In addition to officer studies and CNO endorsements, there remained yet another 
revalidation of Kings’ model of officer development: the resumption of inter-war 
promotion examinations.117  The return of the promotion examination communicated to 
junior and mid-grade officers that there existed a common body of professional 
knowledge which a naval officer should aspire to master.  The promotion examinations 
further served to encourage the study of general tactics and operations.  Like before, the 
exams also provided 'line' officers an incentive to attend the junior course at the War 
College.   
The exam was almost identical to the pre-war exams and tested in the subjects of 
military law, international relations, strategy, tactics, and intelligence.  Indicative of the 
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increased stature of aviation, there was added a section of “…aviation tactical, 
operational, and strategic aspects.”118  The inclusion of aviation as a subject for ALL 
officers is further evidence of the continuing importance of the generalist conception of 
‘line’ officer.  In guidance to promotion boards, general combat and overseas experience 
was valued over technical duty, at least in the 'line'.  Evidence of this operational bias is 
found in a temporary provision in the promotion guidelines of 1945: only officers who 
had served at sea for at least two years in their current grade or have served over seas 
were eligible for promotion.   By such a provision, officers who had remained in the 
United States, many of whom would have been in technical assignments, were culled 
from the pool of eligible 'line' candidates for promotion.  
* 
Officer Development in the Shadow of the Bomb: Hartman Report of 1948 
The expansion of the officer corps in Second World War and the rise to 
dominance of naval aviation produced a ‘line’ more broad and rounded than ever before. 
The concept of the well-rounded line officer survived intact and was even extended, 
evidenced by the broader qualifications of naval aviators on both ships and aircraft and 
the Navy’s embrace of joint training and education. The 1944 and 1945 studies of the 
officer corps had validated the primacy of operational knowledge, not narrow technical 
specialization.  Most importantly, the post-war studies had made an explicit judgment 
based on the lessons of combat: the well-rounded, generalist officer was revalidated as 
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the model for command. But an alternative model was beginning to emerge in the U.S. 
Army and the U.S. Air Force. 
Naval officers, to include Ernest King, had long recognized the tendency of Army 
aviators to focus more on their machine than on their function within a larger 
organization.119  The creation of the Air Force in 1947 posed two threats to the Navy.  
First, the Air Force might serve as a model for naval aviators and help precipitate the 
fragmentation of the Navy, a real concern in the late 1940s.120  The second, more subtle 
threat was the possibility that the Air Force example would encourage greater 
specialization in the 'line'.  It was feared naval aviators would begin to identify more with 
their platform, a shift in loyalties that would come at the expense of the larger Navy.  The 
Navy studied the problem and devised concrete steps to counter the fragmentary effects 
of technological innovation.  The Navy's post-war thinking on this subject was collected 
in a remarkable study completed at the direction of VADM Thomas Sprague, Chief of the 
Bureau of Personnel in 1948.  The board chairman was RADM C. C. Hartman and the 
report typically referred to as the Hartman Report.121    
The apparent instigator of the Hartman Report was VADM Thomas L. Sprague, a 
highly decorated aviator veteran.   The actual report was produced by several officers, 
some of which were war veterans from varied technological groupings, to include a 
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future four-star admiral and father of the US Senator, John S. McCain, Jr.  These 
officers—CDR McCain and five captains—appear to have been chosen for their youth, 
and it is likely that none of them were much beyond the rank of lieutenant when the fleet 
buildup for war began in 1936.  The Hartman report examined formal education, training 
assignments, and “duty assignments which constitute a rounded career."  In designing the 
parameters of the study, the Navy leadership engaged squarely the threat posed by 
technologically-induced specialization.   Sprague explicitly tasked the board to consider 
the following question: “…what training and education outside the specialty field are 
necessary at various stages of a career to insure that the specialty does not constitute a 
handicap to high command qualification.”122    The report acknowledged the tendency of 
social groups to organize and attempt to rise to dominance through their association with 
new technologies.  As recorder, it was mostly likely CDR McCain who wrote:  
 
“This is not a new problem.  The basic cause rests in the fact that new weapons 
either produce or tend to produce dominant groups of officers.  During the 19th 
century the advent of steam engineering and the iron clad brought their troubles.  
At the turn of the century the torpedo boat threatened the battle line.  From 1920 
to 1940 the gun club was predominant.  Now it is aviation and to a lesser extent 
submarines, and in the future it will be guided missiles, atomic energy or 
whatever else science introduces as a new weapon.  The importance of each new 
weapon, if only because it is new, gives prestige to the officers skilled in its use 
that acts as an incentive for that group to seek special privilege, authority and 
autonomy.   This is natural and normal.  Therefore, it becomes incumbent that the 
Navy establish a training and educational system which constantly emphasizes the 
importance of high command relative to any specialty.  Further, this system must 
insure an opportunity for the specialists to expand his knowledge of the naval 
profession as a whole as well as an opportunity for non-specialists to acquire 
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knowledge of the new weapon this should obviate the contortions the Navy now 
experiences each time it absorbs a new weapon.” 123 
 
Written three years after the dawning of the nuclear age, it is remarkable that the 
report essentially revalidated the King system, which was by this time thirty years old. 
The Hartman Report exhorted officers to seek a balanced career, distinct from a specialty:  
"This training and education must be such that as an officer advances in rank, he 
concentrates less on the specialized duties of the junior grades and more on the broad 
administrative and executive responsibilities of high command.  In other words, his 
identification with any particular specialty or branch becomes less marked as he moves 
on in his career." 124  To effect such a goal, VADM Sprague recommended the 
continuation of the integrative education sequence outlined first by the King plan of 
1919, reaffirmed by the Pye Report of 1944 and the Holloway Board of 1945.125  
 The authors recognized and were concerned about the increasingly powerful 
draw exerted by socio-technology communities associated with platforms.  To counter 
the power of socio-technological communities, the board further recommended that 
officers in their later years come under the control of a technology-independent Career 
Planning Board.  The Career Planning Board would be independent of platform 
community influence and would direct officers to broadening education and career 
assignments.  This Career Planning Board would take control of officer assignments after 
the 18 year point.  This board would have responsibility to assign officers for the benefits 
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of the larger service, rather than allow specialized personnel officers to control officer 
assignments.126   
The Hartman Board appreciated that any independent body could come under the 
influence of associations of officers, associations which by this time had come to form 
almost exclusively around technological systems.  To preclude the creeping identification 
of board members with parochial interests, “…the membership of this board shall be so 
rotated that the periods of duty for the members are staggered.  This provision is to 
obviate the possibility of one group of officers by continuous association over a long 
period subconsciously imposing their specific determinations on the naval service." 127   
The desire to counteract the tendency of persons to identify with a group, and a 
technology, were direct echoes of the concerns voiced by officers in 1916 when the Navy 
reformed the promotion system.  Officers feared in 1916 and in 1948 that 'promotion by 
selection' had a tendency to create factions in the service.  The overall benefits of the 
merit system were doubted by at least some officers as late as 1944.  William Pye raised 
the question as to whether the practice of ‘promotion by selection’ should continue in the 
post-war period. 128  The officers who developed the policy recommendations of 1948 
realized the tendency of the 1916 Promotion Act to encourage resurgent 'technicism', or 
technocentrism, and sought to counterbalance this effect.   
 This board was remarkable for an additional reason: it was more vociferous in its 
advocacy of the generalist (integrative) and rounded officer than even the King plan a 
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generation before. Specifically, the 1948 board recommended that attendance at the 
General Line Course, a course first conceptualized by King in 1920, was to be 
mandatory.  To make such an educational course compulsory was unprecedented.  The 
board was convinced that common educational experience would help develop an 
integrated rather than a specialized view of the ‘line’ and would break down barriers 
between socio-technological officer communities. The Board acknowledged that in 1948 
the navy officer corps was still recovering from the disruption of war, and the GLC was 
currently fully subscribed as it absorbed many junior officers who had been narrowly 
specialized.  But once the Navy had readjusted, then "... by 1954 all line officers, 
regardless of course of entry will receive the Line school course...."    129  This plan for 
compulsory integrative education was not just one of many recommendations that 
remained ‘on the shelf’ but might never be communicated to the fleet.  On the contrary, 
the plan for compulsory, integrative education was conveyed to all commissioned officers 
in personnel bulletins and books.   Ageton’s widely read Naval Officers Guide stated 
clearly that by 1954 the Navy’s General Line Course was to be mandatory for all 
unrestricted line officers.130   This aggressive advocacy for integrative and broadening 
education is all the more remarkable when one considers that VADM Sprague was an 
aviator.   And Sprague was not alone among the aviators.  The leading aviation admirals 
were also strong advocates for integration. Admirals Radford, Gerald Bogan, and Daniel 
Gallery, and several senior surface officers continued to propound the philosophy  "... 
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that while naval officers were trained in at least one specialty, they owed their primary 
duty to the Navy as a whole and that they would some day obtain command.131 
The Hartman Report proved to be prescient in its prediction of the rise of 
powerful new technological social groups. The board singled out atomic energy as a 
potential source of parochialism.   But it did not anticipate that one of these groups might 
actually prevent the implementation of the Board’s own recommendations.  But that is 
what happened: the Hartman plan to make integrative education mandatory in 1954 was 
derailed.  Instead, in 1954 a new technology emerged that caused the Navy's leadership to 
delay its quest for further 'line' integration.  In 1954 the CNO Admiral Robert Carney 
issued a letter that questioned the validity of a generalist model of the ‘rounded’ or 
integrative officer.  The rationale he gave for questioning the validity of the generalist 
model was the emergence of the atomic reactor championed by Captain Hyman 
Rickover.    
* 
Taking Stock: Promotion to High Command 
 
The model of the general line officer was validated in several post-war studies.  
The navy's commitment to the generalist model was further evidenced in promotion 
statistics of the high command. At the end of the war, the ‘well rounded officer’   
dominated the ranks of three and four star admirals.  Four years later, in 1949, the share 
of officers who had conformed to King's system had declined, but this 'demographic dip' 
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resulted from the disruption of war preparations.  Despite this 'dip', more than half of all 
four star and three star admirals had conformed to King’s recommendations to attend the 
Naval War College.132     
Some may argue that the generalist admirals who commanded the Navy in the late 
1940s were a product of institutional ‘momentum’, that they were the residue of an 
earlier officer development system.   There is some truth in this view, as promotion to 
flag comes necessarily late in a career.  Decisions to broaden or specialize would have 
been made several years before selection to flag.  Therefore, to ascertain whether or not 
officers actually believed the rhetoric about the 'well rounded officer', something else is 
needed.  An examination of the later careers of mid-grade officers who attended the war 
colleges in the years immediately after the Second World War provides that evidence.  
Graduating war college classes in the immediate post-war period produced a high 
percentage of three and four star admirals.   The classes of the National War College 
illustrate this point.  The National War College was the least specialized of the war 
colleges, but in the years 1947-1950, it produced almost four dozen high ranking flag 
officers (three and four star admirals).  Such a high promotion rate indicates the Navy 
directed its best mid-grade officers to the joint war colleges, just as the General Board 
had recommended.  This close association between promotion to high rank and prior war 
college attendance is a clear indication that both navy leaders and younger officers 
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valued broad education.133   The integrative and generalist model of naval commander 
was very much alive and well in the first decade after the Second World War.  
The “technical specialists” would not displace the ‘generalists’ as a result of the 
Second World War.  The environment of war, war-time expansion, and the lessons of war 
all reaffirmed the basic tenets of the pre-war system of officer education and 
development.  King's system was validated by war.  The environment of the Pacific War 
propelled to command submariners and aviators who were not technical experts but 
masterful and aggressive tacticians.  The massive influx of war reservists both expanded 
and broadened the 'line'.  Annapolis emerged from the war with a more highly qualified 
and experienced faculty and with the validity of the general education curriculum 
reaffirmed.  The graduate school educated more specialists for the restricted line and staff 
corps, but the ‘cornerstone’ of the school was an expanded General Line Course for 'line' 
officers.  The Naval War College under Admiral Spruance reaffirmed the importance of 
senior-level professional education as an essential part of a 'line' officer’s preparation for 
command.  In this same period, the most integrative and joint institution, the National 
War College, became a popular destination for the best ‘line’ officers from all 
communities, aviation, submarine, and surface.  
The Navy’s commitment to breadth as opposed to specialization was not a ‘hold 
over’ from the old ‘surface’ officers of the pre-war generation.  Rather, the new leaders 
of the Navy, combat aviation veterans, also endorsed the officer model of breadth and 
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balance.  The first aviator CNO Forrest Sherman endorsed integrative officer 
development and cautioned against specialization when he wrote in blunt sailor language 
that:  “We are not pushed willy-nilly into specialization…”134   The Navy as an 
organization continued to hold to its integrated view of warfare and of the profession.135   
The 'generalists' privileged position would not remain unchallenged, however.  The 
confluence of a deepening Cold War and the creation of nuclear machines offered an 






134 Department of Defense, Armed Forces Officer, 1st ed. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1950), 39. 
135  Paolo E. Coletta, The United States Navy and Defense Unification, 1947-53 (Newark: University of 
Delaware Press, 1981), 23. Coletta explains: "While naval doctrine contrasted sharply with army doctrine, 
which emphasized concentration on a military specialty, it perforce had to wait until the Air Force 
developed its doctrine before tri-service comparison would be made."  Ultimately, Coletta observed, "...the 
Air Force developed its doctrine along lines followed by the Army Air Corps... (in contrast) ...the Navy's 




 The Reactor, Rickover, and a Technocratic Philosophy of 
Command: the King and Rickover Systems Co-Exist, 1948-58 
 
“Every experienced naval officer should possess, as a necessary component of his 
technical knowledge, a thorough grounding in the principles and methods of naval 
strategy and tactics and of joint operations with other branches of the armed forces…  
Education for supplying such knowledge and for the development of doctrine and good 
military character is necessary throughout our naval service.”                                      
Bureau of Personnel Manual, 19481 
 
“The system is based on the all around officer who can be shifted from 
 post to post and is capable of doing each routine job well…” 
“The system is designed for the ‘operators’... the ‘idea’ men (technical experts)  
are left out in the cold, passed over and retired...” 




   At the beginning of the Cold War, the Navy's high command continued to 
endorse King’s model of the general line officer.  In the 1950s, an Engineering Duty 
Officer, Captain H.G. Rickover, mounted an unprecedented challenge to the King model.  
In place of the ‘generalist’, Rickover promoted an alternative vision of 'line' commander: 
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education policies.  However, there is one wording change worthy of note: the addition of the reference to 
“joint operations” and the manner in which strategic knowledge was categorized, as a “necessary 
component of his (an officer’s) technical knowledge.”  Thus, the navy, in this important policy document 
and manual that was carried aboard every ship and station, continued to affirm the essentials of the well 
rounded officer, but considered it necessary to couch strategic knowledge as part of an officer’s “technical 
knowledge”. 
2 Rickover as quoted in Clay Blair, The Atomic Submarine and Admiral Rickover, [1st ed. (New York,: H. 
Holt, 1954), 210-211.  Author inserted (technical experts) to clarify meaning.  
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a technical elite in command.  On the face of it, Rickover seemed to have offered a 
reprise of arguments made by Melville and the Navy's old engineering corps of the late 
19th century.  But on closer inspection it appears Rickover's ideas did not originate with 
navy engineers.   Rather, Rickover borrowed his technical elitist notions from activist 
engineer groups in New York City, most likely from a group known at the time as the 
Technocracy Movement.   Rickover's adopted technocratic philosophy became uniquely 
powerful when he married it with one of the most important naval programs of the Cold 
War: the nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine.   Rickover fought several 
philosophical battles against the 'generalist' model.  In the face of considerable 
opposition, he created a highly unique organization that became the source of the most 
technically elite 'line' officers ever to command an American man-of-war.  Despite 
Rickover's successes in the 1950s, however, the Navy leadership continued to support the 
'generalist' as the preferred model for all 'line' officers, including nuclear trained officers.  
As recorded in classified documents, manuals, and official statements, the Navy 
continued to assign and educate officers in conformance with the model of the 'well 
rounded' officer.  By the close of the decade, Rickover did not have the political capital, 
or perhaps the personal conviction, to displace this traditional conception of command.  




Rickover’s Ideological Roots and the 'Discipline of Technology’ 3 
 
 There is little in his public record that would indicate that Rickover would 
become virulently antagonistic to the ideal of the 'well rounded officer."  His espousal of 
the technical specialist did not originate in his naval experience or at the nuclear technical 
school that he attended at Oak Ridge in the late 1940s.  Rather, Rickover’s philosophy of 
technology, and his belief that technical specialists should lead, were rooted deeper in his 
intellectual development and experience at graduate school.4 
Rickover's early career and broadening professional experience made him a 
paragon or model of the 'well rounded' officer.  Rickover grew up with his family in 
Chicago, comfortable enough that he attended school regularly though he worked after 
school to supplement the family income.  Chicago during his childhood was one of the 
fastest growing and most industrial of American cities, a fact which may have shaped 
some of his views on technology.  There is, however, no direct evidence of this effect 
other than the fact that Rickover worked in one of the hi-tech organizations at the time: 
Western Union as a telegraph delivery boy where he became expert at Morse Code.  
                                                 
3 Francis Duncan, Rickover and the Nuclear Navy: The Discipline of Technology (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 1990), 293.  This phrase, "Discipline of Technology" is the subtitle of Duncan's book.  It 
was meant to capture Rickover's philosophy of technology.  Duncan explains that Rickover held a 
deterministic view of technology. Rickover believed that “technology will not yield to leadership", “you 
can’t argue with technology.” Duncan went on: “The discipline of technology means that the organization 
must adapt to the technology, and not the technology to the organization."  The clear implication was that 
Rickover believed human activity, organization, and development were shaped in response to technological 
requirements. Technological systems occupied an elevated position as a determinant of officer 
requirements.  An officer, in Rickover's philosophy, should be an engineer and technical expert.   
4  In discussions with both his son and close confidant, it was clear that Columbia University played a 
pivotal role in the development of Rickover’s ideas of technology and of the heightened role of engineering 
and the specialist.  Robert Rickover, (son of Admiral Rickover), Interview with the Author, 25 September 
2007.  Theodore Rockwell, Interview with the Author, 25 September 2007. Dr. William Stuart, 
(anthropologist who helped establish Rickover's foundation, Center for Excellence in Education) Interview 
with the Author, 26 February 2008. 
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Rickover in his youth was probably exposed to popular scientific literature  that was 
filled with speculations of new and wondrous technologies.  The possibility of space 
travel and nuclear energy were, for example, popularized to readers by H.G. Wells 
around the turn of the century.  Rickover perhaps knew of these science-fiction 
speculations in his childhood, as he was a prolific reader, perhaps even something of a 
bookworm.  However, Rickover was no young technical wizard: his interests were in 
literature and history; he was an eloquent writer at an early age; and his lowest scores on 
the academy entrance examination were in math, not strong indicators of a young 
technical expert in the making.5   
At Annapolis Rickover could not avoid a significant exposure to mathematics and 
was, like all midshipmen, introduced to the world of modern machines and technology.  
His first year at Annapolis coincided with American participation in the First World War, 
a conflict dominated by machine systems at sea, in the air, and on the land.   His studies 
at Annapolis were those of every other midshipman and had come by 1918-22 to include 
engineering subjects, a relatively new requirement that originated with the Amalgamation 
Act of 1899.  His training, like those of his classmates, included summer-time cruises to 
Europe and the Pacific.   
Rickover received his commission in 1922 and went to sea where his time aboard 
ship was consumed for the most part by the day- to- day demands of operating and 
maintaining machines, leaving little time for philosophical speculations.  Many of his 
assignments were in engineering where, most likely, he came in contact with engineers, 
some of whom may have been veterans of the pre-amalgamation Engineer Corps.  But it 
                                                 
5 Francis Duncan, Rickover: the Struggle for Excellence (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001).  See 
first chapter for discussion of Rickover’s early life. 
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does not seem that Rickover in his early career was particularly enamored with 
engineering or technology.  Rather, he published articles in Proceedings on non-technical 
subjects, translated the leading German U-boat tactical literature into English, and 
completed correspondence courses from the Naval War College.  Furthermore, Rickover 
in his career interests showed a desire to dabble, to be a 'generalist': he served on surface 
ships and submarines and applied twice for flight school.  The last time he applied for 
flight school was in the month before he matriculated in the engineering program at 
Columbia University.  
In all, Rickover spent almost a half generation as a 'line' officer.  After he was 
rejected for command of submarines, he did win command of a small surface ship, the 
USS FINCH.  However, his command experience is shrouded in mystery, and it appeared 
that he was, perhaps by temperament, not suited for command in the 'line': he was 
relieved after a few short weeks. 6   Not long after his apparent failure in command, he 
turned to technology and the career of a specialist--that of the Engineering Duty Only 
officer.  While anger and rejection may have dominated his emotions in the first years of 
his career as an EDO, they do not explain the powerful and coherent philosophy of 
technology that seemed to guide him for the next half century.  It does not appear that 
Rickover, almost middle-aged when he became an EDO, would have been easily shaped 
by the EDOs around him.  Furthermore, Rickover's philosophy of command--in 
particular, its aggressive overtones and the challenge it posed to the 'generalist'-- was 
                                                 
6 Though some may speculate that Rickover’s personal and emotionally traumatic experience with the 
“line” may have colored his later officer policies, I find little evidence for this conclusion, with the 
exception of the recollections of VADM James Calvert. Calvert, one of the first nuclear submariners and 
later the first nuclear trained superintendent of the US Naval Academy, asserted that, indeed, “Rickover 
hated the Line.”  According to Calvert, Rickover would frequently harass Calvert as to his lack of 
substantive engineering knowledge or experience.  James F. Calvert, VADM USN (retired), Interview with 
the Author, 21 November 2007. 
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different than that of his contemporary EDOs.  In contrast to Rickover, senior EDOs who 
were Rickover’s contemporaries typically supported the reigning King model of officer 
development.7  EDOs in the 1930s-1940s typically cooperated and worked closely with 
the 'line' and did not challenge their command prerogatives.  
Nuclear machines and physicists do not appear to have awed Rickover. Rickover's 
experience with nuclear scientists came relatively late in life; furthermore, he was not 
particularly impressed with nuclear scientists.8  Instead, an examination of the time-line 
of Rickover’s education and intellectual development attests to an earlier formation of his 
beliefs.  What Rickover believed about technology and the identity of those who would 
command was molded years before the ‘nuclear age’.  
 The first documented evidence that Rickover was aware of and held opinions 
about nuclear technology came in 1933 while Rickover served aboard a diesel submarine, 
thirteen years before he would report to Oak Ridge.  In a letter he wrote to his wife, he 
expressed a surprisingly well informed opinion concerning the possibility and 
ramifications of a future nuclear device.  Instead of praising the military benefits of such 
a development, he feared the abusive ends to which human masters might apply nuclear 
technology.9  This mature and somewhat liberal opinion concerning the inherent 
dilemmas posed by complex technology indicates that he had been exposed to fairly 
                                                 
7 Albert G.  Mumma, The Reminiscences of Rear Admiral Albert G. Mumma, U.S. Navy (Retired) / 
interviewed by Paul Stillwell (Annapolis: US Naval Institute, 2001), 240, 249. 
8 Theodore Rockwell, Interview with the Author, 25 September 2007.  Rockwell explained that Oak Ridge 
was not a formative experience for Rickover.  Rockwell explained:  "The teachers there were more 
scientists than engineers.  Rickover did not have a particularly high regard for scientists.  And his views of 
technology certainly were not formed by the scientists at Oak Ridge in 1947."   Rather, Rockwell 
speculated that Rickover was most influenced in his professional philosophy of engineering, and high 
regard for theory not at the Naval Academy, but at Columbia University. In discussions with both his son 
and close confidant, it was clear that Columbia University played a pivotal role in the development of 
Rickover’s ideas of technology and of the heightened role of engineering and the specialist.  Robert 
Rickover, (son of Admiral Rickover), Interview with the Author, 25 September 2007.   
9 Francis Duncan, Rickover: the Struggle for Excellence (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 51. 
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advanced thinking on the subject prior to 1933.  It was doubtful he discussed such matters 
with the enginemen of his ships.  Not an engine room but rather an engineering graduate 
seminar seems a more likely inspiration for such ideas, and Rickover enjoyed just such an 
intellectual experience in the late 1920s.  
Rickover attended graduate school and took his masters degree from Columbia 
University in New York in 1929.  It was this academic setting and his Columbia 
professors and associates that seem to have been the most likely inspiration for 
Rickover's philosophy of technology.  Rickover's intimate family and friends speculated 
that Columbia University was the institution and the experience that most shaped 
Rickover’s intellectual development.10  It was at Columbia where he pursued and won a 
Masters of Engineering and Applied Science.11  His choice of field concentration of 
electrical engineering placed him on the leading edge of engineering and science.  
Electrical engineering was in fact one of the first of the engineering disciplines to 
conform to the new ‘school culture’ of engineering, which displaced the older ‘shop’ 
traditions discussed in chapter one.12  Furthermore, Rickover chose to live apart from 
other navy students at Columbia and made it a point to immerse himself in the college 
                                                 
10 Robert Rickover, (son of Admiral Rickover), Interview with the Author, 25 September 2007.    He 
explained that his father valued his Naval Academy experience for introducing him to knowledge of the 
navy profession, but the senior Rickover certainly did not see the academy curriculum as shaping his 
intellectual views of engineering, technology, or much else.  A close associate, Theodore Rockwell, also 
believed Columbia to be Rickover's most important intellectual experience. Theodore Rockwell, Interview 
with the Author, 25 September 2007. 
11 Columbia University Archives,"Columbia University Engineering Department 1929 Graduating Class 
Information", Columbia University, Engineering Department Archives, New York, NY.  It should be noted 
that in the 1920s the master's degree was a “master's in engineering and applied science” rather than the 
degree today known as the “master's of science in engineering." 
12 Monte A. Calvert, The Mechanical Engineer in America, 1830-1910: Professional Cultures in Conflict 
(Baltimore,: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967).  The engineering profession was itself in a period of change early 
in the 20th century.  The electrical engineers were among the earliest of the profession to embrace science 
and advanced education.  Rickover, by his choice of Columbia, ensured he was steeped in the new, 
emerging ‘school’ and scientific culture of engineering.  If had chosen a lesser university, the effects on his 
philosophy and what was to follow for the navy officer corps may have been substantially different.  
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culture.  He met there a PhD student who would later become his wife.  But Rickover 
was doing more than studying and dating while at Columbia.  He was observing the 
intellectual ferment surrounding the emergence of a unique philosophy of technology.   
In the later 1920s, there was springing up in Columbia an activist engineering 
political movement that appears to have shaped and influenced Rickover.  This 
movement called for the creation of technical elite who would command machines and 
ultimately command political power.  A review of available biographical sources, as well 
as a close reading of Rickover’s writings and speeches, provide strong evidence that 
Rickover as a young graduate student was exposed to, and took as his own, the values 
and attitudes of an engineering ideology associated with what has been called the 
Technocracy Movement.13   
At Columbia in the late 1920s and early 1930s, the ‘ideology of engineering’ and 
its aggressive variant, the Technocracy Movement, became highly influential in New 
York.  The Technocracy Movement for a brief period commanded attention even on a 
national scale.  These movements were especially active and influential around the time 
Rickover studied in New York City.  Edwin Layton, a leading historian of this subject, 
described the period as one of philosophical ferment where there occurred almost a 
metaphorical "revolt of the engineers" in a quest for political power.14  Engineers in 
remarkably large numbers adhered to an "ideology of engineering".   Layton describes 
                                                 
13 The Technocracy Movement was an actual movement that came into existence in the late 1920s and 
early 1930s, and held considerable influence on a national scale during the Great Depression.  For a 
discussion of the movement, see Edwin T. Layton, The Revolt of the Engineers: Social Responsibility and 
the American Engineering Profession (Cleveland,: Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1971);  W. 
H. G. Armytage, The Rise of the Technocrats: a Social History (London,: Routledge and K. Paul, 1965); 
Joseph Dorfman, Thorstein Veblen and His America (New York: Viking Press, 1934); William E. Akin, 
Technocracy and the American Dream: The Technocrat Movement, 1900-1941 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1977). 
14 Edwin T. Layton, The Revolt of the Engineers: Social Responsibility and the American Engineering 
Profession (Cleveland,: Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1971), 55. 
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the ideology as a variant of Social Darwinism wherein the man with greater scientific 
knowledge possessed the comparative advantage.  Layton explains engineers of the time 
believed that “…their scientific knowledge gave them a competitive advantage that 
insured their eventual triumph”.   These activist engineers believed that “… future society 
would be what the engineering profession willed it to be..." and that they were the 
"...agent of all technical change, and hence as a vital force for human progress and 
enlightenment.”15  Those who were not engineers, or were not particularly well-versed in 
a technical specialty, were of less consequence and certainly less qualified to lead or 
make decisions.  
 It may be difficult today to appreciate the power of these technocratic ideas, but 
at the time, they influenced minds at the highest levels of political institutions, and were 
thus well positioned to influence the mind of a young navy lieutenant.   During 
Rickover’s time at Columbia, engineers were, by Layton’s account, near the pinnacle of 
their political influence.  It was then that an engineer was for the first time elected to the 
White House (Herbert Hoover).   The various engineering professional societies (e.g., the 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, (ASME)) exerted political influence on a 
national scale.  The society of electrical engineers (the predecessor of what became 
IEEE) was particularly vocal.  Rickover, as an engineering student at Columbia, would 
almost certainly have been a member of an engineering society.  Most significantly for 
Rickover’s value formation, these societies were engaged in a debate about professional 
engineering values and the role of engineers in leadership positions.    
An important and particularly radical outgrowth of the professional engineer 
associations was the Technocracy Movement, which emerged around the time Rickover 
                                                 
15 Ibid.,  56-57. 
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was a student at Columbia.    The Technocracy Movement originated in Manhattan and 
found refuge in the engineering department of Columbia University, the same department 
and perhaps even the same building where Rickover studied as an engineer.16  The 
leaders in this technical elite group were many, but three key figures in physical 
proximity to Columbia were Thorstein Veblen, Howard Scott, and Walter Rautenstrauch, 
the last an engineering professor on the faculty at Columbia. 
It is reasonable to conclude that a young graduate student majoring in electrical 
engineering, living and studying in the same graduate department that gave refuge to the 
Technocracy Movement, might be influenced during this formative period by these ideas.  
Columbia University and Manhattan were home to the technocratic pioneers, the most 
famous of which was Veblen. 17  Veblen, the co-founder of the neighboring “New School 
of Social Research” and a source of inspiration for the Technocracy Movement, lived and 
lectured in New York City and worked with professors from Columbia who taught 
graduate students when Rickover was a student there.  Veblen’s associate and founder of 
“Technocracy Incorporated”, one of several organizations associated with the 
Technocracy Movement, was Howard Scott.  Howard Scott was closely associated with 
the engineers of Columbia’s Engineering Department.  
 Another link between the Technocrats and Rickover's graduate school experience 
was Professor Walter Rautenstrauch of the Columbia Engineering Department, who was 
                                                 
16 Joseph Dorfman, Thorstein Veblen and His America (New York: Viking Press, 1934), 513. 
17 Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of Business Enterprise (New York,: C. Scribner's sons, 1932); Thorstein 
Veblen, The Place of Science in Modern Civilization, and other Essays (New York,: Russell & Russell, 
1961); Thorstein Veblen, The Engineers and the Price System (New York,: A. M. Kelley bookseller, 1965); 
Thorstein Veblen and Stuart Chase, The Theory of the Leisure Class: an Economic Study of Institutions 
(New York: The Modern library, 1934).  For a contemporary analysis of Veblen’s relationship with the 
Technocracy Movement, see Dorfman.   For an updated reflection on Veblen’s broader influence, see Rick 
Tilman, The Intellectual Legacy of Thorstein Veblen: Unresolved Issues (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood 
Press, 1996). 
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also a pioneer in electrical engineering innovation.  It was Rautenstrauch who helped 
propel the Technocrats to national fame.  The source of attention was Rautenstrauch’s 
work, his then famous “Energy Survey of North America” that was purported to hold the 
answer to the causes of the Great Depression.18  Rautenstrauch eventually took on near 
celebrity status and was even provided large time blocks on New York radio to explain 
his theories of 'technocracy'.19   
While direct historical evidence does not show Rickover became a card-carrying 
member of Technocracy Incorporated, it is reasonable to conclude that he might have 
read about their ideas and work.  Rickover was in close physical proximity to the 
Technocracy Movement.  Furthermore, the New York papers and magazines followed the 
developments of the Technocracy Movement and published the work of Veblen, Scott, 
and Rautenstrauch.  The signature issues of the Technocracy Movement—the importance 
of the technical elite, the crime of waste and inefficiency, depletion of raw materials, and 
the danger of the ‘money value’ motivated businessmen – were carried in the New York 
press.  Being an avid reader of the New York Times, Rickover most certainly read of these 
Columbia University celebrities.   But in public, Rickover never claimed these men as his 
inspiration.  It is reasonable to ask why, if Rickover had been influenced by the 
Technocracy Movement, he never spoke of them directly, at least in public?  A possible 
answer to Rickover's silence is embarrassment. Eventually, powerful business interests 
felt threatened by the Technocracy Movement and attacked the leadership and 
                                                 
18 Edwin T. Layton, The Revolt of the Engineers: Social Responsibility and the American Engineering 
Profession (Cleveland,: Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1971),  227. 
19 Dr. Walter Rautenstrauch, "The Message of Technocracy Radio Broadcast, 2-215 pm on 9 January 
1933," (United States: WABC, 1933). 
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undermined its credibility.20    The leader of Technocracy Incorporated,  Howard Scott, 
was eventually found to have inflated his resume (he had never earned the engineering 
degree he claimed).  It would not be surprising that Rickover, the credentialed elite 
engineer, declined to admit to any inspiration derived from the layman Scott and the 
Technocrats from Columbia.   
While Rickover enjoyed close physical and institutional proximity to the 
technocrats, such evidence is circumstantial.  Mere proximity does not confirm 
inculcation of the technocratic ideas into Rickover's belief system.  To ascertain 
Rickover's philosophical affinity for a technocratic philosophy, Rickover’s later writing 
and speeches must be consulted.  Rickover’s writings provide strong evidence of the 
transference of the ‘ideology of the engineer’ into Rickover’s own philosophy.  Soon 
after his departure from graduate school, Rickover began to sprinkle in his letters to his 
wife, a PhD student still at Columbia, references to the issues and beliefs associated with 
the early technocratic authors.  In the early 1930s Lieutenant Rickover wrote about the 
exhaustion of the world’s energy supplies, a signature issue for the Technocracy 
Movement.  He speculated in the letter that perhaps the depletion of cheap energy would 
serve a useful purpose by slowing the rate of industrialization and force mankind to 
return to a "sane" life.  Remarkably, Rickover wrote as a young lieutenant of the 
possibility and dangers of nuclear energy:  “To offset the possible decline in the available 
supplies of fuel, scientists are attempting to obtain sub-atomic energy.  I sincerely hope 
                                                 
20 Edwin T. Layton, The Revolt of the Engineers: Social Responsibility and the American Engineering 
Profession (Cleveland,: Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1971), 228. 
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they fail in this.  It reminds me of Pandora’s Box, where a great deal of misery was let 
loose...” 21   
Rickover echoed another technocracy theme when he wrote of the need to remake 
the nation’s social structure.  He went so far as to speculate that the Great Depression 
might serve a beneficial effect in clearing out the old business leadership and make room 
for something new: “I hope the Depression keeps up a little longer.  We shall have a fine 
country if it does.” 22   Voicing one of his strongest convictions, which reflected a central 
theme of the Technocracy Movement, Rickover criticized the business elites as 
inadequate to lead the nation:  “I believe that business men are, as a rule, the most stupid 
group, from a large viewpoint.  Money apparently warps peoples’ judgment and causes 
them to have an unreal attitude.” 23  All three of these topics to which Rickover of the 
1930s addressed —energy, social reconstruction, and the failings of the business class—
were signature issues for the Technocracy Movement. 
In the intervening years between his graduate education and his rise to national 
stature, Rickover's identification with technocratic values seems to have grown stronger.  
In two of his nationally distributed books, Education and Freedom, published in 1959, 
and American Education: a National Failure, published in 1963, Rickover voiced several 
beliefs that reflect closely those of the early 20th century technocratic thinkers, Scott and 
                                                 
21 Rickover, letter of 16 March 1933, quoted in  Francis Duncan, Rickover: the Struggle for Excellence 
(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001),  51. 
22  Rickover, letter of 28 June 1935, quoted in Ibid. , 57. 
23  Rickover, letter of 14 July 1935, quoted in  Ibid. ,57.  Duncan observed that Rickover carried a low 
opinion or even contempt for businessmen throughout his life.  Similar observations are found in  Norman 
Polmar and Thomas B. Allen, Rickover (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982). Rickover seems to place 
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Failure: the Problem of our Schools and What we can Learn from England, [1st ed. (New York,: Dutton, 
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Veblen.   Rickover writes like an early technocrat when he condemned the wasteful 
exploitation of resources, warned of a decline of Middle East oil and urged a philosophy 
of conservation, especially for fuels and metals.24  The Technocracy Movement also 
focused early on fuel depletion.25  Not coincidently, King Hubbert, the engineer who was 
made famous for correctly predicting "peak oil" in the United States was a member of the 
Technocracy Movement and had arrived at Columbia just months after Rickover had 
departed en route to the fleet.   
Rickover in his public testimonies criticized consumerism, conspicuous 
consumption, and the duplicity of the engineer “…who chooses to engage in design of 
consumer goods.”  Rickover condemned American materialism, writing that “…the 
greatest of modern fallacies is that material possessions are the mark of a successful 
man.”  Rickover exhorted parents to do their duty and to practice less consumption as a 
model to children.26    Rickover’s statements about consumption and materialism parallel 
closely those of Thorstein Veblen.  It was Veblen who in the first extensive social 
critique of modern American materialism, The Theory of the Leisure Class, had coined 
the phrase “conspicuous consumption."27     Rickover gives a further clue to his 
philosophical roots when he posed a rhetorical question of the value of money: “what 
                                                 
24 Hyman G. Rickover, Education and Freedom (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1959).  For discussion of fuel 
depletion and concern for decline of raw materials see 37.  For references that follow, see 57, 80, 82, 87, 
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25 Joseph Dorfman, Thorstein Veblen and His America (New York: Viking Press, 1934), 510.  See 
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26 Hyman G. Rickover, Education and Freedom (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1959), 45, 46, 59, 98.  
27 Thorstein Veblen and Stuart Chase, The Theory of the Leisure Class; an Economic Study of Institutions 
(New York,: The Modern library, 1934). 
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money value can one assign a book?”28   Rickover's concern about the distorting value of 
money was also an important early 20th century technocratic concern.   Veblen sounded a 
similar theme in his second most influential work, The Engineers and the Price System, 
writing:  “Is pay to be the only measure of value of a job? No! Nothing material can ever 
give the intelligent man or woman such deep satisfaction as successful solutions of 
intellectual problems that challenge the mind.” 29    
Rickover was known throughout his later career for his attack on business 
interests and spent his last years battling with corporate leaders.30  He was highly 
suspicious of businessmen and doubted their capacity to protect the public good and 
make a profit at the same time.  In his system of shipyard management, Rickover insisted 
on an independent, technical group of engineers (Naval Reactors Representative Office, 
NRRO)31 who were wholly independent from business influence.  Rickover's unique 
system of independent inspectors was so effective that in the wake of  the Three Mile 
Island nuclear accident in 1979 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission adopted Rickover's 
system, which remains in place at all nuclear power plants in the United States.  This idea 
of technician authority may not, however, have originated with Rickover but has roots 
that can be traced to the Technocrats.  Veblen wrote in the early 20th century-- some forty 
years before the creation of ‘NRRO” and three quarters of a century before Three Mile 
Island-- that engineers should be independent and should not accept managerial positions 
                                                 
28 Hyman G. Rickover, Education and Freedom (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1959), 58. 
29 Thorstein Veblen, The Engineers and the Price System (New York,: A. M. Kelley bookseller, 1965), 59. 
This book was first published early in the 20th century.  
30 Patrick Tyler, Running Critical: the Silent war, Rickover, and General Dynamics, 1st ed. (New York: 
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that would compromise their professional independence.32  Veblen, like Rickover, 
elevated engineers to a favored position of leadership and asserted that engineering was 
the most important profession, “…because mankind’s future may depend on the 
engineer’s practice.”33  Veblen was praised in some corners of the world for his ideas of 
an independent leadership group, an ‘engineerocracy’. 34 
 Rickover was by the late 1950s well known for his attacks on the educational 
system.35   Rickover routinely attacked professional educator’s associations and justified 
his criticism on the basis of statistical output metrics, which he noted contrasted poorly 
with Russian education that graduated twice the number of engineers as did the United 
States.36  Rickover argued in public testimony and his books that colleges should 
downgrade sports, especially at the US Naval Academy.37  Again, Rickover’s ideas 
echoed those of the Technocrats, especially Veblen.38  Veblen opposed the role of 
businessmen in education, in particular, their prominent role in support of sports 
programs.  Veblen called for an increased emphasis on technically educated engineers 
                                                 
32 Thorstein Veblen, The Engineers and the Price System (New York,: A. M. Kelley bookseller, 1965), 66. 
33 Ibid. , 81. 
34 Joseph Dorfman, Thorstein Veblen and His America (New York: Viking Press, 1934), 514-515.  Veblen's 
ideas were praised by leading Soviet thinkers.  The soviet writer, Bukharin, writing in Pravda, summarized 
Veblen's ideas of an engineering elite:"...the real leaders of industry are the engineers.  He (Veblen) puts 
forth an original concept as a guide for the future, i.e., the ideas of engineerocracy, the rule of the 
engineers..."  
35 Hyman G. Rickover, Education and Freedom (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1959), 45. 
36 Committee on Appropriations,  House of Representatives Report on Russia By VADM H.G. Rickover, 
US Navy, 18 August 1959. 
37House Committee on Appropriations, Testimony of VADM H.G. Rickover on Nuclear Propulsion, 87th 
Cong., 2nd sess., 1962, 33. 
38 Rick Tilman, The Intellectual Legacy of Thorstein Veblen: Unresolved Issues (Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood Press, 1996).   See chapter 30, by Thomas Sowell, “Veblen’s Higher Learning After Fifty 
Years”,  599.  See page 591 for Veblen’s negative attitude toward sport’s programs in institutions of higher 
learning.  
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and speculated on the desirability of a ‘Soviet of Engineers” as he denounced the 
American educational establishment.39    
The close relationship between Rickover and the Technocrats extended beyond 
speeches and writing to manifest itself in his personal lifestyle and consumer choices 
both at home and in the office.  Rickover's offices were Spartan, which might have been 
for 'show' to guests and his staff.  But given that he infrequently entertained at home, his 
choice of living conditions for his first wife and son speak more strongly to the origins of 
his values in the technocratic philosophy of frugality, simplicity, and anti-materialism.  
As a Technocrat, it would come as no surprise that in the 1930s Rickover bought and 
maintained a simple farm in New England and had plans to return to the land should he 
fail to promote in the Navy, or perhaps should the economic system collapse in the 
Depression.40  Veblen also owned a home in the country, a rustic mountain cabin, to 
which he returned in his retirement years after leaving New York.  Even after he had 
become one of the most senior officers in the US military, Rickover shunned expansive 
flag quarters and chose instead to live with his family from 1940 to 1972 in the same 
relatively small apartment overlooking the Rock Creek Park in northwest Washington, 
D.C.41  Rickover’s office at Naval Reactors was not characteristic of an admiral, but of a 
penny-pinching or lower-level bureaucrat-technocrat.  It was adorned not with mahogany 
but with a government-issue desk, metal bookshelves, and worn out chair bought at a flea 
market.42   According to his son, Robert, his father Hyman Rickover “dressed down in 
                                                 
39 Also see Ibid.  598.  There is some evidence that Rautenstrauch also expressed interest or admiration for 
Russian and/or Soviet activities.  See "Corporation (Technics International) Plans Revival of Russia," New 
York Times, August 5 1921.    
40 Francis Duncan, Rickover: the Struggle for Excellence (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 60. 
41 Ibid.,  71. 
42 Recollection of a person close to Rickover who requested not to be identified.  
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the extreme” and wore around the house old khaki trousers and a matching modest kha
shirt. 
ki 
                                                
43   
Many of Rickover's life-style choices appear alien to his youthful upbringing. 
Though he struggled at first, like most immigrants, Rickover's father was eventually 
financially secure, politically connected, and came to own an apartment building and his 
own business in Chicago.  Compared to the navy officers with whom Admiral Rickover 
spent most of his life, his tastes and habits were also alien.  But his tastes were typical of 
members of the Technocratic Movement who, at the height of their influence, lived 
simply and wore simple, gray uniform-like attire.44  Veblen, too, even in his last years 
chose to live in similarly spare conditions.  Further, Veblen dressed in clothes so simple 
and coarse that “they would almost stand alone”…and wore the “heaviest of work-shoes, 
purchased from Sears, Roebuck, served him for everyday wear in the house.  He bought 
much from the mail order houses, because he like the rugged utility of their goods” 45 
Rickover appears to have been deeply influenced by the many ideas and values of 
the engineering and technocratic movements of the 1920s and 1930s.  But Rickover 
identified with four technocratic ideas that appear to have informed and guided his 
decisions and actions as a senior naval officer:  the idea that technology drove history and 
that man must conform to its dictates; that the technical specialist should be elevated 
above those with lesser technical knowledge; that the world’s energy sources were a great 
concern and required the best men to solve such a problem; and that the educational 
system should emphasize the study of science and engineering.  The first of these ideas is 
 
43 Robert Rickover, (son of Admiral Rickover), Interview with the Author, 25 September 2007. 
44 Edwin T. Layton, The Revolt of the Engineers: Social Responsibility and the American Engineering 
Profession (Cleveland,: Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1971), 228. 
45 Joseph Dorfman, Thorstein Veblen and His America (New York: Viking Press, 1934),  498. 
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a fatalistic acceptance that technology will drive history, that technology takes on the 
powers of God to define the conditions of life and death.  Such a philosophy makes it a 
man’s duty to conform to technology's requirements.46  Francis Duncan, the admiral’s 
biographer, spent years with Rickover and perhaps more than any other writer captured 
the essence of Rickover’s values and beliefs.  Duncan explains that Rickover elevated 
technology to a position of supreme if not ultimate significance in human activity.47  
Duncan defined Rickover’s key philosophical conviction:  “The discipline of technology 
means that the organization must adapt to the technology and not the technology to the 
organization”.48  The overtones of technological determinism in Rickover’s rhetoric 
closely align to the discourse of the 1920s 'technocrats'. 49  To Rickover, technology was 
the defining, if not a God-like force of modern life.  
 The second value Rickover carried over into his navy reforms naturally follows 
from the first. Rickover held an elevated view of the technical specialist and held a low 
regard for less technical, less specialized persons, whether they were businessmen or 
naval 'line' officers.  A generation after the apogee of the Technocracy Movement, a Vice 
Admiral Rickover would propound the philosophy of the technocrats when he explained: 
“The man of the future on whom we shall depend more and more is the technical expert.  
                                                 
46 Hyman G. Rickover, Education and Freedom (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1959), 46.  Rickover described 
'invention' as the determinative force in history;  see 48-51 for discussion of the role of speed of 
technological innovation and the critical role this speed will contribute to victory in war.  
47 Francis Duncan, Rickover and the Nuclear Navy: The Discipline of Technology (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 1990), 293. 
48 Ibid. , 293.   Rickover's thinking also echoed early writers on the subjects of technology and science.  
Francis Bacon had written three hundred years before, that "...for nature is only to be commanded by 
obeying her." See Robert D. Friedel, A Culture of Improvement : Technology and the Western Millennium 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2007), 163.  Perhaps in Rickover's mind, technology came to represent the 
'nature' of the artificial world.  
49 Stephen Edgell, Veblen in Perspective: his Life and Thought, Studies in institutional economics. 
(Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), 161.  According to Edgell, Veblen might be counted among the 
technological determinists, who placed emphasis on the “character of science and technology” and the 
“requirement inherent’.    
206 
Today he is still subservient to non-technical leaders in government and industry, and his 
work is hampered and sometimes destroyed by men in whom is vested great power but 
who cannot understand the realities of the new, artificial, technological age.  But the 
‘verbal’ men are on the way out; the men who can handle the intricate mysteries of 
complex scientific and engineering projects are on the way in.  That applies all the way 
down the line to the skilled workman on whose judgment, concentrated attention, and 
responsibility may depend the functioning of some new and gigantic piece of 
engineering.  To put this in military terms: we shall need more technical sergeants and 
fewer martinets.  In our naval nuclear program we have taken cognizance of this demand 
for a different kind of man and we have set up schools to train the officers and men who 
will run the new atomic navy.”50  Rickover's views were not original, but reflected his 
absorption of the values of Technocracy.51  Veblen envisioned the engineers as the true 
leaders of the industrial age, “...the indispensable General Staff of the industrial 
system.”52    The similarities between Veblen and Rickover are strong, reflective of 
transference of values and beliefs from the New York elites to Rickover, who would then 
carry them back to the Navy.    
The two additional values Rickover absorbed from the Technocracy Movement—
the concern to solve the depletion of world energy resources and the need to make 
education more technical—also portended significant implications for how Rickover 
                                                 
50 Hyman G. Rickover, Education and Freedom (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1959), 19. 
51 Stephen Edgell, Veblen in Perspective: his Life and Thought, Studies in institutional economics. 
(Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), 237.   Veblen’s views on engineers are paraphrased by a leading 
scholar of the movement:  “Since the late 1890s Veblen had been concerned with the economic and 
political significance of technical experts, whom he regarded as the contemporary embodiment of the 
instinct of workmanship and therefore as a potential solution to the problem of the regular sabotage of 
industry perpetrated by the business class in their routine preoccupation with the ‘pecuniary side’ of 
economic processes.” 
52 Veblen as quoted by Edgell, 140. 
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would spend his career and where he would seek reforms. As we will discuss, Rickover 
dedicated himself to these twin challenges: more than any other single individual, he was 
responsible for the American nuclear power system that exists today, and much of the 
modern naval educational and professional development system is also his legacy.  His 
attacks on the 'generalist' model of officer and his later intervention in educational 
institutions reflect a philosophical coherence when one understands Rickover’s source of 
inspiration.   But the transformation of officer models would not have been possible 
without the benefits of a nuclear reactor organization that came under Rickover's control.  
 
* 
The First Nuclear Reactor: ‘Technocracy’  Finds a Home 
 
Rickover had not long to wait for an opportunity to put his technocratic 
convictions to work, and on a grand, world-changing scale.  Rickover's early speculations 
about nuclear energy in the 1930s proved to be a decade too soon, but with the 
development of nuclear explosive technology and the obliteration of Hiroshima, 
scientifically engineered technology was on the march.  Though the official Technocrats 
had been by this time discredited, their emphasis on the increasingly important role of 
technology and technicians was not out of step with post-war thinking.  The highly 
respected Vannevar Bush, a senior scientist in the Manhattan Project, published several 
post-war works that highlighted the importance of science and advanced technology to 
the safety and security of America.  Bush, like Rickover, sounded a deterministic tone, 
arguing that scientifically designed technology had defined the terms of battle in the 
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Second World War and would do likewise in the future:  “Radar, jet aircraft, guided 
missiles, atomic bombs, and proximity fuses appeared while we were fighting (the 
Second World War); they determined the outcome of battles and campaigns, even though 
their determining nature was not fully exploited in that contest.” 53 (my emphasis) 
Rickover's war experience prepared him well for the age, for he had commanded 
not ships and men in battle, but a complex technical organization. Rickover became an 
Engineering Duty Only (EDO) officer in the late 1930s and spent the war years in the 
Electrical Division of the Bureau of Ships (BUSHIPS).   After the war the head of 
BUSHIPS assigned him to study the nuclear applications in Oak Ridge from June 1946 to 
Sept 1947.54  Though not officially authorized to lead anyone, Rickover as the senior 
man quickly took charge of the navy contingent, which included some of the best minds 
in the Navy: top graduates of Annapolis and later MIT graduates, Lou Roddis and J
Dunford.  Technical education, the study of the science and engineering of nuclear 
technology, dominated every waking hour.
ames 
                                                
55  It was, in short, a technocrat’s dream 
assignment.  In this job Rickover could assist the Navy in its immediate task of finding a 
means to tap nuclear energy for submarine propulsion. But he could also help mankind 
 
53 Vannevar Bush, Modern Arms and Free men: a Discussion of the Role of Science in Preserving 
Democracy (New York,: Simon and Schuster, 1949), 3. 
54 Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: the Military-Industrial-Academic complex at 
MIT and Stanford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 151.   RADM Bowen, and not Rickover, 
was the first naval officer to envision a program to produce a nuclear powered submarine.  Before the first 
successful nuclear detonation in the desert of New Mexico, as early as 1939, some in the Navy had begun 
to visualize the application of nuclear power to submarine propulsion.  Dr. Ross Gunn, a civilian physicist 
at the Naval Research Lab, is credited in January 1939 as the first to envision the possibilities of nuclear 
power to propel submarines. There is, however, a general consensus that the submarine application of 
nuclear technology, and even the first civilian nuclear power plant, would have been severely delayed if not 
for the leadership efforts of Hyman Rickover. See Gary E. Weir, Forged in War: the Naval-Industrial 
Complex and American Submarine Construction, 1940-1961 (Washington: Naval Historical Center 1993),  
157.   
55 Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Nuclear Navy, 1946-1962 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1974) . For detailed discussion of the selection of personnel to go to Oak Ridge, and the nature of 
those first steps into naval nuclear power, see 31-38. 
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solve a perennial problem: the acquisition of a reliable, and potentially limitless, source 
of energy.  
As international tensions began to escalate in the late 1940s, the Navy decided to 
develop nuclear propulsion technology for the submarine fleet.  Though a dark horse 
candidate, and disliked by many, the Navy selected Rickover to head a joint Atomic 
Energy Commission (AEC) and Navy program for naval nuclear propulsion in February 
1949.56  With his advancement, Rickover expanded his span of control to include the 
technical training and education of many more officers.   As a consequence of Rickover’s 
efforts, the world's first department of nuclear engineering came into existence at MIT, 
and the work produced by Rickover’s officers laid the basis for MIT’s first nuclear 
engineering curricula.57   Rickover was not a passive participant in the emerging 
educational system, but closely monitored its development.  Rickover kept a close watch 
on his people and drove his first officers through the MIT program with such haste that 
apparently upon graduation the officers rushed back to Washington before the university 
had time to produce the new engineering diplomas.  As a consequence, these pioneering 
engineers received their academic certification under the title of a degree in 'nuclear 
physics', not nuclear 'engineering'.58 
In August 1949, the Chief of Naval Operations established naval nuclear power as 
a formal program.  He made this decision just weeks before the detonation of a Russian 
atomic bomb in September 1949.  The program evolved rapidly and against a backdrop 
                                                 
56 Theodore Rockwell, The Rickover Effect: How One Man Made a Difference (Annapolis, Md.: Naval 
Institute Press, 1992) see appendix for detailed timeline of milestones.    
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MIT and Stanford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 152.   Leslie writes that seminars and 
papers conducted for Rickover’s officers became "...the basis for a graduate course in nuclear 
engineering...."      See also Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Nuclear Navy, 1946-1962 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1974), 340-341, 345. 
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of rising tensions.  A few weeks after invasion of South Korea, the AEC authorized 
Westinghouse Corporation to begin construction of the Mark I nuclear reactor. 59  The 
Mark I reactor proved to be forerunner of all naval nuclear reactors and most civilian 
reactors in the United States today.  Rickover was about to achieve one of Technocracy's 
goals: to solve the problem of fossil fuel energy depletion.  But the Mark I was important 
for another reason: it became the point of departure for the transformation of naval 
command.     
The Mark I was an engineering and scientific breakthrough: it was the first reactor 
to provide economical and reliable power through the control of nuclear fission.  It was 
also a profoundly complex and dangerous machine that required highly knowledgeable 
and skilled engineers and operators. Though the subject of this paper is the officer corps, 
at this juncture a brief explanation of nuclear technology may help illuminate the problem 
Rickover and the Navy faced in determining the level of training and education required 
of the first generation of operators.  Understanding this basic nuclear reactor also 
facilitates an understanding of later reactors, because their design and construction was to 
remain fundamentally the same for a half century.   
Unclassified sources provide some idea of the technical demands faced by the 
early officers and engineers.60   Rickover and his design teams made the nuclear reactor 
as compatible as they could with existing navy systems.  The steam side of the plant (in 
contrast to the high pressure water side which circulates through the reactor vessel) is 
                                                 
59 Francis Duncan, Rickover: the Struggle for Excellence (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 
111, 116.  See also Hewlett, Weir, and Rockwell.  
60 Randolph W. King and Prescott Palmer, Naval Engineering and American Seapower (Baltimore, Md.: 
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identical in many respects to non-nuclear steam plants aboard the ships Rickover served 
in the early 1930s. However, the two systems—the conventional and the nuclear—are 
closely coupled.  For this reason, material failures or human mistakes in the machinery 
rooms outside the reactor compartment could result in damage to the reactor core and a 
subsequent release of fission products to the environment.  The environmental 
significance of nuclear fission constituted the most profound difference between the non-
nuclear and nuclear technology: mistakes on a conventionally powered plant might kill 
the engineer; mistakes in a nuclear plant might destroy a city. Furthermore, the reactor 
core remained a source of high levels of radiation even when not in operation. 
Consequently, once constructed and fueled, a reactor core required constant supervision 
until it was, after some 30 years of service, dismantled and the fuel removed from the 
ship for disposal.  The dangers of nuclear explosion, melt-down, radiation, and long-term 
waste disposal were a new challenge for the Navy.  Unlike their conventional brethren at 
sea, therefore, the new technology required more rigorous technical education, advanced 
training, and careful screening of officers and men to ensure their reliability.61    
Once the U.S.  Government funded the Mark I (later known as the S1W reactor), 
the responsibility for the timely delivery of the reactor and ship rested primarily with the 
corporate engineering organizations and shipyards.  Rickover and his staff exercised a 
supervisory role over industry, but the training and preparation of the officers and men 
who would operate the reactor was left entirely to the Navy and Naval Reactors.   Few if 
any responsible persons inside or outside the Navy disputed the need for the technician in 
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the engine room to be highly qualified and specialized.  But the emergence of this 
specialized knowledge in the Navy had large and unintended consequences for the 'line'.   
* 
The Clash of Philosophies:  
Promotion to Admiral and Command of NAUTILUS 
 
Naval nuclear power specialists enjoyed a privileged position from which to 
challenge the King model of 'line' officer.   Unlike the last challenge to the King system--
the aviator pioneers of the 1920s and 1930s, many of whom came from the outside of the 
sea service-- Rickover's naval nuclear engineers originated in the Navy.  Whereas 
Princeton and Yale, and many other colleges and flying clubs, quickly produced 
thousands of aviators for the Navy in 1917-8, nuclear engineers in 1954 could be found 
nowhere else but in Rickover's program. Nuclear engineers were in such short supply that 
their numbers bordered on extreme scarcity.  An early report on the nuclear program 
attested to the uniqueness and scarcity of nuclear engineers:  "...the board finds that the 
Atomic Energy Commission managers consider that the heart of their nuclear technical 
staff is made up of Naval Officers.  They (the AEC) state frankly that there is no one who 
could replace them…” 62  
Given the uniqueness and scarcity of Rickover's first engineers, both Rickover 
and his officers enjoyed a significant degree of job security, and Rickover could thus 
challenge the parent organization with relative impunity.  The nuclear specialists did not 
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need to challenge the Navy for more resources, for the Navy and Rickover were of a 
common mind in fully funding the program.  Rather, the conflict in values centered on 
the type of officer who would lead the growing nuclear organizations and command the 
nuclear-powered ships that were then under construction. Rickover and his technical 
expert model of command thus came into direct conflict with the traditional King model.  
In the King model, the technical expert was to be subordinate to the 'generalist' officer, a 
position of inferiority which infuriated Rickover.  The philosophical competition soon 
played out in two disputes:  Rickover’s own promotion to flag and the selection of the 
“line” captain of USS NAUTILUS.  
The battle for Rickover’s own promotion centered on a debate over the 
qualifications necessary to rise to senior command and the rank of admiral: was a senior 
leader to be broad and ‘well rounded’ or technically expert and specialized?63   Rickover 
came up for promotion to admiral in 1951 confident of his selection.  He was, after all, 
the head of one of the highest priority defense projects in the Navy and one of the leading 
specialists in a new field.  Rickover was thus shocked when the board did not select him 
for admiral.  He quietly awaited a second opportunity for the board to select him in 
1952.64  When in 1952 the board met with the same result, Rickover and his staff raised 
questions, agitated in Congress, and forced the Navy to justify the board’s actions.65  
Rickover represented something new: he was a scientifically educated engineer who had 
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focused his professional activity over the past 8 years in the narrow field of nuclear 
power.  He was also disliked.  Rickover’s opponents justified his failure to promote due 
to his lack of breadth.  Rickover was not a "rounded officer", they explained, and thus not 
suited to rise to high command that selection to flag represented.66  Not just ‘line’ 
officers, but senior Navy EDO engineers thought Rickover lacked the broad experience 
to be promoted to flag rank.  One admiral, a senior EDO in command of BUSHIPS, 
VADM Albert Mumma, observed that Rickover “…was not a broad scale individual…” 
and “…Rickover was a vertical specialist, and he hadn’t been broadened.” 67    
The preference that "broadened" officers became flag officers was not unique to 
Rickover's situation, but was in 1953 commonly accepted as the model for admiral in the 
Navy.  Various post-war boards and study groups had endorsed the professional model of 
the "broad scale" officer.  But Rickover would not submit to the dictates of the old model 
and mounted an unprecedented challenge.  It is possible that his protests were merely the 
manifestation of an over-sized ego, but he had little about which to be conceited.  Until 
his specialized experience in nuclear power, he had had a rather unexceptional career.  
The one and only thing in his record that justified his challenge of the promotion board 
results was his status as a unique, highly specialized officer, the very qualities that others 
had used to deny him promotion.   
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To Rickover, the navy decision to oppose his promotion was to perpetuate an old 
concept of the officer corps, that of the 'rounded' officer.  In this battle over identity of 
command, however, Rickover needed allies and he turned to Congress and the national 
press to make his case.68   The press, guided by Rickover and his staff, framed his failure 
to promote as an issue of conflicting models of officer identity, of bias in favor of the 
rounded, operational officer at the expense of the specialist.  The press reported that    
“…the Navy was expressing a deep-seated prejudice against technical specialists.” 69 In 
contrast, the press explained, the Army and Air Force had embraced the specialists, “… 
they recognize that in a technological age specialization is so valuable and so 
unavoidable that the specialists cannot be barred from high rank.”70   
Rickover himself went on the record with reporters and criticized the Navy's 
preference for both the ‘rounded officer’ and the operational officer:  “The system is 
based on the all around officer who can be shifted from post to post and is capable of 
doing each routine job well”.71  Rickover then condemned the operational-mindset of the 
Navy, stating that “The system is designed for the ‘operators’…”  He went to explain that 
the specialists he called ‘idea men’ are “… left out in the cold, passed over and retired...”  
He continued his attack on the Navy's operational mindset by drawing comparison 
between the Navy and large engineering firms.  Rickover explained: “What is even worse 
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is that you have the ‘operators’ dictating and choosing who the top ‘idea’ men will be, 
and what they will do. Contrast this to General Motors…” 72  
Rickover also cast the debate in terms of changing conceptions of engineering 
knowledge, a conflict between the ‘shop culture’ tradition and that of the ‘school culture’ 
that now was producing the technological elite, the scientifically educated engineer.73  
Rickover explained that what was also disturbing was “… that apparently there is no 
place in the Engineering Corps for the scientifically inclined engineer…”74  Clay Blair 
who authored several articles and books on the nuclear Navy and submarines interviewed 
Rickover and recounted: “The Captain went on, time and again, to insist that somehow, 
the scientific and technical minds of the Armed Services must be freed from a complete 
military type of control.”75  In the detailed interviews with Blair which were then 
published before a national audience, Rickover sought to educate the public (and 
Congress) as to the deep historical roots of the dispute over specialists in the Navy.  
Rickover also challenged the practice of closed promotion boards that were immune to 
Congressional oversight.76    
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Following the series of articles, Congress inserted itself into the debate and firmly 
sided with Rickover.   Influential Congressmen threatened to block all flag officer 
promotions should Rickover’s name not appear on a special promotion list.  Faced with a 
Congressional inquiry into the entire Navy promotion system, the Navy bowed to 
political pressure in a desperate attempt to save the promotion system as it had existed 
since 1916.77  A special board was convened in 1953, and the promotion precepts were 
written in a way that all but directed Rickover’s selection. As Rickover himself would 
observe, the Navy was so desperate to select Rickover that it provided board members 
with precepts that practically ordered them to select a "125 pound Jew”, which in effect 
meant: select Rickover.78  But even strict precepts proved inadequate.  The EDO (the 
engineering officers) officers on the promotion board ignored the precepts and refused to 
select Rickover.   Faced with certain Congressional intrusion and the end of the 
promotion system as they knew it, the 'line' officers on the board banded together and at 
the 11th hour outvoted the intransigent EDOs.  Rickover was only by the slimmest 
margins selected for the rank of rear admiral. 79   Admiral Rickover was thus a creation 
not of the EDO officers but of the 'line'.  
 His own battle for flag left Rickover wary of both the EDOs and operators of the 
‘line’.  It was not lost on Rickover that his promotion to flag came through the 
intervention of Congress, not from support in the Navy.  Furthermore, the Navy had used 
                                                 
77 R.N. Smoot, RADM USN (Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel),"Memorandum and Aide Memoir for 
Rickover Case", BUPERS files, Pers-B-JTS 27 Feb 1953 (Author has Copy).  Smoot’s memorandum was 
used by navy flag officers to defend the decision NOT to promote Rickover.   Behind the scenes, however, 
the Navy was being outmaneuvered.  See  Theodore Rockwell, The Rickover Effect: How One Man Made a 
Difference (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1992), 155.  The Navy finally agreed to another 
promotion board after Congressman Yates introduced a bill proposing a profound change to the Navy’s 
promotion system: the addition of civilians to the admiral selection boards.  
78 Rickover, as quoted in Theodore Rockwell, The Rickover Effect: How One Man Made a Difference 
(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1992), 156. 
79 Ibid. , 157.   
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the 'generalist' model to attack Rickover's credentials and in so doing implicitly rejected a 
technical specialist model of higher command.  His ultimate victory, however, no doubt 
reaffirmed in Rickover’s mind that he could leverage an expensive industrial machine 
program, popular with Congress, to gain support for what might seem to be unrelated 
personnel policies.  But to Rickover, personnel policy and machines were closely linked.  
Rickover realized that this was not to be the last battle over promotions and selections.  
The privileged position of the ‘operators’ and 'well rounded' officers in the Navy would 
pose a continuing problem for him and his technical specialists.   
Rickover and his engineers demonstrated the reality of a reactor-power plant 
system on 30 March 1953 when the Nautilus prototype achieved “criticality”.   By June 
of that same year, Rickover and his engineers demonstrated the endurance of the system 
with a sustained high-power operation meant to replicate, as much as possible, the 
anticipated demands of propelling a submarine across the Atlantic Ocean.  With the most 
difficult scientific and engineering problems resolved, the social aspects of the 
technology now loomed large.  In the Idaho desert a senior scientist and engineer could 
make decisions about the reactor; Rickover himself made the 'command decision' to 
steam at full power in June 1953.  But reactors at sea would be under the command of an 
officer aboard ship.  The question now: what kind of naval officer should command the 
nuclear ships at sea?   
The debate struck very close to home for the ‘line’.  Command of a ship was the 
most jealously guarded of the 'line' prerogatives.  The outcome of this debate would exert 
a shaping influence on the 'line' for generations to come.80    Rickover vigorously asserted 
                                                 
80 The officer who was eventually selected, Eugene Wilkinson, who later became the first nuclear admiral, 
would along with Rickover exert a profound influence on the navy.  By Wilkinson’s own account, he was 
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himself in the battle over the selection of the commanding officer, though he knew that 
his intervention as an "Engineering Duty Only" officer (EDO) had no precedent.81   Such 
an intervention was however totally consistent with his fundamental philosophy of 
technology:  the technical expert occupied a privileged position as decision maker.   
Rickover’s intervention established the precedent that nuclear ship captains must carry 
impeccable technocratic credentials.  In addition, Rickover's victorious battle with the 
'line' would establish early his authority in matters of officer selection and assignment.  
 While Rickover’s intervention as an EDO may have had no precedent, he 
claimed historical precedent for his model.  As his biographers explained, his idea of an 
engineer in command “...was an idea stemming directly from the Naval Personnel Act of 
1899.” 82  Starting in the 1950s and continuing for three decades, Rickover would invoke 
Roosevelt’s fateful exhortation that “Every officer on a modern war vessel…has to be an 
engineer…” 83  Rickover used the policy of Theodore Roosevelt and Secretary Long to 
justify the requirement that ‘line’ captains be scientifically educated nuclear engineers.  
Thus it was, more than a half century later, that the confusion of 1899 again influenced 
officer policy.  It appeared to matter little to Rickover that nuclear engineering was a 
fundamentally more complex profession when compared to the practical engineers in the 
ships of 1899, the type of engineers Roosevelt knew.   By the later 1950s engineering was 
qualitatively something new, it had become a profession of  “…science and calculus and 
                                                                                                                                                 
closely associated either through training, mentoring, or selection boards of approximately four dozen 
future navy admirals, who would eventually rise to lead the submarine force and the Navy. Eugene P. 
Wilkinson,  VADM USN,  Interview with the Author, 26 March 2007. 
81 Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Nuclear Navy, 1946-1962 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1974) , 345.  
82 Ibid. , 348. 
83 H.G. Rickover, Admiral, USN,"The Role of Engineering in the Navy (speech entered into the record)", 
Congressional Record, pp 10313-10319 October 9, 1974,  10318. 
220 
higher mathematics…”84  By asserting his right to compel ship captains to be engineering 
experts, Rickover threatened to invert the priorities of the King plan:  instead of 
operations and integration, it was specialized technical knowledge that defined the 'line' 
commander.   
Informed and guided by his engineering ideology, Rickover nominated for 
command of USS NAUTILUS his former protégé and a one time math and physics 
teacher, CDR Dennis Wilkinson. Wilkinson was an accomplished engineer who had held 
substantive design responsibilities in the naval reactors program but also had a 
competitive operational record.   While Rickover advocated for his protégé, the ‘line’ was 
at a disadvantage because it had not reached a consensus as to the qualifications of their 
candidate.  Many in the 'line' were unconvinced that the qualifications of the first nuke 
ship captain had to be particularly “nuclear” in an academic or technical sense.  As a 
consequence, 'line' officers initially divided their support among three candidates: Ed 
Beach, Dennis Wilkinson, and Enders Huey.85  Ultimately the senior submarine 'line' 
                                                 
84 Monte A. Calvert, The Mechanical Engineer in America, 1830-1910: Professional Cultures in Conflict 
(Baltimore,: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967),  279. 
85 John W. Crawford, Jr., (Deputy Manager of the Naval Reactors Program), Interview with the Author 11 
July 2007. Crawford explained that what appeared to matter most to Rickover was a technical education 
and the strength of the personal relationship between the candidate and Rickover.  Rickover had worked 
with Wilkinson for years.  Neither Beach nor Huey were as close to Rickover.  Beach was from an old navy 
family, and had political connections.   Enders Huey, who is less well known, had a distinguished career, 
but was more tactician than an engineer.  Enders P. Huey graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy (Class 
of 1941) and was first assigned to the light cruiser USS RICHMOND (CL-9) stationed at Pearl Harbor. He 
was aboard the RICHMOND when the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Huey attended 
Submarine School in New London, CT, in 1942, and subsequently served on submarines in the Pacific 
Theatre. After the war he participated in Operation Crossroads at Bikini Atoll. During his career in the 
Navy, submarines, education, training, and executive management figured prominently. He served as 
directorate, individual training; and as commander of the naval training center in Orlando, Florida. He 
retired with the rank of captain. Huey was awarded the Silver Star and Bronze Star with combat “ V” for 
his performance in the submarine war in the Pacific.   
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admiral threw his support to Beach, a highly decorated WWII veteran. But Beach was not 
an experienced engineer as was Wilkinson.86   
 Commander Submarines Atlantic (COMSUBLANT), the senior submarine line 
officer with oversight of most submarine matters, along with senior line officers at the 
Pentagon, argued that the commanding officer had to be first a submariner of 
accomplishment, and need not have a rigorous background in nuclear physics or 
engineering.  The Bureau of Personnel, up to that point the organization most responsible 
for personnel assignments, cast the tie-breaking vote and supported Rickover’s choice.  
By doing so, the Navy established the privileged position of an EDO, Rickover, to 
determine the selection of a ship captain.  When the Bureau of Personnel supported 
Rickover's candidate over the objections of the senior operational commander, 
COMSUBLANT, it set a precedent that has endured to the early 21st century: the head of 
a technical organization, Naval Reactors, not the senior operational submarine 
commander, chooses who can be submarine officers and who is awarded command.87  
An EDO, a technical specialist, so empowered posed an unprecedented challenge to t
‘line’.
he 
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The Path Not Taken: The Bruton Plan for the “Well-Rounded Nuke" 
 
By the middle 1950s, thoughtful senior officers realized that nuclear power posed 
a potential challenge to the long tradition of the Navy's 'well rounded officer.'  As early as 
1947 Rickover had requested complete control of the training, assignment, and education 
of all nuclear associated personnel.89  But Rickover's request in the late 1940s concerned 
only a small number of specialists working on a theoretical project and was not seen as a 
challenge to the education and development of the 'line'.   By the middle of the 1950s, 
however, the possibility of nuclear ships was no longer the subject of study groups or 
science fiction, but was taking physical form in NAUTILUS.   The battles over 
Rickover’s promotion and Wilkinson’s assignment to NAUTILUS foreshadowed future 
conflicts if an approved personnel policy was not developed.  To smooth the selection 
and training process for the anticipated wave of nuclear officers, the CNO ordered his 
staff to study the personnel requirements of nuclear power and make recommendations.   
The debate that Rickover had begun to frame in his own promotion battle was echoed by 
Admiral Carney, Chief of Naval Operations.  Carney identified the key issue as the 
reconciliation of the traditional knowledge required of the 'well rounded officer' with the 
specialized knowledge associated with nuclear technology.  Carney went so far as to 
                                                 
89 H.G. Rickover, Captain, USN,"Memorandum to Chief, BuShips, dtd 20 August 1947, Subj: Assignment 
of Oak Ridge officers and Education of Additional Officers", NRD (Naval Reactors Division Archives) 
Copies provided from C.H.Scmitt, 21 May 1980, in response to FOIA request from Norman Polmar 
(Author has copy).   This is perhaps the first documentary evidence where Rickover demonstrated his 
desire to exert complete control over officer education: "The officer who is in charge of nuclear power 
matters in the Bureaus of Ships should coordinate the efforts of the students at the various laboratories to 
the end that a singleness of purpose is maintained.  This officer should also arrange for the continued 
education of all personnel assigned to this duty.  The field of nuclear knowledge is expanding at so rapid a 
rate that such continued organized education is essential."   
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speculate that nuclear technology might in fact require the Navy for the first time since 
1920 to reassess the appropriateness of a rounded career.  Carney wrote to his personnel 
chief:  
“ For: Admiral Holloway,  In the course of my general sponsoring of nuclear 
power for Navy ships, I have become increasingly aware of the fact that some special 
policies may be necessary with respect to the personnel, officer and enlisted, concerned 
with the design, installation, operation, and maintenance of nuclear power installations.   
Specifically, I must conclude that in this field which is not only highly complex, but 
which is changing and advancing with startling rapidity, there is a requirement for a 
continuing and uninterrupted attention to the subject matter by the personnel involved.  
Any hiatus in employment on nuclear assignments would appear inevitably to involve a 
loss of touch with the art which is unacceptable in view of the current rapid development.  
If this assumption is correct, than there must be alteration of the concept of the ‘well-
rounded career.' ….In view of the foregoing, you are directed to conduct a 
comprehensive study of the personnel situation involved in the navy’s embarking on a 
nuclear-power program.” 90 (my emphasis) 
 
Admiral Holloway responded to the CNO's memo by assigning RADM H.C. 
Bruton to study the question of nuclear power and the implications for the 'well rounded 
officer' career path.  The group consulted available references on nuclear technology and 
organizational structures and met with staff from the Army Reactors and Air Force 
Reactors offices. Most importantly, Bruton's staff interviewed a substantial cross-section 
of the Navy’s leadership as well as middle and lower level nuclear officers.  The Bruton 
Report provided a rare snapshot of the expert opinion on nuclear personnel policy before 
Rickover gained near complete control of its policies, pronouncements, and recorded 
history. 91     
                                                 
90 Robert B. Carney, ADM, USN, Chief of Naval Operations,,"Memorandum dtd 2 July 1954 from CNO to 
Chief of Naval Personnel, Admiral James L. Holloway", Naval Historical Center (NHC),  00 Files 1955 
Box 11, Folder 7. 
91 H.C. Bruton, RADM USN,"Report of the Board to Study Personnel Aspects of Nuclear Power 
Utilization in the Navy", NHC 00 Files 1955 Box 11, Folder 7.   This report is important also as evidence 
of the means by which a changing conception of officer models was transmitted widely to the Fleet.  While 
the report reaffirms the preference for “well rounded officers”, it does acknowledge the uniqueness of 
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The Bruton Report calls into question the conclusions of the leading historians of 
nuclear power, those whom Rickover allowed access to his personal files but who were 
also susceptible to his persuasive influence. These historians, especially Richard Hewlett 
and Francis Duncan, suggested that the Rickover model of officer--the de facto 
specialized nuclear 'line' officer-- was from the outset the one and only model considered 
by senior navy leaders.  These historians further contended that the senior navy leaders 
agreed with Rickover's interpretation of the Act of 1899 and Amalgamation: that 
commanders must be engineers.92  A close reading of the Bruton Report leads to a 
                                                                                                                                                 
current circumstances that necessitated the temporary departure from the accepted norm.   The report 
endorses the value of specialization but reaffirms the preference for breadth. The report included a draft 
letter that went out to each officer that explained the Navy's need for repeat nuclear assignments, but 
assured the officer that such specialization would not prejudice his promotion prospects.  Furthermore, the 
report included a draft letter for the Secretary of the Navy which was to be sent fleet wide, explaining the 
value of nuclear power and the need for the officer to specialize, at least temporarily. 
92 Hewlett and Duncan reference the Bruton Report, but apparently they did not read it fully or purposely 
minimized its significance.  The two authors omit important caveats voiced by both the CNO and the 
Bruton Report.  See Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Nuclear Navy, 1946-1962 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1974), 349.   Hewlett’s history of nuclear officer development is incomplete 
and may border on the misleading.  A lengthy quotation of Hewlett’s analysis is warranted to insure 
accuracy:  “Holloway was well aware that the Navy could not stand still in a changing world.  He also had 
the breadth of vision to recognize what Rickover was accomplishing.  Holloway accepted the principle that 
the Navy had established in 1899: that all line officers aboard a ship should be eligible for command.  He 
would not have agreed—even if it had been suggested—to giving special training to engineering duty 
officers so that they could serve aboard ship as reactor operators.  Because these officers could not have 
succeeded to command afloat, he would have considered such an arrangement a step backward.  
Consequently he accepted the view that ultimately all line officers aboard a submarine had to be nuclear 
trained.” (see pg. 349)  Several substantive problems arise with this very important section.  First, VADM 
Holloway played a key role in the initial decisions of the reformed officer corps, yet Hewlett provides no 
references for this definitive paragraph: no interviews, no documents.  Further, Hewlett fails to note that 
Secretary of the Navy Long, an architect of the Naval Act of 1899, stated unequivocally that a policy of 
amalgamation was a unique solution valid only so long as circumstances or environmental factors would 
necessitate. In other words, the Act of 1899 was not an act in perpetuity, but situational specific, a product 
of the times.  Further, Hewlett states Holloway and Rickover agreed that for any line officer on a ship not 
be able to succeed to command would be a step backward, and an unprecedented anomaly to current 
practice. However, Hewlett neglects to note that in the case of the aircraft carrier since 1945 surface line 
officers were excluded from the ranks of commanding officers.  Thus to train EDOs as engineers not 
eligible for command would not have been a radical departure from a practice already observed in the 
carrier fleets.  But most importantly, Hewlett neglects the strict limits Carney and Holloway placed on 
Rickover’s preference for the narrowed specialized career of nuclear officers: it was to be a temporary 
measure, to sustain during the period when the technology was changing with great “rapidity.”    Hewlett 
has, in effect, glossed over a most important series of exchanges and documents and by so doing implies 
that both naval law and seasoned sailors supported the narrow specialization that was to come.  The 
documents do not support such a conclusion.  On the contrary, Carney and Holloway agreed to specialized 
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somewhat different conclusion:  the CNO (Carney), the Chief of Naval Personnel 
(Holloway), and the many officers who participated in the study were not persuaded that 
the Rickover model of a narrowly specialized, nuclear trained 'line' officer was the only 
way to man the engine rooms and command the nuclear reactors at sea.   Not only 'line' 
officers but also nuclear specialists in the middle 1950s considered alternative solutions: 
to establish a separate corps of nuclear specialists OUTSIDE the 'line' (EDOs), or, to 
allow 'line' officers to be nuclear-trained, but NOT at the expense of a 'well rounded' 
career. 93  In the end, the board recommended that 'line' officers be nuclear trained, but the 
board was clear that 'well rounded' educational and career requirements were to be 
suspended only temporarily.   
King would have been pleased with the outcome of the Bruton Report because the 
board recommended that the nuclear officer be 'well rounded':  “…this board is 
convinced of the validity of the well-rounded career…"94 The future commanders of 
nuclear ships were to be broadly educated and experienced, not narrowly trained in 
nuclear power.   In addition, the report made clear that the preference for the 'well 
rounded officer' was not the opinion of just Bruton or a small minority, rather there was 
“…complete unanimity of senior as well as junior officers of the Navy, line and staff, on 
                                                                                                                                                 
nuclear assignments but only on the condition that such specialization was temporary in nature.  For both 
Carney and Holloway, the nuclear trained officers were ultimately to revert back to the King model of the 
well rounded career.    Thus the emergence of the highly technical and specialized nuclear officer corps is 
not adequately explained as the product of senior officer consensus in the middle 1950s. Rather, the events 
and decisions of the later 1950s and early 1960s were critical factors in the development of the nuclear 
officer corps.  
93 H.C. Bruton, RADM USN,"Report of the Board to Study Personnel Aspects of Nuclear Power 
Utilization in the Navy", NHC 00 Files 1955 Box 11, Folder 7, see page  20.  The uncertainty as the 
continued viability of the EDO community may have been a relevant factor in the board’s decision against 
a narrow nuclear or EDO specialist group aboard ship. One can speculate that if the EDO community had 
been more healthy and robust—or the engineering corps still in existence—Navy leaders and even 
Rickover might have considered a different path, perhaps more akin to the British approach. But in the late 
1950s the viability of the EDO community as an independent body was unclear, and had been recently 
recommended for termination by the Under Secretary of the Navy William B. Franke.    
94 Ibid.,  14. 
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at least one point: that the breadth of view point coupled with the judgment indispensable 
to the top executive and his naval counterpart, the flag officer, can be developed only 
through a lifetime of wide experience in his profession.”95  The 1954 report also made 
clear that departures from a rounded career by nuclear officers, if departures proved 
necessary, should be only temporary.  Specialization would be allowed only until such 
time as adequate number of additional officers could be trained and educated. This report 
is all the more remarkable when one examines the composition of the board and the list 
of those interviewed: numerous nuclear engineers were among those who drafted the 
report.     Admiral Bruton’s recommendations, completed on 10 Aug 1954 and endorsed 
and forwarded by VADM Holloway to CNO Carney with but minor alterations,  directed 
that nuclear officers specialize only temporarily, that  “…the proven concept of the well 
rounded career must, for the people involved, be modified temporarily as a rigid 
consideration in assignment, rotation, and promotion.”96  
The most important fact to take away from this report is that, quite simply, the 
Navy of the middle 1950s recognized the challenge of nuclear technology but concluded 
that it could be accommodated within the model of the 'rounded officer' or integrative 
officer.  The scientifically engineering technology of the reactor was indeed unique and 
brought with it some special requirements, but the board members did not see it as 
necessitating a permanent change in the nature of the officer corps.  The senior leaders, 
and participating nuclear specialists, expected that when adequate numbers of nuclear 
officers had been trained, they would as a group revert to the King model of education 
and development.  It should also be noted that when the board explained its rationale for 
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Utilization in the Navy",  NHC 00 Files 1955 Box 11, Folder 7, see page 13. 
96 Ibid.,  14. 
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merging nuclear expertise into the 'line', it invoked not the Act of 1899--that all 'line' 
officers must be engineers-- but expressed their desire to preserve unity in the officer 
corps.  The board concluded: “…for the unanimous opinion of all officers interviewed 
that further fragmentation of the Navy is distinctly undesirable...”97  The concern with 
fragmentation of the naval officer corps, not the primacy of engineering in the 'line', was 
the reason the Navy decided to train URL officers and not EDOs to man the engine-
rooms.  
It appears that in the first years after the Bruton report, when Rickover 
constructed his system of quality control and nuclear training schools, he had reconciled 
himself, at least temporarily, to the continued dominance of the King model.  As will be 
explained below, most of his training innovations were designed to offset or ameliorate 
deficiencies in the larger Navy that might have threatened his capacity to safely operate 
his reactors.  And though he was guided by an elitist technocratic philosophy, he did 
allow his first generation of officers to pursue broadening education and variation in 
assignments outside nuclear power.  But before these officers were allowed to broaden 
out, they first had to survive the rigors of the most highly controlling98  and demanding 
system of technical training and personnel management the Navy had ever seen.  
                                                 
97 H.C. Bruton, RADM USN,"Report of the Board to Study Personnel Aspects of Nuclear Power 
Utilization in the Navy", 20 August 1954", NHC 00 Files 1955 Box 11, Folder 7, see page 20. 
98 Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Nuclear Navy, 1946-1962 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
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* 
Nuclear Officer Assignment and Training Policy, 1955-58     : 
The Bruton Report gave Rickover temporary authority to control all officers who 
were nuclear qualified or sought nuclear qualification. So empowered, Rickover moved 
aggressively to fashion his ‘line’ officers into a scientific elite.  To gain maximum control 
of nuclear officers, Rickover would use to his advantage two important omissions in the 
Bruton Report: first, the absence of a clear statement as to the scope of officer career 
modifications necessitated by nuclear power, and second, the absence of any end-date by 
which time nuclear officers would revert to the model of the 'well rounded' career.  The 
Bruton Report used ambiguous language to describe how nuclear officers should be 
prepared for duty:  “While the traditional pattern of the well-rounded career remains, in 
the opinion of this board, sound and thoroughly valid, the board feels that it must be 
modified, judiciously, and as an interim measure, in the interest of the ensuring success 
of the nuclear power program.” 99 It was, however, unclear what “…modified 
judiciously..." meant in actual practice.   
The meaning of temporary or ‘interim’ was also ambiguous.  The need for 
temporary specialization would end when “…nuclear power operational knowledge has 
become relatively common.”100  But the report did not identify the magic number of 
nuclear officers that would assure a ‘common’ availability of knowledge.  It was clear, 
however, that more was better.  Thus the board recommended Rickover take action to 
generate an excess inventory of nuclear trained officers that would help expedite a return 
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100 Ibid.,  18. 
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to a traditional career path:  “That a greater number of personnel, officer and enlisted, 
technical and operational, be educated and trained in nuclear power than the needs of the 
present and immediate future indicate.” 101   
The navy leadership and Admiral Bruton realized such ambiguity was dangerous.  
The supply of nuclear officers could be manipulated such that the Navy never achieved a 
surplus of nuclear officers.  Without a surplus, nuclear officers would never return to the 
old career path of the general line officer, the well-rounded model.  Concerned by the 
prospect that one man might exercise a disproportionate influence over the officer corps, 
the board recommended and Chief of Personnel concurred in 1954 to terminate RADM 
Rickover’s authority to select officers.   Under the Bruton Plan, as early as 1955 the 
responsibility for nuclear officer selection should have shifted from Rickover to a board 
of officers, only one of which would be a representative from Rickover’s organization.102   
But these approved plans to terminate Rickover’s selection authority were never 
enforced.  As a result of several contingent events, Rickover would remain the ultimate 
selection and assignment authority of nuclear officers for a generation, that is to say, 28 
more years.   
 
Laying the Foundation: Rickover's Training and Selection System  
 
Rickover began to chip away at the Navy’s conception of the ‘line’ by redefining 
in strongly technical terms what the nuclear ‘line’ officer should be.  He did so by 
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establishing far more rigorous academic and technical standards than the Navy had ever 
seen.  He also established a new precedent of personal interviews that in most cases 
discounted an officer's service record and instead judged the applicant on his ability to 
think and reason through several technical questions.  These techniques and standards 
were first applied in the meticulous selection and screening of officers for NAUTILUS, 
which can now be seen in hindsight as the precedent for Rickover's technocratic system 
of officer selection and training that followed.  But at the time, it was unclear that 
NAUTILUS' high personnel standards would be applied to the leadership of an expanding 
nuclear fleet.  A key issue was whether the nuclear officer would be, like Rickover,  
scientifically educated or would be an engineer more in the tradition of the ‘shop culture’, 
with practical experience similar to the steam ship or diesel navy.   
There existed in the Navy a large pool of officers who were engineers in the old 
tradition, those who had been trained in the engine rooms first as enlisted men and then 
promoted into the officer ranks as Limited Duty Officers (LDO).  Senior navy leaders 
proposed manning the new reactors with officers of this type and even considered an 
expanded program to tap promising junior enlisted men for officer rank followed by 
nuclear training.103  Rickover, who was a product of an advanced and elite technical 
education, was immediately hostile to the idea of shop-engineers managing his reactors.   
To him, the requirement that his officers be scientifically educated was a core value that 
the larger engineering profession had adopted earlier in the 20th century.104  
                                                 
103    James L. Holloway, Jr., VADM USN (CNP),"Ltr to CNO, Subject: Shortage of Nuclear Officers 15 
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  To ensure that only those with a capacity for scientific training would enter his 
program, Rickover maintained a high bar for selection.  The technical rigor of the nuclear 
program was from its inception something qualitatively new for the navy ‘line’.  While 
the earliest nuclear officers—Roddis, Dunford, Crawford and others—were accomplished 
EDOs with advanced technical degrees from MIT, some ‘line’ officers believed they 
would be held to a less rigorous scientific and technical standard.  Rickover quickly 
dashed such ‘hopes’ when he demonstrated with the selection of Wilkinson and the first 
officers of NAUTILUS that technical requirements of even the ‘line’ were very high.  
Nuclear instructional courses exemplified the new level of technical rigor.  Former diesel 
officers were required to study six days a week, twelve hours a day, to master the subjects 
of advanced mathematics, chemistry, physics, electrical engineering, heat transfer, fluid 
flow, reactor engineering principles, radiological control and so on.105  Some officers, not 
familiar with the technology, criticized the level of engineering as "needlessly 
academic".106  Officers were concerned that Rickover's rigorous scientific and academic 
standards might exclude a large percentage of the existing body of fleet officers.  From 
the outset, Rickover used the requirement of high grade point averages in college to 
exclude many diesel submarine officers.   Criticism of this practice, at least in the early 
years, was arguably invalid. In the first years of nuclear power, the technology was on the 
edge of the frontiers of science and engineering.  The early operating procedures were 
scanty compared to what came later and relied to a remarkable degree on the knowledge 
of the operator.  In this context, criticisms of Rickover’s program as overly academic 
appear ill-informed.  Rickover was creating a new machine without precedent.  He 
                                                 
105 Norman Polmar and Thomas B. Allen, Rickover (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), 294-300. 
106 Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Nuclear Navy, 1946-1962 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1974),  353. 
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needed in those early years a cadre of 'line' officers who were also capable of being 
scientific engineers.   
Even if an officer possessed high grade point averages and test scores, he had to 
survive a series of interviews, including a personal interview with the admiral himself.  
Rickover personally interviewed every officer who entered his program and turned down 
more officers than he took, including many with superb military records as reflected in 
their fitness reports.  Senior navy leaders questioned the value and purpose of his 
personal interviews.107 However, a close examination of the context of the time offers 
evidence that Rickover was perhaps more justified in this method of selection than is 
commonly appreciated.  Rickover's early practice of personal interviews and his rejection 
of many officers with superlative fitness reports were most likely necessitated by the poor 
condition of the officer reporting system of the 1950s.   The Navy’s system of evaluating 
officers had deteriorated in the post-war period, especially in the submarine force.   
In a large bureaucracy like that of the Navy, an honest and accurate reporting 
system became critical to the efficient assignment of officers.  When Rickover began 
building his elite cadre of officers, he discovered that the Navy fitness report and 
selection system had lost its capacity to report honestly the performance of officers.  One 
retired four star admiral reflecting on this problem in the 1950s noted that submarine 
officer reports were among the least accurate and the most inflated. 108  Not surprisingly, 
                                                 
107 See Duncan, Polmar, and Rockwell for discussion of the more colorful aspects of the interview process.  
While other scholars have devoted considerable attention to the sometimes rough treatment Rickover meted 
out to young officers, this author and nuclear trained officer considers the issue irrelevant to our purposes.  
If naval historians made it there business to record every time a senior officer roughly treated a subordinate 
officer, very little else would be written.  The Navy is a demanding and dangerous profession, and 
Rickover was hardly unique in possessing a rough manner.  
108Harry Depue Train, ADM USN, Interview with the Author, 2 November 2007.  Admiral Train explained 
that surface officer fitness reports were relatively objective, but that submarine reports were the most 
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Rickover and his staff found many officers unfit for the program despite a service record 
filled with superb fitness reports.  The problem of inflated reports grew so troublesome 
that one CNO of this period would chastise an assemblage of his flag officers as to the 
gross deficiencies in the officer evaluation system.109  This tendency toward grade 
inflation had apparently been going on for years and had thus compromised years, 
perhaps decades, of fitness reports.  The misleading nature of the reports became all too 
obvious when the fitness report was contrasted with several hours of personal observation 
by Rickover and his interview team.110   Faced with a suspect system of officer reports, 
Rickover's interviews appear in a different light than is commonly portrayed.  Another 
challenge that confronted Rickover in the early years and helped shape his personnel 
program was the growing shortage of line officers, good or bad, anywhere in the fleet.  
Nuclear ships were manpower and officer-power intensive, requiring significantly 
more personnel than diesel boats.  The NAUTILUS had been manned in a time of relative 
personnel surplus, a condition that changed over the next few years.  The surplus in 
personnel that existed in the first half the 1950s was replaced in the later half of the 
decade by severe shortages.111  Fleet personnel levels reflected the shortage: in five years, 
                                                                                                                                                 
inflated.  James L. Holloway, III, ADM USN (CNO), Interview with the Author, April 26, 2007.  Admiral 
Holloway recollected occasions in the 1950s when he felt compelled to challenge other officers who 
routinely inflated fitness reports.  Crawford and Wegner also confirmed the unreliability of fitness reports 
was one of the early reasons for Rickover’s insistence on lengthy series of interviews. 
109 George Anderson, ADM, USN,"Personal Papers", NHC Operational Archives, Collection 439, ADM 
G.W. Anderson, Jr., Boxes 40, 43, 51-53,  15 Feb 1962,  MFR by Kidd of Anderson’s remarks at CNO 
Conference.  Admiral Anderson bluntly chided his audience about ‘grade inflation’ and observed that not 
every officer deserved the opportunity to compete for admiral, and that serving flags must begin by 
“…pointing out deficiencies as they came to our attention.” See also Crawford letter of 5 March 2007.   
110 John W. Crawford, Jr., Captain, USN, Ltr from Crawford to Hagerott, 5 March 2007.   Observation of 
grade inflation also confirmed in interview with Admiral James Holloway, III, on 26 April 2007. 
111 Arleigh Burke," Personnel Situation in the Fleet, CNO Memorandum 7 Feb 1958", Naval Historical 
Center, CNO 00 files, 1958, Box 11, Folder 16. 
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manning had fallen from a navy 94% manned in 1953 to only 81% manned in 1958.112   
In an environment of personnel shortage, Rickover was compelled to compete 
aggressively for officers but had at the same time to be especially careful to identify and 
reject poor quality officers whom the system, loath to lose any more bodies, had failed to 
screen out.  In addition, the diesel force numbered well over a hundred boats in this 
period and for several years competed with the growing nuclear fleet as an equally viable 
career alternative to nuclear submarines. 
Rickover’s problem of personnel was further complicated by inconsistent support 
from the senior ranks in the early years.  Navy senior leaders who eagerly supported the 
construction of the hardware (reactors) were less supportive in matters of personnel and 
training, and not infrequently resisted elements of Rickover’s manning plans.113  Facing 
Navy-wide personnel shortages, the Bureau of Personnel did not accede to Rickover’s 
early requests for additional manpower.  In response to one of Rickover’s cogently and 
persuasively argued requests for extra personnel, the Chief of Personnel, in violation of 
his own earlier endorsement of the Bruton report, which recommended over-manning in 
the field,  wrote to the CNO that nuclear training resources were adequate and, in current 
circumstances, the Navy “cannot afford overtraining in any field.” 114  The shortage of 
                                                 
112 James L. Holloway, Jr., VADM USN (BUPERS),"Memo to Asst Secretary of the Navy, dtd 22 Nov 
1958, Subject: Current Active Duty Strength Levels", NHC, 00 Files, 1958, Box 11, Folder 16, Personnel. 
113James L. Holloway, Jr., VADM USN (CNP),"CNP memo to CNO 20 Dec 1956, Subj: Training Facilities 
at Nuclear Reactor Testing facility, Idaho Falls, ID,  " NHC 00 1957 Box 12 Folder 11.     See dispute over 
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Navy staff declined Rickover’s request, the VCNO was warned of Rickover’s possible response to the 
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note: “So What!”   See CNP memo to CNO 20 Dec 1956, Sub: Training Facilities at Nuclear Reactor 
Testing facility, Idaho Falls, ID, NHC 00 1957 Box 12 Folder 11.   
114 James L. Holloway, Jr., VADM USN (BUPERS),"Chief of Naval Personnel to Chief of Naval 
Operations, memorandum dtd 12 Feb 1957", NHC, 00 Files, 1957 box 12 folder 11. 
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officers and men at this early stage in the program no doubt contributed to Rickover’s 
penchant to carefully and jealously control the assignment of his personnel. 
There existed, however, another means to mitigate the manpower shortages and, 
at the same time, possibly minimize human error:  the use of more automation in the 
engineering plant.  Though faced with shortfalls of quality personnel, Rickover refused to 
pursue increased automation of his engineering plants.  There were apparently two 
reasons for the rejection of automation.  Rickover was an officer himself shaped and 
matured in the machine age where he had minimal, if any, exposure to modern 
computers.  To Rickover, automation was anathema, and he had grounds for his bias: 
computers and automated systems in the later 1950s were perhaps good enough for the 
Census Bureau and payroll companies but were a risky bet when wagering the safety of a 
nuclear reactor pier-side in a large city.   
Rickover’s distrust of computers and automation was not, in the 1950s, unique.  
Arthur Norberg in his study of computer technology noted that military personnel in the 
1950s were sufficiently fearful of automation that overcoming such a bias was a high 
priority in early computer programs.115  Boslaugh in his detailed study of the Navy’s first 
mobile digital computer network also records substantive officer resistance to 
automation.116  But whereas the remainder of the Navy eventually embraced automation-
                                                 
115 Arthur L. Norberg, Judy E. O'Neill, and Kerry J. Freedman, Transforming Computer Technology: 
Information Processing for the Pentagon, 1962-1986 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 
11, footnote 27. 
116 David L. Boslaugh, When Computers Went to Sea: the Digitization of the United States Navy (Los 
Alamitos, Calif.: IEEE Computer Society, 1999), 397.  According to a survey conducted in the early 1960s, 
19 out of 20 officers polled resisted the idea of an automated command and control system on their ship.  
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-in the surface navy, computers were sometimes given control of entire weapon 
systems117-- the nuclear program resisted automation for a generation.  
Rickover inculcated into his staff and wrote into the organizational principles an 
aversion to automation.  While a bias against greater automation may have been well 
advised in 1955, the validity of this bias was undermined as computers proved 
increasingly more reliable.  Yet, this early aversion to automation tended to manifest 
itself in design characteristics of the technology (e.g., continued reliance on manual valve 
operations) that in turn perpetuated higher levels of officer and enlisted manning for 
years to come.118  The failure to simplify and automate nuclear technology thus 
invalidated one of the key assumptions of the Bruton Report: that lower quality officers 
could be relied upon to operate a mature technology as compared to a technology in its 
‘break through’ stage.  Bruton had written: “Especially in operational field….the trend is 
toward simplicity (the more difficult ‘break through’ may have already occurred) with the 
result that new personnel of generally lower quality than those now in the field should be 
able to carry on.” 119  Without the benefits of automation, the program faced greater 
difficulty in attaining an officer surplus.  The officer surplus was the essential condition 
stipulated in the 1954 study, without which a return to the 'well rounded career' would be 
delayed indefinitely.  
                                                 
117 Perhaps the best example of the non-nuclear navy’s embrace of computers and automation is found in 
the surface navy, in particular, on AEGIS cruisers and destroyers where the option exists that a captain can 
turn over to the computer program complete control of missile systems, known as “auto-special”.   
118Francis Duncan, Rickover: the Struggle for Excellence (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 
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119 H.C. Bruton, RADM USN,"Report of the Board to Study Personnel Aspects of Nuclear Power 
Utilization in the Navy", 20 August 1954", NHC 00 Files 1955 Box 11, Folder 7, see page 32.   
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Rickover may have resisted automation due to his unfamiliarity with the 
technology.  He was old and approaching retirement on the first day NAUTILUS put to 
sea. But such an explanation may not do justice to the admiral's bureaucratic intuition, 
especially as it relates to the issues of officer corps reform and social power of an 
organization. Rickover, an officer who had observed the rise to power of aviation and the 
eclipse of the surface navy, could not have failed to notice that part of the aviators power 
emanated from numbers, not so much numbers of planes, but numbers of pilots.  
Automation of reactor technology would reduce the number of officers and men who 
could then rise to senior ranks and to command.  Though POLARIS will be discussed in 
more detail later in this chapter, at this juncture a comparison of the nuclear program with 
that of the POLARIS missile program may help to illustrate the inverse relationship 
between automation and social power.   
The POLARIS nuclear missile program in the 1950s and early 1960s was briefly 
considered by naval officers to be the more important and sought-after career experience 
than nuclear power.120   But POLARIS was highly automated and consequently required 
relatively few officers and men to maintain and operate the system.  In contrast, nuclear 
power was the most man-power intensive of the submarine technologies, even more so 
than the older diesel technology it supplanted.  Therefore, in relative terms, it was not 
POLARIS but nuclear power that rapidly generated officer billets and produced greater 
social power within the Navy.  The more manpower intensive technology required more 
operator officers and thus generated more officers who were then available to promote to 
command.  The technology with the greatest number of officer progeny had a greater 
                                                 
120  To be a Weapons Officer on a POLARIS boat was considered at one time a coveted post and beneficial 
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likelihood to shape the institution to better meet the needs of the parent socio-technical 
community (nuclear power, less so POLARIS).  Eventually, POLARIS officers were 
eclipsed by nuclear trained officers, and the separate community of missile officers was 
terminated in the 1980s.  While there is no written record of that, Rickover made an 
explicit connection between labor-intensive technology and social power; this line of 
thinking and strategizing remains a possible consideration in the admiral's policy that 
limited labor saving innovation in the reactor plant.  
With each new reactor the numbers of nuclear trained personnel, without the 
offsetting benefits of automation, increased at a rapid rate.  In addition, the number of 
nuclear trained officers grew quickly because almost a third of all nuclear submarines, the 
ballistic missile submarines, to be discussed later, required two full crews.  With each 
new submarine reactor, Rickover had the opportunity to select and then shape one or two 
new commanding officers, men most likely destined to be future leaders of the Navy.  
Rickover continued to solidify the precedent he set with Wilkinson:  that he, the 
Engineering Duty Officer, would select the future ‘line’ commanders.  Like Wilkinson, 
the captains who followed had to demonstrate a high propensity and capability to master 
scientific engineering principles. Most of the first generation of nuclear captains who 
followed Wilkinson— Calvert, Anderson, Zech, and Peet—were among the most talented 
and the most technically capable officers in the fleet.121   They were the 'first generation' 
of Rickover's maturing system of training and selection.  
 
                                                 
121 Wilkinson was an engineer and had personally completed reactor core calculations at Oak Ridge; 
Calvert and Zech possessed top intellects, one a former medical school student and the other a son of a 
doctor; Peet, the first surface officer, was a top student and graduate of MIT.  The pattern of scientific and 
engineering excellence was solidified with the selections that followed.  
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Building the Walls: A Technocratic Training Organization Matures 
 
The training experience of the first officers was informal, though demanding and 
highly technical.  During this early time the number of officers required in the program 
was comparatively few and as such the officers could be accommodated in close 
proximity to Rickover’s office spaces.  James Calvert and Lando Zech, future vice 
admirals, and William Anderson, a future congressman, studied within ear-shot of 
Rickover and met frequently with the admiral, bringing along not golf clubs but bundles 
of physics and engineering books.122   As the program matured, the training demands on 
these officers grew progressively more formalized.  Ray Peet, the first surface nuclear 
officer, who entered the program after Calvert and Zech,  qualified at two nuclear 
prototypes and spent a year with Rickover’s staff, followed by several months in a 
conventional engineering plant.123  Not only in their selection but also in their rigorous 
training, Rickover mentored, monitored, and shaped the future leaders of the navy.  
Given the unprecedented manner in which the EDO Rickover selected, assigned, 
and shaped the future leaders of the navy, it is puzzling that at this early juncture  the 
Navy's leading line officer, the CNO, did not intervene to curtail Rickover’s growing 
influence over the ‘line’.  The Bruton Report as early as 1954, endorsed by Chief of 
Naval Personnel, recognized the danger of Rickover’s personnel practices and 
recommended he be removed from the selection process of nuclear officers. But the 
Navy’s senior line community did not act to limit Rickover’s selection authority, and on 
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the contrary, in 1958 a CNO directive further solidified Rickover’s unique position.  The 
failure of senior 'line' officers to intervene held portentous consequences and requires 
explanation.  
Admiral Carney, the CNO at the time of the Bruton Report, was several years 
senior to Rickover and had taken a relatively slow approach to the development of 
nuclear power. Carney, however, served a short tour as CNO and was replaced in 1955 
after only two years.  Therefore, Carney had only a few months in office following the 
completion of the Bruton Report in 1954 to take action against Rickover.  As such, he 
had not the time or perhaps inclination to strip Rickover of his authority to select 
commanding officers as was recommended in the Bruton Report.   Admiral Burke, 
Carney’s relief, was one of the most junior CNOs on record and was selected for the top 
job in part due to Burke’s enthusiastic embrace of new technologies.  Burke was on 
record as an enthusiastic supporter of nuclear power.  In less than a month after he took 
the helm as CNO in August 1955,   Burke announced that all future submarines were to 
be nuclear, thus marking the beginning of the end of the independent diesel force.   In 
testimony before Congress a few months later, Burke described nuclear power as the 
most revolutionary innovation since steam, and he insisted that for both submarines and 
surface ships nuclear power was "…not only warranted but mandatory.”124  For whatever 
reason, Burke did not act on Bruton's and Holloway's recommendation to limit Rickover's 
authority, but instead appears to have become one of his most enthusiastic supporters, at 
least initially.  
                                                 
124 Burke, as quoted in Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Nuclear Navy, 1946-1962 (Chicago: 
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page 265. 
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The development of the POLARIS submerged-launched ballistic missile, carried 
by a nuclear submarine, raised the stature of both Rickover and his program. Burke’s 
enthusiasm for nuclear submarines, and by extension, those who could deliver and man 
them, grew stronger when the Soviets shocked the world with the launch of SPUTNIK in 
October 1957.  Burke apparently was present at the National Security Council Meeting in 
November 1957 when the Army Science Advisor proposed to the President that he 
accelerate POLARIS submarine construction as a counter to the Soviet missile 
breakthrough evidenced by Sputnik.  The planned number of Polaris submarines was 
increased modestly a few days later. 125  The SPUTNIK crisis further played a role in 
solidifying Rickover’s position in the Navy and in personnel matters.  Just days after 
SPUTNIK shocked the nation, Rickover’s reactors went 'critical' at the civilian nuclear 
plant in Shippingport, PA.  Shippingport, Rickover’s creation, was of such importance 
that President Eisenhower portrayed the event as a symbol of American technological 
strength.126   Perhaps influenced by Eisenhower's enthusiasm for naval nuclear reactors, 
in the first days of January 1958, Admiral Burke solidified Rickover’s control of nuclear 
personnel.  Burke issued several CNO and BUPERS directives that granted to Rickover 
near complete authority over the selection, training, and assignment of personnel for 
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nuclear ships.127  Political contingency and a young, perhaps impressionable, CNO had 
thus undone the recommendations of the Bruton Board.  Rickover’s position as the sole 
selection authority for nuclear ship captains and young officers was now all but 
permanent.  Only the admiral's health and his statutory retirement at age 62 could remove 
him from his privileged position in the nuclear navy.  Burke would come later to regret 
his failure to limit Rickover’s authority in personnel matters.128  
 With the 1958 CNO and BUPERS directives in hand, Rickover now moved more 
aggressively to find and better train personnel for his reactors.  To sustain the building 
rates of the nuclear program, it became evident he needed a more efficient system for 
training nuclear officers.  The nuclear training program he created became one of the 
nation’s most important technical training institutions in the second half of the 20th 
century.  This system of schools would eventually train the bulk of all nuclear engineers 
and technicians, as well as the operators of naval reactors, a vast number of whom would 
go on to populate America’s civilian power industry.  As important as it was to the 
construction and operation of most nuclear reactors in the United States, the Navy's 
nuclear engineer training program had an additional effect.  As will be discussed later, 
this system of schools would take priority and precedence over tactical schools, graduate 
education, war colleges, and would exert a shaping effect on undergraduate education of 
Navy and Marine Corps officer alike.   The creation of this technical school system did 
not come easily and proved to be a bureaucratic battleground.  
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 There was at first general agreement that the development of nuclear ‘line’ 
officers required two training phases: a theoretical classroom phase of approximately six 
months followed by a more practical, hands-on phase also of six months duration. The 
classroom phase did not provoke controversy.  Rickover's staffing of the technical school 
was accepted without dissent by the 'line'.  It was the second phase, the practical training 
phase, that proved to be a point of contention between the major tactical organization, 
COMSUBLANT, and the major technical organization, Rickover’s Naval Reactors.   
At issue was the proposal to conduct the practical, hands-on nuclear training 
course at the Submarine School in New London, CT, the most tactically oriented 
submarine base in the country.  The plan also proposed that simulators would substitute 
for training on an actual reactor.  Rickover saw the contest over location and simulators 
as an early battle for control of the minds of his young officers.  His opponents in the 
battle were the tactical-minded, diesel-submarine veterans of the Second World War.  
Rickover's rival was the senior diesel veteran commander, the admiral in command of 
COMSUBLANT, RADM George C. Crawford, USN.129  Convinced of the high stakes, 
Rickover rejected the use of simulators (though this practice was soon to be common 
place in much of the rest of the Navy) and instead trained his officers and men on actual 
nuclear reactors in locations removed from New London, a practice that persisted to the 
end of the century.130 To further isolate his young officers from early exposure to fleet 
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influences, Rickover moved his theory school (nuclear power school) from New London 
to Mare Island in late 1958.131   
Rickover’s creation of an independent training organization that answered only to 
him could be interpreted as a power-play directed against the tactically-minded diesel 
officers.  It was that, but it was also something more.  In the 1950s there was another 
reason that Rickover sought isolation from the non-nuclear fleet: he feared that his 
program would be infected by what he saw as corrupted training and manning standards.  
By contemporary standards of the early 21st century, the larger Navy's training and 
personnel policies at mid-century were substandard.  An indicator as to how low the 
Navy’s training standards had fallen is found in the policies advocated by the highest 
ranking officers in the Navy.  Policies proposed by both the CNO and VCNO in early 
1958 are illustrative of the poor conditions and standards in the fleet.  Faced with severe 
manpower shortfalls, the VCNO, Admiral Felt, suggested as a remedy a deliberate policy 
of mediocrity: Felt suggested the Navy provide lower quality training to officers and 
men.  The admiral’s rationale was that higher quality training made the officers and men 
more appealing to civilian industry, which then lured the officers away.  To Felt, high 
quality training resulted in reduced retention and more personnel shortfalls.  Not to be 
outdone by his Vice, the CNO suggested that many ships be purposely undermanned. The 
savings in personnel would then enable the Navy to fully man a small number of ships or 
squadrons.  The fully manned ships would be expected to operate at higher standards and 
                                                                                                                                                 
conducting training at the prototypes, the program was able to spread the financial cost of reactor 
operations across training and testing budgets.   
131 A second nuclear power school followed in Bainbridge, MD, in 1962.  
245 
could then serve as ‘elite’ examples for the remaining units to emulate.132  These 
proposals would be anathema to a nuclear engineer in the midst of creating a new 
engineering organization.  Upon hearing of such proposals from the CNO, Rickover no 
doubt further resolved to isolate his program from larger fleet influences, and to develop 
the manning and training programs that he was convinced were not only desirable but 
essential to the safe operation of a dangerous new technology.   
Rickover’s personnel selection, assignment, and training organization matured 
rapidly in the 1950s.  The design of Rickover's training organization and screening 
process were informed by a technocratic philosophy, but they also responded to 
identifiable deficiencies in navy personnel, evaluation, and training policies.  When 
Rickover identified a navy deficiency, he acted to correct the flaw or to shield his 
program from its effects.  Given his aggressive nature, it would seem logical that if he 
had detected a deficiency in the Navy's educational system he would have early in the 
1950s intervened at the Naval Academy or at the graduate school.   Moreover, Rickover's 
nuclear system was a knowledge-based and education-dependent organization, much 
more so than the skill-based technology of naval aviation.  As such, it might be expected 
that Rickover’s program would have made early demands on the Navy’s collegiate 
educational institutions. However, for most of the 1950s, while his program was small in 
size, Rickover made modest demands on graduate education and refrained from any 
significant intervention at Annapolis.   As a consequence, both undergraduate and 
graduate institutions of the Navy continued to prioritize as their main mission the general 
education of unrestricted 'line' officers.  
                                                 
132 CDR Baxter CNO-Staff,"Minutes of Meeting Between CNO, VCNO, and BUPERS to Discuss 
Personnel Shortages, dtd 21 Feb 1958", NHC 00 files, 1958, box 11, folder 16. 
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* 
Nuclear Power and Collegiate Education: Indifference and Detachment 
 
From 1949 to 1958 the Naval Academy curricular debate is best characterized as 
conventional and sedate when compared to what was to come in 1959-69 when Rickover 
began to intervene.  In the 1950s, before Rickover became actively involved in the 
academy's affairs, there existed no powerful organizational or technological driver for 
change. There were minor additions to the curriculum in support of a series of 
technological innovations, to include radar navigation, updated fire control computers, 
and avionics equipment.  But the last major technological driver--aviation-- was by the 
1950s a source of conservatism.  No other technological innovations, important as they 
might prove to be in the fleet or industry, exerted any appreciable effect on the general 
pattern of officer education at the academy.  Perhaps not coincidently, none of the post-
war technological innovations were manpower intensive, with the exception of nuclear 
power.  But in the 1950s, the number of reactors remained small, as did the demand for 
nuclear engineers. 
The lack of curricular change in the 1950s should not be interpreted, however, as 
a lack of curricular awareness on the part of naval officers and faculty at Annapolis.  
Annual Board of Visitors reports and three internal curriculum reviews conducted 
between the end of the Second World War and 1959 carefully evaluated the academy and 
found its program generally satisfactory.  The lack of substantial change was not a sign of 
neglect, as later engineering educators would charge, but more a sign of satisfaction with 
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a program of general education.133  This sense of validation was articulated by the 
chairman of the English and History and Government Department, Capt J.F. Davidson, a 
future superintendent, who wrote on 26 Feb 1953 of the curriculum:  
“The basic concept of a prescribed curriculum for all midshipmen, 
except for the choice of language, is sound; it has not yet been impugned 
by any informed group who have examined it, including the Stearns-Ike 
Board and the Annual Board of Visitors.  In the past three decades minor 
alternations and additions have been made but no revolutionary one has 
been contemplated.  Very much as a Liberal Arts College provides the 
foundation for later specialization in the Schools of Medicine and Surgery, 
so the Naval Academy provides the educational background for the future 
naval officer who gets his specialized training at sea and in the various 
post graduate schools of the Navy and of civilian life.  The basic training 
at the Naval Academy should be such as to equip the officer to understand 
the world about him, human and material, as specialized training and 
living experience come to him in the succeeding years …”134   
 
By the late 1950s aviation technology, the former motive force for change, was all 
but spent as an instigator of curricular change, and some of the aviation-inspired changes 
had in fact been rescinded.  The failure of aviation to permanently shape educational 
programs is perhaps not hard to explain: the human demands of naval aviation operations 
had been from its origins in 1920s more skill-based and physical than they were 
curricular or scientific.  But by the middle of the 1950s, aviators and educators alike were 
coming to the conclusion that an aviation-centric focus was approaching the end of its 
usefulness.  The head of the Aviation Department, Capt R. Weymouth, wrote to the 
Secretary of the Academic Board on 31 October 1957: “It is my opinion that the Aviation 
Department, as a separate entity, has about finished its usefulness to the Naval Academy 
                                                 
133 Charles Paul Sheppard, “An analysis of curriculum changes at the United States Naval Academy during 
the period 1959 through 1974” (Thesis Ph D --George Washington University, 1974),  241.  Sheppard notes 
that Dr. Folsom, the leader of the Rickover inspired review committee in late 1959, accused the academy of 
being complacent in its attention to curricular matters.  
134 J.F. Capt USN Davidson,"Head of Dept of English,  History, and Government to Secretary of Academic 
Board, dtd 26 Feb 1953, " RG 405, USNA Special Collections, Curriculum Studies, 1948-57, box 2, folder 
11). 
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because of the gradual absorption into the Academy as a whole of the educational 
material and professional outlook on naval aviation for which the department was 
designed to establish.  It appears to be time to revamp the academy organization along 
unified lines which assure a balanced regard for all facets of navy line endeavor.”135 (my 
emphasis) 
While the curricular importance of aviation was declining at Annapolis, the 
influence of nuclear power was throughout the decade modest and almost transparent.  
The Bruton Report of 1954 recommended relatively minor changes to the Naval 
Academy curriculum: the addition of a nuclear simulator; modification of the internal 
combustion engine course to include additional hours of nuclear engineering; additional 
hours in fundamental chemistry of the atom; and the addition of high school physics as an 
admission criterion.  All the recommendations with the exception of the physics 
requirement were endorsed by the Chief of Bureau of Personnel.136 A few years later in 
1956, the faculty, not naval reactors, proposed one additional course devoted exclusively 
to nuclear engineering.137  
In the absence of any particular technological driver, the academy leadership and 
faculty nonetheless initiated a detailed curriculum review in early 1957.  The timing of 
the academy review was, in hindsight, fortuitous.  After the review had been started, the 
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Soviet satellite SPUTNIK humiliated the United States in October 1957.  In the search 
for a scapegoat, the politicians focused not on the military program managers and 
scientists, but on educational programs.   In an effort to correct perceived educational 
deficiencies, Congress passed what became known as the National Defense Education 
Act of 1958.138    
Despite the panicked finger-pointing and the calls for a curricular revolution in 
engineering and science education, at the Naval Academy a general calm was observed.  
The calm was perhaps attributable to the long traditions of the institution, and the simple 
fact that naval officers had been on the leading edge of technological innovation longer 
than perhaps any other national institution, save the Army and West Point.  Not 
surprisingly, then, the Naval Academy's review did not recommend a curricular shift 
toward science and engineering at the expense of broader, general education.  Rather, the 
academy review recommended an increased emphasis on educational fundamentals and a 
balance slightly more favorable to foreign language and the humanities.  This plan 
would, however, by the end of the decade come into direct conflict with the needs of the 
reactor and the technocratic philosophy of Admiral Rickover.   
 
Graduate School and War College 
It was entirely reasonable that Rickover and his program could make demands on 
academia.  Rickover and his reactor specialists had in the first years worked closely with 
a small number of graduate institutions, in particular, MIT.  But this active and close 
cooperation would soon fade.  Rickover's relationship with graduate school programs 
                                                 
138 Barbara Barksdale Clowse, Brainpower for the Cold War: the Sputnik Crisis and National Defense 
Education Act of 1958 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981). 
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might be best described as an inverse relationship: as nuclear power grew in stature, as 
the nuclear training schools and reactor fleet expanded, the relative value attached to 
education at the graduate level declined.   
The Bruton Report of 1954 had explored several alternative sources for advanced 
nuclear degrees at civilian universities but determined the nation’s university system was 
inadequate, with the exception of MIT.  The Bruton Study recommended instead a 
substantive role for NPGS, to include the lion’s share of degrees in the field of naval 
nuclear engineering.   If experience with previous naval technological innovation was any 
guide, the NPGS might well have become a major center for the study of nuclear power.    
With time however, the relationship between Nuclear Power and the Navy’s 
Graduate School deteriorated, a pattern at variance with other technologies that emerged 
at mid-century.139   Instead of a closer relationship between nuclear technology and 
graduate schools, Rickover began to oppose lengthy academic graduate education in 
nuclear engineering and disparaged the graduates from such courses as “poorly 
educated”.  Rickover described the nuclear studies at NPGS as so ineffective that after 
two years students gained about as much new knowledge as “…could be put into a 
thimble.”140  Without Rickover’s support, the nuclear field at NPGS declined, and its 
graduates gradually faded from the forefront of nuclear power leadership.  By the middle 
1960s, the trend was clear: the nuclear programs at both NPGS and MIT received less 
support from Rickover, and the education of the prospective nuclear EDOs shifted toward 
                                                 
139 NPGS did indeed play a critical role in the other profound technological development of the mid 
century, that of the digital computer network.  Many of the navy’s pioneers in the field—especially those 
associated with the first mobile computer network NTDS—attended or even taught at the university. Some 
of the leading computer pioneers of the century, in particular, Gary Kildall, the developer of DOS, taught as 
an officer at Monterey.     
140  House Committee on Appropriations, Testimony of VADM H.G. Rickover on Nuclear Propulsion, 87th 
Cong., 2nd sess., 1962, USNA General Collection, Y4.AP6/1: 36/5:62/pt 6  28-29. 
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industry sites, in particular, the Bettis facility.141  Line officers attending the year long 
Bettis-type schools were also less likely to attend graduate school though they were 
sometimes encouraged to view their training as the equivalent of graduate school.  But 
these training schools were not graduate schools but rather highly demanding training 
establishments.142   
The reasons for the failure of NPGS or civilian universities to continue to play a 
substantive role in the field of naval nuclear power are unclear.   Some officers close to 
Rickover attribute the declining role of graduate schools to Rickover himself, to his 
concern that graduate education required he cede some of his control over his officers.143    
Rickover's concern may not have been misplaced.  Navy graduate school policy for line 
officers (URLs) changed significantly in 1959 with the adoption of a strict ‘pay back’ 
requirement for URL officers who attended graduate school.  The strict 'pay back' 
requirement came about as a result of plans to drastically reduce the number of EDO 
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of control: Rickover could not control MIT.  Rickover, according to Crawford, thought the MIT students 
were wasting time.  As evidence of this attitude, Crawford recounted how Rickover sent some officers to 
investigate the navy officers studying at MIT to determine if they were wasting time.  Crawford also 
speculated that Rickover wanted training on his systems as they existed at the time.  Rickover was not 
interested in building a cadre of officers who could innovate in the nuclear field later in their careers.   
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officers in the Navy.  As EDO officers were planned for reduction, the shortfall in 
technically trained officers was to be compensated by an increase in URL technical 
education.  After graduate school the 'line' officers were then suppose to fill a technical 
billet related to their field of graduate study.  With such a new system, Rickover faced the 
possibility that, should his scarce nuclear officers attend graduate school for two years, he 
might lose an additional two years service as these  officers ‘paid back’ their educational 
debt somewhere outside his program.144  
With regard to the upper level professional military educational institutions, 
Rickover in the early years appeared indifferent.  The Naval War College and its joint 
equivalent, the National War College, remained isolated from the effects of nuclear 
innovation, at least in the 1950s.  The curriculum at war colleges was modified to include 
unclassified discussion of the operational and strategic implications of both POLARIS 
missiles and the nuclear submarine.  Officers from all communities in the Navy still 
considered attendance at a war college to be an important step for career development.  In 
the 1950s nuclear trained officers continued to attend the war college at relatively high 
rates, though the nuclear officers constituted a small community throughout the decade. 
145  A more useful indicator of the relationship between the war colleges and the nuclear 
program was the promotion success of nuclear officers who attended war colleges.  When 
viewed in this way, the nuclear and King-models appear to co-exist.   A large share of the 
first generation of nuclear flag officers—Wilkinson, Zech, Calvert, Peet, Long, Shear, 
                                                 
144 R.T.S. Keith, RADM, USNR,"Billet and post-graduate educational requirements in the specialty areas in 
the line of the Navy, Report of Board 1 October 1959", NARA RG 24-470-54-25-6 box 5  
145 Promotions and attendance rates by all officer groups at Newport, discounted for the diversion to NDU, 
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Holloway—attended either the Naval or the National War College.  Almost all of these 
nuclear officers matriculated at the war colleges after they had become Rickover's men.  
Thus it seems Rickover had been supportive, or at a minimum acquiesced, as the first 
generation of nuclear leaders 'rounded out' their careers by attending a war college.   
 
* 
Nuclear Power and the Fleet:  The King System Sustained, for now… 
 
Rickover used the 1950s to build a small but highly effective personnel system of 
selection, assignment, and training that began to chip away at the traditional values of 
officer development and laid a foundation for a new model of the 'line'.  As registered in 
personnel manuals and publications of this period, the 'generalist' model continued to 
occupy its privileged position in the Navy.  However, there were at least some signs in 
the lower ranks that support for the old King system had begun to erode.  Whether this 
dissent was in response to Rickover's agitation is, however, unclear.  
An analysis of changing officer policy and attitudes is facilitated by the fact that 
the same publications examined in the immediate post-WWII period remained in 
publication and were updated to reflect changes in the later 1950s. These publications 
provide evidence that the model of ‘line’ remained within the outlines devised by King 
some forty years before. The BUPERS manual of 1959 edition continued to emphasize 
the need for service school education and the need to understand the full spectrum of 
service capabilities as well as those of the joint force, the Army and the Air Force.  
Though a new and revised edition was published in 1959, the words in the manual 
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remained essentially unchanged from the 1942-48 editions. Line officers were exhorted 
to attain “…a thorough grounding in the principles and methods of naval strategy and 
tactics and of joint operations with the other branches of the armed forces…Education for 
supplying such knowledge and for the development of doctrine and good military 
character is necessary throughout our naval service.” 146   
In addition to the BUPERS Manual, the widely read and navy-sanctioned Naval 
Officer’s Guide and Armed Forces Officer both urged young officers to pursue a 
“rounded” and integrative career.  The Armed Forces Officer, published initially in 1950 
and republished in 1959, included a chapter entitled “Planning Your Career”.  The text 
acknowledged the need for specialists, but decisively advocated the 'well rounded' officer 
as the ideal type for which the young 'line' officer should aspire: “The health and 
progressive spirit of the services come of the many-sided officer who can make not one 
career for himself but three or four.”147 
Ageton’s 1960 version of the Naval Officer’s Guide,  the fifth edition, endorsed as 
accurate and authoritative by the Chief of BUPERS, VADM Smedberg, continued to 
emphasize the need for a 'well rounded' or integrative career.  The Guide described the 
need for joint and service college and the need for all officers to understand the strategic 
and policy issues that confronted political leaders.148  The Navy went a step further and 
disseminated official policy documents that included graphical representations of the 
‘ideal’ career path for which line officers should strive.  “The Manual of Qualifications 
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255 
for Officers of the Line of the US Navy, 1100/1310”  of May 1958  depicted all line 
officers following a path of progressive education punctuated by three or four periods of 
graduate school or war college.149  This navy manual thus recommended an officer 
career, not of a specialized 'line' officer, but rather a path that mirrored to a remarkable 
degree the generalist model as presented in King’s 1920 report and Holloway’s report of 
1945.  
The Secretary of the Navy’s Advisory Board on Education Requirements 
(SABER) also communicated its support for less technical and more general officer 
education.  The SPUTNIK crisis prompted the Secretary to establish this board for 
purposes of evaluating navy educational programs.  In the first years after SPUTNIK, the 
SABER members counseled a measured response to the 'crisis'.  The board, made up of 
senior admirals and political appointees in the Navy department,  did not recommend 
'line' officers or midshipmen receive more technical education in response to SPUTNIK, 
but instead endorsed again King’s system of ‘rounded’ and integrative education!   The 
board expressed concern about the growing stature of science and advanced technology 
that threatened to overshadow traditional officer educational and developmental 
practices.  The board members in 1959 and 1960 went so far as to counsel the Secretary 
of the Navy to guard against the current “…fetish of science…” and in the same report 
recommended he expand language training, not technical training!150 
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A study of graduate education and officer specialties (sub-specialties) in 1959 
also came to the same basic conclusions of the King report some 40 years before.151  The 
report included a near replica of King’s 1920 career plan and counseled the URL officer 
to set as his goal the development of those qualities of "broad command".  Key steps in a 
career included:  general duty on surface ships; specialization in one platform (aviation, 
submarine, surface); graduate education of one year to be completed between the third 
and seventh year of service; variety in assignment and eventually senior service college.  
This 1959 report endorsed the King plan, but it did something more that portended 
difficulties for the 'line'.  The report recommended that more URL officers develop a 
technical sub-specialty so that they would be qualified to replace EDOs in technical 
billets.  EDOs had apparently been slated for massive reductions, if not out-right 
elimination, and the 'line' was being called upon to 'take up the slack'.152 To fill the 
anticipated shortfalls in EDOs,  the URL 'line' officers were required to attend graduate 
school and then ‘pay back’ their education by a tour in a specialist field.  This policy 
went further than the King plan, which had not required 'line' officers to serve a 
mandatory pay-back tour. A policy that required the URL officer to be both a seagoing 
commander, and at the same time acquire the technical education necessary to replace the 
EDO specialist, would prove all but impossible to enforce in the years ahead. The Keith 
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report stated in blunt language that a 'line' officer could not be a technical sub-specialist 
and also meet the emerging 'joint' education requirements.153   
This new requirement that 'line' officers replace EDOs coincided with a subtle 
shift in the type of sub-specialties open to URL officers at graduate school.  Whereas the 
pre-war and Holloway Report conceptions of sub-specialty were divided more or less 
equally between three types ( the "design of material", "manipulation of material", or 
"operations"),  the sub-specialty as described in the 1959 Keith report was associated 
with study in a scientific or engineering field.154   This shift in sub-specialty priorities is 
indicative of a slight shift in the direction from operations to an elevated status accorded 
to technical specialty. 
 The rising profile of the new weapons and technical specialists began to be 
evident in the discourse of leading naval professional publications.  Numerous articles 
that appeared in Proceedings in the late 1950s discussed atomic weapons and nuclear 
propulsion.  Nuclear machines took on an increasingly high profile in personnel 
publications.  The 1960 edition of the Naval Officer's Guide featured a POLARIS missile 
emerging from the surface of the sea.  Line officers became aware of the proliferation of 
specialties in civilian industry and even in the Navy's own staff corps.  In this period the 
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258 
staff, or 'restricted line', witnessed a rapid increase in the number of new specialties.155   
Some lower ranking ‘line’ officers observed the specializing trend in science and 
engineering and began to question the 'generalist' model for the line officer in command.  
Perhaps foreshadowing the change to come was an article that appeared in Proceedings 
that questioned the capacity of King’s model of the generalist officer to command the 
new technologies.  The barrage of negative responses to the article, which was titled  “Is 
the Versatile (generalist) Line Officer Obsolete”, was evidence of both an emerging 
debate but also indicative of continuing strong support for the King model of the 
generalist.156   
 
* 
Taking Stock: Promotion to High Command 
 
The assignment and promotion system in the late 1950s still produced a ‘versatile’ 
or ‘well rounded’ line officer.  Most non-nuclear and nuclear officers continued to be 
assigned to a wide range of billets.  Command tours remained relatively short in duration, 
a practice consistent with the ideal career path as defined in the Holloway Plan.  Official 
publications communicated a version of 'line' officer career that strongly resembled 
King's plan.  The submarine officer career was among the most well rounded careers and 
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shared a common educational and assignment sequence with surface officers.157   
Remarkably, the first generation of nuclear officers also conformed to the pattern of the 
'well-rounded' officer.  Almost to a man, the first generation of nuclear flag officers 
attended either the Naval or the National War College.158  Rising stars in non-nuclear 
aviation also continued to adhere to the King model.  Indicative of this pattern was the 
career of Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, a non-nuclear aviator who rose to CNO.  
Hayward recounted that his aviator commanding officers had encouraged him to broaden 
his career by attending not one but two war colleges, which he did.159  
Promotion examination procedures remained relatively unchanged during most of 
the 1950s.  The promotion exam symbolized the existence of a body of knowledge that 
all line officers held in common. For example, the promotion examination for LCDR and 
above still required the study of tactics, operations, strategy, and international relations.  
But the traditional operational ethos of the 'line' was coming under pressure.  A deliberate 
navy policy for planned reductions in the number of EDO officers would require 
increasingly more 'line' officers to fill technical billets.  Beginning in the later 1950s, 
perhaps due to a looming shortage of EDOs, promotion boards for flag were encouraged 
to pay more attention to officers with technical sub-specialties.160 There is no evidence, 
however, that more technically specialized 'line' officers were in fact selected for flag, or 
that they promoted to senior operational commands.    
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This study has used promotion to high rank to measure the relative success of two 
models of command: the 'generalist' and the technical specialist.  The 'generalist' model 
was represented by the proxy of those officers who had attended a war college. Analysis 
of the pre-war period showed a steady rise in percentage of flag officers who had been 
generalists as measured by war college attendance: fully 98% of flag officers who 
commanded at sea in WWII were graduates of the NWC.  This pattern persisted for the 
first years following the Second World War.  In the 1950s, however, the number of senior 
flags who attended War College dropped off, falling to 30-50% of the senior admirals, 
varying slightly depending on the year.161  This drop, however, is NOT indicative of a 
changed attitude toward officer education and development, but rather was the 
demographic echo of the disruptive effects of the lead-up to and combat of the Second 
World War. The officers rising to senior flag rank in the middle to late 1950s were the 
same officers who were precluded from attending the war college in the late 1930s and 
the first half of the 1940s.  From 1936-1946 most 'line' officers could not avail 
themselves of a war college education.  Most senior 'line' officers whose career 
progression was disrupted by the war were, however, hardly narrow technical specialists.  
Many had commanded or served on staffs in the Pacific and Atlantic fleets and perhaps 
learned more about command and integrated warfare than any generation before or 
since.162  These officers could argue-- as perhaps they did in conversation with their 
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War College, and later National War College.  United States. Bureau of Naval Personnel., Register of 
Commissioned and Warrant officers of the United States Navy and Marine Corps (Washington: Govt. 
Print. Off. etc., 1814-2002).  
162 It is also reasonable to conclude that some senior captains who served in war-time joint and combined 
staffs did not feel they needed a war college education after they returned from the war.  Admiral’s Carney 
(Chief of Staff to Halsey) and Burke (Chief of Staff to Mitscher) come to mind. Both would have missed 
their opportunity for war college in the interwar period due to the build up, but would have had little reason 
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assignment officers-- that their war experience had broadened them and more than 
compensated for their lack of war college education.  
The relative dearth of senior flag officers who had received a war college 
education proved to be a temporary condition. Evidence of this return to 'normal'-- that 
the educational changes wrought by war were temporary and did not portend a secular 
shift to a new conception of 'line' officer-- is found in the first years of the 1960s.  At that 
time, the number of senior navy flag officers who had attended either the Naval War 
College or joint war colleges rebounded dramatically and approached interwar levels of 
matriculation: 90% of senior flag officers in the middle 1960s were war college 
graduates.163   
Rickover had by the end of the 1950s constructed a highly effective system of 
technical training, selection, and assignment.  But he had not yet redefined command to 
be that of the specialist or the engineer.  For whatever combination of reasons, Rickover 
had supported, perhaps begrudgingly, the King model of integrative officer development.  







to think the war college in 1946-47 would have served a particularly useful purpose.  Burke, it should be 
noted, did take war college correspondence courses before the war.  
163 United States. Bureau of Naval Personnel., Register of Commissioned and Warrant officers of the 
United States Navy and Marine Corps (Washington: Govt. Print. Off. etc., 1814-2002). 
Chapter Five 
   
USS THRESHER and the Culminating Battle of 




“The man of the future on whom we shall depend more and more is the technical expert.  
Today he is still subservient to non-technical leaders in government and industry, and his 
work is hampered and sometimes destroyed by men in whom is vested great power but 
who cannot understand the realities of the new, artificial, technological age.  But the 
‘verbal’ men are on the way out... In our naval nuclear program we have taken 
cognizance of this demand for a different kind of man and we have set up schools to train 
the officers and men who will run the new atomic navy.” 
Vice Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, USN, 19591  
 
"The argument that these men (submariners) had spent years in command had no appeal 
to him, for these officers often represented an older tradition that had to be broken..." 






Rickover was an advocate of command by technical experts.  In the 1950s, 
however, Rickover had been willing to abide King's model of the general line officer.  
His willingness to compromise diminished as his program expanded and his political 
stature grew.  In the early 1960s, the size of the nuclear force greatly increased, and the 
Navy commissioned the first cohort of nuclear surface ships.  A transformation of the 
'line' officer corps followed not long after.  But the nuclear technology did not itself 
compel or pre-determine the transformation of the officer corps, though the machines 
                                                 
1 Hyman G. Rickover, Education and Freedom (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1959), 19. 
2 Francis Duncan, Rickover and the Nuclear Navy: The Discipline of Technology (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 1990), 86.  Author insertion (submariners) to clarify Duncan's meaning.  
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were an important tool in the process.3   Rather, Rickover achieved the transformation 
through bureaucratic competition over officer education, assignment, and promotion 
processes.  Rickover used various means to win control of the officers and break the old 
culture, to include highly selective interviews, changed training institutions, and tight 
control of assignments to submarines.   Perhaps the most important of his tools was a 
purposeful policy of officer shortage, which was then followed by the infusion of large 
numbers of aviators and surface officers into the submarine force to dilute the traditional 
'diesel' submarine culture.  Senior 'line' officers belatedly recognized Rickover's 
culturally transformative plans for what they were and resisted Rickover's initiatives with 
respect to the diesel submarine officers.  The future of the traditional submarine 
community was of such importance that the dispute could be resolved only at the highest 
levels of the Navy and Congress.  The culminating clash came in the aftermath of the loss 
of a nuclear submarine, USS THRESHER.   Rickover won the struggle and became 
unassailable as the leading architect of a techno-centric model of officer development.   
 
       * 
Strategic Primacy of the Nuclear Submarine: Accelerated Shipbuilding and 
Personnel Shortages 
 
In the late 1950s, the Soviets shocked the world when it launched SPUTNIK, the 
world’s first satellite.  Almost as important as the satellite was the means of its placement 
                                                 
3Studies of professional military education as early as 1959 speculated that nuclear machines might prove 
to exert a significant shaping effect on the officer corps. See Gene Martin Lyons and John Wesley Masland, 
Education and Military Leadership:  a Study of the R.O.T.C (Princeton, N.J.,: Princeton University Press, 
1959),  226.  Ron Spector, one of the leading American  naval historians in this period, gives credit to 
nuclear power for changing profoundly the navy and submarine officer corps, but devotes only a few pages 
to explaining how Rickover effected this transformation.  See Ronald H. Spector, At War, at Sea: Sailors 
and Naval Warfare in the Twentieth Century (New York, N.Y.: Viking, 2001), 333-336. 
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into orbit:  a vehicle capable of acting as an inter-continental ballistic missile.  SPUTNIK 
was followed with other missile launches that further demonstrated the Soviet capacity to 
deliver Russian hydrogen bombs to the American homeland.  These developments 
compelled American leaders to reevaluate a policy of “massive retaliation” that depended 
on vulnerable land-based systems and prompted a search for alternatives.   The Navy’s 
nuclear-propelled and fleet ballistic missile submarine (known in abbreviated form as 
either the FBM or SSBN) provided a technology well-suited to a shifting strategy, that is, 
a mobile and therefore survivable missile platform.4  The demands on the Navy and 
Rickover would grow when the new Kennedy Administration made an even larger fleet 
of nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines one of its key policy differences with that 
of the outgoing Eisenhower Administration.  Symbolic of his commitment to the 
program, Kennedy, the former naval officer, made a point of traveling to sea to observe a 
missile launch from a nuclear submarine.  In remarks prepared for the President to 
deliver on the day of his assassination, Kennedy was to invoke  a 50% increase in 
POLARIS missile inventory as a sign of American technological and military prowess.5    
                                                 
4 Harvey M. Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development:  Bureaucratic and Programmatic Success in 
Government (Cambridge, Mass.,: Harvard University Press, 1972).  To place the SSBN program in the 
context of larger navy policy and action, see Robert L. Love, Jr., The History of the U.S. Navy, Volume II 
(Harrisburg, : Stackpole Books, 1992), 408-418.   
5  John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: a Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National 
Security Policy (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 218-222.   Gaddis includes a brief 
discussion of the significance of increased POLARIS submarine construction.  For a discussion of 
Eisenhower’s doubts about the need for a large POLARIS fleet, see Peter J.  Roman, Eisenhower and the 
Missile Gap (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995).  In contrast to Eisenhower,  Kennedy was a 
particularly strong supporter of the ballistic missile submarine program.  He went to sea on 16 November 
1963, just days before his assassination, to witness a missile launch from USS ANDREW JACKSON.  
Kennedy later wrote in a letter to RADM Pete Galantin, the POLARIS lead project officer, that “Once one 
has seen a Polaris firing the efficacy of this weapons system as a deterrent is not debatable.”   John F.  
President of the United States Kennedy,"Letter to RADM Galantin dated 19 November ", Kennedy 
Presidential Library,  (author has copy) .  See also digital collection for 22 November 1963, "Remarks 
Prepared but not Given".  The proposed speech stated:  "In less than 3 years, we have increased by 50 
percent the number of Polaris submarines scheduled to be in force by the next fiscal year, increased by 
more than 70 percent our total Polaris purchase program..." 
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To counter what was portrayed as a 'missile gap', Kennedy planned to deploy 
hundreds more nuclear missile tubes, but to do so required more submarines, which in 
turn required an accelerated pace of reactor construction.  The speed at which Rickover 
and his engineers fielded this complex system was unparalleled, and engineering histories 
noted that “…never has a naval engineering project of such complexity been 
accomplished successfully in so short a time.”6  By the early 1960s, the size of the 
nuclear submarine fleet would dwarf that of just a few years before (see Figure 5-1), 
bringing with it more political, technological, and human challenges. Rickover navigated 
the political challenges with great success.  His building programs were popular both in 
the Pentagon and in Congress, and he used every opportunity to build his power base 
with each launching or commissioning of a nuclear ship.7  The technical problems by the 
early 1960s were well in hand: NAUTILUS had been at sea for almost half a decade, and 
naval engineers had reached consensus that the pressurized water reactor was the 
preferred technology.8  It was however the human challenge-- what type of man would 
command-- that proved most problematic for the admiral. With each new launching, the 
                                                 
6 Randolph W. King and Prescott Palmer, Naval Engineering and American Seapower (Baltimore, Md.: 
Nautical & Aviation Pub. Co. of America, 1989), 278.  The inventory of commissioned nuclear ships 
increased almost exponentially from the late 1950s into the 1960s:  1955-1, 1956-1, 1957-3, 1958-5, 1959-
9, 1960-14, 1961-24.  The increase in rate of production was even more pronounced: 1958-2, 1959-4, 1960-
5, and 1961-10.  See Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Nuclear Navy, 1946-1962 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1974), appendix 2. 
7  Rickover used his nuclear construction program to build allies throughout the political power centers, 
from the executive branch, AEC, to Congress.  To help garner political support, Rickover abandoned the 
traditional naming convention (fish names) and instead named the submarines after leading politicians, to 
include Senator Richard B. Russell and Congressman L. Mendel Rivers.  Eventually Rickover would agree 
to follow the surface navy tradition of assigning city and state names (e.g., the LA Class and Ohio Class 
submarines).     
8 Gary E. Weir, Forged in War : the Naval-Industrial Complex and American Submarine Construction, 
1940-1961 (Washington: Naval Historical Center 1993); Norman Friedman, Submarine Design and 
Development (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984).   Duncan and Hewlett also examine the issue in 
detail, but tend to offer a less critical analysis than does Weir or Friedman. 
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personnel shortages grew more acute, a shortage worsened by some factors outside 

















Just as the ship construction rates and manpower demands began to accelerate, an 
important group of Rickover’s technical officers began to resign in large numbers:  the 
nuclear Engineering Duty Officers.9  This corps of officers had been crucial in the early 
years of the program. They provided the essential technical talent Rickover used to over-
see the construction of the reactors and to develop the procedures for their operation.   
The nuclear EDOs were the elite of the Navy, combat veterans of the Second World War, 
but also the first nuclear specialists on the planet.  These superb naval officers, graduates 
of both the Naval Academy and MIT, approached with confidence their flag 'promotion 
windows' in the late 1950s and early 1960s.   When none were selected for promotion, in 
                                                 
9 Theodore Rockwell, The Rickover Effect: How One Man Made a Difference (Annapolis, Md.: Naval 
Institute Press, 1992). See personnel appendix which lists all technical personnel, when they first entered 
the program and when they resigned.  The loss of several highly qualified, relatively young officers is 
plainly evident in the late 1950s and early 1960s.   
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quick succession several of the top officers, including Captains Louis Roddis, John 
Crawford, and James Dunford,  retired from the Navy and took their knowledge and 
expertise to the private sector.   
The failure to promote these nuclear officers marked the beginning of a 
generation-long decline of the nuclear EDO community and a reduction in the availability 
of experienced nuclear specialists to support the growing nuclear organization.10    The 
decline of this essential group of officers is a major theme of Theodore Rockwell’s work, 
The Rickover Effect.  The cause of the EDOs’ failure to promote is not altogether clear, 
and a detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this work.  The fault may in part reside 
with the larger EDO community that was reluctant to promote these nuclear EDOs 
because they were not “broad scale officers”, the same argument traditional engineers 
and line officers had used against Rickover in his promotion battle for flag.11    Part of the 
blame may reside with Rickover.  Political leaders in the early 1960s had made plans for 
one of the retired nuclear EDOs to return to active service and to promote him to flag, if 
Admiral Rickover had been willing to retire.12  A general decline in navy support of 
EDOs (nuclear and non-nuclear alike) may also have contributed to the attrition.  
Apparently some senior 'line' officers and the Secretary of the Navy questioned the long 
term viability or even necessity of the EDO community.  These doubts were made public 
with the publication of the Franke Board report that in 1959 recommended a significant 
reduction in EDO officers and a compensatory increase in URL sub-specialists to make 
                                                 
10Ibid.      
11 Albert G.  Mumma, The Reminiscences of Rear Admiral Albert G. Mumma, U.S. Navy (Retired) / 
interviewed by Paul Stillwell (Annapolis: US Naval Institute, 2001), 249. 
12 John W. Crawford, Jr., (Deputy Manager of the Naval Reactors Program), Interview with the Author 11 
July 2007. 
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up the resulting shortfall.13  For whatever combination of reasons, the senior nuclear 
EDOs in the early 1960s were a shadow of their robust community of the 1950s.  The 
effect of their failure to promote was not, however, limited to the EDO community.  In 
the absence of nuclear EDO officers of flag rank, Rickover had to rely more on 
experienced URL ‘line’ officers.  The decline of the EDO community may have further 
compelled Rickover to protect and control his ‘line’ officers because the ‘line’ would be 
needed to fill nuclear billets at sea and might be needed to fill more technical billets 
ashore.  
A demographic wave of retirements from the Second World War generation of 
veterans also washed over the Navy in the early 1960s.  Officers who first joined the 
Navy as young men in 1941-45 approached 20 years of service in the early 1960s, and 
with a booming economy on the outside, the number choosing to stay in the service fell 
rapidly.14   Fortunately, there was a large pool of officers on which Rickover could call to 
meet the growing needs of the nuclear program: the diesel officers who manned and 
commanded the rapidly dwindling inventory of diesel submarines.15  But Rickover would 
                                                 
13 William B. Franke, Under Secretary of the Navy, Chairman,"Report of the Committee on Organization 
of the Department of the Navy, 1958-59", US Naval Academy, General Collections, VA52.A184.  There 
appears in this period also a move by ‘line’ officers to reduce the numbers of EDOs in the Navy.  See 
discussion of the Keith Board, which recommended a reduction in EDO officers,  in Ralph Kirk James, 
RADM USN (ret), Reminiscences of RADM Ralph K. James, USN (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute, 
1972). 
14 See Defense Advisory Committee on Professional and Technical Compensation, Highlights of a Modern 
Concept of Compensation for Personnel of the Uniformed Services, Washington : Gov Print Officer, March 
1957, 4, as quoted in Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: a Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, 
Ill.,: Free Press, 1960), 17.  
15 In the late 1950s, the diesel fleet numbered over a hundred sea-going ships. Between the officers at sea 
and ashore, the number of diesel officers numbered in the thousands.  Diesel hulls would decline by 60% 
between 1960 and 1970; nuclear hulls would increase in the same period 1000%, from 10 to 100 hulls. See 
Norman Polmar, The Ships and Aircraft of the U. S. fleet, 11th ed. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1978),  
2. 
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call few, and the nuclear fleet would not become home to the mass of diesel officers and 
their culture of command. 
* 
Rickover’s Personnel Policy: Perpetuating Shortage to create Technical 
Specialization in the Submarine Fleet  
 
The traditional submarine officers (diesel officers) seemed ideal as a source of 
leaders for Rickover's new fleet of nuclear ships.  The traditional officers made up a 
relatively small, elite group of officers, highly decorated in war, and proficient in the 
complex and demanding technologies of the day, to include radar, sonar, advanced 
diesels.   Why so many of these officers could not transition into a rapidly expanding 
nuclear program has so far defied satisfactory explanation.16   Yet an understanding of 
these events is crucial, for the decision to prevent the transition to nuclear power of a 
large percentage of diesel officers is one of the most important personnel policy decisions  
in the history of the post-WWII naval officer corps.  Though only a modest percentage of 
all navy ‘line’ officers was directly involved, the outcome of this bitter and contested 
policy debate created a submarine community of highly specialized, technical-expert 
officers who would later serve as an exemplar for the larger fleet.17  The nuclear 
                                                 
16 The history of the nuclear program by Hewlett, and the authorized biographies of Rickover by Duncan, 
devote minimal attention to the issue of the diesel officer.  Polmar and Allen, in their unauthorized 
biography of the admiral, were perhaps overly critical of Rickover.  This section will attempt to provide a 
dispassionate analysis of the diesel officer demise, and locate the events in the larger context of a dispute 
between two, fundamentally different models of the 'line' officer.    
17 Several officers interviewed recall an address by VADM James D. Watkins, then Chief of the Bureau of 
Personnel, at the Naval War College, during which he explained that the future fleet would be all nuclear. 
VADM Watkins further explained that non-nuclear surface and aviation officers would follow the example 
of what happened to the diesel officers.  The 'lesson' of the diesel officer demise, even years later, 
continued as a powerful exemplar for line officers, both nuclear and non-nuclear.  
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submarine community established the primacy of a technical expert model and 
accelerated the diffusion of these values throughout the larger fleet.     
Most members of the diesel community had known by 1955 that future submarine 
construction would be nuclear and not diesel.18  Yet, the diesel submarine officers did not 
define themselves by their engines (though that is how the nuclear officers would refer to 
them) and thus they expected they would inherit command of whatever new kind of 
submarine was developed, including those that were nuclear propelled. Navy studies had 
in fact planned for the traditional submarine community leaders to assume responsibility 
for choosing the leaders of the nuclear navy:  diesel officers and not Rickover would 
select the new nuclear submarine captains.19  Fleet-wide shortages of officers and a rapid 
increase in nuclear hulls also favored the transition of large numbers of the traditional 
submarine officers into Rickover’s program.  Furthermore, the younger officers on 
traditional submarines no doubt comforted themselves with the knowledge that Rickover 
was an old man and would soon retire.20  In the end, however, the traditional submarine 
officers did not gain control of the personnel selection process for nuclear command, and 
a large share of diesel officers did not transition to the nuclear navy as they had hoped.  
Rather, Rickover lived and served long enough to witness the near complete demise of 
                                                 
18 It was in 1957 that the first nuclear missile submarine, USS GEORGE WASHINGTON, began 
construction, and was also the year the last diesel submarine would be built in American shipyards.  But as 
early as 1955 the CNO, Admiral Burke, had made the decision that all future submarines would be nuclear. 
19 The Bruton Report of 1954 decided against creating a new corps of nuclear specialists with which to man 
the new reactor spaces and instead recommended the transition of diesel officers to these ships.  Also, this 
same report had recommended the selection authority shift from Rickover’s AEC/Navy office back to its 
traditional home: the Bureau of Personnel and the Submarine Detailer who was a diesel officer.  
20 It was widely known that Rickover would reach mandatory retirement in 1962, and, under normal 
circumstances, be expected to relinquish control of his administrative position in the nuclear power 
program.  
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the traditional submarine, diesel-trained officer community. 21  How and why this 
occurred has been explained in several ways.  
Some traditional submarine officers attributed their ultimate extinction to a 
personal bitterness Rickover harbored toward the ‘line’ and in particular the submarine 
community.  Admiral Charles Duncan observed what he thought was this animosity, and 
recalled that Rickover “…would hardly communicate with the submarine desk in the 
Bureau of Naval Personnel because they were diesel submariners.” 22  Some alleged that 
diesel-trained submarine officers had attempted to discredit the nuclear program,23 an 
action which may have then provoked Rickover to 'counterattack' against the traditional 
community.   But an explanation that offers nothing more than score-settling is 
insufficient.  Rickover had served several years on diesel submarines and knew first hand 
of the personal sacrifice made by this group of officers.  In the early years of the 
program, all the officers he chose to command were experienced, traditional submarine 
officers.  Finally, Rickover's ‘bitterness’ or score-settling as a causal explanation seems 
inconsistent when compared with Rickover’s long history of selfless service to the Navy 
and nation. Rickover's service, after all, brought him and his family little personal gain.  
And other scholars agreed. Something else was at work.   
                                                 
21 In 1960 diesels outnumber nuclear ships almost 10 to 1; by end of 1960s the diesel submarines would be 
in the minority, and rapidly approach single digits in the 1970s.  Though the last diesel left service in the 
1980s, the critical period of decision had passed by the end of the 1960s.  
22 Charles Kenney Duncan, The Reminiscences of Admiral Charles K. Duncan, USN (Ret.), 4 vols. 
(Annapolis: U. S. Naval Institute, 1978), 479;   William Wegner (Deputy to Rickover from 1963-1979), 
Interview with the Author, 17 July 2007.   William Wegner, Rickover’s deputy for almost 15 years in the 
1960s and 1970s, concurred that rivalry played a part; that the demanding and selective interviews 
combined with the high nuclear school attrition were in part aimed to reduce the influence of Commander 
Submarines Atlantic, a tactical commander who was also a diesel officer. 
 
23 Carl Lavo, Slade Cutter: Submarine Warrior (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2003), 206-209.  A 
highly decorated diesel submarine officer, working in public affairs, was accused of attempting to discredit 
or undermine Rickover and the USS NAUTILUS. 
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 Rickover’s biographer and a leading historian on naval nuclear power, Francis 
Duncan, attributed the mass retirement of diesel officers to technological fate or 
inevitability.  Duncan explains fatalistically: “In a way, it was one more instance of 
individualism giving way before the imperatives of technology.”24  But such a 
determinist explanation is insufficient for two reasons.  First, the Royal Navy operated 
nuclear submarines of the same reactor design as the American system and adopted very 
different personnel policies: the technical experts did not command but remained in the 
engine room.  Secondly, it is not technology itself but human interpretation of machine 
requirements that ultimately molds personnel policy.  Thus, Francis Duncan's explanation 
does not allow consideration of the possibility that Rickover's political action mattered.    
Furthermore, nuclear reactors were not akin to labor saving innovations that wiped out or 
reduced dramatically a work force, a phenomenon known as ‘technological 
unemployment’.25  Rather, nuclear technology was more manpower intensive than diesel 
technology.   The nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) required officer complements  50% 
greater than the diesel attack boats and the missile boats (SSBNs)  almost 300% more 
officers.26  
                                                 
24 Francis Duncan, Rickover and the Nuclear Navy: The Discipline of Technology (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 1990), 84. 
25 The phrase, ‘Technological Unemployment’, was first used during the Great Depression in an attempt to 
blame 'technology' for the phenomenon of mass unemployment. But technology seldom if ever ‘fires’ a 
person from a job.  A manager makes a value judgment, and then makes a decision to hire or fire. Even in 
what would appear ‘clear cut’ cases of ‘technological unemployment’ in industry, the story is much more 
complicated, and involves value judgments about people.  For a good illustration of social nature of what 
seem to be clear-cut cases of technological unemployment, see David F. Noble, Forces of Production: a 
Social History of Industrial Automation, 1st ed. (New York: Knopf, 1984). 
26 Norman Polmar, The Ships and Aircraft of the U. S. fleet, 11th ed. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 
1978), 17-46.  Nuclear ships required from 50% to 300% more officers than diesels.  For an illustration, 
consider the diesel class of  BARBEL.  The entire class of three ships commissioned in 1959 the same year 
as the first SSBN was commissioned.   This modern diesel submarine had a crew of 8 officers.  In contrast, 
the SSBNs of the same year had complements ranging from 24 officers (George Washington Class, 
combined blue and gold crews) and 34 officers (Lafayette Class, blue and gold crews). The nuclear attack 
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There was something in the very mindset and tradition of diesel officers that 
Rickover found objectionable, so objectionable that an officer’s experience in command 
was seen not as a benefit but as a detriment.  As one observer noted, "The argument that 
these men (submariners) had spent years in command had no appeal to him (Rickover), 
for these officers often represented an older tradition that had to be broken..." 27   But the 
observer is unclear of exactly what tradition had to be broken.  Hewlett and Duncan 
suggested that what Rickover found objectionable was the propensity of diesel officers to 
recklessness and a certain “flamboyance.”  Hewlett writes that nuclear power, in contrast 
to diesel “flamboyance”, demanded “…caution and self-discipline…”28   This 
explanation is asserted rather than argued and appears again to be inadequate to explain 
Rickover's actions.  The traditional submarine officers to whom Hewlett refers were in 
fact highly disciplined as evidenced by success in war: they had fought across the open 
expanse of the Pacific Ocean, developed innovative new tactics of under-sea warfare, and 
the survivors returned home safely in face of determined enemy attacks.  This type of 
war-winning professionalism is not what most observers would describe as undisciplined 
or reckless behavior.  It seems reasonable to assume that most diesel officers would not 
recklessly operate a nuclear reactor any more than these officers would have been 
reckless with torpedoes or ballast tanks.    
To Rickover, the priorities of the diesel submariners were wrong.  Given 
Rickover's ideology of technical elitism, technical expertise must displace tactical and 
                                                                                                                                                 
submarines had complements approximately 50% larger than the diesels, for example, the STURGEON 
and PERMIT class had 12 officers each.  While some diesel officers could serve in non-nuclear positions 
aboard the nuclear submarine, they could not progress to command without nuclear training.   
27 Francis Duncan, Rickover and the Nuclear Navy: The Discipline of Technology (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 1990), 86.   
28 Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Nuclear Navy, 1946-1962 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1974),  345. 
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operational knowledge as the most important priority of the ‘line’ officer.29  The 
underlying reason for Rickover's attack on the traditional officers was that their diesel 
culture represented a different philosophy of command, with a different ordering of 
priorities: operations and tactics were valued above technical expertise.  The war, as 
discussed in chapter three, had transformed the submarine commander to a more tactical 
orientation than that of the pre-war period.  Several scholars and veterans of the 
submarine force had noted the shaping and winnowing effects of the war, and of a bias 
imparted by the war that prioritized the tactical over the technical.30    The war-tested 
diesel submariners brought with them a tactician and operator view of command.  In 
contrast, Rickover’s technical-expert officer model was inspired not by combat 
experience, but by his ideology of technical elitism.   From his formative years in 
graduate school, Rickover had come to believe that technology drove history and that 
man must be conformed to technology.  To conform required the leader to master the 
minute details of technology.  To be able to master the minute, the technical leaders must 
be scientifically and technically trained and must specialize.31  Tactics and non-technical 
factors may have been supremely important in an earlier time, but the nuclear age was 
different.  Rickover was an apostle for the idea  that in the 20th century the  “ …hero is 
                                                 
29 Ronald H. Spector, At War, at Sea: Sailors and Naval Warfare in the Twentieth Century (New York, 
N.Y.: Viking, 2001).  I credit Spector with first introducing me to the idea that Rickover had engineered an 
inversion of the line/staff priorities which had been at issue since 1899.  I read Spector’s book while in 
command of my ship in 2002.  See Spector, page 335 for a discussion of Rickover’s ‘inversion’, which is 
also discussed in Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Nuclear Navy, 1946-1962 (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1974),  343. 
30 W.J. Holmes, Undersea Victory: The Influence of Submarine Operations in the War in the Pacific 
(Garden City, NY: Double Day and Company, 1966); Paul R. Captain Schratz, USN, Submarine 
Commander: A Story of World War II and Korea (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 
1988).    
31 This summary is a compilation from Rickover’s own writings, his policy statements on nuclear training, 
the texts by Hewlett and Duncan, from interviews with numerous nuclear officers, and from my own 
familiarity with the naval nuclear power program over a two decade period.  
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the engineer or scientist who does valiant deeds that will benefit the  country..."32  The 
valiant deed to which Rickover aspired was to create a nuclear fleet, manned by 
engineering experts, not aggressive tacticians.  An officer who focused more on tactics 
and operations was suspected to be lacking in devotion to scientific education and to the 
mastery of the engine. The bulk of the diesel submarine officer group in the post-WWII 
period was by such standards ill-suited to Rickover’s purposes; their professional 
development and their sense of priorities represented the past, a tactical culture of combat 
of the Second World War.33   
VADM James Calvert, a decorated diesel boat officer and one of the first nuclear 
commanders, corroborated the idea that a differing philosophy of officer models underlay 
the dispute between Rickover and the traditional submarine community.  Calvert 
observed that tactics and operations, not engineering, occupied a favored place among 
those who rose to command in the traditional submarine community.  Calvert noted that 
most of his submarine school classmates who rose to command in the post-WWII period 
were more tactically and operationally oriented than they were engineers.34  Calvert’s 
observation that engineering was not the path to command is further supported by the 
policy and career recommendations found in the Navy’s Manual of Officer Qualifications 
of 1958, an authoritative document for career management of submarine, surface and 
                                                 
32 Rickover, as quoted in Norman Polmar and Thomas B. Allen, Rickover (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1982), 588. 
33 Carl Lavo, Slade Cutter: Submarine Warrior (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2003).  The combat 
achievements of the Second World War officers were indeed impressive.  See Lavo, 194, for statistics of 
WWII diesel effectiveness.  They accounted for 55% of all Japanese vessels sunk including eight aircraft 
carriers.  All this was accomplished by diesel officers who made up 1.6% of navy and who sustained the 
highest casualties in the Navy (a 22% loss rate, 3500 of 1600 submarine personnel).  An officer that was 
considered by some to be an opponent of Rickover, Slade Cutter, had twenty three ‘kills’ to his credit, 
second only to a Medal of Honor winner, Dick O'Kane, who had twenty four. 
34 James F. Calvert, VADM USN (retired), Interview with the Author, 21 November 2007. 
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aviator ship captains.  In this manual, engineering experience was altogether absent from 
the list of important qualifications that defined the officer in command.35    
Rickover's low regard for tactical acumen may have derived from the changing 
role of submarines.  With POLARIS, an increasing share of the submarine fleet was 
strategic and not tactical, a change that may have convinced Rickover an inversion in the 
old command priorities (the tactical versus the technical) was tolerable.  But among those 
who knew Rickover, Rickover's relatively low regard for tactical and operational training 
pre-dated the deployment of a large fleet of strategic missile submarines.  According to 
one submariner who later rose to the highest rank of the service, Rickover was committed 
to the idea of the naval 'line' officer as engineer and would have been pleased if all the 
'line' had become engineers! 36    
To Rickover, it was simply unacceptable to allow a non-engineer qualified officer 
to command his engineers and relegate the technical experts to the engine room. The 
Royal Navy had such a system wherein technical specialists were subordinate to the 
operators, and Rickover was highly critical of this policy.37   To Rickover, the more 
                                                 
35 Bureau of Personnel,"Manual of Qualifications for Officers of the Line of the US Navy, 1100/1310, May 
1958", NARA RG 24-470-54-26-5 Box 30.  The Commanding Officer’s requisite  “Knowledge and 
Abilities”, as described in the manual, was very clear in its tactical bias: “Knowledge of ship’s tactical 
doctrine and characteristics; seamanship, rules of the road; communication procedures; tactical and 
administrative publications such as BuPers Manual, General Signal Book, Naval Warfare Publications, type 
regulations, ships organization book, and various other general and type tactical publications.  Skill in 
maneuvering ship; seamanship, navigation, and piloting; and coordinating activities of all departments for 
efficient functioning of the ship.” 
36 The tactical requirements of the ballistic missile submarine were decidedly less demanding than those of 
the attack submarine. Some submarine officers interviewed believed Rickover was indifferent to tactical 
training altogether and would have been quite content if all naval officers were trained as engineers. C.A.H. 
Trost, ADM USN, Interview with the Author, 3 November 2007, 18 December 2007.    
37 James F. Calvert, VADM USN (retired), Interview with the Author, 21 November 2007.  Calvert 
recollected that Rickover made references to the British tendency to look down upon engineering and that 
engineers in the Royal Navy were a lower caste when compared to the bridge officer. Rickover also 
expressed his concern of a slow decline in the status of engineers in the US Navy and believed there was a 
bias against engineers rising to command. Rickover related to Calvert his concern that if he did not take 
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technically specialized and expert officer should run the reactors, command the ships, and 
ultimately command the navy.  Tactical acumen and bravery in war were to Rickover 
secondary, and thus by his new metric the many veteran “…bold and skillful 
operators…” of the old submarine officers were found wanting and were in large 
numbers discarded.38  Rickover's plan to eliminate the mass of diesel officers and 
promote a new officer model was not, however, openly manifest for several years.  
In the early years of the program, Rickover compromised.  He cooperated with 
others holding different views of the officer corps, and he permitted his first generation of 
nuclear officers to conform to the integrative requirements of the King model. The first 
generation of nuclear officers, as discussed in chapter four, served on surface ships, 
commanded surface ships, and attended war colleges.  But in those early years Rickover's 
program was a tiny segment of the Navy, and Rickover was junior in rank.   As Rickover 
took more reactors “critical”, promoted in rank and cultivated more supporters in 
Congress, his willingness to compromise declined.  By the beginning of the 1960s, he 
had attained the stature of a national technological leader and gained with this heightened 
stature the power to challenge the Navy’s conception of the officer corps. 39   Rickover 
                                                                                                                                                 
action, the USN would trend more to a UK model of non-engineers in command.   On a more personal 
note, Rickover apparently pointed out to Calvert that one of Calvert’s major failings was his lack of an 
engineering tour and qualification.  For similar recollections of Rickover’s concern over the status of 
engineering, see James L. Holloway, III,  ADM USN (CNO), Aircraft Carriers at War:  A Personal 
Retrospective of Korea, Vietnam, and the Soviet Confrontation (Annapolis: US Naval Institute 2006). 
38 Francis Duncan, Rickover and the Nuclear Navy: The Discipline of Technology (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 1990), 84. 
39 In the course of eighteen months in the late 1950s, Rickover launched the first SSBN, produced 
commercial power from Shippingport reactor, published a nationally acclaimed work on education, and 
was promoted to vice admiral.  He was now empowered to extend his influence beyond naval reactors and 
to the larger navy. He was so well known that even Mad Magazine carried cartoons about him and his 
nuclear machines!  See "Hymie Rickover and his Atomic Submarines," Mad Magazine, no. 7, July 1959, 6. 
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became more outspoken and blunt; his goals for the future became clearer and focused, 
broadcast through his public testimonies and his books. 40    
To expand and sustain his fleet of reactors, Rickover believed he required a 
technocracy to lead and manage them.  Rickover’s personnel policies of recruitment, 
training, assignment and selection supported his philosophical goals and produced a 
growing number of technical leaders for the Navy.  Perhaps not coincidently, Rickover at 
one time produced 60% of all nuclear engineers in the United States, the cadre of nuclear 
engineers who he hoped could help solve the global energy problems he wrote about a 
generation before.41  The reactors carried aboard nuclear ships became incubators for the 
technical experts and specialists that would, in large numbers, diffuse through the 
hierarchy of the Navy and Defense Department and into government and civilian 
industry.42   
To create technical experts and specialists, Rickover believed he needed large 
numbers of men adept at scientific engineering.  Rickover searched for and promoted 
those officers who conformed to his conception of the scientific engineer, those 
distinguished by “scholastic aptitude” and “intelligence” whose professional 
                                                 
40 Hyman G. Rickover, Education and Freedom (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1959).  Through the publication 
of his nationally acclaimed books, he became a recognized expert on education. 
41Rickover would later boast in testimony before the Joint Commission on Atomic Energy (JCAE) in 1975 
that his people constituted the majority of civilian American nuclear technicians. In his JCAE testimony he 
explained:   "These people are very valuable to industry...civilian companies are constantly advertising to 
get them.  I would estimate that 60% of all the people who operate commercial atomic power plants today 
got their training in the navy.  It is a fact that 2/3 of all young officers who left the (nuclear) navy in the 
past 2.5 years have gone to work in the commercial nuclear field." See Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 
Testimony of ADM Hyman G. Rickover USN on the Value of Nuclear Trained Naval Personnel to 
Industry, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., 5 March 1975, 24. 
42 Rickover’s program would indeed create the world’s leading nuclear executives who went on to lead the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Admirals Zech and Carr) and Department of Energy (Admiral Watkins), 
as well as the leadership of countless power utilities and nuclear power plants. See Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission website for biographies of senior civilian leaders. 
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advancement was “...evidenced by his work and study habits.”43  But the imposition of 
scientific academic criterion for officer selection cannot adequately explain why 
Rickover rejected such a high percentage of diesel officers.  There were in reality a 
multitude of diesel officers who were re-trainable, and who had the academic credentials 
to do scientific work.  The Bureau Chief, VADM Smedberg, supported Rickover’s 
scholastic standards of selection and screened a large pool of mid-grade officers who had 
the academic ability to complete the technical schools. Yet, when presented the 
candidates, Rickover would take only a small fraction of these officers.44   As a 
consequence of these many rejections, there soon emerged a pattern of persistent shortage 
among nuclear trained officers.  Confronted with a persistent shortage condition, nuclear 
officers were required to remain in nuclear assignments for long periods, and when they 
did transfer, they went typically to another nuclear billet.  There existed little time or 
flexibility to broaden their assignments or their education.45   In conditions of shortage, 
the 'line' officers who served on nuclear submarines began to look increasingly like a 
group of specialists.  
                                                 
43 Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Statement by VADM H.G. Rickover,USN, during Joint Committee 
Tour of USS ENTERPRISE (CVN-65), 87th  Cong., 2nd sess., 31 March 1962, 46.  Rickover provides a 
detailed description of the criteria by which he judged the diesel officers. These were described as: 
scholastic aptitude, experience in engineering, intelligence, and “…the willingness of the officer to 
undertake the difficult training program for nuclear propulsion assignment and his interest in professional 
advancement as evidenced by his work and study habits.”  When placed in the context of the testimony, his 
reference to ‘work’ appears to be associated with ‘engineering’, and the reference to study habits appears to 
be associated with grades in scientific and engineering curriculum.  Hence, Rickover reveals that he was 
seeking a scientific engineer very much like that he had become at Columbia University a generation 
before.  
44 Court of Inquiry: Loss of the USS THRESHER (SSN-593), Testimony of 21 May 1963, VADM Bernard 
L. Austin, USN, Presiding", Office of the Judge Advocate General, National Security Litigation and 
Intelligence Law Division, Washington, D.C., 1607.  VADM Smedberg acknowledged the need for high 
academic standards, and explained that officers were screened carefully on the basis of their scholastic 
record.  However, despite this careful screening of officers they were nonetheless rejected at a high rate.  
45 Dan A. Summitt, Tales of a Cold War Submariner (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2004), 194.  
Summitt discusses the acute shortage of officers, but observes that Rickover steadfastly refused to expand 
the number of officers.  
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The shortage of men and subsequent tendency toward officer specialization was 
not accidental. The shortage was in fact another tool purposely created by Rickover to 
break the old culture46  and force upon the new nuclear officers an identity of technical 
specialization.  Conditions of shortage necessitated that the new officers become 
narrowly focused.  The policy of purposeful shortage would then be followed by an 
infusion of surface and aviator officers into the submarine navy that would dilute the 
"...older tradition that had to be broken."47  (The infusion of surface and aviator officers 
will be discussed later in this chapter) 
The rejection of large numbers of diesel officers created a shortage condition and 
thereby forced officers to become technical experts in nuclear engineering.  But if an 
officer was to be a technical expert, he could no longer be a 'generalist' or integrative 
officer.  Such an outcome was entirely consistent with Rickover's values and beliefs 
about technology and leadership.  Rickover’s technocratic philosophy rejected the idea 
that a modern leader could any longer be the generally educated 'line' officer.  He held a 
low opinion of the ‘generalist’ and of the King system of progressive education and 
assignment that produced the “…all around officer that can be shifted from post to post 
and do a routine job well.” 48  Rickover believed attempts to spread one’s time across 
tactics, operations, and technologies were bound to produce mediocrity.49  Rickover 
                                                 
46 William Wegner, (Deputy Naval Reactors Manager, 1963-1979), Interview with the Author, 17 July 
2007. Wegner explained that Rickover fought a difficult bureaucratic and budget battles with the diesel 
leadership,  and that severely limiting the number of diesel officers that could continue on to command was 
a means by which to undermine the diesel community.  
47 Duncan, 1990, pg. 86.  
48 Clay Blair, The Atomic Submarine and Admiral Rickover, [1st ed. (New York,: H. Holt, 1954) , 211. 
49  Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Nuclear Navy, 1946-1962 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1974), 345; Francis Duncan, Rickover and the Nuclear Navy: The Discipline of Technology 
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1990), 86;  Francis Duncan, Rickover: the Struggle for Excellence 
(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 193.      
281 
acted on these convictions and used his officer selection interviews to measure the 
potential of an officer to embrace specialized knowledge, to focus several years of time 
and attention on the mastery of the technical details of an engineering field.50 
                                                
RADM Beshany, the first deputy CNO for Submarine Warfare, was one of the 
senior diesel officers who pinpointed the demise of the diesel officer as rooted in a 
conflict of philosophies: technical expertise and specialization versus what he called the 
“operational philosophy”, which was less technically specialized.51   Captain Edward 
Beach also observed: "To be an acceptable engineer, the acme of human aspiration in 
Rickover's view, is to be very one-sided”.52  The diesel officers were products of the old 
King system that placed primacy on the operations and also encouraged a breadth of 
experience. Not only did the diesel officers devote themselves to anti-submarine and anti-
surface tactical innovation, but also many had served on surface ships at various steps in 
their career. The traditional submarine officers were not only tactical and operational-
minded; they were also integrative in their outlook.  To advance his alternative model-- 
the technical expert in command-- Rickover had to eliminate rival officer models.  Once 
Rickover’s transformational strategy became clear, the diesel officers resisted and 
precipitated a battle that engulfed the highest levels of leadership in the Navy.   
When scholars describe opponents to Rickover’s personnel policies, the opposing 
force is sometimes represented as isolated, fighting a Luddite battle to preserve jobs made 
redundant by the "discipline of technology”.  Rickover’s biographers sometimes leave the 
 
50 Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Statement by VADM H.G. Rickover,USN, during Joint Committee 
Tour of USS ENTERPRISE (CVN-65), 87th  Cong., 2nd sess., 31 March 1962, 46. 
51Philip A. Beshany, VADM USN, Reminiscences of Philip A. Beshany (Annapolis: US Naval Institute, 
1983), 532-533.   
52 Edward Latimer Beach, Captain USN (retired), "Life Under Rickover: Stormy Duty in the Silent 
Service," Washington Post, 27 May 1977, D-1.  
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impression that most of the ‘modern’, non-diesel Navy stood by silently, perhaps in tacit 
support of Rickover’s policy of mass redundancy.53   In fact, many non-submarine 
officers opposed Rickover’s diesel officer policy, including the highest leadership of the 
Navy:  the Chief of the Bureau of Personnel, VADM Smedberg, a surface officer, and the 
CNO, Admiral Anderson, an aviator.  These senior leaders recognized the diesel and 
nuclear officer personnel issues as among the most important facing the Navy in the early 
1960s.  They believed that if they could regain control of nuclear officer selection policy 
from Rickover, his threat to the Navy would be much reduced and might precipitate 
Rickover's retirement.  But by joining the battle on behalf of diesel officers, the navy 
leaders pitted their philosophy of the officer corps against that of Rickover’s.  By 
accepting battle for the diesel officers as the test of the philosophies, they raised the 
stakes: if the political leadership sided with Rickover, then Rickover’s model could be 
interpreted as the ascendant model of command, an outcome pregnant with profound and 
perhaps generational implications for the entire navy.  
* 
The THRESHER Disaster and its Immediate Political Effects  
 
 
By 1961 senior navy leaders had realized that Rickover might not retire the next 
year as planned. 54  Senior officers further concluded that Rickover’s selection procedures 
                                                 
53 Duncan and Hewlett concentrate most on the role of Commander Submarines Atlantic, a diesel officer. 
They give only passing reference to non-submarine officer interventions, in particular, VADM Smedberg, 
Chief of Naval Personnel.  They minimize or make no mention of the CNO and Secretary of the Navy 
efforts to limit Rickover’s authority over the officer corps development.   It is clear that Duncan and 
Hewlett had paid too little attention to this dispute. In interviews with Jack Crawford, Deputy to Rickover 
until 1963, and William Wegner, deputy to Rickover from 1963-1979, and James Holloway, the disputes 
over personnel were in the early 1960s issues of the highest import for navy leaders.    
54 Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Statement by VADM H.G. Rickover,USN, during Joint Committee 
Tour of USS ENTERPRISE (CVN-65), 87th  Cong., 2nd sess., 31 March 1962, 44.  See also Francis 
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and rigorous training schools might be purposely constructed, not to weed out poor 
performers, but to winnow out the bulk of the diesel force in accordance with a new 
model of officer.55   If Rickover did not retire soon, his personnel policies would remain 
in effect long enough to eliminate the bulk of the diesel officers and along with them an 
important subculture of command.  Furthermore, the issue had by the early 1960s grown 
beyond the diesel officers to include the larger fleet. With the proliferation of nuclear 
surface ships, there existed the real possibility that the entire fleet could go nuclear, 
which would then be commanded by officers selected by Rickover.56  Rickover’s public 
statements that “…‘verbal’ men are on the way out …” 57 could be interpreted to threaten 
not just the diesel force but perhaps the entire ‘line’.   
In contrast to Rickover's technocratic belief in the deterministic qualities of 
advanced technology, Admiral Anderson, the CNO, articulated a decidedly less technical 
vision of the Navy of the future.  Anderson called for an officer corps with the ability to 
fight not only the higher technology wars with "push button" machines, but also the 
lower level conflicts of guerrilla warfare and small local wars.  Anderson made "limited 
wars" his first and strongest point: “The first point is that a strong capability to wage 
limited war, particularly non-nuclear war, is now and I believe will continue to be 
mandatory …”  He went on and argued for the necessity of officers with a tactical, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Duncan, Rickover and the Nuclear Navy: The Discipline of Technology (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 
1990), 233. 
55 Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Nuclear Navy, 1946-1962 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1974) , 353.   Also, as recounted by William Wegner, (Deputy Naval Reactors Manager, 1963-1979), 
Interview with the Author, 17 July 2007. 
56 USS ENTERPRISE conducted sea trials in October 1961.  LONG BEACH was already operational and 
BAINBRIDGE not far behind.   See Duncan, Hewlett, and Rockwell for details on the technical and 
programmatic challenges of the surface program. 
57 Hyman G. Rickover, Education and Freedom (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1959), 19. 
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operational, and less technical background.58  But Rickover’s growing power threatened 
this broader type of officer.  The elimination of the bulk of diesel officers could be seen 
as the proverbial ‘canary in the mineshaft’, the harbinger of things to come.  The Navy’s 
top leadership met quietly and discussed ways to limit Rickover’s power before Rickover 
became too powerful to challenge.59   
Navy leaders faced a daunting task if they were to modify the nuclear personnel 
system and preserve the culture and model of command represented by the diesel 
officers.  Rickover’s policies were becoming well established.  Rickover’s mechanisms 
for transformation, as discussed in the previous chapter, were fourfold:  highly selective 
personal interview (selection), demanding engineering schools (training), longer nuclear 
tours for those who became nukes (assignment), and perhaps most importantly, a changed 
undergraduate educational program (to be discussed in the next chapter).  The selective 
interview blocked most diesel officers from transitioning to nuclear power and was the 
mechanism senior leaders found most objectionable. 60   Officers who did manage to gain 
selection to the program then confronted high attrition (25%) in a school system testing at 
                                                 
58 George W. Jr. Anderson, ADM, USN, "The US Navy in 1973," Shipmate, no. 4, April 1963, 2. 
59 By the late 1950s and early 1960s, numerous senior flag officers, apparently in flag officer conferences, 
were openly discussing their concern about the long term effects of Rickover's influence, and were 
grappling with a means to limit his authority.  See Ralph Kirk James, RADM USN (ret), Reminiscences of 
RADM Ralph K. James, USN (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute, 1972), 291.  James recalled that officers 
expressed concern that Rickover might "...infiltrate himself into the personnel and training aspect of it to 
the exclusion of those people in the Navy Dept who felt that was their prerogative." Also, David Alan 
Rosenberg, Interview with the Author, 15 June 2007, recalled that Admiral Burke, CNO from 1955-61, 
confessed that one of his regrets was that he did not do more to limit Rickover’s power earlier in his tenure.   
60 Court of Inquiry: Loss of the USS THRESHER (SSN-593), Testimony of 21 May 1963, VADM Bernard 
L. Austin, USN, Presiding", Office of the Judge Advocate General, National Security Litigation and 
Intelligence Law Division, Washington, D.C., 1608.  Smedberg voiced complete agreement with 
Rickover’s requirement that officers must have an "adequate educational background to absorb nuclear 
training."  But Smedberg had difficulty understanding Rickover's rationale for the rejecting so many diesel 
officers. He challenged this high rejection rate.  Rickover replied that he sought in the interview those 
officers capable of an "...instant response, an officer with great mental alertness…” Smedberg agreed with 
the criterion, but Smedberg still complained that “…his methods by which he arrives at his conclusions are 
not entirely known to me."   
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graduate level standards of scientific-engineering.61  Rickover developed an additional 
tool with which to remake the submarine force and dilute the diesel influence.  In 1960-
61 Rickover created a new source of officers untainted by fleet influences: he broke a 50 
year peace-time tradition and began to access future submarine officers not from the fleet 
but directly from Annapolis.  This source of officers was so important to Rickover that in 
little over two years the inexperienced officers who came direct from Annapolis would 
make up 30% of the nuclear submarine force.62  Shortfalls remained, however, especially 
at the more senior levels, and thus to forestall the need to recruit additional fleet officers, 
those officers already nuclear qualified were required to serve extraordinarily long tours 
of command, some up to six years.63   
Admiral Anderson together with Smedberg began a series of interventions to limit 
Rickover’s officer selection authority. The key to saving the traditional submarine culture 
was to allow larger numbers of diesel-trained officers to transition into the nuclear 
program.64  One of the more forceful interventions came in 1962 when the CNO, the  
                                                 
61 Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Statement by VADM H.G. Rickover,USN, during Joint Committee 
Tour of USS ENTERPRISE (CVN-65), 87th  Cong., 2nd sess., 31 March 1962, 45-47.  The nuclear schools 
were touted to work at the graduate level in math, science, physics, chemistry, metallurgy, and reactor 
engineering, and resulted in a relatively high attrition, 25%.   
62 H.G. Rickover, VADM, USN,"Joint Commission Tour of USS ENTERPRISE", US Congress.  Joint 
Commission on Atomic Energy, 87th, 2nd Session (31 March 1962),  46. 
63 Raymond Peet, VADM USN, Interview with the Author, 12 July 2007.  Peet served five years on 
BAINBRIDGE.  See also  W.R. Smedberg, III, VADM USN (ret), Reminiscences of William R. Smedberg 
III, VADM, USN (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1979).   Smedberg noted that many nuclear 
officers served six consecutive years as commanding officers, though such service may have been on 
different crews of boats.  See Smedberg, 717-718. 
64  Francis Duncan, Rickover and the Nuclear Navy: The Discipline of Technology (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 1990), 326, note 91.  Duncan devotes little more than a paragraph to this policy dispute, and 
leaves the impression it was little more than a series of memo exchanges between BUPERS and Rickover 
from December 1961 through 1962.  (The memos are held at Naval Reactors and were inexplicably 
classified and were not made available for any outside review).  The several memos did not persuade 
Rickover to change and the dispute continued. SECNAV eventually called a ‘summit’ between Rickover, 
CNO, and Smedberg in 1962, referenced by Smedberg in THRESHER hearings. See Court of Inquiry: Loss 
of the USS THRESHER (SSN-593), Testimony of 21 May 1963, VADM Bernard L. Austin, USN, 
Presiding", Office of the Judge Advocate General, National Security Litigation and Intelligence Law 
Division, Washington, D.C., 1608.  
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Submarine Force Commander,  and the Chief of Personnel examined Rickover’s manning 
requirements and ordered him to accept  “… 117 senior officers in the LCDR-CDR 
bracket from the conventional submarines to be trained in the nuclear program.”  In the 
end, Rickover resisted and took only fifteen.65     Rickover was nevertheless pressed hard 
by their efforts and complained to Congress that he was “…being constantly harassed 
with attempts to reduce training, to use people we don’t think are qualified, or put people 
into the program for short periods of time …to help their chances of promotion.” 66  
Rickover’s passing reference to promotion was disingenuous.  More was at stake than 
just improving chances for promotion of a handful of officers.  In the military culture of 
‘up or out’, promotion equated to professional survival.  And more importantly to the 
discussion here, promotion was the critical step leading to the formation of the group that 
would rise to senior command, to flag rank.  What was at stake was no less than the 
future of the Navy’s commanding elites.  The number of nuclear crews would soon 
overtake diesel boat crews.  Without the opportunity to transition to the nuclear boats, the 
diesel officers would be without commands, and their profession would have been 
wrestled from them.  (See Figure 5-2)  
Rickover was not one to stay on the defensive and realized that to preserve his 
emerging model of technically expert commander, he had to discredit the alternative, the 
versatile, well-rounded officer of the King model.  Rickover became increasingly vocal in 
his criticisms of the old model of versatility, a model he disparaged as designed “…to 
                                                 
65 Court of Inquiry: Loss of the USS THRESHER (SSN-593), Testimony of 21 May 1963, VADM Bernard 
L. Austin, USN, Presiding", Office of the Judge Advocate General, National Security Litigation and 
Intelligence Law Division, Washington, D.C., Smedberg testimony, 1607. 
66 Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Statement by VADM H.G. Rickover,USN, during Joint Committee 
Tour of USS ENTERPRISE (CVN-65), 87th  Cong., 2nd sess., 31 March 1962, 40. 
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train every officer to be the Chief of Naval Operations.” 67    In addition, after CNO 
Anderson’s attacks on the nuclear system of command selection, Rickover called upon 
his technical and political allies to sustain his methods of officer selection. 
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On at least one occasion, Glen Seaborg at the Atomic Energy Commission used 
his technical expertise and political credentials to publicly support Rickover’s method of 
officer development when it came under criticism by the 'line'. 68   Congressional leaders 
                                                 
67 Ibid., 40.   
68 George Anderson, ADM, USN,"Personal Papers", NHC Operational Archives, Collection 439, ADM 
G.W. Anderson, Jr., Boxes 40, 43, 51-53  X File, Aug 1961-Dec 1962.  A summary of a staff officer 
reported to the CNO that Rep Chet Holifield, JCAE, exchanged letters with Dr. Seaborg of AEC.  Both 
strongly endorsed a policy whereby AEC (Naval Reactors) assisted in the selection and training of nuclear 
officers, and expressed the opinion that there could be no relaxation of this practice.   Interestingly, a staff 
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went on record and called for the continuation of the unique system of officer selection 
and assignment, especially the long tours that reduced the number of billets open to 
aspiring diesel officers. 69  In the face of congressional pressure, the new Secretary of the 
Navy Korth sided with Rickover.70   To dislodge Rickover’s policies, the 'line' needed 
some event that could trump Rickover's political allies or persuade them to switch sides 
in the debate.   Such an event presented itself when 129 men were lost at sea aboard a 
nuclear powered submarine. 
The nuclear power program experienced its first tragedy when the USS 
THRESHER on 10 April 1963 sank off the coast of New England.   The submarine had 
just completed a shipyard repair period and was conducting routine testing when it failed 
to surface.  Following an extensive search by submarine, surface, and aviation units of 
the Atlantic Fleet, it was determined that the submarine had sunk, taking with her all 
hands.  The incident captured the attention of the world.  Congress prepared to hold 
hearings after the Navy had completed its formal inquiry of the sinking.  The Navy 
convened a Court of Inquiry under Vice Admiral Bernard L. Austin, a submarine officer.   
Rickover’s personnel policies came under close scrutiny. This event provided an 
                                                                                                                                                 
note attached to this memo indicates that McNamera had sent his own  memo to the Secretary of the Navy, 
Fred Korth, stating that the SECDEF supported the Navy 'line' in its dispute with Rickover.  It appears that  
Korth had intercepted the memo and thereby deprived CNO Anderson knowledge of high level support that 
might have tipped the balance against Rickover.  
 
69 Chet Holifield,"Tour of the USS ENTERPRISE and Report on the Joint AEC-Naval Reactor Program", 
JCAE, 87th Congress,  31 March 1962, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.  Holified writes of 
the assignment of nuclear officers: "Continued cooperation between the Atomic Energy Commission and 
the Navy is required to insure these individuals remain in their assignments for long periods to utilize their 
knowledge and experience to the fullest extent."    
70 George W. Jr. Anderson, ADM, USN,"Office Notes on Nuclear Officer Selection/Training Policies dtd 
March 16, 1962", NHC Operational Archives, Collection 439, ADM G.W. Anderson, Jr., Box 52,  X File, 
Aug 1961-Dec 1962 
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opportunity for Rickover’s opponents to undermine his authority, or to effect his removal 
altogether.  
By 1963 the nuclear submarine yards were producing a steady stream of new 
ships, a pace of construction that placed enormous strain on an already short-handed 
group of nuclear officers.  Such was the pace of production that, for the first time since 
the Second World War, shipyards commissioned two submarines on a single day.  At the 
same time more ships were joining the fleet, none would retire for several years, and thus 
the inventory of nuclear ships in the fleet grew rapidly. The number of SSBNs increased 
from one hull in early 1960 to forty-one a few years later.71  To maintain the production 
schedules under conditions of severe officer shortages, experienced officers were moved 
quickly and sometimes en masse to new ships still under construction.  This was the case 
with THRESHER: both the CO and XO transferred from THRESHER to new submarines 
under construction just prior to the sinking.  Their transfer left THRESHER with only 
three officers qualified on the reactor.72  Thus, the sinking offered an opportunity for 
Rickover’s opponents to criticize his policies that had created the officer shortfalls.   
   Sensing opportunity in THRESHER’s loss, the CNO attacked Rickover's 
officer policies in a meeting with the Secretary of the Navy on 27 April 1963.  Anderson, 
Smedberg, Rickover and his deputy, Captain John Crawford, were present for the battle 
of philosophies.73  In a heated exchange, Admiral Anderson, an aviator, argued that 
                                                 
71 See early editions of  Jane’s Fighting Ships as perhaps the best reflection of the rapidly changing 
composition of the fleet, one that began to filter over to foreign navies as well.  
72 Francis Duncan, Rickover and the Nuclear Navy: The Discipline of Technology (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 1990) , 75. 
73 John W. Crawford, Jr., (Deputy Manager of the Naval Reactors Program), Interview with the Author 11 
July 2007.   Crawford explained that the personnel  dispute was essentially a clash over visions of the 
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Rickover’s selection and assignment policies were unfair to the mass of traditional 
submarine officers and detrimental to the future of the officer corps and the fleet.  
Anderson wanted the Secretary to order Rickover to accept substantially more diesel-
trained officers to be re-trained on the new, nuclear technology.  As many times before, 
Rickover used the unique status of nuclear reactors (they belonged to two organizations, 
the AEC and the Navy) to deflect challenges to his authority.  Rickover played the 
technical “safety” card (the AEC card) which swayed the Secretary of the Navy to take 
no immediate action.  Korth would await the outcome of the board of inquiry and the 
Congressional hearings.74  By raising the possibility that he might lose control of a 
dangerous technology, Rickover had won the first round in a battle over competing 
models of command.75    
As long as the Austin court remained in session, the Navy ‘line’ still hoped to 
compel Rickover to change his officer policies and to accept more diesel officers into his 
program.  The Court provided the 'line' an opportunity to attack Rickover's personnel 
policies.  It was thus not accidental that the court called VADM William Smedberg, the 
Chief of Personnel, and questioned him about nuclear personnel policies.  The 
questioners offered Smedberg the stage he wanted: they asked Smedberg why 
                                                                                                                                                 
officer corps: who would shape the most important new contingent of the officer corps, submarine, surface, 
and aviation.   
74 George Anderson, ADM, USN,"Personal Papers", NHC Operational Archives, Collection 439, ADM 
G.W. Anderson, Jr., Boxes 40, 43, 51-53,  "Summit on Nuclear Personnel: 27 April 1963".  The meeting on 
27 April 1963, just days after the loss of THRESHER, was described as a heated discussion concerning  the 
future of the diesel officers. 
75To be sure, safety was a core issue for Rickover. He saw reactor safety as perhaps his greatest duty, one 
he likened to a fatherly responsibility.  See Thomas R. Weschler, VADM USN, The Reminiscences of 
VADM Thomas R. Weschler, US Navy (Ret), 2 vols. (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute, 1995), 315.  
Weschler recounts Rickover used fatherly analogies when he talked about his responsibilities for reactor 
safety.  In the late 1955, Rickover  drove the then  LCDR Weschler to the Pittsburgh airport from 
Shippingport, and in the course of  conversation Rickover described his responsibility and philosophy: 
"Really, I have a very simple rule.  I say to myself: 'I have a son. I love my son. I want everything that I do 
to be so safe that I would be happy to have my son operating it.' That's my fundamental rule."   
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THRESHER’s captain and executive officer had transferred almost simultaneously in the 
months immediately preceding the sinking.76  Smedberg responded that the transfers 
were necessary because nuclear officers were in critically short supply.  But despite the 
severe shortages, Smedberg volunteered, Rickover had been unwilling to make up the 
shortfalls with more diesel officers.  Smedberg explained that seven hundred addition
diesel officers at the rank of lieutenant desired to transition to the nuclear program and 
that the Bureau had recommended three hundred as academically suitable for the 
program.  Rickover, however, took few if any of these officers.  The result was, in 





                                                
VADM Smedberg went further and implied that Rickover’s personnel policies 
may be hazarding ships.  He argued that Rickover’s excessive selectivity created officer 
shortages that resulted in longer tours.  The cost of longer tours was the physical and 
mental exhaustion of SSBN senior officers. He told the board about one exhausted, long-
serving Polaris submarine captain who came into Smedberg's office and pleaded not to be 
sent to another submarine.78   Smedberg was challenged, however, by a Captain Osborn, 
a nuclear trained member of the board.  Osborn asked Smedberg to provide more details 
to support his assertion that the quality of diesel officers was sufficient for nuclear power. 
Upon hearing Smedberg’s answers, Osborn suggested that the shortfall in officers could 
not be solved by taking more diesel officers.  Osborn then offered a fatalistic summary of 
 
76Court of Inquiry: Loss of the USS THRESHER (SSN-593), Testimony of 21 May 1963, VADM Bernard 
L. Austin, USN, Presiding", Office of the Judge Advocate General, National Security Litigation and 
Intelligence Law Division, Washington, D.C., 1605-1606. 
77 Ibid., 1607, 1613. 
78 Ibid.,  1613, 1615.  W.R. Smedberg, III, VADM USN (ret), Reminiscences of William R. Smedberg III, 
VADM, USN (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1979), 717-718. 
292 
the nuclear officer shortage problem: “It looks like we are in a position that we can never 
get this problem solved until time settles it.” Smedberg challenged Osborn’s fatalistic 
assessment and argued that if the Navy waited to take action the command tours would 
increase to intolerable lengths, at a cost in personnel and morale.79 
Rickover had heard Smedberg's complaints before and would not concede that 
his policies were producing shortages or eroding morale and retention. He refused to 
admit in public that his policy of shortage may have contributed to the loss of 
THRESHER.  But Rickover's position on this issue was precarious.  Just two days before 
THRESHER sank, Rickover had refused to attend a CNO-level meeting concerning a 
severe, fleet-wide shortage of nuclear officers.  His refusal to attend was significant 
enough that Rickover's absence from the briefing was recorded in the CNO records of the 
day.80  But chance events apparently saved Rickover and his policy.  Due to shipyard 
delays in completing the maintenance work on the THRESHER, the transfer of several 
officers to shore had been delayed.  Thus, when the submarine sank, numerous ‘extra’ 
officers were still on board.  The unplanned presence of extra officers on the ship that 
April morning of 1963 ensured THRESHER sank as one of the most overmanned ships in 
                                                 
79 Court of Inquiry: Loss of the USS THRESHER (SSN-593), Testimony of 21 May 1963, VADM Bernard 
L. Austin, USN, Presiding", Office of the Judge Advocate General, National Security Litigation and 
Intelligence Law Division, Washington, D.C., 1613.  The proceedings were not without  some humor.  In 
reference to Rickover's practice of long nuclear assignments, Smedberg conceded that there were some 
officers who wouldn’t object to the continuous nuclear duty: “Now, there are people, perhaps like yourself, 
Captain Osborn, who could go on to command a submarine for ten, fifteen or twenty years without a break 
and without it affecting them, but there are others that this sole responsibility without a break for extended 
periods does affect."  Osborn replied to Smedberg:  “There’s lots of people, Admiral, that think I’ve  been 
pretty well affected already (by the long nuclear tours).”    
80 George Anderson, ADM, USN,"Personal Papers", NHC Operational Archives, Collection 439, ADM 
G.W. Anderson, Jr., Boxes 40, 43, 51-53.    Isaac Kidd, EA to the CNO, noted in the records of 8 April 
1963 that Rickover refused to receive the OPNAV brief on the situation of manpower shortfalls in the 
nuclear navy.   
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the submarine fleet!81  Though Smedberg could show the submarine fleet was critically 
under-manned, the THRESHER was not!  This unfortunate circumstance of work delays 
and officer transfers may have cost lives, but saved Rickover's personnel policy and 
possibly Rickover himself.  
When Rickover was called to testify, the court of naval officers asked Rickover 
few if any questions about personnel policy.  Rickover had emerged from the navy 
inquiry with his program and policies intact.82   Shortly thereafter, Congress convened its 
own hearings on THRESHER, which included a review of personnel practices.  In June 
1963, Rickover’s allies on the Hill reaffirmed their support for his personnel policies:  
“The committee reaffirms there should be no relaxation of existing procedures used in the 
selection, training, and assignment of nuclear propulsion personnel” 83     
Rickover had survived the ‘line’ officer attack and now shifted from defense to 
offense.  He argued to his congressional allies that a contributing cause of THRESHER's 
loss was not nuclear manning policies but the Navy’s old policy (the King system) of 
varied assignment and shorter tours, key tenets of the generalist model.  Sympathetic 
congressmen would, after a delay of some months, eventually join with Rickover and 
attack the Navy’s forty year-old model of officer development.  Influential congressmen 
would urge the non-nuclear Navy to adopt a personnel system of assignment more 
                                                 
81 John W. Crawford, Jr., (Deputy Manager of the Naval Reactors Program), Interview with the Author 11 
July 2007.  Crawford, then deputy to Rickover, explained that when Thresher went down, one of the first 
concerns was the ship's manning levels, which Crawford checked immediately.  As tragic as was the loss of 
life, it came as a bureaucratic benefit to Rickover that the ship went down with more than a full 
complement of officers.   
82 Francis Duncan, Rickover and the Nuclear Navy: The Discipline of Technology (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 1990),  84-85. 
83 Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings on Loss of USS THRESHER, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., 
26,27 June, 23 July 1963, and 1 July 64, ix. 
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closely aligned with Rickover’s model of greater specialization.  This intervention, 
though conducted quietly between the Secretary of the Navy and Capital Hill, would 
carry with it profound implications for the larger officer corps, which will be discussed in 
chapter seven.84  
Following the loss of THRESHER, another contingent event in history 
intervened to shape personnel policy.  The CNO was fired by the Secretary of the Navy a 
few days after the April 27th meeting.  As it became clear that Rickover would survive the 
THRESHER dispute and Anderson would not, the outgoing CNO made a last attempt to 
persuade Rickover to change his policies and accept more of the traditional submarine 
officers.  As one of his last acts as CNO, Anderson penned a personal, handwritten letter 
to Rickover, imploring him for the good of the Navy that he change his officer personnel 
policies.  By all indications, Rickover ignored Anderson’s plea and did not answer the 
letter.85  Anderson, like many of Rickover’s adversaries, did not understand that, once 
Rickover gained power, there was little room for negotiation when it came to issues 
involving Rickover’s technocratic philosophy and his model of command.  Rickover’s 
                                                 
84 In March of 1965, Representative Chet Holifield, the Chairman  of the Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy,  would challenge CNO McDonald  and the Secretary of the Navy to defend the  Navy’s officer 
policy of broadening and frequent assignment changes.  As will be discussed in chapter seven, Secretary 
Nitze would yield to Holifield's demands.  There followed Nitze's concession a series of events, meetings, 
policy papers that presaged the demise the King's model of integrative officer development.  The influence 
of this congressional intervention is hard to measure, but what is certain is that THRESHER and Rickover’s 
agitation were the catalyst for congressional intervention.  
85 John W. Crawford, Jr., (Deputy Manager of the Naval Reactors Program), Interview with the Author 11 
July 2007.   George Whelan Anderson and United States Naval Institute., The Reminiscences of Admiral 
George W. Anderson, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired), 2 vols. (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1983).  Three 
sources confirm the existence of such a letter.  First, Crawford recollected that he received the letter from 
Rickover and kept it in his desk, apparently not knowing if or when the admiral would respond.  Crawford 
read the letter and interpreted from the text and tone of the letter that ADM Anderson knew Rickover was 
in an unassailable position with congressional support,  and thus the CNO made the personal appeal in a 
handwritten note to Rickover.  Anderson implored  him, for the good of the navy, to relax his powerful role 
over the shaping of the future officer corps.  The existence of such a letter is corroborated in both Admiral 
Anderson’s oral history(pg. 598) and in Anderson’s CNO records in an a daily staff notation by Captain  
Isaac Kidd, Chief of Staff to Anderson, see NHC, OO files, Anderson Miscellaneous Files, box 43. 
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policies were not just those of another bureaucrat maneuvering for power.  Rickover was 
a technocratic visionary and revolutionary destroying the old and bringing in the new.  As 
a revolutionary empowered with high rank and unmatched political support, he would no 
longer negotiate or compromise.  Rickover was building both a nuclear fleet and 
providing the nuclear technicians and specialized officers to command this fleet.  
Informed by his philosophy of technocracy, Rickover believed the old model that valued 
general education and assignments outside an officer's specialty must give way. 
Rickover had won this most important of bureaucratic battles: he had faced 
down the CNO and the Bureau Chief.  It was Admiral Anderson, the senior officer in the 
Navy, not Vice Admiral Rickover, who was fired.  Perhaps most importantly, Anderson 
believed Rickover was the cause of his early departure.86  Faced with what appeared to 
be Rickover’s complete victory, Anderson’s successors hesitated to again confront 
Rickover on nuclear or diesel submarine matters.  Rickover could exclude from 
submarine command any officer he so chose.   Rickover chose to exclude even more 
diesel officers.  But in order to exclude so many, he needed a new source of officers to 
take their place.  He settled for a massive, fleet-wide draft of surface ship and aviator 
                                                 
86 George W. Jr. Anderson, ADM, USN,"Tasking Notes to Executive Assistant, Captain Isaac Kidd, dtd 8 
May 1963", NHC Operational Archives, Collection 439, ADM G.W. Anderson, Jr., Box 52, "X" Folder 
(sensitive, private).   Anderson believed that his battles with Rickover, including the meeting on 27 Ap
1963 on officer policy, precipitated more than any issue or event his early termination.  On 8 May 1963
Anderson discretely tasked his staff to determine the most likely cause of his termination, to include a 
timeline of recent events.  In notes dictated to Kidd, Anderson lists Rickover as the most significant of
eighteen policy disputes with his civilian superiors, and lists the meeting on 27 April 1963 at 1000am, 
followed by a visit by Korth at 1445, as the possible causal moments of his termination.  Anderson’s 
elevated perception of Rickover’s power was significant, for in the subsequent turnover process w






f the Rickover-like  model of line officer through the fleet. 
accept Rickover’s authority on personnel, which may explain McDonald’s later passivity and the 
subsequent unimpeded diffusion o
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officers.87  Chastened by their defeat in the battle over THRESHER and still puzzled by 
Anderson's departure, the Navy's senior leaders acquiesced to Rickover’s unprecedented 
demand for a fleet-wide draft of scientifically adept aviator and surface officers.  On 10 
August 1963, just a few weeks after the conclusion of the THRESHER inquiry, hundreds 
of surface and aviation officers were told to report to Rickover for interviews. 88   The 
nal 
ust 
urface and aviator officers to conform to a career of a technical 
expert and nuclear specialist.89   
draft of these non-submarine officers relieved the pressure on Rickover to accept more 
traditional submarine officers and thereby assured the dilution of the tactical-operatio
culture that had defined the diesel boat fleet.  But even with the draft, Rickover took j
enough surface and aviator officers to fill the anticipated billets; no excess was allowed.  
As before, he sought to sustain a condition of persistent shortage, which in turn 
necessitated the new s
                                                 
87 J.O. Cobb,"Memorandum from Pers B to Pers 161, dtd 5 August 1963,  Subject Nuclear Power Program: 
Query 46-63", Author has copy.   
88 William Smedberg, III,  VADM, USN,"Letter from Smedberg to Rickover regarding Nuclear Draft,  dtd
10 August 1963", NHC Operational Archives, Collection 439, ADM G.W. Anderson, Jr., Box 52, "X" file
A first hand account of the draft of aviator and surface officers was provided by one of the first seni
surface officer draftees, J.A. Sagerholm, VADM USN, Interview with the Author, 11 July 2007.  VADM
Sagerholm explained that most senior surface ship officers had no tactical experience on submarin
himself was very senior, having just served as an XO of a surface ship and was soon to promote to 
commander.  He explained that the draft was quick and unavoidable.  Sagerholm recalled that he
with several hundred surface officers, were called into the auditorium at the Bureau of Personnel 
headquarters in August of 1963.  VADM Smedberg informed the officers that they would all interview w
Admiral Rickover and had no choice but to accept if selected for nuclear power training.  From 
Sagerholm’s recollection, several hundred surface officers were drafted over the next couple years and 
provided the crucial manpower source to allow the Fleet Ballistic Missile program to continue.  Wha
remarkable is that officers as senior as Sagerholm would be transitioned to senior positions in a nuclear 
submarine—Sagerholm went directly to XO of a submarine following a brief tour as a division officer (





es.  He 




t the time, while most division officers were ensigns or LTJGs). This practice further 
nted 
(taking no more than ½ of any group of officers, 
confirms the notion that technical expertise had eclipsed tactical or operational expertise as the primary 
focus of the commander. The implication of this massive draft of surface officers may not yet be fully 
appreciated.   
89 Harry Depue Train, ADM USN, Interview with the Author, 2 November 2007.  Admiral Train recou
the shortages were so extreme that when a single department officer was relieved of his duty on one ship, 
his loss disrupted several other officer assignments on other ships.  According to Train, who served as the 
assistant submarine detailer in the early 1960s, the policy of shortage was 'by design'.  Admiral Trost 
observed that additional causes combined to perpetuate the shortage,  not all of which were intentional.  
Trost explained Rickover had a policy of high selectivity 
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With Rickover's victory over the CNO, the bulk of the diesel officers were 
consigned to professional oblivion: most would be forced out of the ‘line’ when 
command opportunities evaporated along with the diesel submarines.90  The nuclear 
model of 'line' officer had become the reigning model in the submarine fleet, a 
transformation guided by Rickover.  Admiral Charles K. Duncan noted that Rickover’s 
legacy, which had been the transformation of ships and engines in the 1950s, became in 
the new decade the transformation of personnel: "… he really selected who the nuclear 
submarine commanders should be.  Eventually, he would select every submarine 
commander in the navy.”91  Having won his battle with the CNO and cemented his 
absolute control of the selection and assignment of nuclear personnel, Rickover turned 
his attention to his nuclear training and qualification system.  THRESHER was his first 
disaster, and he set out to determine what lessons he could draw from the tragedy.   
* 
 The THRESHER Disaster and its Longer term Consequences:  
Technological Over-shoot and a New Generation of Nuclear Officer  
 
The investigation of THRESHER produced thousands of pages of documents and 
multiple theories of causation.  The tragic sequence of events most likely originated with 
a failure of a material system, but Rickover’s officers and his reactor plant procedures 
                                                                                                                                                 
with the Author, 3 November 2007, 18 December 2007. 
no matter how talented they might be as a group).  But retention of officers in the program was also low, in 
part due to the rapidly expanding civilian nuclear power program.  C.A.H Trost, ADM USN, Interview 
90Bureau of Personnel Navy Department,"Unrestricted Line Officer Career Planning Guidebook, 
NAVPERS 15197", Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C., collections, VA 52.A63 15197, 50. 
Command opportunities for diesel and missile officers existed in limited numbers through the 1960s, but 
non-nuclear officer command opportunity evaporated for officer year groups younger than 1970. 
91 Charles Kenney Duncan, The Reminiscences of Admiral Charles K. Duncan, USN (Ret.), 4 vols. 
(Annapolis: U. S. Naval Institute, 1978),  479. 
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were not beyond reproach.  RADM John H. Maurer, Director of Submarine Warfare i
1963, hypothesized that Rickover’s officers and their procedures were at fault:  “…th
were specified operating procedures in connection with the nuclear plant….the plant 
remained shut down until they (operators) had gone through these definitive steps to








                                                
92  But the delay in bringing the plant up, Maurer argued,
doomed the submarine.   Rickover and his staff publicly rejected Mauer's analysis.  
Rickover claimed the evidence inconclusive and protested that, even should the 
procedures be found wanting, his nuclear officers knew when to depart from written 
guidance.  But apparently, behind closed doors, Rickover concluded that the failure of
crew to restart the reactor fast enough may have in fact contributed to the ultimate loss of 
the submarine.93  As hard as it was to accept, the facts appeared to show that the first 
generation nuclear officers had made a profound, tragic, and perhaps, avoidable mistake. 
The loss of the THRESHER compelled Rickover and his staff to abbreviate the p
by which operators could restart the reactor.94  If measured by words on a page, the new 
 
92 Maurer, John H., RADM USN as quoted in Francis Duncan, Rickover and the Nuclear Navy: The 
Discipline of Technology (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1990),  90.  This same opinion was also voiced 
by Ralph Kirk James, RADM USN (ret), Reminiscences of RADM Ralph K. James, USN (Annapolis, MD: 
US Naval Institute, 1972),  392. 
93 James L. Holloway, III,  ADM USN (CNO), Aircraft Carriers at War:  A Personal Retrospective of 
Korea, Vietnam, and the Soviet Confrontation (Annapolis: US Naval Institute 2006), 169.  Holloway 
confirms Mauer's and James' suspicion that a contributing cause of the loss of Thresher was the failure of 
personnel to more rapidly recover the reactor following the inadvertent shutdown.  Holloway,  who was a 
student at NR headquarters in early 1964 would seem in a position to know this information.  Holloway 
states clearly in his book:  “Still, the nuclear submarine Thresher was lost at sea with all hands when the 
crew failed to recover the reactor plant properly following an inadvertent emergency shutdown, or 
SCRAM, of the reactors while underway submerged." This same argument was raised in testimony before 
the JCAE in June 1963 by RADM John H. Maurer, the non-nuclear director of submarine warfare.  
However, Rickover and his staff publicly discredited Maurer’s criticism of the reactor plant as not fully 
substantiated by the limited acoustic evidence.  See Duncan, 1990,  89-93.   
94 Francis Duncan, Rickover and the Nuclear Navy: The Discipline of Technology (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 1990), 92.  Norman Polmar and Thomas B. Allen, Rickover (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1982), 434.  They refer to the recollections of one submarine flag officer who speculated that 
because of THRESHER, the time to start up a reactor reduced by half.  Though the numbers involved seem 
suspect, the testimony of the officer appears to further confirm that THRESHER was the catalyst to 
significant change in procedures and officer training and qualifications. 
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procedural change constituted a relatively minor addition to voluminous reactor 
documents.  But the sequence of actions and policies associated with the implementation 
of the revised procedure, in fact, held profound implications for the nuclear officer 




Rickover had further evidence these same knowledge deficiencies existed fleet-wide.  
Unseen to the outside world, Rickover and his personnel program fell into a quiet crisis.   
                                                
To adapt the accelerated procedure to fleet use, Rickover ordered officers to 
attend training on reactor start up procedures.95   Most importantly, the admiral ordered 
most, if not all, of his ship engineers back to the Washington D.C. headquarters to be 
trained by his personal staff on the new procedures.  The return of dozens of officers to 
headquarters brought about an unpredictable turn of events that was to significantly re-
shape the career path of all future nuclear officers.  When the sea-going engineer of
reported to Naval Reactors in Washington, they were subject to evaluation, testing, and 
questioning concerning their understanding and knowledge of reactor operations.  
Rickover found some officers to be deficient in their technical knowledge.96   He was, to 
put it mildly, displeased with their level of technical knowledge.  With his discove
became apparent to Rickover that not only had the officers on THRESHER failed to fu
understand their technology, a deficiency that contributed to the sinking, but now 
 
95 James D Watkins,"Memorandum: Report of Conference on Nuclear Power School Training Matters, dtd 
19 May 1963",   signed by future CNO James Watkins, who was then serving in the immediate office of 
Admiral Rickover.  The document listed areas of deficient training and tasked the staff to produce new case 
studies and procedures.  Included on the short list was the need to revise “start up” training.   In addition,  
most recent scholarship dates the revision of the procedures to the day after the THRESHER sinking, 
approximately 11 April.  See Thomas B. Allen and Norman Polmar, Rickover: Father of the Nuclear Navy 
(Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books Inc., 2007), 61. 
96 William Wegner, Deputy Naval Reactors, 1963-1979, Interview with the Author, 17 July 1007.  Wegner 
was the deputy manager of nuclear reactors at this time and was especially privileged as to the origin and 
nature of the policy changes that followed THRESHER. 
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Rickover's state of mind at this period is unclear, but it is reasonable to conclude
that he may have been, in these conditions, under severe stress and perhaps prone to ov
reaction.  Rickover felt a heavy personal responsibility for the death of over a hundred 
men.   In the wake of the tragedy, Rickover expressed his condolences in handwritten 
letters sent to every sailor’s widow or mother.  In a letter to the CNO, Rickover soun
depressed and in crisis.  In this brief letter of only ten sentences, Rickover wrote about 
"man's dependence on God", mentioned 'God' or 'prayer' four times, and quoted an 
ancient Breton fisherman's prayer.  He went on to recommit himself and his staff to bet





 mind that 
Rickover made some of the most profound changes to both the material and personnel 




stressful period,  Rickover knew otherwise.  Rickover was now confronted with the 
                                                
97  It was in this state of
 It is well known that in response to the loss of THRESHER Rickover mad
major changes to material management procedures of his program whereby he attained 
unprecedented levels of quality control.98   Less well known is  the fact that he also 
redoubled his efforts to gain more complete control of the 'human element'.    In p
Rickover rejected Maurer’s accusations that his men may have acted like robots and 
strictly  adhered to his startup procedures all the way to the bottom, even though 
“...common sense tells you this is not so…”99   But in private, in this emotional a
 
97 George Anderson, ADM, USN,"Personal Papers", NHC Operational Archives, Collection 439, ADM 
G.W. Anderson, Jr., Boxes 40, 43, 51-53  ltr from Rickover  to Anderson, dtd 6 May 1963.  Rickover 
closed the letter: “I pray that those of responsible for submarines will learn to design, build, and operate 
these submarines in a manner worthy of those men who gave their lives on THRESHER.”      
98   Theodore Rockwell, Interview with the Author, 25 September 2007.  See also John Pina Craven, The 
Cold War Beneath the Sea: The Silent War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001),  103-108. 
99 Francis Duncan, Rickover and the Nuclear Navy: The Discipline of Technology (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 1990),  92.  Though study of accelerated start up procedures had commenced before the loss 
of THRESHER, the efforts were accelerated after the sinking. 
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knowledge that nuclear officers, especially the ship captains, did not adequately 
understand their technology. The perceived knowledge deficiency of the first generation 





training and qualification requirements and make them in spirit, if not in fact, ‘engineers  
                                                
The personnel deficiencies revealed by THRESHER validated Rickover's cor
beliefs: that technology drove history and people; that men must be conformed to the 
machine requirements; that men must be trained to the standards necessary to exercise 
absolute control over their nuclear machines.100  He had lost a submarine in part due to 
the failure of his officers to fully understand and then fully control their machines.  The 
professional development process that produced the first generation of nuclear officer 
was thus, by implication, inadequate.101  Scientifically engineered nuclear technolog
required more of an officer’s time, attention, and education than even Rickover had 
anticipated.   But the question remained as to how to balance these new demands with the
other professional requirements naval 'line' officers had to complete in order to promote
and to command in battle.  If Rickover discarded the first generation model of nuclear 
officers, two options remained.  First, he could return to a pre-1899 model of the 'line' 
and man his reactors with dedicated nuclear specialist engineers who did not command; 
this was the Royal Navy model, which had been considered but not adopted by the 
Bruton Board of 1954.  Alternatively, he could levy on his ‘line’ officers substantial new 
 
100 Ibid.,  87. 
101  John W. Crawford, Jr., (Deputy Manager of the Naval Reactors Program), Interview with the Author 11 
July 2007.  According to Crawford, the system that produced the first generation of nuclear officers was 
less technically robust than Rickover had preferred.  Early in the program Rickover had voiced the opinion 
that perhaps only those officers who had served as engineer should be eligible for command.  However 
VADM Smedberg was opposed to this engineering pre-requisite for command,  and Smedberg was until 
THRESHER powerful enough to reject this requirement.  The loss of THRESHER convinced Rickover to 
act on his technocratic philosophy, and the bureaucratic victory gave him the power to ignore Smedberg.    
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in command', the ultimate expression of the type of leader idealized by the Technocracy 
Movement of Columbia University earlier in the century. 
The first option, to develop a corps of nuclear specialists EDOs to run the 
reactors but not command, was an untried concept when first suggested in 1954 by the 
Bruton Board.  However, when THRESHER sank and a search for lessons began, there 
existed a successful example of nuclear specialists who operated the reactor but who 
remained subordinate to a more broadly educated, tactically minded ‘line’ officer.  This 
alternative model in 1963 was the nuclear engineer of the Royal Navy.102   
The British system of manning and commanding nuclear submarines presented 
an alternative model of nuclear-age officer development.  In the British system, the 
captain's knowledge focused primarily on tactics and ship operations, leavened with 
modest training in nuclear technology.  The officer in charge of the reactor was a 
technical expert, a pure specialist, and devoted himself exclusively to engineering 
knowledge, but did NOT rise to command at sea.  RN leaders believed that nuclear 
technology had not invalidated their model of command and fought to preserve their 
cultural forms.  When the S5W reactor system (Rickover’s system) was transferred to the 
Royal Navy, a major point of contention that threatened to sour relations between the two 
navies was Rickover’s insistence that the British submit to his method of personnel 
                                                 
102 The Royal Navy had, since the advent of steam, taken a different approach to command and engineering 
specialization.  The ‘line’ commander was in overall command, but possessed limited engineering 
knowledge.  The engineer in turn enjoyed a great degree of autonomy, but could NOT rise to command.  
For a brief comparison of these differences in American and British approaches to engineering 
specialization and command, see John Wesley Masland and Laurence Ingram Radway, Soldiers and 
Scholars: Military Education and National Policy (Princeton,: Princeton University Press, 1957),  213.  
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selection and assignment.103  The British refused to adopt Rickover’s personnel system of 
command and continued with their own unique and apparently effective system of officer 
manning and development. That the British model was indeed a viable alternative to the 
American approach was evidenced by the fact that the Royal Navy operated a reactor and 
propulsion system identical to the American S5W reactor without serious accident: the 
Royal Navy would operate multiple S5W-type  reactors for almost a half century without 
losing a ship.104   Thus, for the US Navy, it was not the ‘discipline of technology’, but it 
was Rickover who chose the model of command.   
In devising his post-THRESHER reforms, Rickover chose to ignore altogether 
the British model.  He also rejected further accommodations with the 'generalist' model 
that had produced the first generation nuclear officer.  To ensure he never lost another 
submarine due to officer error, he placed even more priority on technical expertise and 
created an even more technically demanding qualification process.  Rickover would make 
the next generation of nuclear ship captains quite literally into ‘engineers in command'.105   
In comparison to the early nuclear commanders, the second generation of 
officers faced substantially more rigorous standards of testing and evaluation.  To 
succeed in the more rigorous technical tests and schools, the second generation of nuclear 
officers would all but abandon graduate school, war college, and other assignments that 
                                                 
103 John Coote, Captain, Royal Navy (retired), "Commentary on 'Lord Louis'," US Naval Institute 
Proceedings, 107, no. 3, March 1981, 16. 
104 VADM Sir Robert Hill, RN, "Admiral Hyman G. Rickover USN and the UK Nuclear Submarine 
Propulsion Programme," in The Seventy Seventh Thomas Lowe Gray Memorial Lecture (Institution of 
Mechanical Engineers: Power Industries Division, 2005). 
105 This is in fact what Rickover did.  Evidence of this change is found in officer records. Following 
THRESHER, the Navy Officers' Register was changed to reflect the new requirement that submarine 
officers on nuclear ships were qualified as “engineers”.  The notation in the record went further to explain 
that the nuclear engineering qualification superseded any and all other qualifications.  See volumes 1963-
1966 United States. Bureau of Naval Personnel., Register of Commissioned and Warrant officers of the 
United States Navy and Marine Corps (Washington: Govt. Print. Off. etc., 1814-2002).   
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distracted from the specialty of nuclear engineering.  If the first generation of nuclear 
officers were ‘versatile' officers who integrated the latest technology (e.g., nuclear) with 
the education of war (e.g., the war college), this second generation was the more 
technocratic and, by training and education, reflected a model wherein technical expertise 
became the supreme qualification for command.106   After these changes, Rickover’s 
model of the ‘line’ began to more closely approximate what heretofore had been the 
Navy’s definition of an Engineering Duty specialist, an officer to “…fill those positions 
requiring technical proficiency that can only be acquired and maintained by extensive 
education and continuous duties in their specialties.”107  (italics my emphasis) 
In contrast to the first generation of officers, now all nuclear officers had to 
qualify as senior engineer of a reactor to be allowed to progress to command.  This was a 
significant change from the earlier model.  In the earlier model of nuclear command, an 
officer could avoid duty as engineer, merely qualify as a junior supervisor, and still 
promote to command.108   The path to engineer would be even more technically 
specialized and would require additional training and a return to headquarters to take and 
                                                 
106 The first generation of nuclear officers was indeed the ‘renaissance’ men of their day.  They were the 
ultimate product of the King system, educated widely and progressively, with varied assignments in their 
careers, including service on two of three platforms and command of both surface ships and submarines. 
The first generation had studied and some would say had mastered nuclear technology.  Technically, 
however, they were less rigorously trained  than the officers who were to follow for few, if any, of the first 
generation had actually served as chief engineers of a nuclear reactor plant. 
107 Arleigh Burke, Admiral, USN,"Precept Convening Board to Study Billet and Post-Graduate Educational 
Requirements in the Specialty Areas in the Line of the Navy,  dtd 15 June 1959", NARA RG 24-470-54-
25-6 box 5   Official definition of 'specialist' adopted by the navy in 1959.   
108 Francis Duncan, Rickover and the Nuclear Navy: The Discipline of Technology (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 1990), 248.  Duncan discusses the increased engineering demands on nuclear officers, and 
the evolution toward the requirement levied on all aspiring nuclear captains to serve as chief engineer, not 
merely to have stood watch in the reactor spaces.  William Wegner, Rickover’s Deputy for almost 20 years, 
concurred that THRESHER gave rise to the new, more stringent qualification process.  In addition, Wegner 
explained that prior to THRESHER, the commanding officer had the authority to certify subordinate 
officers as ‘engineer’. After 1964, only NR HQ could certify officers as a nuclear 'engineer'.   
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pass an engineer’s exam.109  Furthermore, it now became mandatory that to command a 
nuclear ship an officer had to have served in the billet of senior engineer of the submarine 
or surface ship (the only exception remained the nuclear aviators in command of aircraft 
carriers).110  With the added technical requirements, nuclear officers were forced to 
abandon the King model of versatility in favor of technical specialization. Thus it was, in 
response to the loss of THRESHER and the need for a new reactor 'start-up' procedure, 
that Rickover changed the type of officer who would become the senior nuclear officers 
of the Navy.111  
The CNO's staff caught wind of the new technical pre-requisite for command 
and recognized the implications that such changes, if adopted, might hold for the officer 
corps.  But attempts by the CNO’s staff to view the new policy documents were rebuffed 
                                                 
109 The exam, which remains in effect today almost a half century later, is arguably the most demanding 
technical examination to which any combat officer in any military service is subjected.  As a consequence 
of the additional testing, yet more officers would attrite from the program.   For a description of Rickover's 
post-THRESHER exam process,  see U.S. Congress,"Trip to the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, 
September 28, 1970", House Subcommittee on AntiSubmarine Warfare of the Committee on Armed 
Services,91st Cong., 2nd sess., 23 October 1970, 12258.  
110 For the best first hand summary of Rickover’s views on nuclear training, and the requirements leading to 
command,  see H.G. Rickover, Admiral USN, Statement before the Subcommittee on Energy Research and 
Production of the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, Ninety-sixth 
Congress, first session, May 22, 23, 24, 1979 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1979). 
111 William Wegner, (Deputy Naval Reactors Manager, 1963-1979), Interview with the Author, 17 July 
2007; Francis Duncan, Rickover and the Nuclear Navy: The Discipline of Technology (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 1990); C.A.H Trost, ADM USN, Interview with the Author, 3 November 2007, 18 
December 2007.  Wegner, Rickover’s deputy in this period,  explained that the requirement for the 
accelerated startup procedure was the catalyst and justification that led to the requirement for all officers to 
complete successfully the engineer’s exam, which led, inevitably, to the loss of yet more officers who were 
less mathematical and technical. Duncan in 1990 explained that to be the captain of a nuclear ship an 
officer must qualify and serve as a nuclear engineer (pg. 248).  The requirement that commanding officers 
serve first as chief engineer became a barrier for those officers weaker in engineering, but perhaps more 
adept in operations or tactics.   Admiral Trost corroborated William Wegner’s recollection that the loss of 
THRESHER exerted a significant effect on officer qualification requirements. Trost noted that the 
engineer’s qualification and exam emerged in its final form in the aftermath of the loss of THRESHER, and 
this exam exerted a winnowing effect on the officer corps. Trost recollected that the new engineer's exam 
eliminated from the program at least  two officers he knew personally.  The net result of the exam was to 
raise engineering standards, but possibly led to a loss of other skills or talents to the larger navy. (Note: 
Trost, a future CNO,  joined the nuclear navy early enough that he was less affected by post-THRESHER 
policy.  Interestingly, Trost never served as engineer on a nuclear submarine).    
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by Naval Reactors.112  After Rickover's victory in the THRESHER power struggle, Naval 
Reactor personnel policy was practically autonomous in the Navy.  Senior non-nuclear 
leaders remained convinced, however, of the validity of some elements of the old King 
model and implored Rickover to act in the best interests of the officers and allow his men 
to broaden their careers beyond the reactor and nuclear ship assignments.   
VADM Smedberg conceded that all nuclear officers would be recruited 
according to Rickover’s preferences, trained in his schools by his standards, and selected 
for and assigned to command in accordance with NR's desires.  But Smedberg believed 
the nuclear officer recruits were the Navy’s best officers and should be broadened.113   
Smedberg was concerned that these elite would rise to high command with an overly 
narrow and parochial experience.  As early as the first half of the 1960s, nuclear officer 
attendance at graduate school, for example, was already falling and was linked to a 
declining morale.114   Smedberg sought to sustain for the nuclear officers as many 
elements of the integrative education and assignment system as he could and openly 
expressed his desire “…to give a greater broadening to these officers…”115    
The broadening of nuclear officers was by the middle of the 1960s becoming 
increasingly problematic. Rickover's deliberate policy of shortage, useful as a tool to 
break the old culture of the diesel officers, was becoming a structural feature of the 
                                                 
112 Eugene P. Wilkinson, VADM USN, Interview with the Author, 26 March 2007.  Wilkinson explained 
that Rickover sent him to tell the CNO staff that the policy was approved by Rickover, and the CNO's staff 
had no need to be involved, or to view the documents.  
113 W.R. Smedberg, III, VADM USN (ret), Reminiscences of William R. Smedberg III, VADM, USN 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1979) 625-626.    
114 Court of Inquiry: Loss of the USS THRESHER (SSN-593), Testimony of 21 May 1963, VADM 
Bernard L. Austin, USN, Presiding", Office of the Judge Advocate General, National Security Litigation 
and Intelligence Law Division, Washington, D.C. , 1607-1609. 
115 Ibid.,  1609-1610. 
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nuclear officer corps.  A slight decline in submarine officer retention, combined with the 
manning pressures of an expanding nuclear force and the lack of an officer surplus on 
which to call in emergency, produced a self-reinforcing spiral in retention that produced 
ever longer and repeat sea tours.116  By design, Rickover's draft of surface and aviation 
officers in 1963 filled only the required number of nuclear billets and appears to have 
done little to improve nuclear officer opportunities for shore duty, graduate school, or 
other various assignments.117   The inability of his nuclear officers to attend graduate 
school or other non-nuclear shore duty did not, however, concern Rickover, for he was 
philosophically disposed toward the 'line' officer as technical expert and specialist.  
Nuclear submarine officers were slowly coming to share some of Smedberg’s 
concern about the trajectory on which Rickover had placed the nuclear officer corps.  
Relatively junior nuclear 'line' officers occasionally questioned Rickover and argued for a 
change in policy, for a return to some elements of the ‘versatile’ officer career.  Some 
younger officers published in Proceedings complaints about the narrow nature of nuclear 
training.118  A few outspoken submarine captains brought their concerns to Rickover but 
                                                 
116 Lando Zech, VADM USN, Interview with the Author, 3 August 2007. 
117 After the draft of 1963, officers were seldom involuntarily drafted.  However, the Navy did encourage 
some surface and aviation officers to 'lateral transfer’ into the submarine navy.  As before, tactical 
experience was of secondary importance compared to technical aptitude.  The main requirement was that 
the officers be able to master the engineering and technical requirements of Rickover's schools. Nav OP 38 
of 1977  See "Navy Requests URLs to Enter Nuclear Field," Navy Times, 18 April 1977.  
118 Thomas H. Taylor, LCDR USN, "Nuclear Power Training," US Naval Institute Proceedings, 89, no. 7, 
July 1963; Albert H. Konetzni, Jr., CDR USN, "Comment," US Naval Institute Proceedings, 107, no. 2, 
February 1981.  Konetzni would rise to the rank of vice admiral.   In his article of the early 1980s he 
reflects on the earlier period, and noted that the narrow career path was a deterrent to officers, that various 
measures were adopted to entice officers to remain, including the start of the bonus program in 1969.  
Regardless of these efforts, attrition of officers after their initial obligation reached 66% in the later 1960s.  
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to no avail.119  Others complained years later, after they had retired as senior flag 
officers, that the nuclear training program had been unnecessarily lengthy.120  
                                                
 But the key issue was not the length of nuclear training, but was instead the 
career path that was highly specialized and the implications a specialist career held for 
the retention of officers of the 'line'.  The policy of shortage ensured officers remained 
close to the reactor, but such narrowness did not persuade officers to remain in the 
service, and as a consequence attrition climbed higher.  Long after Rickover had diluted 
and marginalized the diesel culture, the condition of shortage persisted and even 
deepened.  There were signs that Rickover was losing control of officer retention, and it 
began to spiral downward.  The higher attrition required officers who remained in the 
service to spend yet more time on the reactor plants, which further narrowed the officer's 
career.  More time at sea and with the reactor reinforced the tendency of officers to leave 
the nuclear service for high paying civilian jobs.   A major factor in the demoralization 
and declining retention among nuclear officers appears to have been the shift in identity 
to that of technical specialist notion of the ‘line’.121  
 
119 Theodore Rockwell, Interview with the Author, 25 September 2007.  Rockwell explains that indeed 
some submarine captains of the time recognized the cost to tactical proficiency and confronted ADM 
Rickover, via Rockwell. Two of the officers cited by Rockwell were James Osborne and Tappey Simms, 
neither of whom have been by the time of this publication interviewed, and hence, have not yet been able to 
corroborate Rockwell’s recollection.  
120 Kent L. Lee, Vice Admiral, USN (Ret), "The Enterprise in WestPac," in Into the Jet Age: Conflict and 
Change in Naval Aviation, 1945-1975, ed. E.T. Wooldridge, Captain, USN (ret) (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 1995), 237.   VADM Kent L. Lee, the aviator who followed Holloway in command of USS 
Enterprise,  observed that nuclear power training was too long, almost by a factor of 3.  Lee recalled he had 
14 months in Rickover's office,  followed by 2 months on Enterprise,  and then relieved Holloway. Lee 
observed: "I don't think I needed that extensive kind of training.  I think five or six months total would have 
been adequate, but Rickover had a policy that the original training would be one year to the minute." 
121 Thomas B. Thamm, Capt, USN, "Quiet Crisis in the Silent Service", US Naval Institute Proceedings, 
no. 8 August 1971.  Though most nuclear officers did not write about their community, a few pieces did 
emerge in the professional press.  Captain Thomas Thamm, a nuclear officer, provided a detailed 
description of the personnel shortages that wracked the nuclear force. He went further than most to 
speculate as to the root causes of the personnel problems: the way nuclear technology defined personnel 
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As junior officer retention continued to decline, approaching historically 
unprecedented low levels,122 the first generation nuclear officers approached Rickover 
and offered suggestions to reverse the trend.  Captains (later VADMs) Lando Zech, the 
first nuclear submarine detailer, and Raymond Peet, the first nuclear surface officer, were 
representative of this quiet debate within the program.  Captain Ray Peet, himself one of 
the most broadly educated and experienced of the nuclear pioneers, pushed for expanded 
educational opportunities for his nuclear officers and in those early days won a few 
confrontations with Rickover.123  Captain Zech in his capacity as head submarine 
detailer, the officer responsible for the assignment of submarine officers, met with 
Admiral Rickover in the summer of 1966 at which time Zech recommended more 
officers be allowed into the program.  Zech hoped the addition of more officers might 
mitigate some of the worst quality-of-life aspects of the submarine program and allow 
some officers to achieve a more balanced and broad professional experience, which then 
                                                                                                                                                 
policy.  He observed that resignations in the new nuclear submarine force climbed to 3 times the 
resignations  than in the "old" submarine force, and all this BEFORE the worst of the Vietnam retention 
crises that came to afflict the rest of the Navy (pg. 55).  Thamm explained: "In less than 20 years the 
submarine service has  been transformed from a military service with a waiting line to get in, to one with a 
waiting line to get out."  (pg 52)  "Innovations such as radar, sonar and other electronic devices were 
introduced and , while complex, they were absorbed into the body of required knowledge with no particular 
difficulty."   "The science of nuclear energy and ballistic missiles could not be absorbed into the old order.  
To understand and apply these new technologies, officers required highly specialized training.  Officers 
became identified as nuclear-trained, weapons-trained, or neither. ...In accepting these advantages (of 
nuclear technology) the submarine force has had to pay a human cost." "The technological change brought 
about a radical shift in officer qualification emphasis.  The officer's first duty was to prove and reprove his 
command of a technical specialty such as nuclear power..." ( pg. 53)  "The perceived consequences of 
failure brought about an intense pressure to concentrate on one end of the boat."  "But the human animal 
can cope with only so many priorities at a time and most officers--perhaps unconsciously--decided that 
qualification as a submarine officer simply would have to take second place in the event of a conflict with 
technical qualification requirements.” 
122 Albert H. Konetzni, Jr., CDR USN, "Comment," US Naval Institute Proceedings, 107, no. 2, February 
1981, 89.  Commander, later VADM Konetzni, noted that by the late 1960s, attrition of young officers after 
their first tour had risen as high as 66%.  
123  Raymond Peet, VADM USN, Interview with the Author, 12 July 2007.  Peet recounted how he fought 
for graduate school for officers, in particular for a supply officer who would later, in part based on his 
advanced education, rise to be the head of the navy supply system.  Rickover preferred instead, Peet 
explained,  that the supply officer remain in nuclear related billets.  
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in turn might improve retention.  Zech's recommendations were, however, rejected.  
Captain Zech challenged Rickover a second time a year later.124   A second time 
Rickover refused to take more officers or allow departures from a career path of nuclear 
specialization, even if such intransigence came at a cost of yet higher attrition. Later 
events showed Zech and Peet were correct in their early reform attempts. In testim
when he was CNO, Admiral James Watkins would make essentially the same arguments 
Zech had made.  But Watkins’ calls for reform came too late, well after the pattern an




 in the 
unity.125 
                                                
The reality was that Rickover remained in favor of specialization over breadth, in 
spite of falling retention, and continued to work to minimize any and all distractions to 
his officers.  According to his biographer, Rickover discouraged even the most minor of 
what he considered distracting activities and "... refused, for example, to allow them to 
attend extraneous courses, conferences, and meetings." 126   Those who challenged the 
policy did so at great risk to their career.  An occasional nuclear officer was allowed to go 
to War College or graduate school, but these exceptions were apparently designed to give 
 
124 Lando Zech, VADM USN, Interview with the Author, 3 August 2007.  Zech explained that relatively 
soon Rickover lost his capacity to provide broadening opportunities to more than a token number of 
submarine officers.  The exigencies of the Cold War and the growth in the nuclear fleet combined to keep 
the shrinking pool of officers in nuclear assignments.  In short, the nuclear career path was in large part a 
compromise position reached under very unique circumstances of the middle 1960s.  The problem, 
according to Zech, was that the Cold War pattern or low retention and low morale persisted even after ship 
construction rates slowed.  
125 Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, Statement of VADM 
James D. Watkins, USN, Chief of Naval Personnel  H.R. 10451, a Bill to Amend Title 37, United States 
Code, Relating to Special Pay for Nuclear Qualified Officers., 94th Cong., 2nd sess., 3 June 1976.  Watkins 
in his testimony would raise the concern that nuclear officers were remaining at sea for 16 years with but a 
single, 2 year shore tour; that the nuclear officers were not receiving broadening educational opportunities.  
These conditions Peet and Zech had anticipated a decade before they reached such crisis proportions.  
126 Francis Duncan, Rickover: the Struggle for Excellence (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 
307.  In interviews with Admirals Calvert, Zech, and Mckee, as well as with scholars Hattendorf, Rickover 
held a strongly negative attitude toward senior service school programs. 
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the appearance of breadth so as to draw more recruits to the program; they did not signify 
any change in the pattern of specialization.127   Even some of the high profile departures 
from narrow specialization-- CDR Trost's participation in the Olmsted Program—were 
bitterly contested behind closed doors.  When CDR Carlisle Trost, a future CNO, 
returned to the submarine navy after studying in Europe, Rickover sought to bar him 
from further nuclear duty, a prohibition that was tantamount to ending Trost's career.  
Only the intervention of the traditional diesel officers saved Trost's career.128 
Rickover’s model for officer development, forged in the after-math of 
THRESHER, produced the most technically skilled officers in the Navy, surpassing in 
technical knowledge those of the first generation.  But to gain the additional expertise 
required even more narrow focus on the part of the officers.  The widely distributed 
career guidance documents for this new generation of nuclear officers captured this shift 
in emphasis from integrative education to narrow technical training.  In contrast to earlier 
career guides (e.g. the 1963 Pride Report to be discussed in chapter 7) that emphasized 
the importance of war college programs, the career guide for nuclear officers did not 
encourage education or broadening experience.  The guidance given to officers was to 
focus on the reactor and the platform:  “The fundamental goal of the nuclear trained 
submarine officer is to develop the professional SKILL and operational background to 
                                                 
127 Albert H. Konetzni, Jr., CDR USN, "Comment," US Naval Institute Proceedings, 107, no. 2, February 
1981.  Konetzni writes: “ In addition, several officers were detailed to postgraduate schools and non- 
submarine related shore assignments to help create the perception that submariners would, during their 
early careers, experience a wider variety of assignments.”   Konetzni's observation was also confirmed by 
senior submarine officers.  Charles R. Larson, ADM, USN (ret), Discussion with the Author, 2 January 
2008.  
128 Captain Harry Train was the assistant submarine detailer, and was in the office that wrote the orders for 
Trost to report as XO of a nuclear submarine over Rickover's objections.  Harry Depue Train, ADM USN, 
Interview with the Author, 2 November 2007.   In follow-up discussions with Admiral Trost, Trost did not 
dispute Train's account.   
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command a nuclear submarine…accomplished through a definite series of professional 
qualifications, advanced training and operational sea experience.” 129  
Nuclear officers are known for discipline and compliance with procedures.  It 
came as no surprise that nuclear officers quickly conformed to the career guidance 
emanating from the submarine detailer's office.  Whereas many of the first generation of 
officers were graduates of Naval Post Graduate School (NPGS) or the war college, in the 
1960s nuclear officer graduate school participation dropped off markedly. 130  For most of 
the succeeding two decades, the vast majority of nuclear submarine officers, though they 
were the navy's most academically talented officers, were denied the opportunity to 
attend NPGS.131  Declining nuclear officer attendance at the Naval War College and joint 
service schools paralleled that of graduate school.  Rickover pursued a policy of 
‘crowding out’: he refused to send his officers to the institution.132  Whereas almost all of 
the first generation nuclear officers who rose to flag rank had attended the war colleges, 
this pattern was broken with the second generation nuclear officers.  By the mid-1960s, 
the decline in submarine officer attendance at the Naval War College was noticeable.133   
Rickover’s personnel policy of purposeful shortage led to a narrowing of assignment and 
                                                 
129 N.R. Thunman,"Unrestricted Line Officer Career Planning Guidebook, NAVPERS 15197", Naval 
Historical Center, Washington, D.C., collections, VA 52.A63 15197,  47. 
130 Court of Inquiry: Loss of the USS THRESHER (SSN-593), Testimony of 21 May 1963, VADM 
Bernard L. Austin, USN, Presiding", Office of the Judge Advocate General, National Security Litigation 
and Intelligence Law Division, Washington, D.C., 1610. 
131 N.R. Thunman,"Unrestricted Line Officer Career Planning Guidebook, NAVPERS 15197", Naval 
Historical Center, Washington, D.C., collections, VA 52.A63 15197, 51.  Guidebook explains that nuclear 
officers had almost no opportunity for graduate school, in part due to shortages of personnel.  In contrast, 
the diesel officers could attend in large numbers.  
132 All those interviewed who worked close to Rickover recalled that Rickover held the war colleges in low 
regard, and prevented most officers from attending.  
133 Naval War College Staff,"Staff Study ", NWC Archives RG 17 Box 3 Staff Study 1 April 1969.  
Matriculation of submariners at NWC command and staff school from 1965-1969 declined to 
approximately 3%.  The 3% figure included diesel officers.  Therefore it can be assumed that the number of 
nuclear officers attending NWC most was most probably lower, though no definitive documents attest to 
the exact percentage.  
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education and established a pattern of technical specialization in the submarine officer 
corps that would persist for a generation. The pattern became so engrained that it can be 
seen in the educational and joint qualifications of nuclear trained flag officers on active 
duty in the first years of the 21st century.134  The nuclear officers were the first to be 
denied the benefits of King's integrative and well-rounded career pattern.  The 
consequences of such a policy would shape a generation who would rise to command.  
 
* 
Where to Get the Technical Elite: Plans for Annapolis 
 
 
The 'generalist' model of command that had successfully accommodated a half 
century of technological change and molded a generation of leaders would not survive 
the 1960s. The challenger was a potent combination of a truly unique technology, an 
aggressive philosophy of technical elitism, and a bureaucratic genius.  Rickover directed 
his first transformative efforts at the men who commanded the submarines.  Rickover's 
selection interviews, high technical standards, demanding schools, and the draft of 
aviators and surface officers achieved its purpose: to prevent the wholesale transition of 
diesel officers into nuclear power and thereby break their culture and traditions.  The 
primacy once placed on tactics, operations, and integration was replaced by an emphasis 
on technical expertise and specialization. Nuclear submariners would become a group 
                                                 
134 A comparison of 'line' officers in 2006 showed the persistence of the pattern of narrow technical 
specialization first established in the 1960s.  Using a common metric of joint qualification (JS1) to 
represent a broadened and integrative career,  submarine officers had the lowest percentage among the 
three warfare communities when measured at the top three ranks of 0-10, 0-9, 0-8 (admiral, vice admiral, 
and  rear admiral). Among line captains with joint qualification (JS1), the submariners lagged the surface 
navy by approximately 50% and lagged aviators by 30%.  Data from Bureau of Personnel officer inventory 
and qualification records, data run 5 December 2006. 
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that valued technical expertise over tactical and non-technical abilities.  As such, it was 
the more technical officers, the engineers, who quickly rose to command.135    
But solving questions of who would command did not necessarily solve the 
problem of securing adequate junior officers for the rapidly expanding fleet of reactors.  
To sustain the ambitious ship construction program, Rickover had to man new ships.  But 
in addition to manning the new ships, he faced the challenge of filling the shortfalls 
spawned by spiraling attrition.  Rickover had already begun tapping a new source of 
young officers, direct accessions from Annapolis.  But Rickover found many of the 
freshly minted ensigns to be weak engineers when compared to those who graduated 
from civilian polytechnics.  The education provided by the military school on the banks 
of the Severn was to Rickover academically backward, overly military in orientation, and 
insufficiently technical.  Rickover set his sights on his next transformation challenge: the 








135 Norman Polmar and Thomas B. Allen, Rickover (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982),  336- 350.  
Polmar provides a persuasive summary  of the nuclear officer’s rapid rise to leadership in the navy by the 
early 1970s: By 1972, Rickover had trained 4000 officers and 22,000 enlisted men. The first generation of 
nuclear officers—Wilkinson, Peet, Depoix, Zech, and Calvert—were all 3 stars; two of the first Enterprise 
captains,  Michelis and Holloway were 4 stars.  Control of submarine warfare, the DCNO (OP-02) had 
shifted to the nuclear officer control in approximately 1973.  By 1978, 35% of fleet was nuclear (pg. 350); 
and the only air craft carriers and submarines under construction were nuclear. 
Chapter Six 
 
 The Battle for the Minds of the Midshipman: The Eclipse 




“I think the Naval Academy is the most important institution in the Navy because it is the 
fountainhead of future naval officers and leaders and therefore our formative place…”             
Admiral Horacio Rivero, Jr. USN (retired), Ambassador to Spain, 1978 1 
 
“Surely the Naval Academy’s reason for being is to educate its graduates so that they can 
accept the broad responsibilities of the Line-of-the-Navy leadership and command…the 
only vital curriculum recommendation is: Never allow the Academy to become, by 
default, a polytechnic institute; keep the Line-of-the-Navy aspect always paramount in 
any consideration of curriculum…” 
Captain Allen M. Shinn, USN (later VADM Shinn) 
Commandant of Midshipmen 1956-582 
 
“With the increased dependency on nuclear power plant systems, every (Naval Academy)  
major must include enough math, science, and engineering that any midshipman, 
regardless of his academic major, qualifies for selection to the nuclear power program.”  
Bruce M. Davidson 
PhD, Engineering 







Rickover had held a technocratic view of education since the 1920s but as late as 
1958 had not intervened to reform the Navy’s most formative educational institution, the 
U.S. Naval Academy.  His policy of non-intervention changed dramatically between 
1959 and 1963, and Rickover would become, more than any other single figure, the 
                                                 
1 Horacio Rivero,  Jr., Admiral USN (Retired), Reminiscences of Admiral Horacio Rivero USN (retired) 
(Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press, 1978), 467. 
2 Allen M. Shinn, CAPT USN (Former USNA Commandant 1956-58)," From Captain Allen M. Shinn to 
RADM Charles Melson, dtd 14 August 1959", RG 405, USNA Spec collections, Curriculum Studies 1915-
1957, box 3, folder 4, 1959.   
3 Bruce M. Davidson, Academic Dean, USNA, "The Academic Dean Looks at the Academy," Shipmate, 
no. 3, March 1973, 26.  
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driving force behind the most profound reforms at Annapolis since 1845.4    In ten short 
years, Rickover transformed the midshipmen college into a polytechnic.   
Motivated by the need for young officers, Rickover imposed the rigorous 
technical requirements of his program on the Naval Academy curriculum.  The ‘line’ 
veterans of the Second World War initially resisted Rickover’s attempts to make 
Annapolis into a polytechnic, thus compelling Rickover to call on his congressional allies 
to push forward the reforms.  With the aide of his political allies, Rickover orchestrated 
the unprecedented displacement of the military dean by a civilian engineer.  THRESHER 
confirmed Rickover's belief that officers must become technical experts, and the admiral 
encouraged the new civilian dean to play an increasingly influential role in remaking the 
academy curriculum.  The midshipmen, however, did not embrace the engineering and 
sciences in sufficient numbers. When one of Rickover's officers became superintendent, 
the academy adopted a specialized majors program, and midshipmen were strongly 
encouraged to specialize in one of several technical fields. However, the future ensigns 
again failed to follow prompting to meet Rickover's needs, and for the first time, quotas 
on engineering and science majors were instituted.  When quotas also proved ineffective, 
academy leaders worked with Naval Reactors staff to shape high school admissions 
metrics in order to increase the number of midshipman appointments offered to 
technically inclined individuals.  The manipulation of admissions metrics proved 
remarkably effective in satisfying engineering and science quotas, but in so doing, 
                                                 
4 Most if not all scholars of Annapolis recognize this period, from 1959 to the end of the 1960s, as the 
Naval Academy's ‘academic revolution’.  For a detailed discussion of the reforms, see Todd A. Forney, The 
Midshipman Culture and Educational Reform: the U.S. Naval Academy, 1946-76 (Newark, Del.: 
University of Delaware Press, 2004);  John P. Lovell, Neither Athens nor Sparta?: The American Service 
Academies in Transition (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979).  These histories acknowledge 
Rickover played an important role, but they do not provide a deeper explanation of how Rickover 
intervened, and the significance of the technological system, the nuclear reactor.     
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reduced the number of midshipmen who were verbally and linguistically gifted.  The re-
engineered admissions metrics and the elimination of the universal language requirement 
produced after 1968 a far lower share of linguistically educated officers than the academy 
had typically produced in the first century of its existence.5    
In a decade Rickover’s interventions transformed the Naval Academy into an elite 
polytechnic and funneled a generation of the most talented officers into the fields of 
engineering.  Whereas in 1959 the commandant asserted that the academy mission was to 
produce the generalist-integrative officer, by 1973 the civilian dean would assert that the 
academy’s objective was to ensure every midshipman was qualified academically to be a 
nuclear engineer.   
* 
Competing Models for Annapolis:   
General Education or an Engineering Polytechnic, 1959-60 
 
Rickover recognized the unique power of undergraduate institutions to shape the 
values and thinking of the officer corps.   He thus made it a top priority to inculcate into 
young officers his values and ideas.  One of Rickover's closest and most trusted advisors, 
John W. Crawford, Jr., captured the essence of Rickover's ideas about youth and 
published his thoughts in the Naval Institute Proceedings in an article titled, "Get 'em 
Young and Train 'em Right".6   Admiral Mckee, Rickover’s successor as head of Naval 
Reactors, corroborated Crawford’s recollection: Rickover sought to recruit young officers 
                                                 
5 Because of these reforms, officer language education would fall from 100% of academy graduates to less 
than 30% on average.   
6 John W. Jr. Crawford, "Get 'em Young and Train 'em Right," US Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1987, 
103. 
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and midshipmen so that he could more readily shape their thinking and values to his 
own.7   This idea of ‘getting them young’ was not, however, a new one.  The Royal Navy 
was built upon a foundation of youthful recruitment.  As early as 1859, the Royal Navy 
reported to the Queen: “Men, who had been received into the Navy as boys, become from 
early habits and associations more attached, and adhere more closely to the service, than 
those entered at a more advanced age.” 8   
Faced with looming shortages of ‘suitable’ fleet officers, the EDO admiral not 
surprisingly called on the Annapolis midshipmen to man his reactors.  In contrast to re-
educating fleet transfer officers, the ‘mids’ were more impressionable.  Furthermore, the 
Annapolis students offered a potentially good 'return on investment' when compared to 
other sources of officer accessions: Naval Academy graduates retained at much higher 
rates than NROTC or OCS officers did.9   But the investment was only meaningful 
insofar as Rickover was concerned if the vast majority of midshipmen could pass his 
rigorous scientific engineering schools, a feat that they were finding especially difficult to 
achieve.  In an effort to raise midshipmen education up to his standards of technical rigor, 
Rickover began quietly in the late 1950s to take the initial steps to remake the Naval 
Academy into an elite polytechnic.  The transformed college was to become the 
intellectual incubator of the technical elite needed to control his nuclear reactors.  
                                                 
7 Kinnaird R. Mckee, Admiral, USN, Interview with the Author, 18 September 2006. 
8 Royal Navy Commissioners, Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the Best Means of 
Manning the Navy (London, England: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1859), vi.  
9    B.J. Semmes Jr., VADM USN,"Memorandum Chief of Naval Personnel to Secretary of the Navy, 
Subject: Retention, dtd 30 March 1965", Naval Historical Center, Operational Archives, 00 Files, 1965, 
box 29. USNA graduates were retained at almost three or four times that of OCS graduates and two to three 
times that of NROTC at the end of obligated service.  And by four years later, the disparity was even 
greater, USNA retaining up to 43% as compared to approximately 5 % for NROTC and OCS.    
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The first step in Rickover's reform efforts was to suggest an alternative to the 
traditional Annapolis 'general' education model.  The King plan called for 'line' 
commanders to be generalists, and Annapolis produced generalists.  In the early 1960s, 
King's ideas still influenced the academy curriculum and were referenced in several 
education policy documents.10  Rickover sought to break the King model and instead 
suggested the academy emulate institutions that produced technical experts and 
specialists.   
To be sure, the Naval Academy under the King plan had included a substantial 
engineering education program.  From 1899 to 1959, the academy had produced a line 
officer with solid, practical engineering knowledge. 11  However, it was an altogether 
different task to produce a midshipman who could be both scientific engineer and, as 
Halsey advocated, a future tactician and commander of a joint integrated military force.  
As technological complexity increased, some questioned whether a future ‘line’ officer 
had the time to study scientific engineering and still develop the foundation that would 
enable him to command the integrated and joint forces of the modern military.12  
Rickover may have agreed that the 'line' could not do both, but Rickover was clear about 
which endeavor must take priority. Rickover asserted that the priority had been clear for a 
half century: engineering.  Rather than reconsider the premise that ‘all line officers were 
                                                 
10 The King plan was noted in the Keith Board of 1959, and in Chief of Bureau of Personnel study of 
education in 1966.  The Holloway Board Report of 1945, a particularly important document that remained 
a key reference well into the 1960s, also followed the King recommendations.   
11 Peter Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern 
American Navalism (New York: The Free Press, 1972), 356.    
12 R.T.S. Keith, RADM, USNR,"Billet and post-graduate educational requirements in the specialty areas in 
the line of the Navy, Report of Board 1 October 1959", NARA RG 24-470-54-25-6 box 5.  
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to be engineers', Rickover invoked the Act of 1899 as an inviolable principle.13  If ships 
were now propelled by the most advanced scientifically engineered machines, then 
logically naval ‘line’ officers must be scientific engineers in command.  To interpret the 
Act in this way required the academy and the ‘line’ to conform to the requirements of the 
modern engineering profession as defined, not by naval officers, but by polytechnic 
faculty in schools that produced highly specialized engineers.   The possibility that the 
increased complexity of joint operations and the greater demands of scientific 
engineering might justify a reevaluation of decisions made in 1899—to split out 
engineers and the ‘line’-- did not appear to have been considered as a serious alternative 
in 1959.   Rather, guided by a technocratic philosophy, Rickover asserted that the Naval 
Academy must follow the example of the polytechnics and place priority on the study of 
scientific engineering. 
The leading polytechnics of the later 1950s were quite different from the Naval 
Academy.  In the mid 20th century, scientific engineering had begun to gradually displace 
the study of practical engineering in most engineering colleges.  MIT served as a leading 
barometer of the direction of engineering pedagogy.  MIT had started the shift to a 
science-based engineering curriculum in the 1930s,  in part prompted  by the arrival of 
Karl Compton who was later made famous for his role in the Manhattan Project.14  By 
the late 1950s, the new scientific ideology of engineering had spread to the majority
polytechnic campuses.  As one observer noted, the scientific content of the engineering 
 of 
                                                 
13 Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Nuclear Navy, 1946-1962 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1974), 348. 
14   Bruce Seely, "Research, Engineering, and Science in American Engineering Colleges, 1900-1969," in 
Technology & American History: an Historical Anthology from Technology & Culture, ed. Stephen H. 
Cutcliffe and Terry S. Reynolds (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 359-361.  Seely describes 
how “engineering science” in the post-war period displaced practical engineering which had dominated 
prior to 1940.  See also Don K. Price, The Scientific Estate. 
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curriculum had been characterized by a rapid increase, and "...in the 20 years or so after 
1945, of a quantum jump in engineering knowledge."15   To Rickover the new 
polytechnic like MIT was the way of the future, steeped as it was in scientific engineering 
and advanced mathematics.  Rickover’s technocratic philosophy held as one of its tenets 
the conviction that scientific education was the way of the future, that “…technological 
revolution arises from the power of the new science…”, and those who would lead 
required  “…an impersonal scientific attitude toward work that must be done.” 16  
However, such a shift was at odds with how the academy had evolved over the past two 
generations and was at odds with the latest, and most detailed, academy curriculum 
review completed just months before Rickover intervened.  
Naval "line" officers at mid-century were not convinced that the Naval Academy 
should be a scientific-based engineering college patterned after the polytechnic model.  
For half of a century, naval officers had been wary of placing too great an emphasis on 
engineering, and this hesitancy persisted into the 1960s.  In 1899 when ‘line’ and 
engineering education merged at Annapolis, the ‘line’ and operational components of the 
curriculum had been pre-dominant, not engineering.  The academy leaders in the 1920s 
and 1930s pursued reforms to maintain a non-technical and technical balance. Under the 
command of Admiral Thomas Hart, the academy had expanded substantially the non-
technical portions of the curriculum to include the study of politics, economics, and 
foreign language.  Following the disruption of the Second World War, a series of 
                                                 
15 Edwin T. Layton, The Revolt of the Engineers: Social Responsibility and the American Engineering 
Profession (Cleveland,: Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1971),  251. 
16 Hyman G. Rickover, Education and Freedom (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1959), 102.  The deterministic 
underpinnings of Rickover’s technological philosophy is again evident, the idea that persons must become 
‘impersonal’ and conform themselves to the discipline of a god-like technological force.  
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successive superintendent admirals returned the academy to Hart's pre-war balance, with 
the exception of the modest addition of aviation-related course work.  
On the eve of Rickover's intervention, the academy curriculum remained balanced 
between the non-technical and technical, professional and academic, and set as its goal to 
produce the generalist officer, otherwise known as the 'well rounded line officer’.  The 
trend at Annapolis up to the late 1950s, despite what was happening in civilian 
engineering schools, was to maintain a balance between the non-technical and technical, 
perhaps even tilt toward the non-technical parts of the curriculum.17  Masland and 
Radway in their 1957 landmark study of military education rebutted those who described 
the Naval Academy as one of the   “… engineering schools.  This is untrue.”18  A former 
senior engineering professor of the Naval Academy who taught in the 1960s would 
explain that not until the Rickover reforms of the 1960s did Annapolis begin to produce 
engineers in the modern sense of the word.19    Even in the midst of Rickover's 
intervention, a Naval Academy Superintendent, RADM Kirkpatrick, would prefer to 
compare the Naval Academy to an Ivy League liberal arts college rather than to a 
polytechnic.20   
Two generations of naval leaders, from King to Kirkpatrick, declined to endorse a 
curriculum centered on specialized scientific engineering.  These leaders were not 
Luddite admirals who possessed an anti-technical mindset.  Rather, they recognized that 
                                                 
17 For a detailed examination of USNA curriculum changes, see Charles Paul Sheppard, “An analysis of 
curriculum changes at the United States Naval Academy during the period 1959 through 1974” (Thesis Ph 
D --George Washington University, 1974).   
18 John Wesley Masland and Laurence Ingram Radway, Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and 
National Policy (Princeton,: Princeton University Press, 1957),  211. 
19 Peter Wiggins, PhD (academy professor from 1960s-1990s), Interview with the Author, 24 Sept 2007. 
20 C. C. Kirkpatrick,  RADM USN, "Rhode Scholars? Yes! But Naval Officers First: A Century of 
Academic Achievements," Shipmate, no. 9-10, Sept-October 1963,  9. 
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the Naval Academy, as a service academy, was one of only a handful of institutions 
dedicated to the creation of the nation's warrior class.  They believed that what must be 
preserved at Annapolis was its general military emphasis, even at the expense of falling 
behind the latest advances in engineering.  They pointed out that by mid-century in the 
United States there existed hundreds of engineering colleges and over a million engineers 
in the country.   Sheppard, author of perhaps the most detailed analysis of academy 
curricular change, wrote of the uniqueness of the service academy and the difficulty in 
striking a balance between the academic and the military requirements:   
“It is this feature which distinguished these highly specialized professional 
institutions from the typical college, which does not have a responsibility to any one 
particular profession. It is also this feature which makes the professional educational 
institution’s job increasingly difficult as the profession becomes more complex; for in the 
face of a growing number of things which one “should know” in  particular profession, it 
becomes increasingly important that these essential areas of fundamental knowledge are 
given adequate attention….unlike other educational institutions, which prepare men for 
specific professions, service academies are designed primarily to provide a general 
foundation upon which more advanced professional education, along with actual service 
can build.” 21     
Naval officers were fully aware of the technological change engulfing mid-
twentieth century American colleges.22  However, they reached different conclusions 
than did Rickover. The combat veterans concluded that Annapolis was different and 
should not become a polytechnic-- that is, an engineering school with specialized 
engineering degrees.  The academy's 1957 curriculum review articulated that Annapolis
must keep pace with the changing world, but that it was primarily a college to prepare 
midshipmen to be general 'lin
 
e' officers.  
                                                 
21 Charles Paul Sheppard, “An analysis of curriculum changes at the United States Naval Academy during 
the period 1959 through 1974” (Thesis Ph D --George Washington University, 1974), 182-183. 
22 Board of Visitors and miscellaneous reports of 1953-1959, NARA RG 405, US Naval Academy, Special 
Collections.  Several staff papers and clippings of education articles from leading publications were 
collected by the Superintendent’s staff.  The Superintendent and his staff, unprompted from the outside, 
initiated a curricular review in 1957 in order to identify recommendations for changes in the curriculum.  
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To better prepare midshipmen for the changing world of the later 1950s, the 
Naval Academy studied its curriculum and, in the 1957 review, called for strengthened 
humanities and linguistics.  These changes were justified by the global nature of the Cold 
War. As for pedagogical approaches, the review acknowledged the leadership of national 
educational reformers and proposed the academy begin to move from ‘how to’ technical 
courses to a more rigorous study of the fundamentals.23  The internal academy 
assessment of 1957 very clearly engaged the idea of a broad education, one strong in 
liberal arts and language.  J.E. Dougherty, the chair of the language department, wrote to 
the 'line' officer Dean (then known as the Secretary of the Academic Board) on 1 Nov 
1957 and argued for expanded foreign language education.  He offered as evidence 
expanded program the pronouncements of the most respected leaders of the militar
the scientific world-- Omar Bradley, John F. Dulles, Karl Compton, General Mathe
Ridgeway, and Admiral Arleigh A. Burke-- all of whom advocated language training for 
the young officer.    Prophetically, Dougherty noted that changes to foreign language 
curriculum policy could hold consequences not “...only for the years just ahead but for a 
generation to come.”   He explained that the department saw the “…need for the Navy 
and of the nation for capable junior officers, broadly trained for eventual leadership in a 
variety of positions of the highest importance in military and in government affairs.”  He 
went on to conclude: “In any future combat circumstances, just as now in the Cold War, 
the better we understand both our allies and our enemies, and the better we know their 
languages, the more effective and the less costly will be our operations.  We may never 




                                                 
23 W.D. Brinckloe, CAPT USN, "Head Department of Marine Engineering to Secretary of Academic 
Board, 5 Dec 1957, Subj: Final Curriculum Study", RG 405, USNA Special Collections, Curriculum 
Studies and General Correspondence 1915-1957, Box 3. 
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bear against the Japanese and against Hitler’s forces in WWII.”24   And Dougherty was 
not alone in his advocacy for more language training for naval officers.  The CNO at the 
time advised all line officers to make one of their top three career priorities the mastery of 
a foreign language. 25 
The senior admirals and language professors had other allies who also advocated 
for language education for midshipmen.  Some military engineers went so far as to 
recommend an expansion of non-technical education at the expense of the study of 
engineering.  W.D. Brinckloe, the Head of the Department of Marine Engineering, and 
his fellow engineers, in a remarkable analysis submitted to the Secretary of the Academic 
Board in 5 December 1957, called for the abolition of several engineering courses in 
order to allow an expansion in the humanities and social sciences.  This engineer 
department head, in a moment of commendable non-partisanship, favored an additional 
252 hours in the humanities and linguistic fields, as compared to an increase of 117 hours 
for math-chemistry-physics. The expansion in these two non-engineering fields was to be 
facilitated in part by a reduction in his engineering department share by 156 hours.26  The 
approved plan was scheduled for implementation in June 1959, which if implemented, 
would  have reduced  courses in 'applied technology' and favored courses in 
fundamentals.  The approved plan preserved foreign language education for all 
                                                 
24 J.E.Dougherty, "Head of Dept of Foreign Languages to Sec of Academic Board, 1 Nov 1957", RG 405, 
USNA Special Collections, Curriculum Studies and General Correspondence 1915-1957, Box 3, Folder 1. 
25 Arleigh A. Burke, ADM, USN, "Letter From the Chief of Naval Operations to All Line Officers," Line 
Officer Personnel Newsletter, September 1956; Arleigh Burke,"Language Training for Navy Personnel, 
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midshipmen.27   RADM Melson, the Superintendent at the time, described his goal as to 
move beyond the “…narrowed and very fixed…”and instead to “…broaden the 
curriculum.”28 
However, it was not the study of language and culture that would take center 
stage in the coming academic revolution.  In 1959, Rickover blocked the implementation 
of the plan when he created an alternative curriculum review board.  Rickover's review 
board was headed by Dr. Richard Folsom, the president of Rennsalear Polytechnic. 
Absent from this board was the balanced representation of liberal arts college educators.   
The Folsom Board, composed of a disproportionate share of technical educators (only 
one of the board members was a non-technical academic), initially included one navy 
admiral from the atomic energy division of the Navy staff, RADM (s) Frederick L. 
Ashworth (RADM H. Rivero would eventually join the board). 29  This outside board 
reached significantly different conclusions than those of the academy’s 1957 review: they 
recommended a curriculum that strongly resembled that of a polytechnic.  
For those who have studied the Naval Academy, there “…is a special fascination 
and a special significance associated with the years since 1959.”30   The reforms of 1959 
have been described by leading scholars of the academy curriculum as “…the most 
                                                 
27 Charles L. Melson, RADM USN,"Superintendent USNA to ADM W.F. Boone, USN dtd 10 April 1959", 
RG 405, USNA Special Collections, Records of Superintendent, General Correspondence Education and 
Training, Curriculum Studies 1915-1957, Box 3, Folder 4. 
28 Charles Leroy Melson, The Reminiscences of Vice Admiral Charles L. Melson, U.S. Navy (Retired) 
(Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1974), 250-251, 257.   Melson explains that his reform plans had the 
support of both Admiral Burke and Secretary of the Navy Franke.  
29 The initial board composition was to include Dr. Folsom of Rensselaer Polytechnic, four college 
administrators, and one navy admiral (select) from the atomic energy division of the Navy staff, RADM (s) 
Frederick L. Ashworth. A non-nuclear admiral, RADM Horatio Rivero, was added later to the board.  
30 Robert McNitt, RADM, USN (ret), ""Challenge and Change"," Shipmate, no. 4, April 1972, 3-4.    
McNitt explains the changes at Annapolis, and begins his story with 1959, which he, along with many other 
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important curriculum reviews at the Naval Academy since the establishment of the Naval 
School at Annapolis in 1845.”31  Though many histories on the Naval Academy in this 
period attach great significance to the Folsom visit of 1959, they give relatively little 
attention to the inspiration and origins of what became known as the Folsom Board.32   
The board was far less independent than appears on the surface.  Rickover facilitated the 
creation of the Folsom Board, approved, and then guided the implementation of its 
recommendations.  In later years, a senior admiral who served on the board, Admiral 
Rivero, admitted that the board’s results were submitted to Admiral Rickover for his 
approval.33   Rickover’s goals were both pragmatic and principled.  He sought to better 
prepare midshipmen to succeed in his demanding technical schools. But he was also 
motivated by his philosophy of technocracy and his belief in the determinism of 
technology.  To that end, he sought to transform the minds of the young midshipmen to 
conform to the "discipline of technology", to become techno-centric in thinking and 
action.   
Rickover realized he needed political support from Congress to reform the 
academy.  Annapolis administrators were not as receptive to his persuasive powers as 
were fleet officers.  In the fleet Rickover could use his new ships and increased 
opportunities for promotion to win over commanders and captains who coveted 
                                                 
31 Charles Paul Sheppard, “An analysis of curriculum changes at the United States Naval Academy during 
the period 1959 through 1974” (Thesis Ph D --George Washington University, 1974),  222. 
32 John P. Lovell, Neither Athens nor Sparta?: The American Service Academies in Transition 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979).   In chapter seven, Lovell implies that Folsom was invited 
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33 Horacio Rivero Jr., Admiral USN (Retired), Reminiscences of Admiral Horacio Rivero USN (retired) 
(Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press, 1978), 469.      
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command of nuclear platforms.  In contrast, senior admirals and veteran alumni had 
already had their commands, and these independent-minded officers exerted significant 
influence over the academy, both from the Superintendent's home and from the Alumni 
Association in the nearby headquarters in Annapolis.  These combat veterans were not 
receptive to the ideas of an engineering duty officer.34   For Rickover to effect his 
reforms, he needed non-Navy allies-- civilian scientific engineers and political officials-- 
to help implement his vision.   
Rickover enlisted two sets of allies to transform the academy: engineering-minded 
academics and sympathetic elected officials.  The first group included a young president 
of Notre Dame, Father Theodore Hesburgh.  Hesburgh was the proximate cause for the 
Folsom Board: he called for an outside review of the academy program.  His intrusion 
has been depicted as the action of a concerned citizen, a disinterested and objective 
outsider who took it upon himself to criticize the Naval Academy.  His intervention 
began a chain of events that resulted in the most significant academy reforms in 115 
years.35  Hesburgh was not, however, disinterested.  Rather, he was an associate of 
Rickover and maintained a friendship that lasted until Rickover’s death.36  There is little 
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doubt that Rickover helped shaped his friend's views of the Naval Academy and 
prompted the priest's intervention.   
Hesburgh intervened while he served as a member of the Secretary of the Navy’s 
Advisory Board on Educational Requirements (SABER).  In his capacity as a board 
member, Hesburgh in 1959 criticized the Naval Academy, a criticism that was conveyed 
to the Chief of BUPERS, VADM Harold P. Smith.  In response to this complaint from a 
"respected academic", Smith suggested to a reluctant Naval Academy Superintendent that 
he permit an unprecedented review by an outside assessment team.37  The Naval 
Academy superintendent resisted the idea, which prompted BUPERS to send a “hard 
line” letter of 31 March 1959 to force the issue.  The Navy then appointed one of the 
nation's leading engineering educators, Dr. Richard G. Folsom, President of Rensselaer 
Polytechnic Institute, as the senior examiner.38    
The Navy 'line' officers recognized the possible threat posed by an outside board 
of engineers.  In a desperate effort to prepare a defense against the Folsom Board, the 
Superintendent sent out a questionnaire to thousands of USNA graduates asking for their 
opinion as to the sufficiency of their alma mater's curriculum.39  One remarkable and 
cogent response came from the recent Commandant of Midshipmen, Captain Allen 
Shinn, who argued for the continuation of the broad and general educational program.  
The former commandant, who later promoted to admiral, explained that there was indeed 
                                                 
37 Charles Paul Sheppard, “An analysis of curriculum changes at the United States Naval Academy during 
the period 1959 through 1974” (Thesis Ph D --George Washington University, 1974),  237.  Sheppard 
provides invaluable insight into the origins of these events based on lengthy and detailed interviews with 
senior BUPERS officials and members of the Folsom Board.  
38 Ibid., 239. 
39 Charles L. Melson, RADM USN,"Superintendent USNA to ADM W.F. Boone, USN dtd 10 April 1959", 
RG 405, USNA Special Collections, Records of Superintendent, General Correspondence Education and 
Training, Curriculum Studies 1915-1957, Box 3, Folder 4. 
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a time in history when West Point and Annapolis could distinguish themselves by their 
unique offerings in civil and steam engineering.   However, that time had passed and now 
the country was “…dotted with fine engineering colleges of all kinds.”  Rather than 
return to teaching more engineering, it was now the duty of Annapolis and West Point to 
provide broadened officers capable of providing military leadership and exercising 
‘command.’   Shinn anticipated Rickover’s plans and strongly opposed what he expected 
might be a blueprint for a technocratic transformation of Annapolis. Shinn asserted:  
"Surely the Naval Academy’s reason for being is to educate its graduates so that they can 
accept the broad responsibilities of the Line-of-the-Navy leadership and command, and to 
instill in these young officers a strong desire to pursue lifetime careers of such 
responsibility and service….the only vital curriculum recommendation is: Never allow 
the Academy to become, by default, a Polytechnic Institute; keep the Line-of-the-Navy 
aspect always paramount in any consideration of curriculum…”40 
 Rickover anticipated correctly that senior naval officers would resist his outside 
board and early on secured the support of powerful political allies, four United States’ 
senators.   In a letter from the Board of Visitors of April 13, 1959, the four senators 
issued an unprecedented appended statement that was most likely written by Rickover or 
                                                 
40 Allen M. Shinn, CAPT USN (Former USNA Commandant 1956-58)," From Captain Allen M. Shinn to 
RADM Charles Melson, dtd 14 August 1959", RG 405, USNA Spec collections, Curriculum Studies 1915-
1957, box 3, folder 4, 1959.  Shinn is generally correct in his assessment of the changing position of the 
service academies.  West Point in 1802 was the country’s first institution that offered “technical education”, 
followed by Rensselaer Polytechnic in 1824, and the Naval Academy in 1845.  By 1950, however, there 
were in the United States at least 160 colleges dedicated to engineering, and many more that included on 
their campuses highly competitive engineering departments.  See John S. Brubacher, and Willis Rudy, 
Higher Education in Transition: A History of American Colleges and Universities (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers, 1997),  61-62. 
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his staff.41   The senators criticized the Annapolis curriculum and offered a novel and 
somewhat puzzling justification for reforms of a naval school for warriors.  The senators 
complained that the Naval Academy, when compared to civilian engineering colleges, 
did not adequately prepare midshipmen to attend engineering graduate schools.  As a 
consequence, the senators explained,  "...Naval Academy graduates must take two years 
of additional undergraduate studies in order to compete with college counterparts in 
science and engineering graduate fields..." 42  But this argument was only puzzling for 
‘line’ officers, not for those who might see the ‘line’ as a future technocracy.  Rickover 
defined leadership by technical credentials, and engineering graduate schools were the 
new metric.  Rickover’s allies, the senators, were repeating Rickover’s philosophy and 
arguments, almost verbatim.  Unoriginal as they might have been, the four senators were 
crucial in overcoming the ‘line’ officer resistance and opened the door for the polytechnic 
review board.  
 The Folsom Board convened on 11 May 1959 and met several times between 
May until it completed the report on November 16th 1959.  The Board of Visitors, which 
included the four senators sympathetic to Rickover, established a second new precedent 
when it convened a second time in a single year to review and endorse Folsom’s 
findings.43  The Folsom report offered a sharp contrast to the internal Naval Academy 
                                                 
41 House Committee on Appropriations Report on Russia by VADM H.G. Rickover, US Navy, 86th Cong., 
2nd sess., August 18, 1959.   Rickover excerpts a significant portion of the Senators' report, which in tone 
and structure appears quite similar to Rickover’s own discussion of the subject in this testimony on 
education and technology.  See page 72 of Rickover's testimony, wherein Rickover as much as admits that 
he submitted the language for the Senators to forward to the Naval Academy Board of Visitors.  
42 Board of Visitors,"Report of Board of Visitors, US Naval Academy, 17 April 1959", RG 405 USNA 
Special Collections, Reports of Boards and Committees, Board of Visitors, box 2, folder 1951-1964  1959, 
pages 10-11. 
43 Wayne P. Hughes, "New Directions in Naval Academy Education," US Naval Institute Proceedings, 86, 
no. 5 May 1960,  35. 
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review of 1957: the practice of universal language training, a bedrock of academy policy 
for over a hundred years, was not strengthened but recommended for termination; the 
humanities, social sciences, and linguistics were overshadowed by the strong shift in 
emphasis to scientific engineering; civilians were to occupy an increased proportion of 
the academic postings and in so doing displace military officers; and a civilian academic 
of national stature was recommended to occupy the position of dean, an action which 
would displace the military officer who was then Secretary of the Academic Board.44  
The significance of the Rickover-inspired Folsom Board is difficult to overstate, for it is 
generally recognized by all scholars of military education as the foundation for radical 
changes that followed at the academy. 45  However, the Folsom Board recommendations 
lacked support in the senior navy ranks, which were dominated by veterans of the Second 
World War, adherents of King’s system of integrative and general education.  It is 
doubtful, without Rickover's continued intervention, the old alumni and the serving 
admirals would have allowed the Folsom recommendations to be implemented.   
 
* 
A Technocrat to Build the Polytechnic, 1961-1962  
 
Uniform officers, in particular RADM Melson, the Superintendent, resisted 
                                                 
44 Board of Visitors,"Report of the Board of Visitors to the United States Naval Academy", RG 405, 
Special Collections, USNA, Records of Boards and Committees, Board of Visitors, 1936-1977 Box 2.  See 
Folsom Board Report, pg 15,  for an example of the dismissive attitude toward foreign language training.  
The board suggested that foreign language education should be an elective not a core requirement, and 
should a midshipman be interested, he could attend the Naval Intelligence School in Anacostia. For further 
analysis of changes, see also Sheppard, pg. 251, Forney, pg. 113, Lovell, pg. 160.  
45 It should be noted that before completion of the Folsom Review, the academy had already begun to move 
beyond ‘wrote’ learning and lock-step curriculum.  The first opportunity for midshipmen to validate course 
credits came before the Folsom Board.  Thus, the academy's staff was not hostile to change, as Rickover 
may have believed, but were already moving toward adoption of more contemporary instructional 
practices. 
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implementing the Rickover-inspired and Rickover-approved recommendations.46  In the 
face of such resistance, Dr. Folsom expressed pessimism that without “...strong, sustained 
outside support by higher naval authorities over a number of years...” his 
recommendations would not be implemented.47  The reason for the resistance was 
evident both in Shinn’s memo and in recent leading professional journals: officers 
perceived Folsom’s recommendations as a threat to the mission and broad curriculu
the academy.  Implementation of Folsom’s recommendations was tantamount to t
replacement of the time-honored, broadly educated, ‘versatile” officer with Rickover’s 
model of technical expert and specialist.  While Rickover was not alone in his advocacy 
of specialization, he was the most influential advocate, and his nuclear officers were the 
leading exemplar of this new 'line' officer model.   
m of 
he 
                                                
The Naval Academy leadership was outspoken in its resistance to the polytechnic 
model of technical education and continued to subscribe to the goal of producing officers 
modeled in accord with the King system.  RADM Melson acknowledged that advancing 
technology required some adjustments, but technology was NOT defining.  Melson 
stressed repeatedly that the mission of Annapolis was “…preparing well-rounded career 
line officers…”   Melson disavowed technical specialization in two successive alumni 
letters. He explained that the purpose of the letters was to  “… remove any  question that 
the Academy might be emphasizing technical specialties…"48  Naval leaders, to include 
the Secretary of the Navy, John Connally, went so far as to reword the academy mission 
 
46 John P. Lovell, Neither Athens nor Sparta? : The American Service Academies in Transition 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979),  162-163. 
47 Folsom, as quoted in Sheppard, 253-254. 
48 Charles L. Melson, RADM USN, "Superintendent Reports," Shipmate, no. 6-7, June-July 1960.  See also 
Forney, pg. 121 for analysis of Melson's policies.  
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to “…emphasize that the Naval Academy goal is the preparation of  officers for a career 
of naval service.  There was to be no ambiguity which might result in misconstruing the 
mission as primarily the preparation of junior officers, of engineers, or of any other 
special Service need to the detriment of a balanced program for career naval officers.” 49  
Not just the senior admirals and Secretary Connally supported the integrative or versatile 
officers, but a large cross section of the active duty officers also expressed their support 
of the integrative officer. 50   
Melson’s successor, RADM Davidson, inherited the dispute and challenged the 
Folsom Board “…particularly in regard to the foreign language program.” 51  Davidson 
later countered Rickover in a bluntly worded memo, writing that “….there appears to be a 
major difference of opinion as to whether we should be graduating qualified engineers or 
well-rounded naval officers for future service in the Navy.” 52  Senior officials beyond 
the academy joined Davidson in questioning the Folsom/Rickover push toward a 
technical curriculum.  The third convention of the SABER Board described Folsom's plan 
as a manifestation of the current “…fetish for scientific education.”   The board 
                                                 
49 Wayne P. Hughes, "New Directions in Naval Academy Education," US Naval Institute Proceedings, 86, 
no. 5 May 1960,  1.  It should be noted that the mission statement would be changed at the end of Admiral 
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pg. 261; Forney, pg. 130; Lovell, pp. 162-63. 
51  J. F. Davidson, RADM USN, Report to Board of Visitors, 5-8 December 1960, as quoted in Charles 
Paul Sheppard, “An analysis of curriculum changes at the United States Naval Academy during the period 
1959 through 1974” (Thesis Ph D --George Washington University, 1974) ,  252. 
52 J.F. Davidson, RADM USN, "Memorandum from Superintendent, USNA to Chief of Naval Personnel, 
dtd 20 Feb 1962, titled: "Comments Concerning Letter from Manager, Naval Reactors, USAEC, to the 
Secretary of  the Navy Proposing changes to the Naval Academy"", Naval Historical Center, Operational 
Archives, 1966 Box 34, USNA file enclosure (1), 7-8. 
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recommended that foreign language training, not engineering, be expanded.  The SABER 
Board also reiterated that the function of both USNA and NROTC was to produce the 
needed “generalists” of the officer corps. 53      
As the months wore on with no action on Folsom’s recommendations, Rickover 
traveled to Annapolis to investigate.  Rickover was disappointed that academy officers 
were not receptive to his ideas.54  But to intervene again, Rickover needed a reason, an 
opening.  Rickover got his opportunity when the Superintendent blundered on a fairly 
minor issue that allowed Rickover to reenter the academy debate and this time win the 
support of a new Secretary of the Navy.    
The Superintendent of the Naval Academy attempted in 1961 to create a course in 
nuclear engineering without Rickover’s participation, complete with a sub-critical reactor 
that had already been acquired by the academy (See Figure 6-1).  Rickover was 
justifiably concerned and appealed to the Superintendent, RADM Davidson, to forgo his 
nuclear plans.  Instead, Rickover suggested that he and his staff at Naval Reactors should 
oversee all nuclear education for naval officers at his nuclear training commands.  The 
Naval Academy and senior navy officers denied Rickover’s request to cancel what was a 
three-hour course and, by so doing, changed the history of the naval officer corps.  Their 
intransigence compelled Rickover to appeal directly to the Secretary of the Navy.  The 
result was that a three credit hour course for midshipmen was terminated by order of the 
                                                 
53The Secretary’s report of 1961 was most critical of the Folsom Board.   See SABER,"Secretary of the  
Navy Advisory Board for Educational Requirements(SABER): Reports 3-7", Naval Historical Center, 
Operational Archives, Personal Papers of Arleigh A. Burke, Box 9, Folder: SABER.   
54 John P. Lovell, Neither Athens nor Sparta? : The American Service Academies in Transition 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979), pg. 162-164, see also  Charles Leroy Melson, The 
Reminiscences of Vice Admiral Charles L. Melson, U.S. Navy (Retired) (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 
1974), 312-314.    
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Secretary of the Navy! 55  However, something more important than a course cancellation 
resulted:  ‘line’ officers had, once again, similar to 1953, forced Rickover to appeal to 
politicians where, again, he found critical support.  The alliance, though it lasted only two 
years, was arguably the most important political-military relationship in the history of 
post-war naval educational reform.  Not since 1899 when Dr. Ira N. Hollis, the Harvard 
engineering professor, persuaded neophyte navy secretaries Roosevelt and Long to 
amalgamate the engineers and the line had such a potent combination of technocrat and 
politician shaped the officer corps.   
Rickover had larger ambitions than to terminate a three credit hour course and 
with the support of the Secretary of the Navy could now act on his agenda.  He was 
determined to compel the adoption of the most radical of Folsom’s recommendations:  
the replacement of the military dean by a civilian engineer, and a major expansion in the 
civilian composition and civilian leadership of the academy faculty.  To effect this 
change at the academy, Rickover bypassed all uniformed officers and, with a door 
opened to him by the course credit fiasco, appealed directly to the inexperienced 
Secretary of the Navy, Fred Korth, who had recently replaced Connally.56    
Both sides recognized the battle over the position of dean to be among the most 
important in the academy's recent history.  All the military academies, beginning with 
West Point, had for over a century relied upon talented uniformed officers to oversee the 
curriculum.  Though the Navy had had a long history of civilians on the faculty, to 
                                                 
55 John S. Connally, Secretary of the Navy, "Major in Nuclear Engineering at the US Naval Academy", ltr 
dtd 20 Dec 1961 to Chief of Naval Personnel ", Naval Historical Center, Operational Archives 00 File 
1966, box 34, folder "USNA".   
56 Fred Korth, Secretary of the Navy,""Education at the Naval Academy", ltr from SECNAV to 
UnderSecretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Personnel, dtd 22 May 1962", NHC Operational Archives 00 
1966, Box 34, folder "USNA".  Note, at both the USAFA and USMA uniformed officers serve as dean. 
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displace the naval officer with a civilian in the senior position (Secretary of the Academic 
Board) was anathema to the naval profession of arms.  The debate quickly degenerated 
into a bureaucratic battle complete with a fusillade of memos, personal appeals, and even 
secretarial retractions and restatements.  In the after-glow of SPUTNIK, however, 
education had been politicized, and with the National Defense Education Act of 1958, 
political activists happily waded into curriculum debates.57  This political attention 
worked to Rickover’s advantage as his strength was with Congress and senior civilians, 
not with the uniform Navy.58  
In January of 1962, Rickover sent a personal letter directly to the Secretary of the 
Navy in which he pressed for the adoption of several recommendations that had 
originated in the Folsom Report, including hiring of a civilian dean.59  A few months 
later, the new Secretary of the Navy, Fred Korth—inexperienced in the Navy and quite 
possibly under the undue influence of the sixty-year-old admiral60-- supported Rickover’s 
proposals.61  Korth’s decision to endorse in total Rickover’s recommendation, in 
                                                 
57 Barbara Barksdale Clowse, Brainpower for the Cold War: the Sputnik Crisis and National Defense 
Education Act of 1958 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981). 
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(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979),  164.  Lovell attributes Rickover’s successful intervention 
on the issue of the civilian dean to his manipulation of Rep Clarence Cannon, who pressured Secretary 
Korth to support Rickover’s proposals.   
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1966, Box 34, folder "USNA".  Forney describes Korth’s letter as almost ‘regurgitation’ of Rickover’s 
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particular the decision to place a civilian as dean, generated a wave of protest.  Retired 




Figure 6-1: Annapolis Subcritical Reactor Training.  Midshipman training on an apparently sub-
critical reactor filled with 5,500 pounds of uranium in Annapolis, Maryland, in the early 1960s.  Such 
'training' did not particularly please VADM Rickover.  Note concerned expression of midshipman on the 
right of the photo, who is apparently holding the reactor with right thumb.  The concerned midshipman may 
have agreed with Rickover that this type of activity might be better supervised elsewhere, though his 
classmate with the control mechanism does appear to be fully focused on his delicate task. 62 
                                                 
62 Photo taken from USNA Catalogue 1960-61, pg 16, USNA Special Collections, Annapolis, MD.   
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Association, articulated the case for a military dean. 63   The admirals believed, correctly, 
that Rickover’s recommendations struck at the very core of what it meant to be a naval 
officer.64   
Carney took the lead and expressed concern that a civilian dean might come to be 
the second ranking person in the Naval Academy and could thus exert "disproportionate 
influence" and could "raise hob with the basic objectives of the Naval Academy.”  
Carney undermined his argument, however, when he levied a generalized attack on 
civilian academia and expressed a fear of the "professorial mind" that would eventually 
dominate the "military mind".  He did yet more damage to his otherwise strong case for a 
military dean when he fretted that civilian academics could insert "divisive thinking" into 
the minds of the "experimenting youth".65  An argument that invoked as justification the 
danger of civilian influences was not the best tactic by which to enlist the support of a 
civilian secretary.     
 During this critical period of debate, senior line officers at the Pentagon and 
Bureau of Personnel were relatively passive. Some interpret this passivity as tacit consent 
for Rickover’s reforms.  However, later testimonies show that the serving admirals were 
                                                 
63 For representative view of retired officers and academy alumni, as well as insight into the views of active 
duty senior leadership, see exchange of letters between ADM Carney (retired CNO, views endorsed by 
Navy league), ADM Wright (who was president of USNAAA), and the serving CNO, ADM Anderson.  
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Rickover faced in his attempts to reform education.  While Carney's fears of the "professorial mind" are, by 
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quiet on the issue because they had been deceived by Secretary Korth.  According to 
RADM Davidson, senior leaders had remained quiet because the Secretary of the Navy 
had told them that he would take no action to replace a military officer with a civilian 
dean.  Just days after receiving this assurance from Korth, senior navy admirals would 
read in the Washington Post that the Secretary had, despite his assurances, replaced the 
military officer with a civilian dean for the Naval Academy.66  It is also possible that the 
active ‘line’ preferred the alumni to lead the charge at Annapolis while they focused on 
the CNO battle with Rickover over diesel officers and the selection of nuclear ship 
captains.67  For whatever combination of reasons, deceit or tactical miscalculation, the 
‘line’ officers were outmaneuvered, and the inexperienced Korth signed the order that 
appointed a civilian as Dean of the Naval Academy.68    
The consequences of this decision were significant.  Not long after Rickover’s 
victory, the ‘line’ officer who served as Secretary of the Academic Board—the military 
dean—was replaced by a civilian engineering professor, Dr. Bernard Drought, a former 
engineering department chair at Marquette University.  There then followed the dilution 
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of the military faculty by means of a large number of civilian hires.69  With the 
civilianization came many highly qualified engineering professors who were eventually 
protected by the power of tenure.  This favored cohort then imparted to the academy an 
increased polytechnic character.  In the Dean’s office, the new engineer leaders began to 
supplant ‘line’ officer educational goals with those more characteristic of an engineering 
college.  Before the decade was out, Dean Drought would seek to position the academy 
as a good, second-tier polytechnic, thus confirming the worst fears of Captain Shinn.   
 
* 
Redefining the Goal of an Annapolis Education 
 
 
With a civilian engineer designated to take the helm in the Dean’s office and a 
major civilianization of the faculty underway, Rickover may have been expected to turn 
his attention elsewhere.   Leading scholars of the academy, in particular Lovell, note that 
Rickover continued, however, to intervene at the academy.  Rickover remained deeply 
involved in academy affairs for three reasons.  First, Rickover was an apostle for a 
technocratic philosophy of command and wanted the academy to conform to his new 
model.  Second, Rickover still needed more officers for his expanding nuclear fleet, and 
midshipmen attrition remained too high, hovering around 25%.70  Finally, the loss of 
                                                 
69K.W.  Moorhead,"From Public Information Officer to Heads of Academic Departments, Subj: Recent 
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THRESHER in the spring of 1963 reinforced the importance of the first and second 
reasons: with the more rigorous technical requirements levied on nuclear officers after 
1963, it was even more urgent for Annapolis to produce talented technical experts and 
engineers.  The civilian dean proved unable, however, to fully effect the changes 
Rickover desired.   Conservative officers at Annapolis remained deeply committed to the 
old model and fought a delaying, rear-guard action to preserve vestiges of general 
education.    
Rickover needed to convince more navy leaders to support a polytechnic 
undergraduate program and to abandon the old Annapolis general education.  However, 
the shift to a polytechnic model could not be justified, at least in these early years, by the 
manning needs of the nuclear fleet alone.  Until the middle 1960s, diesel submarines still 
significantly outnumbered nuclear submarines, and the nuclear surface fleet was still 
small.  To gain support for his type of reforms, he needed to obtain a fundamental 
redirection of ALL undergraduate education, not just for those headed into his still 
relatively small program.  To justify Annapolis curricular reform by claiming it would 
improve engineering performance on conventional ships did not convince.  Most 
engineering plants in the fleet had been operated for decades quite satisfactorily by 
Annapolis graduates who did not possess scientific engineering education.  Unable to 
justify a redirection of the curriculum based on fleet engineering performance, Rickover 
used another justification for his proposed reforms: midshipmen suitability for civilian 
engineering graduate education.  
Rickover advocated that the Naval Academy adopt the requirements of elite 
civilian engineering graduate colleges as the metric by which to judge curriculum.   
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Rickover defended this shift in standards by claiming that Annapolis graduates took too 
long to get through engineering graduate school.  Rickover expended extraordinary 
energy to convince leaders of the validity of his new metric and new model of ‘line’ 
officer education.  Rickover spoke publicly, testified, and wrote and published nationally 
distributed works on education. 71   He called and harassed the Superintendent regarding 
the slow pace of changes.  Sometimes he would send his staff to Annapolis to evaluate 
midshipmen for his program and reject most of them.  Through this process of evaluation 
and rejection, Rickover communicated to the academy that it had a mission to produce 
scientific engineers, and it was failing at that mission.72   After years of agitation, the 
Secretary of the Navy finally afforded Rickover the opportunity to argue his view of 
education before the highest educational body in the Navy. For the first time, Rickover 
was invited by the Secretary of the Navy to brief the Secretary of the Navy's education 
review board meeting on Treasure Island, California, in November 1962.73  
At Treasure Island Rickover argued that modern technology necessitated more 
‘line’ officers (not EDOs) earn advanced scientific engineering degrees.74  A central 
assumption in Rickover’s argument-- that technical requirements in graduate school 
should drive the undergraduate education of the ‘line’-- was an assertion rather than an 
argument.  While line officers at the conference did not rigorously challenge Rickover's 
                                                 
71 Hyman George Rickover, American Education, a National Failure: the Problem of our Schools and 
What we can Learn from England, [1st ed. (New York,: Dutton, 1963). 
72 John W. Crawford, Jr., (Deputy Manager of the Naval Reactors Program), Interview with the Author 11 
July 2007; William Wegner, (Deputy Naval Reactors Manager, 1963-1979), Interview with the Author, 17 
July 2007.  
73 Dec 1962 SABER Report,"Secretary of the Navy's Advisory Board on Educational Requirements", 
NARA 24-470-54-26 Box 1    
74 Ibid.  In addition, this was corroborated by Rickover's assistant who also attended the conference.  John 
W. Crawford, Jr., (Deputy Manager of the Naval Reactors Program), Interview with the Author 11 July 
2007. 
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assertion,75 others soon exposed the weakness of his claims.  Opponents of the proposed 
changes showed a few months later that the data did not support Rickover's justifications. 
The number of ‘line’ officers required to operate and command the ships and squadrons 
of the fleet dwarfed the number of scientifically educated engineer billets that a line 
officer (URL) with a subspecialty must fill.  The argument to reorient the purpose of 
USNA curriculum toward graduate school preparation was a classic case of a small 
minority shaping the larger majority.  A dissenting panel member of the curriculum 
review committee argued that a   "...study of quotas for Post Graduate school indicates 
740...in technical billets.  However, this can hardly be taken as a cue for a ... commitment 
of present and future graduates of the Naval Academy to these quotas which are designed 
to affect over 10,000 officers within certain zones."76   These dissenting faculty members 
exposed the fact that the entire USNA curriculum, the cognitive preparation of thousands 
of line officers, was being changed ostensibly to produce a modest number of 'line' 
engineers from NPGS.    
Other than Rickover, it was unclear who was agitating for radical curricular 
reform.  There was scant evidence that the EDO community was calling for such changes 
to ‘line’ officer education at Annapolis.  In contemporary publications the EDO 
community, most of whom held civilian engineering degrees, expressed an apparent 
                                                 
75 Line officers may have been susceptible to Rickover's assertion because in 1959 the Navy had agreed to 
reduce the number of EDOs and make up the shortfalls with 'line' officers with technical subspecialties-- 
the 'line could do it all' solution.  To obtain these 'line' sub-specialists more quickly, further reform in ‘line’ 
officer education at Annapolis and in NROTC was required.   
76 C.P. Lemieux,"From Professor C.P. Lemieux to Chairman of Curriculum Committee, subj: Objections to 
Core Curriculum, dtd 4 December 1963", RG 405, US Naval Academy Special Collections, Reports of 
Boards and Committees, Curriculum Review, 1963, enclosures 10, 11.  The report did not explain the basis 
for the 10,000 number.  However, it seems reasonable from the context of the argument that the number 
was the aggregate of several year groups of line officers.  If both NROTC and USNA officers were 
combined, they would in a few years graduate approximately 10,000 young ensigns.  
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satisfaction with the quality of Naval Academy graduates.77  Even if there had been a 
shortage of engineering officers, radical reform at Annapolis was hardly the only solution 
to the problem.  One alternative that would seem less disruptive to 'line' education, and 
arguably more cost-effective, would have been to recruit more engineering specialists 
from civilian colleges.  Why alternative solutions were not pursued is unclear.   Perhaps a 
latent rivalry between 'line' and 'staff' made the operational officers reluctant to expand 
the EDO community.  Perhaps navy leaders were still influenced by the precedent of 
1899 that "all ‘line’ officers were to be engineers".  For whatever combination of reasons, 
senior leaders did not support an increase in the size of the EDO community, but began 
instead to shift their support to Rickover’s recommendation that the ‘line’ should become 
increasingly technically educated. 78    
To those responsible for making midshipmen more technical but still 'broad', the 
irreconcilability of such a mission soon became apparent.  The Superintendent of the 
Academy was being asked to do something much more difficult than that envisioned in 
1899: to educate midshipman as both scientific engineers and well-rounded officers who 
                                                 
77 Bureau of Personnel Navy Department,"The Engineering Duty Officer (General)--NAVPERS 10814-B", 
US Naval Academy, General Collection, VM623.A6 1963.  See page 2. 
78The Franke Board of the late 1950s considered a massive reduction or possible elimination of an 
independent ED community. In the end, the board proposed a 30% reduction in EDO officers. The unfilled 
technical billets that would result were to be filled URL officers with technical sub-specialties.  To gain 
these technically educated URL officers required an increasing number of URL officers to pursue advanced 
engineering and scientific studies.  Albert G.  Mumma, The Reminiscences of Rear Admiral Albert G. 
Mumma, U.S. Navy (Retired) / interviewed by Paul Stillwell (Annapolis: US Naval Institute, 2001), 191.  
See also Smedberg's comments in Court of Inquiry: Loss of the USS THRESHER (SSN-593), Testimony 
of 21 May 1963, VADM Bernard L. Austin, USN, Presiding", Office of the Judge Advocate General, 
National Security Litigation and Intelligence Law Division, Washington, D.C., 1610.  Consequences of the 
reduction in EDOs for the Naval Academy became manifest with implementation of  SECNAV INST of 7 
March 1963.  William B. Franke, Under Secretary of the Navy, Chairman,"Report of the Committee on 




could speak foreign languages, hone skills as mariners, and learn about joint integration.  
Fleet operations in three dimension, joint operations with the Army and Air Force, 
combined operations with allies, in addition to operation and maintenance of 
scientifically engineered machines, all levied increased demands on the future 'line' 
officers.  Echoing critics earlier in the century, some officers in the 1960s questioned 
again whether or not the 'line' officer could meet all these demands and at the same time 
master the complexities of scientific engineering.   Hesitant to change the curriculum for 
all midshipmen just to produce a few more engineers, the Superintendent suggested that it 
might be necessary to split the Naval Academy into two components. One  would 
produce the traditional ‘well rounded officer’ who would focus on operational and 
broader knowledge,  and the other  would serve as an engineering school to produce the 
technical specialists Rickover wanted: “It is conceivable that only by the establishment of 
a Naval Academy University could VADM Rickover's requirements be satisfied and the 
Naval Academy still continue to turn out naval officers in accordance with the existing 
mission.”79 
RADM Kirkpatrick, like his predecessor Davidson, resisted the shift to a 
polytechnic model. Kirkpatrick remained committed to the "...retention of the precept that 
midshipmen must receive a well-rounded education..."   He explained that USNA had 
refused to join the trend in academia toward further specialization in undergraduate 
programs and would continue to do so in the future:  "American education was off on a 
specialization spree which the Naval Academy refused to join.  It steadfastly maintained 
                                                 
79 J.F. Davidson, RADM USN,"Memorandum from Superintendent, USNA to Chief of Naval Personnel, 
dtd 20 Feb 1962, titled: "Comments Concerning Letter from Manager, Naval Reactors, USAEC, to the 
Secretary of  the Navy Proposing changes to the Naval Academy", Naval Historical Center, Operational 
Archives, 1966 Box 34, USNA file. 
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that the general education and the general scientific courses offered at Annapolis were 
best suited to the needs of the navy and of undergraduate education in general."80  
Furthermore, the admiral believed the emergence of many technical schools after WWII 
did not impose additional burdens on the academy, but in fact relieved the academy of 
many of the pressures for technical training.  These schools afforded more time for a 
"...foundation for a better rounded and more complete undergraduate curriculum..." He 
went on:  "Our present position is analogous to Columbia College and Columbia 
University." 81  By this, he meant that most officers should start at the college (USNA), 
but would be expected to comply with the ideals of the King plan and pursue education at 
the ‘navy’ university, at the general line school, graduate school, and war college.  
Specialization, even if it were necessary in a 'line' officer's career, would not begin at 
Annapolis. 
Rickover continued to criticize the Naval Academy as inadequate.  Kirkpatrick 
bristled at the criticism in part because the navy pilot misunderstood the challenge posed 
by Rickover and his technology.  Kirkpatrick praised Rickover's technical schools as the 
“…most modern and notable…” and interpreted them to relieve the academy of 
responsibilities, not add to them.82  But in fact, Rickover’s schools did not relieve the 
academy of a burden.  Instead, the nuclear schools posed a technically rigorous academic 
challenge to future ‘line’ officers that in turn placed a greater burden on Annapolis to 
become more technical.  In the face of the Superintendent's resistance, Rickover turned 
again to politicians to further the technocratic transformation of the academy curriculum.  
                                                 
80 C. C.  Kirkpatrick, RADM USN, "Rhode Scholars? Yes! But Naval Officers First: A Century of 
Academic Achievements," Shipmate, no. 9-10, Sept-October 1963, 6-10. 
81 Ibid.,  9. 
82 Ibid.,  7, 9. 
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In early 1963, the Secretary of the Navy Korth gave official backing to Rickover’s ideas 
of engineering priority and set as a goal that 75% of midshipmen would concentrate in 
engineering. 83  Kirkpatrick could not refuse a direct order, especially one emanating 
from the Secretary of the Navy, and dutifully convened yet another curriculum reform 
effort under the supervision of Dean Drought.    
Dean Drought, the former dean of engineering at Marquette, armed with the 
SECNAV instruction for a larger quota of engineers, pushed for a more strongly 
polytechnic curriculum. Opposition flared again, but this time it was not the 
Superintendent and 'line' officers but veteran members of the faculty who objected.  
Senior professors objected to the curricular shift for two reasons. First, they expressed 
concern that the plans narrowed midshipman education, a shift in policy that was as 
profound as it was ill advised.   Second, the professors protested that the plans were 
bureaucratically driven, hastily assembled, and not supported by rigorous analysis.  The 
professors were trained as researchers and were masters of argument and analysis.  They 
quickly grasped that the proposed technocratic shift in academy curriculum was not 
justified by either the numbers or even the documents cited  in support of the change.  
The professors were blunt as they unraveled Drought's tenuous justification:  "SECNAV 
                                                 
83 SECNAV INST 1520.4 OP-09 of 7 March 1963, as quoted in Lemieux, page 2.   The Secretary may 
have been persuaded by the SABER board meetings in late 1962 at which Rickover spoke, and though 
likely, there is no direct evidence linking the two.   It is noteworthy, however, that the SABER boards that 
followed in 1964 reiterated Rickover’s arguments in which he linked technical requirements at NPGS and 
the curriculum at USNA. See  SABER,"Secretary of the  Navy Advisory Board for Educational 
Requirements(SABER): Reports 3-7", Naval Historical Center, Operational Archives, Personal Papers of 
Arleigh A. Burke, Box 9, Folder: SABER. 
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INST  1520.4 OP-09 7 March 1963 has been cited as a basis... (but it) hardly calls for a 
revolution in the Naval Academy curriculum." 84   
The faculty's primary concern was the loss of balance in the curriculum should 
Rickover's proposals be adopted.  They feared the changes would produce a “…program 
similar to those of most engineering schools...”  and that such a program crowded out the 
broadening function and “…affords no place for other basic education needed to satisfy 
the criteria for a broad intellectual formation consistent with the mission of the Naval 
Academy."85  The demise of the century-old language education requirement illustrated 
how engineering was ‘crowding out’ the broader components of the curriculum.  Dr. C.P. 
Lemieux, a senior faculty member, argued: "A major weakness of the (proposed) core 
program is that is crowds out the foreign language requirement. The naval service more 
than any other has obvious need for wide experience in foreign languages.  It is well 
known that this lack is acutely understood at the highest levels of the military and 
government."86   In the expansive faculty critique, several annexes went into further 
detail and argued the displacement of language by engineering was inconsistent with the 
goal of producing the versatile and generalist officer:  "Curtailment of foreign language 
study at the USNA would create an image inconsistent with that of the 'well-rounded' 
                                                 
84 That these requirements originated from bureaucratic pressure and not deliberate study is evidenced in 
Lemieux’s response to the curriculum plans:  "The need for a program designed to graduate 75% of the 
midshipman with engineering degrees has not been made clear.  If this is the basic task of the (curriculum) 
committee, it should have been determined by exhaustive research..." See pg. 2. Lemieux goes on to 
question why the SECNAV instruction, which included no research or justification, is used as guidance.  
Lemieux points out:  "SECNAV INST  1520.4 OP-09 7 March 1963 has been cited as a basis for this 
need...(but it) hardly calls for a revolution in the Naval Academy curriculum."   
85 C.P. Lemieux,"From Professor C.P. Lemieux to Chairman of Curriculum Committee, subj: Objections to 
Core Curriculum, dtd 4 December 1963", RG 405, US Naval Academy Special Collections, Reports of 
Boards and Committees, Curriculum Review, 1963, enclosures 10, 11, page 1. 
86 Ibid.,   2. 
350 
naval officer.”87  Further, the faculty noted that the academy’s plans ran counter to the 
goals of the National Defense Education Act of 1958, which had called for more, n
language education. 
ot less, 
                                                
88 
The professors quickly realized the proposed changes were not the product of 
analysis and study, but driven by powerful bureaucratic forces.   The source of the 
bureaucratic driver was not hard to discern. The quotas came down from Rickover’s ally 
in the Secretariat, not from a study group of educational analysts or operational 'line' 
officers.  Such high-level, unstudied intervention seemed to the veteran faculty rash and 
risky as compared to a deliberate, though time-consuming study of the problem.  The 
faculty, however, failed to appreciate the immediate challenges Rickover faced:  the 
President of the United States was calling for more ballistic missile submarines, each of 
which required more than double the crew and officer complement of the retiring diesel 
submarines.  Furthermore, USS THRESHER had been lost  around the same time  as the 
academy curricular debate.   As discussed in the last chapter, Rickover interpreted the 
loss of THRESHER to have both material and human causes.  He believed the human 
failure derived from inadequate understanding of technology, a failure he sought to 
remedy by more advanced and narrow engineering training.  After THRESHER, every 
nuclear officer would be required to pass additional, even more rigorous, engineering 
certifications.  To pass the exams required an even more technically educated 'line' 
officer.   Thus, by extension, the THRESHER incident and the demands of a growing 
 
87 Ibid.,  enclosure 11, pg. 4.  
88 Ibid.,  enclosure 11, pg. 4.  The letter to the curriculum review board notes that  between 1958 and 1960, 
modern foreign language enrollments in high school increased 44% and a significant number of colleges 
adopted more stringent foreign language admissions requirements.  
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POLARIS fleet compelled Rickover to demand an even more rigorous engineering 
program at Annapolis.  
RADM Kirkpatrick did not act on Dean Drought's latest reform proposals.  
Rather, the task fell to Kirkpatrick's relief, the new flag officer RADM Minter who had 
moved directly from the commandant’s office to assume the position of superintendent.  
Confronted by the combination of Rickover’s aggressive interventions (including several 
face-to-face meetings)89  and Dean Drought’s sophisticated pedagogical arguments, the 
inexperienced and very junior Minter was at a great disadvantage. In the spring of 1964, 
Minter approved Drought’s plans to shift the midshipman curriculum to one more 
consistent with specialization and increased engineering content (views consonant with 
Rickover’s exhortations).  RADM McNitt, a former dean of admissions at Annapolis and 
a former President of the Naval Post Graduate School, described Minter’s proposals in 
1964 as a “…fundamental change in the educational philosophy at the Naval 
Academy…”90  The decline of the ‘broad’ officer, which Dr. Lemiuex lamented, did not 
this time go unnoticed by the ‘line’.  Senior active duty line officers recognized 
immediately the implications of the specialist trajectory and rallied to protect what was 
left of the King system of broad officer education and development.91   The two line 
                                                 
89 Charles  Minter, VADM USN (retired), Reminiscences of VADM Charles S. Minter, USN (Retired), vol. 
II (Annapolis: US Naval Institute Press, 1981), 531-545.   RADM Minter, '37, was thirteen years junior to 
Rickover.  Rickover called Minter repeatedly and requested several meetings with the young 
Superintendent.  Minter met with him to discuss academy curriculum on at least two occasions.  Minter had 
neither the educational experience nor the rank to oppose Rickover’s ideas.   
90 Robert McNitt,  RADM USN (ret), "Challenge and Change", Shipmate, no. 4, April 1972,  5; Charles 
Paul Sheppard, “An analysis of curriculum changes at the United States Naval Academy during the period 
1959 through 1974” (Thesis Ph D --George Washington University, 1974), 294.   Sheppard concurred with 
McNitt and others, describing the proposed changes of 1964: “This change meant that specialization….was 
ensured for all midshipmen by 1964.” 
91 Charles S. Minter, RADM USN,"Ltr from RADM Charles S. Minter to Secretary of the Navy dtd 24 
March 1964", Naval Historical Center Operational Archives 1966 Box 34, folder "USNA".  While public 
documents at the time reveal little of the debate, CNO papers recently indexed and now more readily 
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officers who engaged the debate were well placed to make their case: the CNO Admiral 
David McDonald and the Secretary of the Navy’s Executive Assistant, Bud Zumwalt, a 
future CNO.  
  Admiral McDonald and Captain Zumwalt were alarmed that a junior admiral, 
Minter, would propose such radical changes, and therefore the two men carefully studied 
the plans and criticized the proposal's underlying philosophical arguments.   They both 
challenged Rickover's argument that 'line' officer education must be measured against 
civilian engineering graduate schools.  McDonald and Zumwalt strongly opposed the 
proposals to specialize midshipmen education.  In response to the unstudied assertion that 
the goal of Annapolis curriculum should be to prepare midshipmen for engineering 
graduate school (the Rickover justification for a polytechnic),  Zumwalt countered that 
the midshipmen ‘major’ was not engineering, rather “…the major is Navy. The entire 
class should major in command and leadership.”92  McDonald also challenged 
Rickover’s core argument—that academy graduates required two years more engineering
education to compete with civilian engineers on an equal basis—writing: “What is wrong
with that (two years of additional education)?”   McDonald was asking the obvious but 
profoundly important question: Why were naval officers being evaluated against a metric 
of civilian engineering college students?  To McDonald it was entirely appropriate that 
young 'line' officers, if they decided to pursue engineering graduate degrees, would 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
accessible provide insight to the competing visions of officer education.  The CNO and the SECNAV's  
EA, future CNO Elmo Zumwalt, reviewed and in excruciating detail dissected Minter’s plan for increasing 
midshipman specialization. 
92 Ibid.   See Captain Bud Zumwalt comments in margins of Minter’s proposed reforms. The comments in 
the margins of the CNO’s copy of Minter’s proposal are striking for the insights they offer, both as to 
senior leaders' advocacy of the “well rounded officer”, but also the suspicion and animosity these line 
officers showed not just to Rickover, but to other technical specialists, including the astronaut alumni of the 
academy.   Zumwalt expressed a fear of not just Rickover, but other specialists in the Navy, writing: “Who 
is behind this proposal: Shriver, Glenn, Sheppard, McDonald, Green, Rickover?” 
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require additional study as compared to their civilian counterparts.  Zumwalt, too, 
rejected the comparison between the midshipmen program and that of a civilian 
engineering college, penning the note: “Comparison is invidious. Likening a pe
(USNA) to a brick (civilian engineering colleges).”   Both McDonald and Zumwalt we
of a like mind that, in an effort to make every ‘line’ officer competitive with civilian 
engineers, the Navy might inadvertently put too much emphasis on engineering 
academics at the risk of neglecting their broa
ach 
re 
der education as a naval officer. 93 
                                                
This rear-guard action by the ‘line’ was partially effective and did ameliorate the 
most aggressive aspects in the shift to a more scientific-engineering curriculum.  Also 
helpful was the fact that Korth had resigned and had been replaced by the more 
independent-minded Paul Nitze.  The Minter-Rickover plan had hoped to achieve a 30% 
greater technical concentration in the curriculum, but due to opposition by the CNO and 
by order of the Secretary of the Navy, the curriculum concentration was limited to 15%.94  
Foreign language content was reduced by 50%, a reduction that was soon criticized by an 
outside, non-technical review board.95  However, the partial victory for general and non-
technical education was to prove only temporary.  Forces more powerful than admirals 
and policy makers were at work transforming midshipman ideas and values.  
 
93 Ibid.  Comments by McDonald are less spirited than Zumwalt, but are of a deeper analytical quality.      
94 Robert McNitt, RADM USN (ret), ""Challenge and Change"," Shipmate, no. 4, April 1972, 5. 
95 Charles Paul Sheppard, “An analysis of curriculum changes at the United States Naval Academy during 
the period 1959 through 1974” (Thesis Ph D --George Washington University, 1974),  300.   The criticism 
emanated from the visit by Middle States Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, February 1966.  
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* 
The Reactor as Recruiter: the Appeal of the New Machine, 
  
the Tedium of  ‘old’ ideas of Operational Integration 
 
 
While admirals and politicians debated educational policy, something was 
happening in the minds of midshipmen.  With Rickover’s rise to prominence, the 
midshipmen were being asked to choose between two models of the ‘line’: the well-worn 
model of the “well-rounded officer” and something that appeared new, the technical 
specialist in control of revolutionary new technologies.  The former was advocated by 
older officers who used war stories and ‘tradition’ to argue their case, the strongest 
proponents of which were now dead (King died in 1956,  Nimitz in 1966). The King 
concept of officer—the versatile generalist-- possessed no physical artifact around which 
to represent the ideal.  Moreover, with the termination of the general 'line' promotion 
examination, the old model had also lost one of its most effective enforcement 
mechanisms.96    
In contrast to the ideas of the King system, Rickover's program had a tangible 
advocate in the fleet: the newest submarines, ships, and aircraft carriers, tons of shining 
steel and shielded uranium.97  To serve aboard or command one of the Navy's newest 
                                                 
96 The nuclear reactor-education dynamic seems to echo the pattern of the early 20th century when large 
steam engines and the engineers compelled the establishment of the NPGS. The lesson: organizations that 
combined ideas with large, manpower intensive machines could mobilize support for educational change.    
The King model was at a great disadvantage: it was both ‘old’ and by its nature not linked to any one 
platform or manpower- intensive machine around which to organize.   King’s philosophy was enforced 
through officer policies such as the written promotion exam that emphasized general knowledge, a practice 
that was, perhaps not coincidently, terminated in the late 1950s or early 1960s.  
97 By 1963, USS LONG BEACH and BAINBRIDGE were the most impressive ships in the surface fleet, 
and ENTERPRISE the exemplar in the carrier fleet. The ‘around the world’ cruise of nuclear ships, and the 
operations of a ‘all nuclear task force’ further foreshadowed the future as nuclear and by extension 
reinforced the perception that Rickover’s technocratic philosophy of education was the way of the future.   
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ships, an officer had to pass through Rickover's nuclear schools.  Rickover’s reactors and 
demanding technical schools thus worked as ‘carrot and stick’: nuclear reactors and their 
ships enticed the midshipmen, but the nuclear training schools held the keys to command.  
The combination of labor-intensive reactor technology and the high-attrition training 
schools became an important tool in reforming midshipmen educational values and 
norms.98  
All the phases of nuclear selection and training reinforced the value of a strong 
academic background in engineering, mathematics, and a techno-centric mindset for 
problem solving.  The midshipmen who most readily took on the new values did not have 
to await assignment to the coveted nuclear ships to reap their reward.  The most 
successful midshipmen who concentrated in engineering enjoyed the support of the 
increasingly powerful engineering faculty, who through their connections to industry and 
the Navy's industrial organizations funneled research grants and internships to the 
aspiring engineers.99 In contrast, the midshipmen who concentrated more in the 
humanities or social sciences received little support.   This combination of 'carrot and 
stick' -- Rickover’s public personae, the rigorous demands of the nuclear schools, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
By 1967, the USS NIMITZ would be authorized for construction, and by 1968, the next line of cruisers, 
CGN 36, would be nuclear.  
98 The allure of machines as a factor in social change is not a new phenomenon.  Several works attest to the 
allure of artifacts on the minds of men.  See Elting E. Morison, Men, Machines, and Modern Times 
(Cambridge, Mass.,: M.I.T. Press, 1966).  For the Air Force experience, see R. Michael Worden, Rise of the 
Fighter Generals: the Problem of Air Force Leadership, 1945-1982 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University 
Press, 1998).  
99 K.W.  Moorhead,"From Public Information Officer to Heads of Academic Departments, Subj: Recent 
Academic Improvements at the Naval Academy (October 1965), ltr dtd 27 Oct 1965", RG 405, US Naval 
Academy Special Collections, Reports of Boards and Committees, 1965.  Engineers were showered with 
research funds and coveted research fellowships (the Trident Scholar program).   Moorhead catalogues the 
multiple grants provided to midshipmen who specialized in engineering, and the relative dearth directed to 
non-engineers.  The funding flowed from the Office of Naval Research ( ONR), Bureau of Ships (later 
known as NAVSEA), and even BUPERS. In contrast to the engineers, for several years almost no research 
money was earmarked for work in the humanities or social sciences.  Furthermore, of the midshipman 
selected for the new and coveted Trident Scholars in the first two years, eleven of twelve were in scientific 
or engineering fields.  
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physical allure of the nuclear ships, and the grants and internships for engineers-- 
threatened to overturn King's old model and ideas of the 'generalist'. Todd Forney, in his 
authoritative account of the Naval Academy in the post-WWII period, observed: "The 
effect of nuclear power's popularity on Bancroft Hall's military culture was 
astounding."100  However, Rickover enjoyed yet one more advantage that ensured that his 
influence was more than a fad: his technology was labor intensive.  
Forney noted that the number of midshipmen entering the nuclear program was 
rapidly increasing, and the best were volunteering: "Over the next five to seven years 
(starting in 1960) the numbers of midshipmen going nuclear power would swell to a total 
rivaling that of naval aviation and surface line.  Moreover, nuclear power could truly 
claim that its exclusive screening process gave it the best and brightest of the Brigade."101   
An important mechanism of value transmission was midshipmen ‘word of mouth’ that 
communicated the threat of attrition but reminded them of the reward of engineering duty 
on the newest ships. What was essential to this 'word of mouth' transformation was the 
power of numbers: technologies manned by larger numbers of officers were favored in 
the competition for the ears of the midshipmen.  Of the three major technological 
innovations of this period-- POLARIS missiles, digital data links, and nuclear reactors-- 
nuclear power was the least automated and was the most manpower-intensive.  Greater 
manpower carried greater transformative power.  Forney explained: "The growing power 
and needs of nuclear power program would help make the recent changes (at USNA) 
permanent.  Growing numbers of midshipmen participating in the new curriculum would 
                                                 
100 Todd A. Forney, The Midshipman Culture and Educational Reform: the U.S. Naval Academy, 1946-76 
(Newark, Del.: University of Delaware Press, 2004), 134-135. 
101 Ibid. 
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eventually create a new academic culture."102  The culture was becoming that of the 
specialist.  However, the quality and number of midshipmen concentrating in engineering 
still disappointed Rickover, and he monitored academy reforms with concern.   
 Dean Drought continued his efforts to increase the credit hours midshipmen spent 
studying engineering.  To encourage midshipmen to study engineering, Drought offered 
electives in specialized engineering fields.   However, in the early years the number of 
midshipmen who volunteered to pursue more engineering electives proved disappointing.  
The midshipmen may have wanted to go into nuclear power, but when it came to 
electives, those who concentrated in literature, history, government, and language 
outnumbered engineers in all but one of these years. In 1964, the midshipmen who took 
most electives in engineering were outnumbered more than 2 to 1 by those who preferred 
social sciences/humanities electives.103  Faced with continued shortages of acceptable 
officers for his program, Rickover in March 1964 blasted the academy’s lack of progress 
in testimony before Congress.  At the academy, Rickover explained "…the appearance of 
education is there, but not the reality."104   To Rickover, the academy was still 
inadequately rigorous and technical.  Yet, the midshipmen refused to respond in large 
numbers to the exhortations of the new engineer dean.   
The midshipmen continued to be influenced by the ‘line’, the Superintendent and 
Commandant, and many other lower ranking officers who had been products of the old 
                                                 
102 Ibid.,  pp. 134-135.  Forney supports his research with a survey of over a thousand graduates of the 
Naval Academy.  
103 “Report by the USNA to the Commission of Institutions of Higher Education.” The Middle States 
Association of Colleges of Secondary Schools, Annapolis, MD Feb 1966,  pp. 167-168), as quoted in 
Charles Paul Sheppard, “An analysis of curriculum changes at the United States Naval Academy during the 
period 1959 through 1974” (Thesis Ph D --George Washington University, 1974),  285.  
104 John P. Lovell, Neither Athens nor Sparta?: The American Service Academies in Transition 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979), 168. 
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King model of education.  Even occasional official statements about the academy 
continued to praise the need for the well-rounded and versatile officer and invoked 
analogies to liberal arts programs.  The Naval Academy mission statement continued to 
focus the midshipmen on the goal of command, for the "...highest responsibility of 
citizenship and Government…"  The official Naval Academy public information officer 
exhorted the midshipmen as late as 1965 to study language and culture.105  The best 
efforts of Dean Drought and Dr. Folsom,106 who continued to be closely involved with 
academy curricular policy, failed to remake the midshipmen.  The bald truth was that 
midshipmen responded to military role models, and the two professors in their civilian 
suits adorned with not medals but lapel pins were poor models.  Rickover needed a 
charismatic military role model who was sympathetic to his technocratic philosophy.   In 
the person of James Calvert-- perhaps one of the most dashing officers of his generation--
he hoped he had his man.107   
                                                 
105 K.W.  Moorhead,"From Public Information Officer to Heads of Academic Departments, Subj: Recent 
Academic Improvements at the Naval Academy (October 1965), ltr dtd 27 Oct 1965", RG 405, US Naval 
Academy Special Collections, Reports of Boards and Committees, 1965,  pg. 12.  The residual King-like 
emphasis on the non-technical education still survived, as represented in the sections of this memo 
regarding humanities and language.  This guidance document emphasized as late as 1965 the need for all 
midshipman to take seriously their work in the humanities, because, as they argued, "...to work effectively 
in overseas areas, officers must also understand the problems of world societies, particularly the many 
smaller nations which are struggling for a place in history."  
106 Folsom was an influential figure at the Naval Academy for more than a decade after his first 
intervention in 1959.  He was a member of the Engineering Council for Professional Development (ECPD, 
which certified USNA engineering majors), and was a particularly strong advocate for engineering.  He 
was soon placed in several key positions at the academy and in the Navy.  He served on the influential 
SABER board from 1958 to 1960s; on the first Academic Advisory Board at USNA beginning in fall 1966; 
and on the Navy's Curriculum review board. In recognition of his contribution to the reform of navy 
education, he was awarded the Distinguished Public Service Award, among the highest the Navy may 
bestow on a private individual. The award was given by VADM James F. Calvert in 1970. See Sheppard, 
244, for a summary of Folsom's involvement at the academy.  
107 There is no documentary evidence that Rickover personally orchestrated Calvert’s selection as 
Superintendent.  At the same time, there is also no evidence that Rickover opposed Calvert's selection.  
What is clear is that Rickover remained in close contact with Calvert through Calvert's tenure at Annapolis. 
Though Calvert maintained his official independence from Rickover, and in fact instituted some reforms 
that Rickover did not favor, Calvert's thinking may have been shaped by his many years of education and 
close association with Rickover.  
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* 
The Shift to Specialization:  
 
The Majors Program and Civilian Control of Engineering Accreditation 
  
Calvert was one of Rickover’s men.  Rickover had personally selected Calvert for 
his program and had mentored him for more than thirteen years as he promoted from 
young commander to become one of the Navy’s youngest admirals.  After completing his 
nuclear training, Calvert was chosen to lead a highly acclaimed nuclear submarine polar 
exploration, the events of which were published in a book authored by Calvert.108  When 
he was selected for flag, he was one of the two youngest admirals in the Navy, and his 
early promotion may have been facilitated by his unique status as a first generation 
nuclear officer.   Calvert was a versatile, 'well rounded' officer, but he was nevertheless a 
'nuke'.  Rickover attempted to take full advantage of their relationship, and throughout 
Calvert's tenure, Rickover called frequently to broadcast his views on educational 
matters.109  However, Rickover was more than just another flag officer interested in 
Annapolis: Rickover was the senior ‘nuke’ who controlled to a great degree Calvert’s 
future.  If Calvert wanted to maximize his chances for promotion to four stars, it would 
not be unreasonable that Calvert would be open to Rickover's requests.110  Policies 
sympathetic to Rickover and his program, however, would carry significant implications 
                                                 
108 James Calvert, Surface at the Pole (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1960).  Calvert would 
also go on to publish a widely read book on the naval profession, written before he became the 
Superintendent. James Calvert, The Naval Profession, 1st ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965). 
109 James F. Calvert, VADM USN (retired), Interview with the Author, 21 November 2007. 
110 William Wegner, (Deputy Naval Reactors Manager, 1963-1979), Interview with the Author, 17 July 
2007.  According to Wegner, Rickover did not approve of all of Calvert’s initiatives, especially the 
inclusion of liberal arts as an optional academic major.  Rickover preferred increased specialization as long 
as it was in the technical or engineering fields.  Thus, Calvert proved to be a mixed blessing for Rickover 
and not as controllable as perhaps the older admiral had hoped. Calvert was, after all, a ‘versatile’ or ‘well 
rounded officer’ if there ever was one:  a first generation nuclear officer with years in the diesel force and 
had commanded a surface group.  He was also a prolific writer and student of history.  He was not the type 
of nuclear officer Rickover would produce later.  
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for Naval Academy midshipmen and for the navy 'line'.  Calvert reshaped the future 'line' 
with four unprecedented actions:  he established a specialized majors program, 
committed the academy to pursue engineering accreditation, established quotas for 
technical degrees, and modified admissions metrics to favor the technical over non-
technical applicants.  
The idea to adopt a specialized academic major’s program, a radical departure 
from 125 years of past academy policy, did not originate with Calvert.  Rather, Dean 
Drought had quietly worked on such a proposal for several years.  Drought’s health, 
however, was failing by the summer of 1968, and thus the new superintendent turned to 
the Academic Advisory Board, chaired by Dr. Richard Folsom, to formulate and help 
implement the majors program.111  The specialized academic majors program powerfully 
reinforced the idea that line officers were, from the start, expected to be specialists.  
Among the specialties, engineering would be the most favored of fields.112  Calvert did 
allow for a small number of non-technical degrees, a liberal arts concession opposed by 
Rickover.113  However, within the system of academic majors, Calvert elevated the 
engineering degree to elite and favored status, and he would adopt policies to compel 
more midshipmen to become engineers.  
 Some have defended Calvert’s specialized majors program as a necessary break 
with a ‘lock step’ system of the past, a system that had failed to recognize the modern 
requirements for an increasing number of specialized officers.  Calvert invoked the need 
                                                 
111 James F. Calvert, VADM USN (retired), Interview with the Author, 21 November 2007. 
112 John P. Lovell, Neither Athens nor Sparta?: The American Service Academies in Transition 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979), 215. The USAFA in 1964 and USNA in 1969 adopted 
specialized majors, but West Point did not.   
113 James F. Calvert, VADM USN (retired), Interview with the Author, 21 November 2007. 
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for specialization of 'line' officers when he explained: "We had to stop asking, 'What 
must every Naval Academy graduate be able to bring to the Fleet' and start asking, 'what 
must every Naval Academy class bring to the Fleet.'"114  But in reality, the advocates of 
the old system of general education had not been ignorant of the need for specialized 
skills.  Admiral King and his generation of reformers in 1920 had fully recognized the 
need for a range of specialties.115 The difference was that King wanted specialization 
built on a common undergraduate foundation so that the young officers had the flexibility 
to pursue a range of specialties in training commands and graduate school after they had 
a better understanding of their own strengths.   The older generation—King and Nimitz—
believed early specialization limited the flexibility and adaptability of the officer corps.   
In a moment of reflection, Calvert acknowledged that adoption of an academic 
majors program constituted a further shift down the road to a specialist conception of the 
officer.  Furthermore, Calvert recognized that this shift toward greater specialization 
brought with it some risk.  He explained his reasoning in taking the risk.  Though there 
are some midshipmen who may “… tend to think of themselves as future mechanical 
engineers or oceanographers, or whatever they major is, rather than as future professional 
officers...  I recognize this as a calculated risk of the program.  It was our carefully 
considered opinion that we had to improve the variety and spice of our academic 
programs if we were to meet today’s competition…."116  The "today’s competition" to 
                                                 
114 Jack Sweetman, The U. S. Naval Academy: an Illustrated History (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute 
Press, 1979), 232. 
115 Ernest J. King, Knox, Dudley W., Pye, William S., "Report and Recommendations of a Board 
Appointed by the Bureau of Navigation Regarding the Instruction and Training of Line Officers," US Naval 
Institute Proceedings, 46, no. 8, August 1920, 11. See King's 1919 discussion of  ‘exchange theory’ of 
specialization. 
116 James F Calvert, VADM USN, "Thoughts Upon the Conclusion of a Four Year Tour," Shipmate, no. 4, 
April 1972,  8. 
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which Calvert referred was different from the competition previous generations of 
officers thought was most relevant.  
To Calvert, the competition was not potential enemies in the fields of Vietnam 
(the 'limited' war then raging in South East Asia). Rather, the competition was civilian 
engineering colleges and, to a lesser degree, the engineering programs at the Air Force 
Academy that might lure away prospective engineers who were needed for the SSBN 
fleet.  The risk to which Calvert alluded was an imbalance between general ‘line’ 
education and that of technical specialization.   
If engineering excellence and specialization were to be gained, they would have 
to come at the expense of linguistic, social sciences, and humanities education.  RADM 
Kirkpatrick, Admiral McDonald, and then Captain Zumwalt only a few years before had 
feared such an imbalance of officer requirements.  These war veterans were convinced 
that the older, broader conception of ‘line’ officer education remained valid.  However, 
these non-nuclear officers had only an idea around which to justify their argument.  The 
generalist idea was that of 'command' and the need to inculcate into the officer the 
capacity to integrate disparate factors on an unknown field of battle that lay in the future.  
The technical specialist model of officer education, in contrast, focused on the immediate 
needs of filling specific billets on complex machines that existed in physical form now.  
Moreover, the specialist model of education, by narrowing an officer, tended to 
presuppose knowledge of the future: future officer requirements would not be too 
different from those of the present. Rickover’s reactors and his nuclear junior officer 
requirements were the machines and billets of the 1960s, and his technocratic ideology 
radiated confidence that the technocratic officer model would endure in perpetuity.  
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The choice to embrace specialization at the undergraduate level was risky in the 
long term, but in the short term met the urgent need for nuclear-trained officers.   The 
growing fleet of reactors and the attrition at nuclear training schools became the explicit 
‘demand signal’ for more scientifically educated engineers. The dearth in nuclear officers 
reached such dire levels that Rickover resorted to a de facto draft in the 1967-1968 to 
make up for the shortfall.117    Confronted by short-term shortages of line officers who 
could or would pursue engineering, especially nuclear engineering, Calvert felt 
compelled to support Rickover's demand for a more technically specialized Brigade of 
Midshipmen. By the end of Calvert’s tenure, academy leaders would proclaim the 
college's new goal:  prepare every midshipman to become a nuclear engineer.118  The 
cradle of the officer corps, Annapolis, had embraced a techno-centric identity of the 
'line’.   
 Guided by the objective that every midshipman should be able to be a nuclear 
engineer, the academy administrative apparatus became highly sensitized and responsive 
to nuclear program officer requirements.  Whereas visual acuity had been a driver in the 
pre-war period, accounting for almost 40% attrition of midshipmen in the Class of 
1940,119 now the metric had become nuclear school acceptability.  The outcome the 
academy most feared was the failure of midshipmen to meet nuclear training school 
                                                 
117 William Wegner, (Deputy Naval Reactors Manager, 1963-1979), Interview with the Author, 17 July 
2007.  As Wegner explained, the actions taken by Rickover's officer in 1967-68 were not a 'prescreening', 
as described in other general histories of USNA.  Rather, it constituted a draft of midshipmen into the 
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118 Bruce M. Davidson, Academic Dean, USNA, "The Academic Dean Looks at the Academy," Shipmate, 
no. 3, March 1973,  26. 
119 Chester W. Nimitz, RADM USN (Chief of Bureau of Navigation),"Committee of Naval Affairs, 21 
April 1941, testimony of RADM Chester Nimitz on HR 4368 (to shorten USNA course from 4 to 3 years)", 
NARA RG 405, USNA Special Collections,  General Correspondence, Education and Training , 
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standards.  As Rickover demanded more technical rigor, the academy was compelled to 
oblige. As Forney explained, “The worst scenario was a person reporting to the training 
commands and washing out of those programs.”120   Moreover, the nuclear program was 
not only the toughest academic training school but also the fastest growing.  Rickover 
wanted for his program approximately 25% of each class in the later 1960s121, and this 
percentage would grow in the 1970s as civilian colleges temporarily produced fewer 
NROTC midshipmen engineers due to the disruption of the Vietnam War.  Once again, 
urgent short-term conditions--first it was POLARIS construction schedules, in the later 
1960s it was the Vietnam War and NROTC shortfalls-- drove officer development 
policies that carried generational implications. 
Calvert, like his mentor, became an apostle for the idea of the academy as a 
leading scientific-engineering undergraduate college.  In various venues, he vocalized his 
belief that scientific engineering was the most important field of study for a young 
officer.   In ten short years after Commandant Shinn pleaded “…never allow the 
Academy to become, by default, a Polytechnic Institute…” Calvert asserted 
“…Annapolis must take its place among the nation’s foremost undergraduate engineering 
schools.”  The depth of Calvert’s commitment to engineering became even more apparent 
in the words he used to describe the construction of Rickover Hall, the new engineering 
building:  “The engineering building design (Rickover Hall) is nearing completion and 
authorization of the first portion of this sizable undertaking is now under study by the 
Congress.  The laboratories of the new engineering complex will be appropriate to the 
advances in engineering curriculum which have occurred at the academy during the 
                                                 
120 Todd A. Forney, The Midshipman Culture and Educational Reform: the U.S. Naval Academy, 1946-76 
(Newark, Del.: University of Delaware Press, 2004),  212. 
121Ibid.,  212.    
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1960s... This magnificent structure, when completed, will be perhaps the most symbolic 
of all the new buildings at Annapolis. It is built for, and suited to, the advances in 
engineering education which have been part of the reforms of the 1960s..."  122  
Calvert was not always comfortable being Rickover's revolutionary, and 
sometimes he attempted to minimize the significance of the changes he was making.  On 
one occasion, Calvert asserted, not quite accurately, "...despite all the requirements 
placed on it for other academic skills, the Naval Academy must always remain, primarily, 
an engineering school.”123   In fact, before Rickover's intervention, Annapolis had not 
been primarily an engineering college.  Rather, the goal of the Naval Academy had been 
to provide a broad and general foundation for 'line' officers who would rise to command.  
The mission statement of 1960 had been specifically worded to emphasize the command 
orientation and to minimize the idea that midshipmen were being prepared to be 
specialists.  Calvert recognized the disconnect between his goals of technical 
specialization and the generalist goals of command.  To eliminate the cognitive 
dissonance that might result, Calvert changed the Academy mission statement.  The older 
statement had been oriented toward attainment of command, "...toward educational needs 
of senior rather than junior officers..."124  Calvert's mission statement, in contrast, 
directed midshipmen to prepare for their first years of duty in the naval service.  In 
                                                 
122 James F. Calvert, VADM USN, "The Fine Line at the Naval Academy," US Naval Institute 
Proceedings, 96, no. 10, October 1970,  64. 
123 Ibid., 64.   The debates of 1899, the reforms under Hart of the 1930s, and even the diplomas awarded 
until the 1960s, provide evidence that the Naval Academy curriculum since early in the 20th century was a 
general education program that produced leaders of the 'line' more than it was an engineering college.   
124 John D. Yarbro, PhD,"USNA Curriculum Development Report Dtd January 1974", NARA RG 405  
USNA Special Collections, Studies and Reports, Curriculum 1970-75, Box 5.  The mission statement of 
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responsibilities of command, citizenship and government."   
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Calvert's redefinition, references to the higher duties of command, or of a midshipman 
education as the foundation for more senior service, were eliminated.125   
Calvert supported many of Rickover's ideas for navy education, and he worked 
for their implementation with few exceptions.126  Calvert's writings echoed the Rickover 
belief that technology was the dominant driving force in history and in the Navy.   
Calvert espoused technocratic core beliefs when he stated that the education of the 
officers must conform to “…the new requirements for engineering excellence posed by 
the ships and aircraft of the modern navy…”  He argued, “Technology and the state of 
the art in the utilization of the environment...will be determinant factors in our curriculum 
and teaching methods."127   In his letters to critics, he propounded the new orthodoxy, a 
technocratic vision of the academy.  Calvert asserted, without argument or justification, 
that Annapolis must become a leading scientific engineering college, a leader in 
"...propulsion systems, naval architecture, and the allied nuclear, electrical and 
mechanical systems.  Additionally, we will have to be among the top few institutions in 
aerospace and aeronautical engineering." 128    
Calvert realized that he was constructing an academy curriculum that would mold 
generations of leaders for the entire Navy, not just those officers who would take up more 
technically specialized careers.  And though he was aggressively remaking the academy 
                                                 
125 Calvert's modified statement in the late 1960s: "To prepare young men morally, mentally, and physically 
to be professional officers in the naval service." 
126 Calvert did not embrace every Rickover recommendation.  Rickover believed that officers should read 
history and literature on their own time or in high school before they entered college, but that midshipmen 
should not take classes in liberal arts at the academy.  Calvert, however, preserved the option for a modest 
percentage of students to major in the humanities, though the ‘core’ curriculum remained heavily technical. 
The existence of humanities majors at the academy was an annoyance to Rickover for the next fifteen 
years. Calvert’s independent streak, perhaps on this issue, may have cost him his fourth star. 
127 James F. Calvert, VADM USN,"Ltr to Mr. Paul Schratz dtd 11 March 1970", RG 405, USNA Special 
Collections, Office of the Superintendent, General Records, Series: Educational Organizations, Middle 
States Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, 1970-76, Folder 9, Box 4. 
128 Ibid.,  2. 
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into an engineering polytechnic, in a moment of candor he admitted that "...there is not 
necessarily a correlation between advanced technical education and success as a naval 
officer."129  In a moment of further philosophical reflection, Calvert observed that the 
Naval Academy reforms were "...as much the product of their times as any other 
institution in this land.  This is at once frightening as it is comforting..."  He went on to 
remind future leaders that they, too, had the duty to change the institution, to preserve the 
“…the flexibility to adapt to their times."130   In the depths of the Cold War when the 
primary strategic weapon was a complex engineering system (the SSBN), Calvert chose 
to make specialized engineering majors the centerpiece of his new academy curriculum.     
Calvert's second precedent-setting policy was engineering accreditation. As a 
‘nuke’, Calvert was deeply influenced by Rickover’s life-long struggle for excellence in 
engineering.  Rickover had this effect on people.  Rickover’s most celebrated student, a 
future president of the United States, titled his book in honor of Rickover, “Why not the 
Best.”  Rickover's biographer, Francis Duncan, titled his last book, “Rickover: The 
Struggle for Excellence.”131  Calvert, already by nature a fierce competitor but influenced 
by Rickover and his ideas of technological primacy, sought to institutionalize the Navy’s 
commitment to excellence in engineering.   
When compared to MIT and CALTECH, academy engineers in the 1960s were 
not the best and may have been, as Rickover repeatedly claimed, significantly 
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substandard. When civilian engineers in the Naval Academy engineering department 
proposed that the academy pursue engineering accreditation, Calvert did not hesitate but 
became a strong supporter of their proposal.132   At the urging of civilian faculty 
members, Calvert committed the Naval Academy engineers to compete for certification 
by the Engineer’s Council for Professional Development (ECPD).  Dr.  Drought and Dr. 
Folsom, who continued to serve on Navy and academy academic advisory boards, were 
familiar with such certifications and advocated them as the sine qua non of membership 
among the engineering elite.133   Folsom was a member of the ECPD leadership.  The 
engineering mindset of these two early civilian leaders meshed well with Calvert’s 
nuclear and engineering bias. In explaining his decision to pursue the ECPD, Calvert 
explained that such a prize would symbolize the academy’s commitment to pursue "in 
depth learning" in the technical fields,134 a rationale very much in line with Rickover’s 
emphasis on engineering education. 
Calvert's decision to pursue engineering accreditation, though perhaps a natural 
step for a civilian educational institution, established for the academy a second new 
precedent.  Accreditation, like the establishment of specialized technical majors, 
communicated the idea of 'midshipman as specialists'.  Moreover, the decision to 
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compete for accreditation tilted the academy's payroll and hiring priorities toward the 
goal of securing better engineering faculty, a goal that came at the expense of non-
technical faculty.  The decision to pursue engineering accreditation placed this military 
institution even more firmly on a polytechnic and techno-centric foundation. However, 
even with accreditation, there existed some latitude as to how specialized the accredited 
degrees could be defined.  
The U.S. Coast Guard had been one of the first of the federal academies to seek 
accreditation, but they did so in the broad field of 'general engineering.135  In 1968 at 
Annapolis, however, accreditation was used to subdivide the discipline and further 
require engineering students to specialize more narrowly.   This was not the preference of 
military officers, but was instead the desire of the highly specialized engineers who had 
come to the academy as a result of Rickover's first intervention earlier in the decade.  
These tenured civilian engineers took control of the accreditation effort and worked to 
make the engineering program even more specialized than military officers had 
envisioned.  To achieve greater specialization, the civilian professors undermined the 
more general degrees, in particular, naval engineering, and worked to replace it with three 
narrowly focused majors found more frequently in civilian colleges.  
To prepare for the accreditation, the academy invited outside engineering 
professors to serve as advisors. The professors came not from other military colleges, but 
from the University of Maryland, a major research university and one of the best 
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engineering colleges in the nation.  Building on the Maryland program and experience, 
the academy successfully won accreditation in the specialized majors of mechanical 
engineering, electrical engineering, systems (weapons) engineering, and aeronautical 
engineering.  However, the more general degree of naval engineering failed to earn 
accreditation.  The reason for the failure: the academy's own civilian professors 
undermined the major.  Apparently, the civilian faculty in private discussions with the 
accreditation board complained that naval engineering was too broad.  The civilian 
engineers preferred instead to establish majors that were more specialized.  As a 
consequence of the failed accreditation, in 1971 the naval engineering major was 
disestablished and replaced by three more specialized majors--naval architecture, marine 
engineering, and ocean engineering-- all three of which were promptly accredited.136  
The replacement of a naval engineering degree by three more specialized degrees furt
reinforced among the midshipmen a specialist identity.  In addition, this blatant case of 
faculty influence made clear the growing power of specialized civilian engineers to 
remake the curriculum in their image.  
her 
                                                
 The implications of engineering accreditation for the identity of the midshipmen 
were significant.  To continue to win such a prized certification required the academy to 
absorb the certifying board’s criteria, internalize the standards in the teaching plans, hire 
the best possible engineering faculty, and direct the best students to the engineering 
fields.   An increasing share of the academy’s curriculum and its best students were thus 
shaped more by the standards of highly specialized engineers, and less so by ‘line’ 
officers and leaders tested in war.  With the elevation of engineering to the academy’s 
 
136 Vincent Lopardo, PhD, (senior engineering professor at USNA, from 1960 to approximately 1995), 
Interview with the Author, 13 December 2007. 
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highest academic priority, professional, academic engineers would solidify their 
privileged position in the intellectual and professional development of midshipmen, a 
position once held by ‘line’ officers.  The academy dedicated itself from 1969 onward to 
the highest attainment in engineering excellence and created a continuing pressure on the 
institution that would direct financial and intellectual resources to ensure the academy 
would continue to win accreditation.137  Perhaps not coincidently, for the generation to 
follow, with but a single exception, engineers would hold the position of academic dean.   
Accreditation required midshipmen to perform at a level established by the 
examining boards made up of specialist engineers.  The needs for continued successful 
accreditation thus imparted a tendency by the academy to encourage the most 
academically gifted midshipmen to become engineers.  To increase the likelihood the 
best students went into engineering-- an outcome that pleased both Rickover and the 
rapidly professionalizing civilian faculty-- the plebe curriculum was modified to favor 
engineering.  Specifically, the freshman curriculum was re-designed to encourage 
midshipmen to look favorably on technical degrees. In the first year, students would take 
an introductory course in engineering.  In contrast, language was in most cases eliminated 
in the first year for all midshipmen, a dramatic reversal from the past policy of 'language 
first'.  As Sheppard observed, the early engineering bias in plebe year was not accidental, 
rather the “…principal objective of the Common Plebe Year was to obtain an increased 
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number of engineering majors.”138  The effects of such a policy were cumulative: the best 
midshipmen became engineers, who then recruited the best incoming midshipmen to 
become engineers too. With the gathering momentum and self-reinforcing logic, the 
culture of the academy moved further down the road to that of a polytechnic and an 
officer identity as a technical expert and specialist. 
However, even with a charismatic, nuclear- trained superintendent and the 
elevation of engineering majors to a most favored status, the midshipmen did not choose 
engineering in adequate numbers.  When engineering majors fell to only 22.9% of the 
brigade, a 40% shortfall,139 Calvert no doubt fielded more phone calls from his mentor at 
Naval Reactors.  More directive or coercive action was required to push midshipmen into 
the engineering and technical majors.   Shortly after his decision to pursue accreditation, 
Calvert established a third precedent when he set quotas on midshipmen curricular choice 
and dictated strict limits on the number who could pursue a humanities, social sciences, 
or management degree.  Calvert justified the new policies by invoking the needs of the 
Navy subspecialty system and by referencing  a general shortage of engineers in the 
Navy.140  To justify ‘line’ officer education policy by invoking these three technical-
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graduate school: "Ceilings have been established on all general areas of majors programs in order to ensure 
that the proportion of graduates in the various disciplines in general consonance with the Navy's P-coded 
subspecialty structure, the overall Postgraduate program, and the available studies giving projections of 
naval officer skill requirements in the years ahead."  See also Forney, pg. 213 for further discussion of 
implementation of the ceilings and quotas.  However, one must be reminded that the billets at NPGS, and 
the very concept of the URL subspecialty, had itself only been changed recently.  The General Line School 
had been absorbed by the large technical program of the NPGS in 1962, and the sixty year old option of a 
subspecialty in ‘navy operations’ was displaced by subspecialties more typically held by EDOs.  Yet, it was 
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specialist requirements, requirements not normally associated with the development of 
combat leaders, marked another step on the path that led to a more techno-centric naval 
command.   However, Calvert had a point: the numbers of reserve officers volunteering 
to become engineers was falling, dramatically. 
The problem was the Vietnam War (mentioned previously) and the declining 
propensity of NROTC midshipmen on civilian campuses to pursue engineering degrees. 
Calvert was concerned about the drop in numbers of NROTC engineers, even though the 
drop would prove to be temporary.  In the depths of the Vietnam War, Calvert would 
admit the decisions he made about the academy were "...a product of their time..."141  
Calvert justified his Annapolis reforms: "I am more convinced than ever that we made 
the right decision when we set the ... majors distribution as our goal.  The problems being 
faced by the engineering schools throughout the country in attracting students are 
reflected in the serious shortage of young engineers entering the Navy through the 
NROTC and OCS program.  The necessity for the Navy to depend on the Naval 
Academy to provide it with its engineers is becoming a reality.”142  However, it was not a 
general shortage of engineers that concerned Calvert, but the shortage of NROTC 
midshipmen who chose to become nuclear engineers in Rickover's program. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
not the EDO Corps but the URL who was tasked by the Franke and Keith studies to meet the new technical 
requirements. The EDO Corps was slated for reduction in time of technological system growth.  One is 
tempted to ask: what were navy leaders thinking when they sought to cut back on the EDOs. The reduction 
soon proved problematic, as evidenced in Smedberg's criticisms.  See Smedberg testimony in THRESHER 
inquiry.    
141 James VADM USN Calvert,"Ltr to Mr. Paul Schratz dtd 11 March 1970", RG 405, USNA Special 
Collections, Office of the Superintendent, General Records, Series: Educational Organizations, Middle 
States Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, 1970-76, Folder 9, Box 4. 
142 James F Calvert, VADM USN,"Statement to the Board of Visitors Submitted by the Superintendent of 
the US Naval Academy, James Calvert", RG 405, USNA Special Collections, Board of Visitors Report, 




Figure 6-3:  Sources of Nuclear Power, Direct-Input Officer Accessions.   
Horizontal axis is number of ensigns entering directly into nuclear power from college.  
Vertical axis is time in calendar year.  The sharp drop in NROTC officers coincides with 
Vietnam Era college campus unrest.  In contrast to the collapse of NROTC recruiting, 
USNA numbers increased, and academy grads made up much of the shortfall to ensure 
the reactor fleet remained adequately manned. Source: Shipmate, April 1974.143 
 
It was not just the navy-wide need for more scientists and engineers that 
concerned the admiral.  Rather, Calvert was concerned about filling nuclear power billets.  
As the historical record of officers inducted into nuclear power show, the Naval Academy 
                                                 
143 Paul R. Schratz, Captain, USN (ret), "An Open Letter: Dear Admiral Rickover," Shipmate, April 1974, 
19. 
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in the depths of Vietnam War filled a growing percentage of nuclear billets. Whereas in 
1967 both NROTC and USNA provided roughly the same number of nuclear officer 
accessions, by 1972-73 the Naval Academy provided almost three times the number as 
did NROTC (see Fig 6-3).   
 
In hindsight, it is apparent that the large quota of engineers, which became a semi-
permanent fixture at Annapolis, was prompted by the confluence of two unique events: a 
rapidly expanding POLARIS fleet, on the one hand, and Vietnam War campus strife that 
reduced NROTC nuclear officer recruiting on the other.  POLARIS expansion was a one-
time event.  Vietnam was an unpredictable and unanticipated event.  However, together 
these two events cemented at Annapolis a curricular policy that would persist long after 
the last POLARIS submarine was retired and after Vietnam had become not a war but a 
destination for American tourists. 
 
* 
Changing Admissions Metrics to Produce More Engineers: the 
Decline of the Non-technical Midshipman 
Even with Calvert's quotas, many midshipmen did not measure up to the higher, 
accreditation-driven engineering standards.  Midshipmen were failing out of the 
accredited majors in such numbers that a ‘fall back’ major was created, a non-accredited 
‘general engineering’ degree.  But despite the difficulties experienced by the midshipmen 
in meeting the higher standards, Rickover would not lower his technical requirements and 
continued to drive academy policy. For more midshipmen to succeed in the accredited 
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majors and in the nuclear engineering schools, the academy required more midshipman 
candidates with stronger abilities and inclinations in technical fields.  However, the 
admissions office could not say which applicants were likely to choose engineering and 
ultimately be more competitive for nuclear power.  Running out of options, senior 
academy leaders concluded that all midshipmen had to be more technically inclined.144   
The search for solutions turned to admissions where Calvert established a fourth 
precedent.   
The admissions process as it stood in 1968 could adequately identify and select 
students that would receive a general education.  However, following Calvert's reforms, 
the academy now had a more rigorous specialized engineering major and a curriculum 
focused to prepare midshipmen for Rickover's schools.  Such a program required 
applicants more technical in their outlook and preferences.  The persistent failure of 
midshipmen to meet these higher technical standards in adequate numbers finally 
prompted officials to examine the utility of shaping admissions decisions based on 
psychological profiling.  Academy admissions officials began to explore the use of the 
'Strong Interest Inventory', 145 a tool by which a person's interests and inclinations were 
measured.  
Prior to Calvert’s tenure, the admissions system was not oriented to produce 
future scientific engineers and made little attempt to measure the propensity of 
                                                 
144 Bruce M. Davidson, Academic Dean, USNA, "The Academic Dean Looks at the Academy," Shipmate, 
no. 3, March 1973,  26.  Dean Davidson stated “... any midshipman, regardless of his major, qualifies for 
selection to the Nuclear Power Program.” 
145 Thomas F. and Kamyar Pashneh-Tala Foster, “"The Utility of Personality Measures in the Admissions 
Process at the US Naval Academy"” (2002), 21.  The Strong Interest Inventory (SII) is a psychological test 
used in career assessment. The test was developed in 1927 by psychologist E.K. Strong, Jr., and revised 
later by Jo-Ida Hansen, and David Campbell.  
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midshipmen to study any particular subject.   Consequently, though technical and 
mathematical performance was highly valued, the academy admitted candidates without 
undue regard to their non-technical (often referred to as 'verbal') or technical 
inclinations.146  To be sure, the admissions process by the middle 1950s had become 
relatively sophisticated and was geared to accept applicants distinguished by high athletic 
and scholastic achievement.  In the late 1950s, the admissions process had become more 
academically discerning when it required applicants to submit College Entrance 
Examination Board (CEEB) scores.147  By 1959, the academy developed a metric known 
as the “Whole Man”, a measurement that attempted to ensure balance between the 
military, athletic, and academic qualities of the applicant.148  The formula considered and 
weighted academic, extracurricular, and leadership-related achievement.  The "Whole 
Man" metric was reevaluated yearly, adjusted based on the previous year's cohort 
performance.   Formulated to yield well-rounded officers, the “Whole Man” construct did 
not determine which midshipmen might be particularly inclined to pursue rigorous 
technical subjects like engineering.  Not surprisingly, as Rickover and the academy 
                                                 
146 Kendall Banning, Annapolis Today, 6th ed. (Annapolis,: United States Naval Institute, 1963).   Banning 
produced a series of books over a quarter century, which included a discussion of admissions requirements.  
Prior to Calvert’s tenure there appears to be no evidence of an admissions system that tried to discern an 
applicant's propensity to embrace technical interests.  The admissions tests gave scores in various subjects, 
but these were not correlated to a propensity to pursue engineering over literature, for example.  Rickover 
scored lowest in math on his admissions tests, and higher in literature, yet he became one of the Navy's 
most influential and innovative engineers.  One may speculate that had Calvert's profiling system existed in 
1919, it may have rejected Rickover. 
147   Charles L. Melson, RADM USN,"Superintendent's Statement to the Board of Visitors 1959", RG 405, 
USNA Special Collections, Boards and Committees, 1959. 
148 Charles Paul Sheppard, “An analysis of curriculum changes at the United States Naval Academy during 
the period 1959 through 1974” (Thesis Ph D --George Washington University, 1974) 263; Todd A. Forney, 
The Midshipman Culture and Educational Reform: the U.S. Naval Academy, 1946-76 (Newark, Del.: 
University of Delaware Press, 2004), 93-94.   
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pushed more young midshipmen to identify themselves as specialized engineers, an 
insufficient number chose to pursue engineering majors.149   
To increase the share of incoming midshipmen who were inclined to pursue 
technical studies, the Naval Academy admissions office attempted for the first time to 
apply psychological screening (Strong Interest Inventory) of midshipman applicants in 
1967, just prior to Calvert's arrival.  This effort to shape the applicant pool was rejected 
by Calvert's predecessor, RADM Draper Kauffman, a founder of the Navy SEALS, who 
believed the tests to be inconclusive and "overly invasive".150  Calvert, more than his 
predecessor, was willing to take risks with the midshipmen pool of applicants and 
resurrected the profiling.151  In 1971, Calvert began to reconstruct the admissions metrics 
to favor engineering and the technical over the non-technical.152  Calvert left Annapolis 
before his profiling initiatives could bear fruit, but Naval Reactors and Admiral Rickover 
built on Calvert’s precedent.  By the middle of the 1970s, Naval Reactors staff began the 
practice of quietly communicating their officer requirements to the academy's Dean of 
                                                 
149 BUPERS,"Study of Resignations, 6 Dec 1966", Naval Historical Center, Operational Archives, 00 Files, 
1967, box 32.   The study observed that most officers leaving the navy pursued a graduate degree.  
However, officers were significantly less likely to pursue engineering studies, even among the group who 
had served as engineers in the Navy.  Specifically, of officers who resigned and pursued graduate 
education, 67% of them had served as engineers in the Navy.  Yet only 43% of all former officers pursued 
graduate degrees did so in engineering.  This study provides some evidence of a generally low propensity 
of naval officers, admitted and educated in pre-Rickover educational institutions, to identify themselves as 
engineers of the type Rickover sought.  This study was found filed in the CNO's records and was obviously 
read and analyzed.  It is highly likely that Rickover had access to this same study.   
150 Thomas F. and Kamyar Pashneh-Tala Foster, "The Utility of Personality Measures in the Admissions 
Process at the US Naval Academy" (2002), pg. 21.  
151 John D. Yarbro, PhD,"USNA Curriculum Development Report Dtd January 1974", NARA RG 405  
USNA Special Collections, Studies and Reports, Curriculum 1970-75, Box 5.  See pg. 28 of the report. 
152    Todd A. Forney, The Midshipman Culture and Educational Reform: the U.S. Naval Academy, 1946-76 
(Newark, Del.: University of Delaware Press, 2004), 210-13;  See also Superintendent's Statement to the 
Board of Visitors, April 1971, RG 405, USNA Special Collections;   Bruce M. Davidson, Academic Dean, 
USNA, "The Academic Dean Looks at the Academy," Shipmate, no. 3, March 1973,  26.   
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Admissions, Robert McNitt, who would then adjust admissions metrics using the 
profiling technique to produce more engineers.153      
The nuclear fleet continued to expand in the 1970s and with it the requirement for 
yet more technically educated officers.  In the middle 1970s, Admirals McKee and 
Holloway took command of the Naval Academy and Navy respectively, and instituted a 
hard requirement for an 80-20 ratio of technical to non-technical majors.  To support this 
explicit goal, the academy resurrected Calvert’s initiative and altered admissions to favor 
those applicants who exhibited a propensity to pursue technical studies.154   In the years 
that followed, the modification of the admissions metric became more pronounced until it 
proved to be a highly effective tool that consistently produced the high percentage (98-
99% of the goal) of elite engineers so important to Rickover’s program.155  Even though 
the admission's policy increased the number of midshipmen who pursued engineering 
degrees--and reduced the non-technical share of the Brigade of Midshipmen-- Rickover 
agitated for yet more engineers. The demand for engineers remained high, and when 
shortages spiked in the middle 1970s, Rickover called for the elimination of all 
humanities and social science majors at the academy.156           
                                                 
153 William Wegner, (Deputy Naval Reactors Manager, 1963-1979), Interview with the Author, 17 July 
2007.  The long serving Deputy Naval Reactors explained that Rickover and staff refrained from direct 
contact with McNitt (written directives or formal meetings) but that by use of phone calls McNitt was fully 
aware of the technical needs of the nuclear power program and adjusted admissions metrics to 
accommodate the programs’ needs. See also Robert W. McNitt and Paul Stillwell, The Reminiscences of 
Rear Admiral Robert W. McNitt, U.S. Navy (Retired) (Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, 2002). 
154 Thomas A. Sheppard, “A Validation of the Strong Campbell Interest Inventory As Part of the 
Admissions Process at the US Naval Academy” (NPGS, 2002). 
155 Robert W. McNitt and Paul Stillwell, The Reminiscences of Rear Admiral Robert W. McNitt, U.S. Navy 
(Retired) (Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, 2002).  McNitt explained that the metric based on the 
Strong Interest Inventory became so effective and accurate that he could adjust admissions to consistently 
yield within 1-2 percent the “80-20” ratio of technical to non-technical majors.  
156 Eric P.  Woelper, “The Impacts of Academic Background on Submariner Performance, Retention, and 
Promotion” (NPGS, 1998), 1. 
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 Rickover and his political, military, and academic allies established the academy 
on a technocratic course that remained in force for a generation, well into the 21st 
century.  Though the conditions that gave birth to the polytechnic program proved 
temporary and have long since passed away, the academy curriculum still complies with 
Dean Davidson’s foremost requirement of 1973: a curriculum that ensures “…any 
midshipman, regardless of his major, qualifies for selection to the Nuclear Power 
Program.”157  Though Rickover's new Annapolis produced a growing number of 
technical officers, there was another source of midshipmen.  This source of midshipmen, 
the NROTC program, could possibly infuse into the naval service more officers educated 
in language, the social sciences, and humanities.  However, by 1971 NROTC fell under 
Rickover's influence and was restructured to produce a higher percentage of technical 
specialists for the nuclear power program, thereby reducing yet again the number of non-
technical officers who would rise to command.  
Navy ROTC:  Mirroring the Annapolis Polytechnic 
Although the archival material is less comprehensive than that of USNA, there is 
strong evidence that Rickover and his engineers reshaped important priorities of the 
NROTC program.  NROTC had at one time helped to broaden the 'line'.  In the Second 
World War, the reservist program had infused a large percentage of liberal arts students 
into the officer corps.  But by the later 1970s, NROTC would become a rigorous 
technical program, one that mirrored more closely the technocratic requirements of 
Annapolis as defined by nuclear power.  To shape NROTC Rickover used tools and 
                                                 
157 Bruce M. Davidson, Academic Dean, USNA, "The Academic Dean Looks at the Academy," Shipmate, 
no. 3, March 1973,  26. 
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tactics similar to but not identical to those he used to shape the Naval Academy.  He 
needed different tools because NROTC was less susceptible to his direct influence as was 
the federally controlled academy.   
NROTC had been for most of its history a supplemental source of officers for the 
'line' and the 'staff'.   Confronted with consistently high manpower needs associated with 
the enlarged Cold War navy, NROTC began to supply an increasing number of 'line' 
officers eligible to serve as ship commanding officers and therefore took on added 
significance in Rickover's priorities.158  Rickover needed these officers for his program 
and took decisive action to change NROTC.  Rickover reshaped the NROTC program 
with three interventions: his personal involvement at the Secretary of the Navy's 
educational review board of 1962; his interventions with individual colleges and students 
over a twenty-year period; and his successful effort to persuade the Navy to adopt nuclear 
officer performance measures as the yardstick by which to judge NROTC educational 
programs.   
 The first intervention came in 1962 at the Secretary of the Navy Advisory Board 
on Education Requirements (SABER), during which time Rickover led the discussion 
and deliberations concerning officer undergraduate education requirements.  Rickover 
proposed that all officer candidates, to include the future 'line' officers, be required to 
graduate with a technical degree.  The Board resisted Rickover’s most aggressive 
recommendation of "...putting pressure on the state selection committees...”  to select 
only technically inclined applicants.  However, the board did take the first steps toward a 
                                                 
158 Holloway Board on Naval Training, Naval Historical Center and USNA General Collection, V411.H65, 
1945. 
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policy that placed a premium on students who excelled at physics and advanced 
mathematics.  The panel endorsed the recommendations—which Rickover may have 
penned himself— that preserved student choice of majors but gave “…preferential 
treatment, financial or otherwise…” to engineering and science students.159  In addition, 
the Board issued a statement that exhorted faculty and NROTC staff members to 
encourage midshipmen to pursue the technical and engineering fields.   The Board further 
recommended that the Navy pursue legislation to require more NROTC midshipmen 
(both future 'line' or 'staff' officers) to study engineering.160  
Rickover also shaped NROTC through a series of interventions at individual 
colleges.  Similar to his approach at Annapolis, Rickover called and pressured college 
officials to improve their engineering and technical curricula.  When confronted by a 
reluctant college administrator, he used as evidence his mass of nuclear officer 
performance data.  Rickover or his staff linked the performance of a college's nuclear 
recruits back to the officer's undergraduate alma mater and academic major.161  Rickover 
                                                 
159 Dec 1962 SABER Report,"Secretary of the Navy's Advisory Board on Educational Requirements", 
NARA 24-470-54-26 Box 1.     
160 Dec 1962 SABER Report,"Secretary of the Navy's Advisory Board on Educational Requirements", 
NARA 24-470-54-26 Box 1.  The very explicit question was addressed to this influential panel: whether or 
not to require of ALL officer candidates a technical education.  The board appears to have resisted the 
nuclear advocate's most aggressive recommendations, but did take the first steps on the road of shaping 
admissions and offering inducements for engineering or science-oriented line officers.   
161 John W. Crawford, Jr., (Deputy Manager of the Naval Reactors Program), Interview with the Author 11 
July 2007.  John Crawford had observed these interventions from a privileged position: he was both a long-
time interviewer of midshipmen candidates, but also Rickover’s deputy for six years.  According to 
Crawford, the interviews were the key instrument to control quality, but there was also an unwritten 
consideration called the "Good School Effect".  Crawford explained that there existed an elaborate tracking 
system that monitored officer performance in the nuclear program, and linked this data back to the 
student’s alma mater to produce an unwritten metric of judgment, the "Good School Effect (GSE)".  
Crawford observed: “Rickover and, I suspect, a good many of the interviewers had their own estimates of 
the academic status of the NROTC colleges and universities from which we selected graduates into the 
program. For example, Rickover did not have a high regard for southern colleges and universities. There 
were two exceptions, Duke and Rice. On the other hand Rickover was inclined to place too high a value on 
having been to an Ivy League school. On one occasion, I 'down-checked' a Princeton football player whose 
record and interview justified my action. Rickover and I disagreed strongly with HGR reminding me that 
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also compiled the performance data of all nuclear students by their undergraduate 
college. When a certain number of officers from a college performed poorly, he would 
call university officials to complain.  If student performance from these universities did 
not improve, Rickover adopted a policy of retribution: he would continue to interview 
future applicants from such schools but secretly refuse to select some of them, regardless 
of an individual's own merits.  There were, no doubt, some unfortunate officer applicants 
who failed to select for nuclear training not because of their own performance, but 
because, unbeknownst to them, their predecessors had ruined the reputation of their alma 
mater.162   
Rickover's third intervention in the NROTC program was his most successful.  In 
the early 1970s, the Navy established a command to help organize the Navy's collective 
education and training programs: the Commander of Naval Education and Training 
(CNET).  Rickover successfully persuaded the new organization to adopt his metrics of 
officer measurement as well as his recommendations for a change in midshipmen 
requirements.  In 1971, VADM Malcolm Cagle, the Navy's lead educator (CNET), 
convened a board to study naval education. 163   A key issue was the relationship between 
midshipman preparation and follow-on officer performance in technical schools and fleet 
                                                                                                                                                 
this guy wouldn't have even gotten into Princeton had he not been in the top one percent intellectually.”  
With regard to the widely used but unwritten metric of school evaluation (GSE), Crawford further 
explained: “I should mention that the collected views of interviewers led to the development of what was 
termed the GSE - Good School Effect. You won't find it in the records, but it was an ever-present reality. 
For example, Mississippi State had a low GSE. When a MSU grad failed miserably at the Bettis School 
(one of the nuclear schools), Rickover informed me that we wouldn't interview any more MSU graduates. I 
objected and Rickover said. "OK, we'll interview them, but not take any." I said that in that event I would 
have to refer any calls from Senator Stennis (MS) to Rickover's office. Since Stennis was Chairman of the 
Appropriations Committee ,we continued to interview. But don't think that elevated the MSU GSE.” 
162 William Wegner, (Deputy Naval Reactors Manager, 1963-1979), Interview with the Author, 17 July 
2007. 
163 M.W. Cagle, VADM, USN, CNET,"Memorandum: Actions Proposed by Ad Hoc Committee to 
alleviate shortages of technically educated officers in the Navy: implementation of", NARA RG 24-470-54-
25-6 Box 1.   
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assignments.  After some deliberation, the board adopted as the metric for officer 
performance the relative success or failure of 'line' officers in Rickover's nuclear schools.  
Thus, the ability of a former NROTC student to succeed in Rickover's highly technical 
schools became a measure of how well the college had educated the former midshipman.  
By adopting this metric, the study essentially adopted nuclear attrition rates at Rickover's 
school as the metric by which the health of the entire 'line' officer undergraduate 
education system would be judged.  Rickover's metrics became the root justification for 
later NROTC curricular and admissions changes that continue to shape NROTC today.164  
Armed with statistical reports that appeared to show the need for additional engineering 
education for the midshipmen, nuclear program managers successfully lobbied for a 
restructuring of NROTC curriculum, which was given force through the CNET policy 
directives.165  Thus, by 1972, Rickover and his allies at the academy and CNET had 
realigned the academy and NROTC to become polytechnic institutions and programs, and 
the top priority for both was the production of engineers for the nuclear power program.  
                                                 
164 M.W. Cagle, VADM, USN, CNET,"Memorandum: Actions Proposed by Ad Hoc Committee to 
alleviate shortages of technically educated officers in the Navy: implementation of", NARA RG 24-470-54-
25-6 Box 1.   VADM Cagle, the Director Naval Education and Training,  in this 1971 study of technical 
requirements of officers, tasked the personnel organizations of the Navy to take action to implement 
recommendations of expanded technical education. Included in the actions are fairly significant curricula 
actions, including the shift of NROTC seamanship/navigation in undergraduate programs to summer school 
so as to accommodate more math and sciences.  However, most importantly, this memorandum provides 
documentary evidence that the technical standards of nuclear reactor schools were beginning to shape the 
entire Navy’s approach to education. In particular, this Navy-wide board cites in its calls for changes to 
curricula the statistics of officer quality provided by VADM Rickover and the NR staff.  Specifically, see 
enclosure 1, paragraph 1, where the nuclear program asserts that only 30% of surface officers could 
complete the nuclear power training  program; that only 60% of NROTC officers could meet requirement 
in 1967, and only 20% of the officer year group of 1962 (which apparently included both USNA and 
NROTC) could complete the nuclear program requirements.   
165 Ibid.  The 1971 study considered eliminating in its entirety the professional military courses for any 
engineering or science majors in NROTC.  While CNET stopped short of this for NROTC, this goal was 
eventually achieved with the establishment of a highly technical undergraduate program for nuclear officers 
call the 'NUPOC' program. 
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The model of the technical expert officer had displaced the generalist at Annapolis and at 
NROTC units around the country.166 
 
* 
Consequences of the Nuclear Reconstruction of Undergraduate Education 
 
Rickover began in the early 1960s to reshape the Naval Academy and NROTC 
curriculum to become more technical and specialized.  Rickover needed scientific 
engineers to man his growing nuclear fleet, a manning problem made more acute by low 
retention of nuclear officers and the collapse of NROTC nuclear recruiting on college 
campuses during the Vietnam War.  By 1973 the transformation was complete and the 
academy curriculum, and to a lesser extent NROTC, had been reformed to meet the needs 
of the reactor.   Dean Davidson, the civilian engineer who was the academy's second 
dean, stated bluntly: "With the increased dependency on nuclear power plant systems, 
every major must include sufficient math, science, and engineering so that any 
midshipman, regardless of his major, qualifies for selection to the nuclear power 
program.” 167  
Preparing all midshipmen to be nuclear engineers had unintended consequences.   
A significant cost of the Rickover curricular changes was declining language proficiency 
among academy graduates.  Prior to the reforms of the 1960s, every graduate of the 
                                                 
166 Thomas B. Buell, "The Education of a Warrior," US Naval Institute Proceedings, 107, no. 1, January 
1981, 41-45. To this day, NROTC continues to levy a heavy requirement of math and science on its 
midshipman.  Anecdotal evidence argues that more verbal and less technical officers have gravitated away 
from NROTC to the Marine version of ROTC, which does not carry the Rickover requirements.  
167 Bruce M. Davidson, Academic Dean, USNA, "The Academic Dean Looks at the Academy," Shipmate, 
no. 3, March 1973, 26.   In addition, the dean also desired higher percentages of the class to pursue the 
more demanding engineering majors.  To achieve such a goal, he advocated shaping admissions standards 
or criteria to ensure midshipman were inclined by ‘free choice’ to select the more demanding engineering 
majors.   
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Naval Academy was expected to study one to two years of a foreign language.   First in 
1964, when mandatory language education was reduced to a single year, and then in 1968 
when it was made optional, the numbers of midshipmen with collegiate education in at 
least one foreign language plummeted.  With adoption of strict quotas, only 20% of the 
student body could study social sciences or humanities, a restriction that had the effect of 
further reducing the number of midshipmen who received an education in a second 
language.  The loss in undergraduate language training created a generational dearth of 
'line' officer language proficiency that persisted into the first years of the 21st century.   
 More difficult to measure is the effect Rickover's policies may have had on the 
personality types of midshipmen.  As early as 1970, the Naval Academy detected that 
midshipmen who had a higher performance in verbal tests were resigning in larger 
numbers than those who were more technical in their preferences.168  Later studies 
echoed the Navy findings and linked the loss of verbal-type officers to the increased 
technical requirements of the academy program.  More studies have shown that, as the 
academy program became more technical, it tended to weed out persons gifted in the 
non-technical fields.169  Some scholars of the officer corps conclude that the academy 
became such a technical-oriented institution that the more "intuitive” types of 
midshipmen resigned from the academy at a 2/1 ratio over the technically inclined 
midshipmen.170  One might argue that the loss of the intuitive type person was more than 
                                                 
168 W.S. Shields, Dean of Admissions, US Naval Academy,"Memorandum to Superintendent, U.S. Naval 
Academy,  "Comments on Report of Recruitment Research Study Group of 4 November 1970", dtd 23 Nov 
1970, RG 405, Office of the Superintendent, VADM James Calvert, Box 3, Folder 18, "Midshipman 
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169 Kendra M. Bowers, “The Utility of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator and the Strong Interest Inventory 
in Predicting Service Community Selection at the US Naval Academy” (NPGS, 2002).   
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compensated by the increase in highly technically educated midshipmen who became 
'better' officers. However, such a conclusion is difficult to prove.  Even VADM Calvert 
admitted "...there is not necessarily a correlation between advanced technical education 
and success as a naval officer."171 
Not surprisingly, Rickover’s technocratic transformation of the Annapolis 
curriculum exerted a measurable effect on those midshipmen inclined toward service in 
the Marine Corps.  A statistical study of the changes in academy majors and admissions 
metrics evidenced a decline in the propensity of the Naval Academy to produce officers 
who wanted to serve in the USMC.172  This study, completed by an academy professor 
who later died in combat in Iraq, discovered a statistically significant relationship 
between USMC officer selection and academic major.  The study showed that, as the 
academy curriculum and admission’s process favored the more technical-oriented person, 
then the percentage of both applicants and midshipmen graduates who were inclined to 
become Marine officers declined.  With fewer midshipman inclined to choose the 
Marines, selectivity would necessarily fall, and a lower quality midshipman-turned-
Marine might result (or fewer USMC officers who were Annapolis graduates might 
result).   
The 1960s witnessed an ‘academic revolution’ at Annapolis, implemented by 
a myriad of officers, academics, and political leaders. Rickover, more than any other 
single person, and the reactor, more than any other technological system, inspired and 
                                                 
171 VADM James F. Calvert as quoted in Report to Board of Visitors, May 1969).  
John D. Yarbro, PhD,"USNA Curriculum Development Report Dtd January 1974", NARA RG 405  USNA 
Special Collections, Studies and Reports, Curriculum 1970-75, Box 5. 
172 Richard J. Gannon, “The Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship: an examination of the Marine 
Corps' influence on the Academy and the Academy's professional impact on the Marine officer corps” 
(Thesis M S --Naval Postgraduate School 2000).     
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drove these changes.  Despite the opposition of several superintendents, 
commandants, veteran professors, at least one Secretary of the Navy, and two CNOs, 
the academy in the space of a decade was profoundly transformed. What had been a 
naval college that measured its success by the production of ‘well rounded officers of 
the line' became a college that measured itself against civilian engineering graduate 
programs.  Commandant Shinn in 1958 would claim the first goal of the academy was 
to provide a general education ‘of the line’ and to avoid, at all costs, becoming a de 
facto polytechnic. However, by 1973, the Dean would assert that the curriculum must 
ensure that every midshipman could qualify for selection as nuclear engineer. 
 The reorientation in objectives produced a changed curriculum, admissions 
metrics, and ultimately, a changed officer of the 'line'.  When midshipmen proved 
hesitant to embrace engineering, quotas were established.  When the Brigade 
continued to prefer the study of humanities and language over engineering, 
Rickover's protégés changed the midshipmen intellectual DNA:  personality profiling 
was adopted and admissions metrics were recalculated to favor the 'technical' over the 
'verbal' person.  Rickover intervened to reshape NROTC such that it would no longer 
serve as a welcoming conduit for the lesser-technical student who hoped to be a naval 
officer.  Under such new metrics, one may wonder if some of the Navy's leaders in 
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the Second World War, most of whom scored highest in their verbal studies, 173 or 
even Rickover himself could have gained admission to the academy.174   
With the reforms of the 1960s, the vast majority of midshipmen were directed 
toward a specialized, technical major.  These highly specialized majors reinforced 
midshipmen identity to be a technical specialist, an identity that would shape their 
follow-on decisions about education and the value they attached to the study of non-
technical subjects, including foreign languages and culture.  The effects of this 
shaping were amplified by the fact that the shaping came so early in life for the future 
officer.  Like the Royal Navy of an earlier time, the U.S. Navy recognized the power 
of formative educational and professional experiences in the making of senior 
officers.  VADM Semmes, the Personnel Chief in 1966, studied the influence of 
formative experiences on officers.  He concluded that the young officer "...will 
probably select his post-graduate area of study based upon his past operational and 
academic experience, without too much thought or understanding of how this 
selection will effect his future..."175 When the academy was reshaped to meet urgent 
but temporal nuclear requirements,  the die was cast for a generation.  Some officers 
understood what was happening and warned that "…in surrendering to contemporary 
                                                 
173 Carroll Storrs Alden, PhD, "Outstanding Naval Officers Once Midshipmen," US Naval Institute 
Proceedings, no. 72, Feb 1946.  Most of the leading admirals of the Second World War—the four stars-- 
excelled in the non-technical portion of their studies.  It is debatable whether all would have survived in the 
new academy.  Rickover himself scored lowest on his math entrance examinations. 
174 Thomas B. Buell, "The Education of a Warrior," US Naval Institute Proceedings, 107, no. 1, January 
1981, 43. 
175 B.J. Semmes JR., VADM USN,"Policy on Education for Unrestricted Line Officers,  Memo from Chief 
of Naval Personnel, dtd 9 Feb 1966,  to all Unrestricted Line Flag Officers," Naval War College Archives, 
RG 27, Box 1966, folder "Educational Policy",  4. 
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pressures, the academy had alleviated some of it immediate problems but only at the 
cost of its soul."176  
 Calvert, a key architect of many of these changes, later pondered whether he 
had been correct in his actions.  He wrote to a fellow academy graduate: "Perhaps the 
correct balance among all the factors has not yet been found; perhaps the military and 
the naval professional will have to be more drastically reshaped than we can yet 
foresee in order to respond to the needs of our society."177  Calvert was reflective and 
mindful of his time in history, but the model he and his mentor had put in place 
became with each succeeding year more permanent and resistant to change.  Like the 
technological system that inspired the changes, the academy changes took on a type 
of momentum.  The mass of civilian hires, many of them engineers, became tenured 
faculty and thus an increasingly permanent and powerful fixture at Annapolis. 
Moreover, each year, the academy produced approximately a thousand officer-leaders 
imbued with the new values more sympathetic to technical specialization rather than 
the non-technical, cultural, and linguistic experience valued in King's model of broad 
education.   The new mindset, when combined with Rickover's additional 
interventions in assignment and promotion policies, diffused through the fleet and 
became the reigning conception of the ‘line'.  The future commander and admiral 
                                                 
176 Todd  Forney, "Charting Institutional Change: The United States Naval Academy During the 1960s," in 
New interpretations in naval history: selected papers from the Twelfth Naval History Symposium held at 
the United States Naval Academy, 26-27 October 1995, ed. William B. Cogar (Annapolis, Md.: Naval 
Institute Press, 1997), 311.  
177 James VADM USN Calvert,"Ltr to Mr. Paul Schratz dtd 11 March 1970", RG 405, USNA Special 
Collections, Office of the Superintendent, General Records, Series: Educational Organizations, Middle 
States Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, 1970-76, Folder 9, Box 4; See also James F. 
Calvert, VADM USN, "The Fine Line at the Naval Academy," US Naval Institute Proceedings, 96, no. 10, 
October 1970, 68. 
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from Annapolis was not King's generalist 'line' officer but became instead a more 










Diffusion of the Technocratic Model to the Fleet:  




"... in connection with the loss of the USS THRESHER, I and other members of the Joint 
Committee expressed our concern over the lack of continuity and the frequent turnover of 
military personnel...  advise me at its earliest convenience as to what actions it (the Navy) 
has taken to change its past rotational practices..."  
Congressman Chet Holifield, Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, letter to the Secretary of 
the Navy, 16 March 19651 
 
"...I have directed, if periodic automatic rotation of our officers has ever been our 
assignment policy, that such a policy be totally disregarded as a personnel management 
concept."  
Paul Henry Nitze, Secretary of the Navy, letter to Chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 19652 
 
 
"...if service college training is valuable, then it must follow that billets wherein such 
training is a prerequisite could be readily identified.”   






In the 1960s, Rickover transformed both the submarine force and the U.S. Naval 
Academy.  Both organizations abandoned the generalist model and adopted a technical 
                                                 
1 Chet Holifield, Chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,"Letter from Holifield to the Secretary of 
the Navy, 16 March 1965", NHC, 00 Files1965, Box 29, JCAE file. 
2 Paul  Nitze,"Letter to Chet Holifield, Chair, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy", Naval Historical 
Center, Operational Archives, CNO Records, 1965,  Box 29, JCAE file.  This copy of Nitze's letter was 
preserved in the CNO files.  It is not the signed original, and thus it is possible later changes were made but 
not communicated to the CNO, but that would seem unlikely.  The fact that this copy was retained by the 
CNO argues strongly that this is a copy of the actual letter sent to Holifield, and thus accurately represents 
a shift in thinking to Rickover's model of officer development.  At issue was Rickover's recommendation to 
discontinue the practice of frequent assignment rotations which was so essential to creating the generalist 
officer.  Instead, Rickover desired longer assignments in fewer assignments which helped the officer master 
a single, typically technical, specialty.  
3B.J. Semmes, Jr., VADM USN,"Policy on Education for Unrestricted Line Officers,  Memo from Chief of 
Naval Personnel, dtd 9 Feb 1966,  to all Unrestricted Line Flag Officers," Naval War College Archives, RG 
27, Box 1966, folder "Educational Policy", 5. 
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expert model of the 'line'.   As he emerged the victor from these bureaucratic battles, 
Rickover called on senior military and political leaders to help him diffuse his model 
through the larger fleet.  By the middle of the next decade, the vast majority of the 'line' 
officers--to include surface and aviators-- would also abandon the generalist tenets of 
King's system and adopt instead a more specialized conception of command.  Rickover 
was so unpopular that few surface or aviation officers would credit Rickover’s policies as 
the inspiration for their own abandonment of the generalist.  Though Rickover did not 
directly compel the adoption of the new model by the surface and aviation communities, 
he more than any other single officer was the inspiration for the change.    
Rickover used both 'carrot' and 'stick' to persuade the remainder of the 'line' to 
abandon the King model.  Rickover offered the 'carrot' of command.  If officers wanted 
command of the newest ships, they would have to adopt his philosophy that technology 
trumped tactics; technical expertise was preferred over breadth of experience.  But if a 
'line' officer could not become a 'nuke', he would face the 'stick', the fate that befell many 
a diesel officer.  The fear of an expanding nuclear navy spurred aviators and surface 
officers to fight ‘fire with fire’, and they chose increased specialization as a defensive 
strategy.   This pattern of specialization-as-defense was evidenced by the rise in the 
surface navy of the AEGIS community, and in the aviation community by creation of a 
new career path that eschewed carrier command.  
The changed officer development system ultimately produced a different type of 
senior commander in the flag ranks.  By the last years of the Cold War, navy high 
command would witness an almost complete inversion as compared to the Second World 
War generation:  the platform specialist came to dominate the Navy’s senior flag ranks 
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and the integrator, the 'well-rounded' officer educated at a war college, became a small 
minority.  The changed model required almost three decades for the new kind of officer 
to promote to the top, but the transition in the high command from generalist to the 
technical expert was by 1990 complete.   
 
* 
Technical Expert as a Universal Model for Navy Leaders 
 
 
Rickover would use three tools to diffuse his ideas of the technical expert officer in 
command:  the exemplar of his nuclear ships, his speeches and books, and direct 
intervention by his allies in Congress.  The specialist notion of command progressively 
displaced the generalist model first in naval literature, then in personnel manuals, and 
ultimately in the minds of officers.   The specialist identity, once in place, became a 
cultural fixture of the line and proved resistant to attempts by senior admirals who 
decades later sought to re-unify and re-integrate the 'line'.   
Ships are persuasive symbols and have been used frequently to shape human 
perceptions of power and influence.  Perry’s steamships which sailed into Tokyo in the 
mid 19th century; Roosevelt’s Great White Fleet which sailed around the world; nuclear 
SSBNs that prowled the deep,  all conveyed to potential enemies the idea of American  
power and thus shaped adversaries' perception and action.  Elting Morison, a leading 
naval historian in the 20th century, was among the first to explicate the power of 
technologies to shape internal organizational perceptions and values in the U.S. Navy.4  
                                                 
4 Elting E. Morison, Men, Machines, and Modern Times (Cambridge, Mass.,: M.I.T. Press, 1966).  Morison 
was among the first to write of the power of ships to shape values and ideas in the later 19th and early 20th 
century.  For a more recent discussion of the American battleship exemplar, see William M. McBride, 
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Rickover’s ships of the 1960s not only intimidated the Soviets with their putative power, 
but shaped the values of the U.S. Navy officer corps.  The nuclear ballistic missile 
submarine first displaced the carrier and battleship as the most influential ship in the 
American inventory, a change manifest for every young officer when he opened the 
pages of Jane's Fighting Ships.5  The power of the nuclear ship to influence perceptions 
was widespread in the early 1960s and swayed the career choices of American officers 
seeking to command the sleek hulls.  While it is well known that four of the Navy's 
CNOs were Rickover's officers, less well known is that three others sought to have 
nuclear command but were denied. 6   The appeal of the nuclear ships also swayed even 
those being paid to be dispassionate judges of their capabilities.   In a moment of candor, 
a ship-design team in the Pentagon confessed that they endorsed plans for nuclear ship 
construction less so due to the persuasiveness of technical arguments, than by the ships' 
unique aura and appeal.7    
The 'elite' officers who commanded the nuclear reactors became highly effective 
boosters of the new nuclear navy and its system of technical training and assignment.   
The nuclear commanders were treated as heroes in the early years of the program.  
Rickover’s nuclear officers captured the imagination of the nation and the Navy when 
                                                                                                                                                 
Technological Change and the United States Navy, 1865-1945 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2000).    
5 Ronald H. Spector, At War, at Sea: Sailors and Naval Warfare in the Twentieth Century (New York, 
N.Y.: Viking, 2001), 332.  Spector observes that the submarine had moved to the front of fleet guides as the 
new capital ship, reversing the order of priority that had existed since the Second World War.  
6 The best officers vigorously sought assignment to nuclear ships.  Future CNO Zumwalt sought command 
of USS BAINBRIDGE, but was turned down.  Similarly, future CNO Thomas B. Hayward sought 
command of a nuclear aircraft carrier, but couldn't even get an interview with Rickover.  Thomas B. 
Hayward, Admiral, USN (former CNO), retired, Discussion with the Author, 24 January 2008.  Sources 
who know of the third CNO's preferences for nuclear power have requested that the identity of this CNO 
remain anonymous. 
7 OP-090,"Assessment of Surface Nuclear Program, OP-090 study dtd  28 July 1964", Naval Historical 
Center, Operational Archives, 00 files, 1964 Box 19, folder 9000B.       
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they sailed under the polar ice cap and were welcomed home with ticker tape parades.8   
A popular television series in the 1960s--Voyage to the Bottom of the Sea-- also glorified 
the nuclear trained officer who sailed around the world in a submarine named after 
Rickover's first nuclear ship!  
The personal influence nuclear officers exercised over shipmates who were not 
nuclear qualified was also considerable.  There is some evidence that, when non-nuclear 
naval officers and sailors served alongside the nuclear officers and men, the values and 
standards of Rickover's organization were observed to "...spread through the ship". 9   The 
decision not to retrofit reactors to older ships was also important in raising the profile of 
nuclear power. Nuclear command was closely associated with everything new.  With 
each nuclear reactor came a nuclear captain, and with him came a new ship which in turn 
carried the newest radars, missiles, and computers.  The nuclear ships posed a stark 
contrast to the Navy’s rapidly aging fleet of ships, 80% of which were of WWII 
vintage.10     
A critically important factor that helped diffuse Rickover’s ideas about officer 
development was the notion that the entire fleet would one day become nuclear powered.  
                                                 
8 The second commander of NAUTILUS who sailed beneath the polar icecap--CDR Anderson-- received a 
ticker tape parade in New York, and was recognized by President Eisenhower in a ceremony at the White 
House.  Skippers Calvert and Beach both wrote popular books about their nuclear adventures.  Rickover 
was featured on the cover of Time magazine.   
9 RADM John T. Hayward, USN, testifying before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Testimony of 
VADM H.G. Rickover on the U.S. Lead in Nuclear Propulsion Experience, 88th Cong., 2nd sess., 30 
October 1963,  61. 
10 R. L. Schreadley, From the Rivers to the Sea: the United States Navy in Vietnam (Annapolis, Md.: Naval 
Institute Press, 1992), 47.  By the beginning of the 1960s, four out of five ships were of Second World War 
vintage, and most were near the end of their service life.  In contrast, the nuclear ships were ALL new.  
Thus, the nuclear surface ships were the first to receive the first mobile digital data link, NTDS. The 
nuclear surface ships were also among the first to carry TOMAHAWK cruise missiles. The author recalls 
more than once overhearing sailors from older steam ships comment admiringly on the appearance, 
capabilities, and size of the USS TEXAS (CGN 39), a modern nuclear cruiser built in the middle 1970s, 
and the author's first sea-going assignment when it was commanded by George Miller and William Gautier.  
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In a 1963 study, the Secretary of the Navy reported to the Secretary of Defense that "...we 
have come to the conclusion that all new major warships should be nuclear powered..." 11  
The next year the nuclear powered carrier ENTERPRISE, cruiser LONG BEACH, and 
frigate BAINBRIDGE made an ‘around the world’ demonstration, steaming without 
logistic stops for 65 days at an average speed of 22 knots.  Such a feat of engineering and 
navigation gave physical form to the idea of an all-new nuclear fleet that would be 
unmatched by the old navy ships.12  The idea that the officer corps, too, would be nuclear 
trained was disseminated through the ranks when the officers who commanded the 
nuclear ships quickly promoted to flag rank.13  Officers knew from the scuttlebutt and sea 
stories that an officer could command one of the futuristic ships only if the officer 
conformed to the Rickover model of 'line' officer, which meant supreme technical 
proficiency in the field of scientific engineering.14  In addition to the 'carrot' was the 
                                                 
11 Secretary of the Navy Fred Korth as quoted in Paul R. Schratz, Captain, USN, "Fred Korth,  4 January 
1962 to 1 November 1963," in American Secretaries of the Navy, 1913-1972, ed. Paolo E. Colletta 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1980),  934. 
12 See Ibid. ,  948.  Note also that in 1964 the world’s first nuclear powered merchant ship, Savannah, made 
port calls to Europe, see pg 947.  The portrait of Secretary Korth which hangs in the Navy Corridor in the 
Pentagon also contains a hint of the allure and significance of nuclear ships as exemplars of the fleet: in 
Korth's portrait he is depicted standing in front of a painting of the first three surface nuclear ships steaming 
on an open ocean, unaccompanied by an oiler or other auxiliary ships.  
13 Almost all the commissioning captains of the first nuclear ships made flag as well as most of those who 
followed in the first and most formative years of the program. The first nuclear submarine, surface, and 
aviation officer all made three stars: Wilkinson, Depoix, and Peet.    Selection to command for nuclear 
officers was also among the highest in the Fleet (90% for XO, 80% for CO) and remained at this level well 
into the 1970s.  See page 49 in N.R. Thunman,"Unrestricted Line Officer Career Planning Guidebook, 
NAVPERS 15197", Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C., collections, VA 52.A63 15197. 
14  The first nuclear submarine commander Eugene Wilkinson, who had also served on surface ships, was 
selected to command the first surface ship, USS LONG BEACH.  The first nuclear officer who was a non-
submariner was CDR Ray Peet, who was an accomplished engineer but also a decorated WWII combat 
veteran with significant tactical and operational experience.  Surface officers who Rickover picked for later 
commands were, however, more engineering experts than they were tactical experts.  A member of a 
surface group staff in the early 1970s recounted an interaction between Rickover and a non-nuclear admiral 
(RADM Walters) who was in command of a group of nuclear surface ships.  Rickover directed Walters to 
accept a certain nuclear engineer to command one of the admiral's nuclear cruisers.  The surface admiral 
apparently demurred that he preferred another nuclear-trained officer who was more tactically and 
operationally experienced.  Rickover responded that if Walters did not accept the technically stronger 
surface officer, then Rickover would place a submariner in command of the nuclear surface ship.  Walters 
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'stick': the example of diesel officers showed that, if an officer did not receive nuclear 
training, his chances for promotion would be reduced.15 
The lure of the ships may have been enough to change younger officers' career 
conceptions, but to persuade older officers to abandon the generalist model and adopt a 
specialist model of command required Rickover to win the intellectual argument.  His 
tools of argument were speeches, books, and articles that enjoyed a remarkably wide 
circulation.  He wrote extensively on education and argued that the artificial world of 
technology now required a new kind of man and new kind of officer.  He argued 
forcefully that technically specialized officers should command the new fleet:  “The 
operation of modern warships becomes daily more of a technical job. Even their use in 
naval combat now requires scientific and engineering skill rather than the skills of a 
professional naval officer.”  He asserted that the generalist was out: “This may have 
worked in the past when such versatility had to do with what might be called strictly 
naval qualifications of the naval officer; that is, when this versatility did not have to 
include competence to direct highly technical, scientific and engineering work.”  
Rickover went on: “Theoretically, a competent team from GE or Westinghouse could 
operate a nuclear submarine or launch a missile…these ships are comparable to our most 
                                                                                                                                                 
accepted Rickover's choice.   Glen Gottshalk (staff assistant to RADM Walters), Interview with the Author, 
16 October 2006.     
15 There remained for several years a group of submarine officers made up of the diesel and missile 
officers, however their command opportunities evaporated rapidly and as such had no long-term future.  
The 1970 year group of officers was the last with any hope of an at sea command, see pg. 50 in  N.R. 
Thunman,"Unrestricted Line Officer Career Planning Guidebook, NAVPERS 15197", Naval Historical 
Center, Washington, D.C., collections, VA 52.A63 15197. 
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advanced industrial plants….To run them is essentially an engineering rather than a naval 
job.”16   
Rickover addressed the public with several full length books, some of which sold 
widely and are read even today.17  He cultivated friends among the writers and opinion 
makers who more often than not adopted his technocratic arguments and published 
supportive pieces in major publications.18   Senior officers who read national magazines 
or who had to answer to the powerful congressmen sympathetic to Rickover couldn’t 
help but take note of the admiral's arguments.19  But despite Rickover's rigorous 
arguments and national following, he failed to sway many of his fellow admirals.  As late 
as February 1963, six weeks before the sinking of THRESHER, senior officers completed 
a major study of officer policy that endorsed again the King model of the generalist 'line' 
officer.  The report was considered so authoritative that the Secretary of the Navy 
transmitted the report to every ship and station in the U.S. Navy.20   
In early 1963 the Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations, concerned 
by the "... escalating technical developments in years to come, and the increasing 
                                                 
16Hyman George Rickover, American Education, a National Failure: the Problem of our Schools and What 
we can Learn from England, [1st ed. (New York,: Dutton, 1963), 181-182.   
17 Hyman G. Rickover, Education and Freedom (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1959);  Hyman George Rickover, 
American Education, a National Failure: the Problem of our Schools and What we can Learn from 
England, [1st ed. (New York,: Dutton, 1963).  
18 Clay Blair, The Atomic Submarine and Admiral Rickover, [1st ed. (New York,: H. Holt, 1954). 
19 George W.  Anderson, Jr., ADM, USN,"Analysis of Rickover Article on English Education System, 10 
Sept 1962", NHC Operational Archives, Collection 439, ADM G.W. Anderson, Jr., Box 52. Anderson's file 
included marked copies of Rickover's speeches and articles. 
20 Fred Korth, Secretary of the Navy,"SECNAV NOTICE 1412, From Secretary of the Navy to All Ships 




requirements for officers conversant with the fundamentals of political  science..."21,  
tasked a group of senior flag officers to study the best system to prepare an officer for 
high command.  The board, chaired by aviation pioneer and decorated combat veteran, 
Admiral Alfred M. Pride USN (retired), and made up of several active vice-admirals and 
rear admirals,  examined the question  to what extent future "...flag officers should be 
trained in science, engineering, management, international relations, and other special 
fields..." 22  The board of admirals described the question as fundamental not only for 
flag officers but for the entire officer corps,  for those "...lesser ranks through which 
every flag officer passes."    
                                                
The Pride Board identified three basic skill sets an officer-leader must possess: the 
"technical, human, and conceptual."  The board pondered the appropriate phases and 
priorities for officer development and education and placed modest emphasis on technical 
skills:  "...insofar as technical skills are required, the input occurs primarily at the bottom 
of the rank structure."23  When considering the needs of the more senior commanders, 
those who rose to higher command, the board stated that "...the need for the broadest 
conceptual skills is overriding."   As to how to attain this balance of skills throughout an 
officer's career, the board concluded that the existing "...Navy's education programs now 
supports the three types (technical, human, and conceptual) at the appropriate career 
points."  The career points to which the board referred were, of course, King's phases of 
integrated education.  In advocating the integrative or generalist model of 'line' officer, 
 
21 Fred Korth, Secretary of the Navy, letter to Admiral Alfred W. Pride, USN (retired) dated 21 January 
1963.   See cover letter in file for  Alfred W. Pride, ADM USN (Ret),"Criteria for Selection to Flag Rank in 
the USN, Report of Board 20 February 1963", NARA RG 24-470-54-25 Box 6. 
22 Ibid., part 3, page 1. 
23 Ibid.,  part 3, page 2. 
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the board advocated not one rigid career pattern, which would be impossible for all 
officers to follow, but a process that produced a generalist type of mindset, an officer 
with a "...frame of mind, free of parochial fetters..." 24   The report was not, moreover, an 
isolated and un-read report that gathered dust in the Navy Yard, but was on the contrary 
disseminated to "...all ships and stations..." of the entire Navy!25  But the 1963 victory for 
the King's generalist and integrative 'line' officer would prove short-lived.  Rickover had 
not yet called upon his political allies to support his model, a call that he would make 
following the loss of USS THRESHER. 
   In hindsight, THRESHER was a contingent event that Rickover used to garner 
political support for his ideas about the officer corps.  In the post-disaster analysis, 
Rickover convinced powerful political leaders that the Navy’s traditional officer 
development system was flawed and partly to blame for the disaster.  In particular, he 
attacked the practice of 'broadening' officers by rotational assignments and asserted that it 
left officers with inadequate expertise in any one field.26   United States Senators Pastore 
and Jackson and Representative Holifield, convinced of Rickover’s argument, questioned 
the Navy and demanded changes.  Senator Pastore of the Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy (JCAE) asserted:  “The committee reaffirms there should be no relaxation of 
existing procedures used in the selection, training, and assignment of nuclear propulsion 
personnel.”  Senator Pastore saw the nuclear navy as an example for the larger 
organization to emulate and urged the Navy adopt Rickover’s recommendation of longer 
                                                 
24 Ibid.,  part 3, page 2. 
25 Fred Korth, Secretary of the Navy,"SECNAV NOTICE 1412, From Secretary of the Navy to All Ships 
and Stations, Subject: Criteria for Selection to Flag Rank in the Navy, dtd 1 May 1963," NARA RG 24, 
Box 6  Report of the Pride Report of 20 February 1963.  
26 Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Testimony of VADM H.G. Rickover on the U.S. Lead in Nuclear 
Propulsion Experience, 88th Cong., 2nd sess., 30 October 1963,  97.  Well before THRESHER Rickover 
had drawn attention to the Navy’s practice of short tour lengths in contrast to his system of longer tours.  
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tour lengths for officers: “There is no doubt that a policy which requires military officers 
to be transferred every 2 to 3 years is not conducive to efficient technical 
management….” 27 
 
When the Navy appeared to make no changes to the old 'generalist' policy, the 
Joint Committee pressed the Navy to change.  Chet Holifield, the Chairman of the JCAE, 
wrote to the Secretary of the Navy and invoked the loss of THRESHER as justification 
for change.  The politician demanded a report on what he saw as the flawed practice of 
frequent assignment changes that the Navy used to broaden its 'line' officers:  "... in 
connection with the loss of the USS THRESHER,  I and other members of the Joint 
Committee expressed our concern over the lack of continuity and the frequent turnover of 
military personnel...  advise me at its earliest convenience as to what actions it (the Navy) 
has taken to change its past rotational practices....furnish the committee a report, as 
complete as possible, covering assignments and responsibilities for the major technical 
and line commands of the past five years.  Please indicate the tenure of each of the 
commanding officers..." 28  Ominously for the survival of the King model, neither the 
CNO, Admiral McDonald, nor the Secretary of the Navy challenged Holifield's repetition 
of Rickover's criticisms of the officer system.  The Secretary of the Navy Nitze was 
either convinced of Rickover's arguments or caved to political pressure. Nitze informed 
Holifield that henceforth key “...management and technical billets will lengthen to 4 to 6 
years.”  He went further to assert that, if ever it had been the Navy’s personnel policy to 
encourage frequent rotation (which it had been--frequent rotation was a key tenet of both 
                                                 
27 Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings on Loss of USS THRESHER, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., 26, 
27 June, 23 July 1963, and 1 July 64,  ix. 
28 Chet Holifield, Chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,"Letter from Holifield to the Secretary of 
the Navy, 16 March 1965", NHC, 00 Files1965, Box 29, JCAE file. 
403 
 
King and Holloway plans), then henceforth he ordered  "...that such a policy be totally 
discarded.”29   
After Nitze' pronouncement of a new officer policy, there followed shortly 
thereafter information briefings and an exchange of letters between the CNO and his 
senior officers concerning changes to the traditional system of officer development.  
Senior leaders first discussed plans to lengthen the duration of command tours, a key 
concession to Rickover’s concept of technical specialists in command.30   Even more 
indicative of changing officer models, in January of 1966 the CNO quietly directed his 
leading education and training admirals to re-examine the entire system of ‘line’ officer 
education and development.31  McDonald's memo marked a remarkable 'about face', 
coming as it did less than three years after the Pride Report had validated the King system 
of officer development.  
Why McDonald, the senior uniform officer of the Navy, failed to oppose Holifield’s 
ideas is unclear, but two factors, both leading back to Rickover and THRESHER, seem 
important.  McDonald was close friends with the CNO Anderson and would have been 
                                                 
29 Ibid.,  Tab B holds a file copy of Secretary Nitze' response. 
30  F.M. Radel, Captain, USN,"CNO/VCNO briefing, Subj: Qualifying Command and Major Command 
Tour Lengths for Captains, briefer Capt F.M Radel, 13 May 1965.  "NHC 00 Files 1965 Box 29.    In the 
months after JCAE wrote to the Secretary complaining of the short tours in the Navy, the CNO/VCNO held 
a briefing to discuss command tour lengths.  As Rickover had accused them, notes from this meeting 
confirm that the shorter tours were a means to facilitate more promotions by giving more officers command 
experience, which resulted in a loss of readiness.  The brief explains:  “Our policy of 12-15 months in 
command provides the maximum number of captains with command experience…..however longer tours 
would probably increase unit readiness.”  The fact that this brief was produced and provided to the CNO so 
soon after the Congressional inquiry is further evidence of the shift in attitude toward a Rickover 
philosophy of officer development.  
31 CNO McDonald sent out a tasking letter on 20 January 1966 to the President of the Naval War College 
and Superintendent of Post Graduate School, ordering them to re-evaluate officer education and 
development. The actual letter is missing from war college archives, but is referenced in B.J. Semmes, Jr., 
VADM USN,"Policy on Education for Unrestricted Line Officers,  Memo from Chief of Naval Personnel, 
dtd 9 Feb 1966,  to all Unrestricted Line Flag Officers," Naval War College Archives, RG 27, Box 1966, 
folder "Educational Policy".  
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aware of Anderson’s belief that Rickover was a primary cause of his professional demise.  
Rickover was thus perceived as powerful if not politically immune in any battles with a 
new CNO.   Secondly, McDonald was desperate to win the support of the Capitol Hill 
“Atomic extremists” as he called them.32  Two of the extremists were Senator Pastore 
and Congressman Holifield who had become, in the wake of THRESHER, supporters
Rickover's technical expert model of command.  Wary of Rickover’s power and anxious 
to curry favor with powerful Capitol Hill politicians, McDonald showed none of 
Anderson’s fight when it came to issues of officer development.  Evidence of 
McDonald's surrender to Rickover is manifest by what is not found.  After 1963, there is 
little CNO criticism of any of Rickover's nuclear manning policies.
 of 
                                                
33      
No longer opposed by the CNO,34 or perhaps with the CNO's tacit support, key 
components of the Rickover officer model began to be adopted by the larger officer 
corps.  By later 1965 and early 1966, command tours had been lengthened by 50 percent, 
a move Rickover had long advocated.  Less obvious but possibly more significant was a 
shift in flag selection guidance: selection was incrementally adjusted to promote younger 
 
32 David L. McDonald, Admiral, USN (retired), The Reminiscences of Admiral David Lamar McDonald 
USN (retired) (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press, 1976), 350. 
33 H.G. Rickover, ADM USN,"Congressional Testimony: Problems in Retention of Qualified Personnel", 
JCAE 92nd Congress, 10 March 1971, Testimony of HG Rickover, Washington DC: Government Printing 
Office, 89.  There is a complete absence of any further mention of the demands for shorter tours or 
lowering standards, the major complaints Rickover voiced in his 1962-63 testimony.  The CNOs after 
McDonald also accepted Rickover’s authority.  Admiral Moorer resigned himself to Rickover’s unique 
authority, and recalled that during his tenure he would "...agree, never fight, and then forget..." when 
dealing with Rickover.  See Elmo R. Zumwalt, Interview with Norman Polmar 4 April 1979. 
34 John T. Hayward, VADM, USN (ret), "Comment," US Naval Institute Proceedings, 107, no. 4, April 
1981, 21-22.   Hayward levied a spirited attack on Rickover's legacy and recalled that eventually no one 
challenged Rickover, not just on nuclear issues, but on issues where Rickover had little expertise: "He 
(Rickover) is right where he belongs, running a complex technical program and doing it well. However, 





and more junior officers.35  The decision to promote captains sooner to flag, a practice 
that mimicked the Air Force, was a significant shift toward a specialist model of 
admiralship.  To 'round out' an officer took time.  To select officers for flag earlier in 
their career meant the officer had had less time to 'broaden'.  Flag officers selected after 
1966 were thus marginally more specialized than they were broadened.   The cumulative 
effect of these many changes— more specialized undergraduate education, the demise of 
the less technical diesel culture, the diffusion of reactors into the surface fleet, longer 
command tours, earlier promotion to flag, and decline of war college matriculation 
rates— spelled the coming end of the generalist and the rise of the technical specialist in 








In the early 1960s, the Navy eliminated several pillars of King's system of 
integrative officer education.   Within a decade not only would Annapolis become a 
specialized engineering college, but integrative educational institutions and examinations 
would be terminated. The General Line Course, established by King in 1920 endorsed 
again in 1948 in the Hartman-Sprague Report, was terminated in the early 1960s.36  While 
                                                 
35 Paul R. Captain Schratz, USN, "Paul Henry Nitze," in American Secretaries of the Navy, 1913-1972, ed. 
Paolo E. Colletta (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1980) 952-953.  Command tours were lengthened 
from 12 to 18 months, a change very much in line with Rickover’s criticisms.  Flag officer selection was 
moved earlier, a change that followed Nitze's observation in 1965 that “…our (Navy) flag officers are 
generally older by several years than their counterparts in the other services.”   
36 Harry Depue Train, ADM USN, Interview with the Author, 2 November 2007.  Admiral Train attended 
the course in 1956, and noted that it was a highly integrative course in planning and operations, not in any 
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the proximate reason for the termination of the GLC is unclear, it is probably no 
coincidence that it was terminated around the same time Rickover first participated on the 
educational review board—the SABER Board.  This board included the Under Secretary 
of the Navy who had the authority to terminate the course if he was so persuaded.37   The 
changes at the Naval Academy, as discussed in the last chapter -- begun quietly in 1959-- 
had by the end of the decade yielded a very different product. Annapolis no longer 
produced the all-around naval ensign with a general college degree, but many a young 
officer with an accredited engineering major.  Through these changes the very identity of 
young officers began to move from that of general line officer to that of technical expert 
and platform specialist.38  
A shift in criterion for flag promotion, from ‘well rounded’ to ‘specialist’, also began 
to emerge coincident with Rickover’s rise to prominence.  A study of flag promotions 
noted a gradual shift in priorities from an emphasis on officer 'versatility' to a growing 
emphasis on officer specialization: "Despite general satisfaction with the past results and 
a firm belief in the essential soundness of the selection system, every senior officer 
interviewed, whether unrestricted line, restricted line or staff corps, showed an awareness 
of the growing importance of the sub-specialist to the conduct of the Navy's affairs." 39      
                                                                                                                                                 
way a technical course like that which would come to dominate the graduate school curricula in the 1960s.  
Train recalled the GLC course was large and well attended despite the fact that it was not mandatory.   
37  It might also be relevant to note that Rickover’s deputy, Jack Crawford, recalled that Rickover despised 
the General Line Course.  Though he could not recall a specific instance where Rickover intervened to 
cancel the school, Crawford thought such an intervention by Rickover would have been totally consistent 
with his views of the school. 
38 Todd A. Forney, The Midshipman Culture and Educational Reform: the U.S. Naval Academy, 1946-76 
(Newark, Del.: University of Delaware Press, 2004), 135.  Forney’s extensive survey of midshipman 
attitudes is crucial in measuring this shift in loyalties and identification.  According to Forney naval officers 
began to shift their loyalties to their group of specialists associated with the machine communities (surface, 
aviation, submarine).  
39 Alfred W. Pride, ADM USN (Ret),"Criteria for Selection to Flag Rank in the USN, Report of Board 20 
February 1963", NARA RG 24-470-54-25 Box 6, see page v.  
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The increasing value attached to specialized knowledge, as opposed to integrated 
knowledge,  was further manifest in changing promotion examination policies.  In the 
early 1960s the Navy terminated the practice of written promotion examinations.  Navy 
policy had traditionally required as a pre-requisite for promotion the completion of 
common examinations.  The requirement for promotion exams was in force from the 
1920s to the early 1960s, interrupted on a large scale only by the Second World War. 40  
The Bureau of Personnel administered the examination to all line officers.  The test 
included sections on tactics, operations, strategy, international law, and in the versions 
after WWII, a section on aviation tactics.  The Navy promotion exams symbolized a 
common, integrated body of professional knowledge, required of all unrestricted line 
officers.  The exam was discontinued sometime between 1960 and 196441  around the 
same time Rickover won decisive clashes with the CNO, Bureau Chief, and Naval 
Academy Superintendent.   
The termination of the general promotion exam no doubt affected officer 
perceptions and priorities, though to what degree is difficult to measure.   Without the 
exam, the requirement that each officer maintain general knowledge of the naval 
profession – operations, strategy, international law and the like—was unenforceable.  For 
young and mid-grade officers who were short of study time, the termination of the exam 
was no doubt welcome.  But with the end of a general line exam, career advancement 
became even more the exclusive domain of the specialized, technological communities 
                                                 
40 Arthur Ainsley Ageton, CDR, USN, The Naval Officer's Guide, 1st- ed. (New York,: Whittlesey House, 
1943) see 1960 edition, article 702.  BUPERS,"BUPERS Manual",  see 1934 version, pg 242. See also 
BUPERS Manuals from 1942 to 1959, most copies of which are held in the Naval Historical Center library, 
general collection. 
41 Arthur Ainsley Ageton, RADM, USN (ret) and William P. Mack, RADM, USN, The Naval Officer's 
Guide, 6th ed. (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute, 1964),  218. 
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that reinforced community priorities through their respective technical training 
programs.42  
The termination of the exam requirement also reduced the appeal of navy 
service schools.  The old exam had tested material taught by the service schools.  Navy 
regulations permitted more junior officers (0-4 and below) to substitute war college 
correspondence and classroom courses in lieu of tactical and strategic sections of the 
promotion exam.43  This option, if exercised by the younger officers, reduced the 
possibility of exam failure.  In the old system, then, War College coursework was directly 
relevant and helpful to an officer's effort to gain promotion.  But with the termination of 
the exam, the direct linkage between promotion and advanced professional military 
education (war college) was severed.  The balance between education and specialized 
technical platform training swung further in the direction of the latter. 44    
The training requirements dictated by platform communities took almost 
complete control of an officer’s career.  The platform communities controlled both the 
detailing of the officers and, through their selection for command, the de-facto control of 
their promotion prospects as well. The Naval War College no longer provided any 
measurable benefit to an officer’s promotion prospects.   The idea of a navy officer as 
being responsible for general tactical, operational, and strategic knowledge faded.  An 
officer was increasingly responsible for only specialized knowledge associated with his 
                                                 
42 James L. Holloway, III,  ADM USN (CNO), Interview with the Author, April 26, 2007.  Admiral 
Holloway noted that in the middle 1950s  the promotion system was more selective than the ‘command 
screen’ process.  He observed that many former squadron commanders who successfully completed 
'commander command' did not, however, win promotion to the rank of captain (0-6).  After 1960, 
Holloway observed this pattern was reversed: it was more difficult to select for command than it was to 
promote in rank, and the vast majority of successful squadron commanders did promote to 0-6.  Whether or 
not this inversion and the demise of promotion examinations are related phenomena is open to speculation, 
but the coincidence in timing is potentially significant.   
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particular platform machine, not for knowledge of other platforms, let alone other 
services.   
Navy leaders in the 1960s adopted another policy that moved the 'line' away 
from an integrative model and closer still to Rickover's model of technical expert in 
command.  In the first years after the Second World War, the Navy had been an 
enthusiastic proponent of joint education.  The best officers for a half generation had 
willingly attended joint war colleges.  But in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Navy 
downgraded its support of joint education.  The proximate cause was the decline in 
numbers of EDO officers.  This decline prompted the Navy to prepare more URL officers 
to fill billets for the EDOs.   
It was never clear how URL officers could replace EDO officers, command 
navy ships, and fulfill their growing 'joint' responsibilities.  The Navy in 1959 tasked 
RADM R. T. S. Keith to study the education requirements of line officers.  Keith 
concluded that it was not likely, if not impossible, that ‘line’ officers could be trained as 
mariners, educated as technical specialists, and also prepare to serve as joint 
commanders.45   Shortly after Keith's study, the Navy shifted its priorities away from 
joint education toward URL technical education.  So important were the perceived 
                                                                                                                                                 
43 Bureau of Personnel Navy Department,"Bureau of Personnel Manual, 1959", Naval Historical Center, 
general collections, call number VA 52.A65.  
44 VADM John T. Hayward, President of the Naval War College, concluded that the Navy had swung in 
favor of specialized education to the detriment of non-technical, integrative education. He noted that 1967 
would be the first year naval officers constituted a minority at NWC. He also observed this  naval 
phenomena spreading to all war colleges, e.g., only 129 of 168 seats filled; only 59% naval officers service 
college graduates compared to 98% of Army, yet at same time 1442 navy officers at graduate school, all 
indicative of the rising power and influence of specialization.  See John Hattendorf, Sailors and Scholars: 
The Centennial History of the Naval War College (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1984), 259.   
 
45 R.T.S. Keith, RADM, USNR,"Billet and post-graduate educational requirements in the specialty areas in 
the line of the Navy, Report of Board 1 October 1959", NARA RG 24-470-54-25-6 box 5  
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technical education requirements that in the early 1960s the Navy adopted a policy that 
required a mandatory two year ‘payback tour’ for URL ‘line’ officers in technical 
assignments.  The Navy adopted no similar mandatory ‘joint tour’ or joint education 
requirements.46  By the end of the decade, navy officer matriculation at joint educational 
institutions began to fall off.47   
Some senior line officers perceived the shift toward a technical specialist model 
and complained to the Superintendent of the Naval Post Graduate School.48  Official 
studies questioned the decision to embrace technical specialization for URL officers.  
One study pointed out that the rapidly rising demand for technically educated URL 
officers was not founded on any empirical research, but was instead the result of an 
uncontrolled bureaucratic competition between technical bureaus as each attempted to 
grab the most technical officers in anticipation of future needs.49  Despite these concerns 
and criticisms, the Navy did not change its policy.  Rather, the Navy continued to assign 
line officers to more technically specialized assignments and training at the expense of 
broader, integrative, and non-technical education at the war colleges. 
                                                 
46 Ibid.  
47 Directory of National War College Graduates,  (Washington, D.C: The National War College Alumni 
Association, 2003) 
48 Robert  RADM McNitt, USN "Ltr from President, NPGS, to Superintendent of the Naval Academy,  
VADM James F. Calvert, USN ", RG 405, US Naval Academy, Special Collections,  Superintendent 
Correspondence, files 1968-1981, Subj: NPGS,  File number NC 1500-4. 
49 H.S. Heire, and H.M. Worth, BUPERS Research Activity,"US Naval Officer Billets Requiring Post-
Graduate Training: Task Assignment W17-02-01 dtd December 1959", NARA RG 24-470-54-27-3/4 Box 
65.  The report noted that the tilt toward a technical coding of billets arose from the conviction that such 
billets and technical training would be the way of the future:  "Predictions for the future indicated, without 
exception, a rapid and continuing increase in technical complexity of naval equipment which will 
necessitate a corresponding increase in technical competency among officer personnel. An outgrowth of 
these conditions has been a large increase in the number of officer billets reported as requiring postgraduate 
education."   The report noted that a more standardized and valid means to determine technical training 
was, however, needed.  The number of technically coded billets had increased  at an unjustified pace, rising 
50% in just three years, from 4,500 technical URLs to 6,700 between 1956 and 1959, over a time period of 
only 36 months! 
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 The credibility of the old King model in the eyes of 'line' officers was dealt a 
final blow when the Chief of the Bureau of Personnel, VADM B.J. Semmes, openly 
questioned the validity of the generalist model.  In a 1966 policy memo from the Navy’s 
Chief of Personnel, distributed to all URL Flag officers, Semmes titled the memo with a 
simple sounding but troubling question: “Does the Navy have an approved, accepted, 
widely understood policy on educational (career development) requirements for 
unrestricted line officers?” 50  Semmes went on to remind the flag officers that until 
recently the Navy had an official policy of progressive and integrative education.  He 
observed that the policy had been highly effective in producing the 'well rounded officers' 
in high command.  In 1966 a remarkably high percentage (176 of 217) of URL flag 
officers had attended a senior war college, a level of participation similar to King’s 
generation on the eve of the Second World War! 51   Though Semmes pointed to the large 
number of broadly educated admirals, he was uncertain in his support for the continuation 
of the King model.  He explained that the old policy had proceeded on the "...general 
premise that service college is broadening and valuable for career officers..."  But then 
Semmes questioned the premise, noting that no specific billets could be found to justify 
such a system of broadening education.  Semmes articulated the idea that for education to 
be valuable, it had to be linked to a coded billet of some sort.  If education could not be 
linked to a coded requirement, then the value of the education was questioned: "...if 
                                                 
50 B.J. Semmes, Jr., VADM USN,"Policy on Education for Unrestricted Line Officers,  Memo from Chief 
of Naval Personnel, dtd 9 Feb 1966,  to all Unrestricted Line Flag Officers," Naval War College Archives, 
RG 27, Box 1966, folder "Educational Policy".  
51 Ibid.,  4. 
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service college training is valuable, then it must follow that billets wherein such training 
is a prerequisite could be readily identified.”52     
The mere fact that the highest ranking personnel admiral would ask the question 
as he did, and then fail to endorse the old model, undermined the old model.  Semmes’ 
memo was tantamount to an admission that the King model no longer enjoyed wide 
support in the 'line'.  Semmes' memo sparked a wave of responses, but most officers 
seemed uncertain which Navy policy best developed leaders of the future.53  VADM 
Fitz-Hugh Lee was perhaps representative of the responses when he asserted that there
longer existed an agreed-upon policy for officer development, but that one was badly 
needed.
 no 
                                                
54   
As the 1960s wore on, the Rickover-inspired officer model began to gain more 
adherents.  Though the larger non-nuclear navy might never admit what it was doing, the 
unrestricted line officers were moving toward the technical expert model propounded by 
Rickover.  One of the Navy’s most senior officers, Pacific Fleet commander, ADM Roy 
Johnson, noted that in this period Navy promotion boards began to penalize officers who 
left the platform community to pursue any sort of education or training not associated 
 
52 Ibid., 5. 
53 It is interesting to note that Admiral Nimitz, the last great war-hero exemplar of the King model, died 20 
Feb 1966, about the same time Semmes sent out his memo of 9 Feb 66.  One of the important factors in 
paradigmatic change according to Kuhn is generational change, the physical death of the preceding 
generation, which thereby provides an opportunity for new ideas and patterns to take hold.  But again, the 
Navy's transformation did not conform neatly to any one pattern.  When Rickover was most powerful as a 
transformative leader (he promoted to four stars at the age of 73), he was past retirement age and if he had 
been an 'average' officer, he should have been dead.   
54 Fitzhugh Lee, VADM USN, Letter to CNP, 11 March 1966: "Comments on Policy on Education for 
Unrestricted Line Officers".  In response to Semmes’ question as to whether or not a recognized policy of 
officer development existed, he answered: “No (there is no policy), and it badly needs one (a policy).”   
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with the platform community.55  Navy planners also noted the decline in the number of 
officers interested in graduate and service education and proposed several policy changes 
to reverse the trend.56   The myriad attempts to increase service school attendance rates 
were, like Semmes “all flag” message, a further sign of professional confusion 
surrounding the identity and qualifications that should define the 'line' officer.57   
The aviation and surface communities began in this period to refocus their 
officers on the narrower needs of the platform community.  Community detailers began 
to downgrade general education in their order of priorities.  Within two years following 
Semmes memo, line officers going to the war college dropped off dramatically.  As a 
consequence, the navy officer share of the student body reached the lowest on record.58  
Furthermore, the most ‘promotable’ line officers increasingly avoided graduate education 
at Monterey, a decline that persisted into the latter years of the century. 59   
                                                 
55 Roy Johnson, ADM USN,"Ltr to Chief of Naval Personnel, dtd 17 March 1966", NWC archives, RG 27, 
PME policy 1964-1966, Johnson ltr 17 March 1966 to CNP.  Johnson argued that the navy penalized 
officers who pursued education.  What is noteworthy is that Johnson was not an academic admiral, but a 
fleet commander who had oversight of South East Asia.  He was, so to speak, on the 'Front Lines', yet he 
still considered education to be a matter of critical importance.  
56 Multiple reform efforts were initiated by successive war college administrations in an effort to stem the 
slide in student numbers and quality, but to no avail. For a detailed explanation of the various reform 
attempts in the 1960s and 1970s, see John Hattendorf, Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the 
Naval War College (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1984).   
57 It is important to note that this shift in values to specialization, away from integrated knowledge, as 
represented by falling war college and graduate school attendance, occurred before the full weight of the 
Vietnam War was felt.  Thus the crisis in officer models did not originate with the Vietnam War, though 
the war may later have aggravated the tendency of community leaders to limit officers to community 
assignments.  
58 A. Pickert, and D. Morgiewicz,"NWC Staff Study 1968: Comparison of NWC and NPS Quotas", NWC 
Archives, RG 17, box 3, Staff Study 8 Aug 1968. The study shows that the Naval War College in 1967-
1968 experienced its lowest navy enrollment in history:  naval officers were outnumbered by other services 
and organizations 57-38.  Specifically, see pg. v., see also NWC briefing of May 1968, chart showing 
dramatic drop in attendance beginning mid 1960s,  pg. iii-1;  The document makes the point that the secular 
decline in C&S school was especially significant given the closure of King's  General Line Course in 1962.   
   59 The most academically gifted officers in the late 1950s were nuclear officers and many went to graduate 
schools under the Burke Scholarship.  In the early to mid 1960s, up to 60% of navy line PhDs in the Burke 
program were nuclear officers. However nuclear officer participation would drop off in the later 1960s.  
This pattern of falling attendance by the ‘best’ officers in graduate school would persist to the end of the 
century.  See Linda C. Cavalluzzo,"Navy Line Officer Advanced Education Requirements for 21st 
414 
 
Admiral John T. Hayward, the President of the War College in the middle 1960s, 
saw the declining enrollment as a sign of the ascendance of the specialist model. The 
declining naval enrollment was spreading to other war colleges:  navy officers filled only 
129 of their quota of 168 seats at the senior joint war colleges.   Some might attribute the 
vacancies to the Vietnam War.  But the decline in attendance began before the war and, if 
comparisons with the Army are considered appropriate, the drain of the war as an 
explanation seems even less persuasive.  While the Army was arguably more heavily 
committed to the war than were naval officers (with the exception of naval aviators  
flying in Vietnam), the Army filled 98% of their senior war college seats, while the Navy 
filled only 59% of navy seats.60  It was also noteworthy that during this period the 
number of authorized war college student billets declined while those for educating 
technical sub-specialists increased.61   If the war had been the main cause of declining 
officer education, it seems it would have affected both the integrative education at the 
war colleges and technical education. But criticisms from VADMs Hayward and Fitz-
Hugh Lee, the commandant at the National War College, could be dismissed as 
complaints typical of ‘educators’, perhaps exaggerated in an effort to gain more funding. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Century", Center for Naval Analyses Report, 1998  Linda C. Cavalluzzo, A Bottom-up Assessment of Navy 
Flagship Schools (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 1998).  Cavaluzzo shows that in the last 
two decades of the 20th century, graduate education was undersubscribed by those who were on the path to 
command. Furthermore, promotion was negatively influenced by attendance at graduate school. See 
Cavalluzzo, pg. 20.   
60 John Hattendorf, Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the Naval War College (Newport, RI: 
Naval War College Press, 1984), 259.  The year of 1967 is the first class wherein naval officers are in a 
minority at NWC. At the same time enrollment in technical degrees at NPGS climbed to 1442, an inversion 
further indicative of the shift to a specialist notion of the officer corps.  Hattendorf’s numbers, however, do 
not provide complete fidelity in that it is unclear how many line officers, and of what quality, were 
attending the joint service schools.  
61 A. Pickert, and D. Morgiewicz,"NWC Staff Study 1968: Comparison of NWC and NPS Quotas", NWC 
Archives, RG 17, box 3,  Staff Study 8 Aug 1968, 193.  Study shows comparison of change in quotas for 
specialization versus those of service school training.  From 1958-1968, Post-graduate quotas for 
specialized education increased 100% while at the same time quotas for NWC increased only 20%. 
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But their assessments were corroborated by another source: a shifting conception of line 
officer captured in the officer manuals and career guides of the period.   
The Navy’s leading publication for officer career planning, Ageton’s Naval 
Officer’s Guide, which has remained in print and been periodically reissued for six 
decades, captured the shift in officer models in the 1960s.  The authority of the document 
as a reflection of navy personnel policy is unquestioned: navy officials reviewed the text 
for accuracy, and the 'forward' to each edition was written by either the Chief of 
Personnel in 1960-67 or the CNO in 1970.  
A first indicator of shifting officer models was a change  of frequency in 
revisions to the career guides.  The 1960s witnessed the rapid release of multiple 
revisions of the Naval Officer Guide, a dramatic increase in the frequency of revision that 
was symptomatic of the professional confusion and change of the period.62   The multiple 
revisions reflected Ageton's attempt to stay abreast of an officer system that was in flux.   
Whereas during the thirteen year period from 1946 to 1959 revised editions were 
infrequent (updated only once, in 1951), the 10 year period from 1960 to 1970 witnessed 
no fewer than four revised editions (1960, 1964, 1967, 1970).  Whereas in the 1960 
edition all three communities adhered to King’s system of integrative and progressive 
education, by the end of the decade the impending collapse of the King model is evident.  
The 1970 edition broke with the old King model and displayed for the first time a new 
model of technically specialized and platform-centric career paths.    
                                                 
62Periods of confusion and uncertainty within a professional body are sometimes associated with changing 
models or paradigms of thought.  See  Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2d ed. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).  Kuhn explains that a period of professional anxiety often 
preceded a ‘paradigm shift’ to follow.   
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The change in photographs and their placement telegraph a period of professional 
flux and the ascendance of nuclear power and the supremacy of technical specialization.  
Whereas from 1943 to 1959 the guide features the image of a single unifying technology-
-an aircraft carrier-- the 1964 edition features images of three platforms that corresponded 
to the three officer communities.  The changing dust jacket of the book also tells a story 
of changed values.  In contrast to earlier covers that featured a single officer crest and the 
star of the 'line' officer, the 1970 edition dispensed with the officer crest and replaced it 
with three separate images: a submarine officer at the periscope, a flight deck officer on a 
carrier, and officers on the bridge of a surface ship (see appendix, A-4, A-5).  The three 
photos of the three platforms with their different officers operating their machines posed 
a stark contrast to past covers which featured the star of the 'line'.  The changed cover 
conveyed the idea that the ‘line’ officer corps was no longer unitary and integrated but 
was instead three fragmented social groups identified by their platforms.    
Graphical charts of the notional officer career path were included in every 
Naval Officer’s Guide after 1946.  The changes in these charts, perhaps more than any 
other discursive element, capture the professional turmoil and change in the 1960s and 
attest to the diffusion of Rickover’s model into the broader profession. The submarine 
officer chart in the editions from 1951 to 1967 represented the submarine career as the 
least specialized of all officer communities in the Navy:  the submarine officer served 
first on surface ships, was broadly educated as King recommended, and  shared a career 
progression common with the surface officers later in his career.63  Furthermore, the idea 
that all combat commanders (surface, submarine, air) were first and foremost members of 
                                                 
63 Arthur Ainsley Ageton, RADM, USN (Ret) and William P. Mack, RADM, USN, The Naval Officer's 
Guide, 7th ed. (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute, 1967), 394. 
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a “general unrestricted line” officer corps was captured by a chart in 1951.  The 1951 
chart represents all 'line' officers as sharing a common educational experience.64  The 
chart shows that all URLs are to be educated at graduate school and at the war college.   
The 1960, 1964, 1967 editions include a similar chart that depicts elements of unified 
officer education, which are almost identical in content with King’s model (1920).  But 
the continuity reaching back to King is decisively broken in the 1970 edition.   
   The 1970 edition (8th) communicates a model of line officer who is 
specialized, a technical and platform expert.  The most compelling evidence of the 
eclipse of the King model is found in the depiction of the General Unrestricted Line 
Officer (GURL) career: it is deleted from the guide!  The GURL career had been charted 
in every guide between 1951 and 1967.  The 1970 edition, however, eliminated the 
GURL career path in its entirety. The image is gone completely and with it in the minds 
of the readers is the general line officer.  By implication, there is no 'well rounded', 
versatile officer, but only increasingly specialized officers.   
The changes evident in Ageton’s series are echoed in the official Bureau of 
Personnel Manual and other career guidance documents. Changes in the official Bureau 
of Personnel Manual show the model of officer shifted decisively in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s.  Successive editions of the manuals from  1925 to 1968 had consistently 
endorsed integrative education.65  All editions from 1934 to 1968 used almost identical 
language to describe the knowledge all officers should aspire to attain: “A thorough 
                                                 
64 Arthur Ainsley Ageton, RADM, USN (Ret), The Naval Officer's Guide, 4th ed. (New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company, 1951), 212. 
65 The Bureau of Personnel Manual of 1959 remained in print until approximately 1970.  The latest copy 
found was a version from the Naval Historical Center which was updated with changes as late as 15 August 
1968, by Charles K. Duncan, VADM USN.  See copy of BUPERS Manual in Naval Historical Center.   
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knowledge of our nation’s policies and the correct conception of the strategy necessary to 
secure our national success are essential parts of the mental equipment for higher 
command (defined in the manual as 0-5 command).  Every experienced naval officer 
should possess, as a necessary component of his technical ('technical' added in 1951) 
knowledge, a thorough grounding in the principles and methods of naval strategy and 
tactics and of joint operations with other branches of the armed forces.  Every 
commission officer should have sufficient knowledge to interpret correctly strategic 
dispositions, and the tactical decisions of our leaders.  Education for supplying such 
knowledge and for the development of doctrine and good military character is necessary 
throughout our naval service.” 66  The 1968 version went on to describe the phases of an 
officer's career and when such education should occur.  The sequence in the 1968 manual 
approximated the sequence first laid down by King in 1920.  Thus, the Navy, in this 
authoritative policy document and manual that was carried aboard every ship and station, 
continued to affirm the essentials of the well rounded officer, the King system, until 
approximately 1968.   
After 1968, the BUPERS Manual made minimal mention of the general line 
officer. The official career guidance after 1968, preserved in a 1970s edition of the 
Unrestricted Line Officers Guide, contains no reference to  the existence of the general 
line officer.  The new guidance conveyed the idea of the unrestricted line officer corps as 
fragmented into three warfare specialties.67  The elevated value attached to specialization 
                                                 
66 Bureau of Personnel Manual, editions 1925, 1934, 1942, 1948, 1959.   See in particular the 1968 updates 
to the 1959 edition, pg. 503. 
67 The BUPERS library collection was eliminated in 1998 when the bureau moved to Millington, TN.  
However, versions of the BUPERS manual from 1925 to 1968 were preserved at the Naval Historical 
Center.  After 1968 the career guidance document that was preserved is a “NAVPERS” publication, 
entitled Unrestricted Line Officer’s Guide, change one (1976).  The preserved version echoes in even 
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was incorporated into the very structure of the manual.  Unlike the BUPERS Manual of 
1968 or Ageton’s earlier editions of Naval Officers Guide, the 1970s Unrestricted Line 
Officer's Guide included but perfunctory remarks concerning the common qualities or 
capabilities of a “naval officer”.  In discussions of education or training, there was almost 
a complete absence of any reference to the words ‘breadth”, “broaden”, or “general’.68  
Rather, in both structure and content, the officer career was depicted as that of the 
specialist who concentrated his attentions on the mastery of a single platform technology.  
The machine was central, as was single-platform training.  Diversions from either the 
primary platform or platform training were implicitly discouraged.  Not surprisingly, the 
practice wherein officers first served on surface ships before moving onto aviation or 
submarines was rare if non-existent by the early 1970s.69 
Officer education, as opposed to training, appeared to be devalued in the 1970s 
manual when compared to the language of earlier BUPERS manuals. The introductory 
section of the later manual noted that a specialty and specialized training are necessary to 
a career, but advanced education was not a necessary part of an officer’s development.70  
Graduate school was quietly discouraged since “…sufficient experience and exposure in 
a given field may obviate the requirement for graduate level education.” 71   Non-
technical graduate education fell further down the list of priorities.  If an officer pursued 
                                                                                                                                                 
stronger terms the shift detected in Ageton’s guide.  See Bureau of Personnel Navy 
Department,"Unrestricted Line Officer Career Planning Guidebook, NAVPERS 15197", Naval Historical 
Center, Washington, D.C., collections, VA 52.A63 15197. 
68Unrestricted Line Officer Career Planning Guidebook, NAVPERS 15197", Naval Historical Center, 
Washington, D.C., collections, VA 52.A63 15197  The only mention of these terms is in passing, in one 
paragraph in the surface officer section, see pg. 32. 
69 James F Calvert, VADM USN, "Thoughts Upon the Conclusion of a Four Year Tour," Shipmate, no. 4, 
April 1972, 9.  Calvert explained that his efforts to revive this practice met with limited support.  There is 
no record of later attempts to implement the common surface ship assignment after Calvert’s failed attempt.  
70 Unrestricted Line Officer Career Planning Guidebook, NAVPERS 15197", Naval Historical Center, 
Washington, D.C., collections, VA 52.A63 15197, pg. vii. 
71 Ibid.,  8. 
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graduate education, the field of study was now restricted to technical fields!   The Burke 
Scholarship, intended by its benefactor for study in technical or non-technical fields,72  
was reinterpreted to confine officers “...in a chosen scientific or engineering field.”73    
Furthermore, navy-funded graduate study in English and history was now forbidden.74   
Education at the war colleges garnered minimal discussion: there was no mention of 
service school in the entire section for nuclear officers and only passing reference in the 
section for aviators and surface warfare officers.  Most telling of the now low stature of 
progressive and integrative education, service school for aviators and surface officers was 
no longer described as a necessary or even desirable component in officer development.  
Rather, the service schools were just one option on a menu of hodge-podge items, 
apparently inter-changeable with any number of less career-enhancing assignments.75   
Future career guides well into the 1990s would follow the patterns established in the 
1970s.76 
The shift from generalist to Rickover's model of technical expert is reflected 
clearly in the changes of the BUPERS Manual of 1968 and the career guidance 
                                                 
72 David Alan Rosenberg, Interview with the Author, 15 June 2007. 
73 N.R. Thunman, RADM USN, "Commanding Officer's Addendum, Unrestricted Line Officer Career 
Guidebook", Naval Historical Center, general collections, Call Number VA 52. A63 NAVPERS 15197 
Addendum c.2, dtd 6 March 1979, 18. 
74 Ibid.,  20. 
75 Bureau of Personnel Navy Department,"Unrestricted Line Officer Career Planning Guidebook, 
NAVPERS 15197", Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C., collections, VA 52.A63 15197, pages  32, 
39.  War College was just another option, the alternatives being listed included NROTC instructor, a 
training officer, staff duty, or recruiting.  
76 G.W. Emery, The Naval Officer's Career Planning Guidebook, NAVPERS 15605 (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1990).  The technical-specialist pattern of officer education appears in 
BUPERS guides well into the 1990s.  In the 1990 edition  there is  no mention of general "naval officer" 
qualifications of education.   The 1990 guide book, by its organization and layout, represents a naval officer 
corps as a collection of specialists, with almost no common educational and or integrative experiences.  Of 
the three career paths, only the surface navy makes mention of integrative education (pg 22) before the rank 
of 0-6.   For the submarine officer (pg. 35) and the aviator (pg. 61), the only integrative military educational 
experience is optional, but comes only after the 20 year point in an officer's career.  
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documents of the 1970s.  The leadership role of Rickover, his philosophy, and his nuclear 
officers is all but certain. The timing is consistent; the interventions are recorded.  Navy 
policy changed as Rickover and his reactors ascended in power and influence. But the 
BUPERS Manual alone does not persuasively show which community of officers led the 
change.  However, a synthesis of the BUPERS Manual changes with those recorded in 
Naval Officer’s Guide shows clearly that the nuclear submarine path was the prototype 
for the changes that followed.77    
The leadership role of the nuclear community is confirmed by a comparison of 
career development charts in the Naval Officer’s Guide, eighth and ninth editions.   In the 
1970 eighth edition, the nuclear submarine officer career path is for the first time 
represented as distinct from diesel submarine officers.78  While the diesel submarine 
career path still included the King phases of integrative education and development 
(fundamental, advanced, final), in the nuclear chart the development and educational 
phases are all but absent; the nuclear career sequence is defined by the requirements of 
the ship and its reactor.  Whereas in the submarine officer charts prior to 1970 an officer's 
career progression included substantial educational and broadening assignments, the 
requirements of the machine (the nuclear propelled ship) took command of the career 
progression after 1970 and continued in later editions (see image A-3).  The chart of the 
                                                 
77 See Appendix, pp. A-1, A-2, A-3 for relevant chart reproductions.   
78 Arthur Ainsley Ageton, RADM, USN (ret) and William P. Mack, VADM, USN, The Naval Officer's 
Guide, 8th ed. (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute, 1970), 384. The battle for identity between diesel 
officers and nuclear submarine officers is in full display on these pages.  The diesel officers on their career 
chart still claim the moniker ‘submarine officer career path’ (no reference to ‘diesel’).  The nuclear officer 
career chart is laid directly next to the ‘submarine’ chart, but the nuclear chart includes the adjective 
“nuclear” that precedes the word ‘submarine’.  
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nuclear submarine career is thus the first community model to delete reference to 
“rounding out” an officer’s career or educational experience.  
The dominance of technology in the officer career path did not remain unique to 
nuclear submarine officers.  The surface and aviation communities within a few years 
followed suit, evidenced in later editions of the Naval Officer’s Guide:  the surface and 
aviation career models eliminated any reference to ‘rounding out’ and instead adopted a 
career pattern strongly similar to the nuclear submarine depiction of 1970.   Integrative 
education as represented by the King phases of development disappeared, replaced with 
an emphasis on technical training and sequential assignments focused almost exclusively 
on manning the platform.79   Admiral Carney’s 1954 concession to allow for temporary 
specialization in nuclear power had, by the early 1970s, become the permanent model for 
the entire navy ‘line’. 
 
* 
Failed Counter-Revolution:  
 
Studying Engineering, Not War in the War College   
 
 
The fleet-wide diffusion of Rickover’s ideology of technical specialization did not 
proceed unopposed.  While the personnel managers and many aspiring ship captains 
warmed to the relative simplicity of a specialist model of command--concentrate on one 
machine in order to maximize opportunity for command--a collection of senior officers 
                                                 
79 The specialist career model, first pioneered by the nuclear submarine career, would prove to be a 
prototype that both the surface and aviation communities followed.  See Naval Officer’s Guide, 9th edition, 
images of surface and aviation career paths which strongly resemble the lay-out and structure of the 1970 
submarine path.   William P. Mack, VADM, USN and CAPTAIN Thomas L. Paulsen, USN, The Naval 
Officer's Guide, 9th ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983), 377-378.   
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opposed the new model.   Admiral Bud Zumwalt was perhaps the most vociferous 
opponent of the Rickover view of the 'line', but he was not alone.  Admirals Stansfield 
Turner and Harry Train, and Vice Admiral James Stockdale-- even some of the first 
generation of nuclear officers--recognized the dangers of a ‘line’ of specialists.  Norman 
Friedman explained that Zumwalt’s goal was to “… encourage American Naval officers 
to be patrons of a common mission and strategy rather than of discrete technologies...” 80  
At varying times over a two decade period, Zumwalt and the other officers attempted to 
counter-act the effects of specialization in the ‘line’ and  regain elements of integrative 
education and a common identity.   That the counter-reform attempts failed is explained 
by the momentum and persuasive power associated with large socio-technological 
systems.    The material of planes, reactors, and radars attracted the attention and time of 
the best officers who spent their sea duty on the platform and their shore-duty close to 
their parent community.  This highly talented group of officers then became persuasive 
advocates for their community of fellow platform specialists.   CNO messages and 
service college presidential speeches advocated that officers travel to Newport to study 
the ‘art of war’, fleet operations, and strategy.  But such exhortations were, as Admiral 
Stirling had warned decades before, at a severe disadvantage to the material and thus 
went unheeded.   
Turner and Stockdale, key figures in the counter-revolution, attempted from their 
position as presidents of the Naval War College to restore balance to the officer corps.  
Zumwalt, who feared an increasingly parochialism in the thinking of more junior officers, 
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Operations, ed.  Robert William Love, Jr., (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1980), 378. 
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sent Turner to Newport.81  Turner is widely known as the officer who reinvigorated the 
Naval War College curriculum, raised faculty standards, and enhanced the profile of the 
institution among the world’s military professions.  Turner instituted these important 
reforms in an effort to compensate for what he described as the "…creeping intellectual 
devitalization..." at the Naval War College.82   A wave of important conferences, 
publications, and war-game lessons emanated from the college while he served as 
president in the early 1970s.  However, in perhaps his most important task—to draw the 
best officers to the Naval War College—Turner failed.  He was unable to overcome the 
opposition of warfare community detailers and personnel officers who valued specialized 
community assignments over the integrative officer education which Newport offered.  
Turner reflected years later that he had made a mistake: he had wanted to reinvigorate the 
War College so that it would become a magnet for the best officers, who would then 
voluntarily seek assignment for a year of higher-level education.  But the officers Turner 
sought did not respond voluntarily.83  John Hattendorf, a leading scholar of the War 
College, noted the problem was that the “...NWC faced the ever increasing problem of 
obtaining appropriate students…”84  Admiral Turner was more blunt in his assessment:  
“…the best did not come.”85    
What Turner had failed to overcome was the diffusion of the technical specialist 
identity in the minds of the officers of the ‘line’.  Officers were increasingly aware that, 
                                                 
81 Ibid.,  370. 
82 John Hattendorf, Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the Naval War College (Newport, RI: 
Naval War College Press, 1984),  283. 
83 Stansfield Turner, Admiral, USN (retired), Interview with the Author, 14 September 2005. 
84 John Hattendorf, Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the Naval War College (Newport, RI: 
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as VADM Semmes had revealed with his fleet-wide message in 1966, the Navy no longer 
enforced nor supported the integrative and non-technical education of 'line' officers.  
There was no quantifiable link between a war college education and assignment to 
specific billets, so war college education was seen as increasingly superfluous.  
Moreover, unlike the pattern that sustained from 1920 to 1966, promotion boards were 
discounting the value of integrative war college education when compared with more 
time spent with the parent community.  Time away from a community, even if it helped 
the officer gain a broader picture of the Navy and of integrative and joint warfare, was 
viewed as a ‘black mark’.  The likelihood of promotion was fast becoming inversely 
proportional to time spent in either graduate school or the war college.86   
Stockdale, too, believed in the importance of integrative education provided by 
the War College and tirelessly promoted the institution.  Stockdale, a decorated combat 
veteran and survivor of years in a North Vietnamese prison camp, urged the Navy to 
reemphasize advanced education that pushed officers beyond narrow technical 
specialization and the management of machine systems.  Stockdale feared that, even 
among line officers, the “... manager came, almost consciously to eclipse the 
warrior…”87  But Stockdale’s exhortations failed to stem the slow decline in ‘line’ officer 
attendance at the war college.  Rather than attract more officers to its non-technical
curriculum, Stockdale may have served only to prompt an unprecedented intervention
the war college curriculum by leading nuclear-trained adm
 
 in 
irals.   
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Stockdale’s successor was confronted with aggressive interventions by the first 
wave of Rickover’s technical protégés who were now reaching senior flag rank.  In one 
case illustrative of the rising power of technocratic thinking, VADM James D. Watkins, 
the nuclear-trained personnel chief, proposed in 1975 a fundamental redirection of the 
Naval War College. He suggested the War College move away from the study of strategy 
and policy and move toward the study of the technical aspects of current operations.88  A 
detailed discussion of the issues and debate are beyond the scope of this paper, but a few 
points are worthy of note.  Stockdale's successor, VADM LeBourgeosie, had worked to 
build on Turner's and Stockdale’s efforts, to raise the educational and academic profile of 
the college.  But Watkins’ proposals would, in the words of the Chief of Naval Education 
and Training, VADM James B. Wilson, shift the curriculum to one that promoted the 
study of “…enemy threat parameters, missile radar frequencies, and the like—all subjects 
better taught at the Surface Warfare School, Submarine School, Readiness 
Squadrons...”89  Such a redirection, Wilson further warned, would transform the war 
college into more of a "trade-school" and less of an educational institution.  In the end, 
the dispute of conflicting visions of the war college was resolved by the CNO, Admiral 
Holloway.  He upheld VADM Watkins’ recommendation to expand the technical content 
of the curriculum.90  This decision to lean toward the technical over the strategic is all the 
more remarkable given the then recent Office of Secretary Defense directive of 5 June 
1975 to the Service Secretaries.  In this directive the civilian leadership urged the Service 
                                                 
88 James D. Watkins, VADM USN," Ltr from VADM James D. Watkins, Chief of Bureaus of Personnel  to 
Chief of Naval Operations, dtd 13 April 1977", NWC Archives, RG 27, File "PME Policy 1974-1977". 
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Secretaries to broaden officer education beyond the traditional specialties.91  This 
example serves as yet one more signpost on the road to a techno-centric mode of training, 
education, and even thinking that was coming to dominate the values of the uniform 
officers.      
While rear-guard actions against techno-centrism were failing at the War College, 
some senior civilians attempted to undo some of the Rickover reforms at Annapolis.  In 
the mid-1970s, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, William Clement, chaired what became 
known as the Clement Committee. The committee sought to deemphasize technical 
specialties in favor of general education and encouraged the adoption of a more joint and 
integrated common core.  The board recommended Annapolis re-emphasize the military 
aspects of the program by increasing the share of officer instructors relative to civilians.  
It further recommended strict limits to civilian tenure to "...that percentage of faculty 
members needed to maintain institutional memory..." 92  The Naval Academy, under the 
leadership of Vice Admiral Mack and later Vice Admiral Kinnaird McKee, a nuclear 
trained officer, resisted the Clement committee recommendations.93  The identity of the 
Naval Academy as an engineering college that served as the primary source of nuclear 
officers continued to solidify in the 1970s.  By 1979 the influence of the nuclear program 
was so powerful, and the idea of a naval officer as a technical expert so engrained, that 
engineering training became the highest priority of the naval officer corps.  In late 1979, 
as the military confronted in Iran global Islamic terrorism, the momentum of Rickover’s 
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program remained unabated.  In that year the Navy again drafted midshipmen 
involuntarily into the nuclear engineering program.  
Other training and educational initiatives serve as further evidence of the 
diffusion of Rickover's technocratic ideas to the larger fleet.  The Navy witnessed 
perhaps the ultimate manifestation of the technocratic idea of command in the deserts of 
Idaho:  senior commanders, captains, and even admirals in large numbers were diverted 
from the study of tactics and operations and required instead to study engineering 
systems.  The Rickover policy of mandatory, in-depth engineering education as a 
prerequisite for nuclear command became in the mid 1970s a fleet-wide, compulsory 
policy for all commanding officers.  Prior to taking command of any conventionally- 
powered surface ship or group of ships, the putative commander was required to 
complete Rickover's course in engineering.  Rather than study operations, strategy, and 
war at a war college, senior officers en masse now went to nuclear prototype facilities to 
complete a course of study known best by its acronym:  SOSMRC, Senior Officer’s 
Ship’s Material and Readiness Course. 
The SOSMRC material course and its influence on officer assignment arose out of 
a crisis in the fleet readiness of surface ship propulsion systems.  By the middle 1970s, 
the surface fleet of ships was in poor condition.  Driven hard by the Vietnam War and 
starved of maintenance funds by higher priority programs, the propulsion plants of 
surface ships were increasingly unreliable.  Justifiably concerned by the deteriorating 
condition of the surface fleet, Admiral Holloway, the Chief of Naval Operations, turned 
to Admiral Rickover for advice.  In consultation with VADM James Watkins, the nuclear 
trained personnel chief, Holloway asked Rickover to assume control of the commanding 
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officer engineering training.  Under the new system, all commanding officers (including 
many admirals) would be required to complete an intensive, nuclear-style engineering 
course of instruction prior to assuming command of the Navy's surface ships and surface 
groups.  
Admiral Holloway saw in SOSMRC something more than just a remedial 
program, however.   He envisioned SOSMRC as a tool to effect a long overdue shift of 
officer attention away from the study of tactics and weapons to the study of engineering 
fundamentals.94  Holloway believed that the concentration on command and control and 
weapons had come at the expense of propulsion engineering.  Holloway saw an urgent 
need to restore the professionalism and pride of ships engineers:  "It didn't take me long 
to identify the root cause of the problem. The entire professional area of naval 
engineering had been neglected since WWII. Command and control and weapons were 
the glamorous assignments in the surface ships.  If a line officer hoped to get ahead in the 
Navy, engineering duty was to be avoided at all costs."  Admiral Holloway explained the 
inspiration for his program was Rickover’s philosophy of engineering education and 
assignment policy:  “Rickover’s example of deep immersion of prospective commanding 
officers in engineering had impressed me.”95   Holloway adopted as his own Rickover's 
deeply held conviction, justified by the Act of 1899, that 'line' officers must be engineers.    
Holloway planned to go yet further in his effort to make 'line' commanders into 
engineers.  He planned to require all prospective commanding officers to serve first in the 
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engineering department of a sea-going ship.96  As this assignment requirement proved 
logistically difficult to impose, he relented and required only that commanders attend 
SOSMRC, as discussed previously.  Attendance at SOSMRC was vigorously enforced 
such that some officers who were not inclined to the study of engineering were weeded 
out of the officer ranks.  Holloway noted that some officers refused to attend the 
engineering course as a matter of principle, in which case they were removed from the 
command list.   But according to Holloway, “...the quality of the cadre of commanding 
officers was not diminished by the removal of these officers...” 97   What is further 
remarkable is that this major change in officer assignment policy was developed and 
implemented without consultation with the surface leadership, but was the policy 
decision of Holloway, Rickover, and Watkins. With SOSMRC, Rickover’s ideas diffused 
through the fleet and were communicated to every commanding officer, the group from 
which all future senior leaders would be chosen.  A large number of ship captains, 
numbering near a thousand, would ultimately pass through this intensive engineering 
training school.98 
The diffusion effect of Rickover’s program was unprecedented both in the 
number of captains it involved, but also in the number of senior policy-makers it reached.  
Rickover was able through this program to re-educate a large number of flag officers to 
focus first on the material, on engineering, and second on operations and integration.99   
Even Secretary of the Navy Middendorf was persuaded to devote a substantial share of 
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his time to engineering training and inspection issues.  The CNO asked the Secretary to 
visit as many ship engine rooms as possible.  The CNO explained to the Secretary: “After 
just a couple visits, I told him, you will know what to look for—in the bilges and 
firesides, for example—and will be able to speak knowledgeably about what you see.”  
Holloway summarized the effect on the Secretary:  “The final upshot was that Secretary 
of the Navy made more than 350 ship visits in the fleet, for the express purpose of 
inspecting the engineering spaces and visiting the engineers, in nearly every case 
climbing into a boiler opened for cleaning.”100  One is left to wonder how much time 
remained, after several hundred boiler inspections, for the Secretary to do much of 
anything else.    
The nuclear model of the 'line'—of technical specialist and the engineer-- 
remained ascendant, and if measured by promotions to high rank, the nuclear officers 
came to dominate the Navy by the early 1980s.   All new submarines and all aircraft 
carriers under construction were nuclear.  As late as the mid 1970s, all future large 
surface ships were, by Navy plans, to be nuclear powered.  With SOSMRC an important 
change had been effected in the qualification for command of any and all surface ships, 
non-nuclear included.  Threatened with a nuclear-takeover of the Navy through training 
initiatives like SOSMRC and by the construction of nuclear cruisers and carriers, the 
conventional surface officers and aviators took action to defend their community of 
officers.  The non-nuclear aviator and surface officers embraced deeper specialization as 
a defensive bulwark against Rickover.   
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Part of the reason non-nuclear officers adopted the Rickover model of technical 
expertise and specialization was that it brought substantial bureaucratic advantages, 
especially those of defensive protection.  Rickover's parochial model engendered in the 
broader Navy what could be called a "defensive technicalization", a tactic of bureaucratic 
competition.101  Non-nuclear surface and aviation officers came to fear the rise of nuclear 
power, but so persuasively did the idea of technical specialization appeal that in their 
efforts to assert their independence they adopted similarly specialized and technically 
narrow programs and strategies.  In the surface navy, the most successful bureaucratic 
defense against the nuclear ideology of engineering specialization was not breadth and 
integration, but the creation of the specialist community of “surface warfare".  The 
creation of a specialized surface warfare identity marked an important shift from a 
'generalist' identity to one of the 'specialist'.102   The shift toward a specialist identity 
became particularly evident as the most successful surface officers embraced a radar 
                                                 
101 Jon Tetsuro Sumida, "Forging the Trident: British Naval Industrial Logistics, 1914-1918," in Feeding 
Mars:  Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present, ed. John A. Lynn (Oxford: 
Westview Press, Inc. , 1993), 234.    Sumida postulates that the dramatic expansion of Royal Navy 
bureaucracy in the First World War was a complex phenomenon. The expansion cannot be fully explained 
by the increased output in war material or even planning, or by the direct administrative needs of the war 
effort.  Rather, the expansion was in part a result of bureaucratic competition between departments of the 
Royal Navy.  In a similar way, the personnel innovations and rise of highly specialized groups in the 
surface and aviation communities of the US Navy may have been in part driven by 'defensive' strategies of 
the groups.  Such a claim is in part substantiated by the observations of a mid-grade author writing in the 
1980s about the relative isolation of the nuclear community from the other communities.  See Albert H. 
Konetzni, Jr., CDR USN, "Comment," US Naval Institute Proceedings, 107, no. 2, February 1981: “The 
forced lateral transfer draft of qualified warfare specialists in to the submarine forces in the early 1960s 
further polarized the two groups—nuclear submariners and all others—and resulted in a situation in which 
the submarine community was forced to solve its manning problem alone. “ 
102 Robert B. Pirie, VADM USN (ret), "1958: The Transition Year," in Into the Jet Age: Conflict and 
Change in Naval Aviation, 1945-1975, ed. E.T. Wooldridge, Captain, USN (ret) (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 1995), 70.  Pirie noted that he, among others, had pressured the Chief of Naval Personnel to 
compel surface officers in the early 1960s to adopt a shore-based technical training system akin to aviators 
and submariners, but that the surface officers had resisted.   The surface navy may have ignored Pirie, but 
in the face of the expanding nuclear fleet, by the mid 1970s adopted the nuclear priority on platform 
centric, technical training in place of broader and integrative education.   
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system as a symbol of a new surface warfare officer specialist.  The AEGIS103 
community created by RADM Wayne Meyer, an engineering duty officer like Rickover, 
helped blunt the nuclear drive to take over the surface fleet. But AEGIS could blunt 
Rickover's efforts only by replacing one technical specialty with another.  In time, 
officers not so fortunate to be assigned to an AEGIS ship were threatened with 
marginalization and would complain that the AEGIS specialists were dominating the 
surface navy. 104    
In an effort to protect the socio-technical group of aviation from the power of 
Naval Reactors, aviators also embraced further specialization as a defensive tactic.   
Secretary Lehman feared the winnowing effect the nuclear engineering selection process 
would exert in the aviation community.  Unless the policy was changed, when all aircraft 
carriers became nuclear only nuclear-trained officers would promote to flag rank.105  In 
an effort to provide an alternative career path for aviators who were not particularly adept 
at engineering, the community embraced a model of narrow specialization known as 
commander of the carrier air group (CAG).  But CAG as a path to flag was itself a 
solution based upon further specialization: an aviator rising to flag could indeed avoid the 
study of nuclear physics, but he was no longer broadened by command of a surface ship.  
One could argue that the CAG officers were more narrowly specialized than the early 
generation of aviator leaders, and perhaps even more narrowly experienced than the 
                                                 
103 AEGIS is the name given to a highly sophisticated radar fielded in the late 1970s.  Cruiser platforms 
later became defined by the radar and were known, in contrast to 'nuclear' cruisers, as 'aegis' cruisers. 
104   Wayne Meyer, RADM, USN (ret), Interview with the Author, 23 March 2007.  RADM Meyer, an 
EDO specializing in ordnance systems, explained that he patterned much of his program, to include officer 
training, after Rickover’s system.  
105 James L. Holloway, III,  ADM USN (CNO), Interview with the Author, April 26, 2007. 
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nuclear-trained aviators, all of whom were required to command a surface ship before 
taking command of the aircraft carriers.106   
The machine had become by the 1980s so influential in the career of an officer 
that many feared that the first assignment in a long career could become determinative.  If 
the first assignment, even as an ensign, were to the 'wrong' type of ship or aircraft, an 
officer's career path to higher command might be seriously compromised.  If an officer 
was assigned as an ensign to an amphibious ship, he might henceforth be considered an 
'amphibious sailor', and his prospects to be a future CNO would be almost zero.  An 
ensign chosen to fly helicopters or anti-submarine aircraft was confronted with a 'glass 
ceiling' in his climb to four stars, a ceiling that had not existed in the time of the 
'generalist' officer.  By the 1970s, luck in aircraft or ship assignment combined with 
superior performance with a singular platform-- not integrative knowledge of the Navy or 
wide experience-- became the preferred path to high rank and command.   
When the surface and aviation communities embraced more narrow 
specialization, King’s idea of a unified and integrated ‘line’ was lost.  In the place of a 
unified line emerged three de-facto independent professions organized and trained 
predominantly on their respective machines.   By 1970, organizational charts of the 
CNO's office reflected the division of advisors along three platforms, a distinction which 
                                                 
106 Illustrative of this narrowing of focus is the experience of an aviator CNO in the later 20th century who 
had served as a CAG, not as a nuclear carrier captain.  Though his detailed service record is not available 
for review, it is commonly believed that Admiral Jay Johnson, CNO 1996-2000, never served as a member 
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1940s to 1970s, who contributed to the book chapters for Into the Jet Age, was widely experienced as 
members of ship's company in addition to their time in the cockpit.  Of the twelve aviator flag officers who 
contributed to the book, ten of twelve had been surface ship officers prior to reporting to flight school, and 
then in almost every case followed with command of one or more surface ships.  See E.T. Wooldridge, 
Captain, USN (ret), Into the Jet Age: Conflict and Change in Naval Aviation, 1945-1975 (Annapolis, MD: 
Naval Institute Press, 1995). 
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was absent in the organizational charts of 1962.107   In parallel, attendance of the best 
officers at integrative institutions or assignments—the Naval War College and joint war 
colleges—fell out of favor.  The technology had now assumed a dominant role in making 
and choosing the admirals and commanders of the future.  
By the early 1980s, the larger naval officer corps was beginning to express a 
growing unease with how the education of naval officers had changed.  The Navy's 
leading professional publication, the Naval Institute Proceedings, carried almost a half 
dozen articles that debated the relative merits of the technically specialized officer versus 
what had been known as the generalist (though this term had fallen out of favor).108  
Retired admirals joined in the public discourse, and one, a former supporter of Rickover, 
criticized the admiral's technical ethos which was spreading through the officer corps' 
education and career development practices. 109  While the admirals pointed to Rickover 
as ‘the problem’, they failed to appreciate that many of their own organizations had 
                                                 
107 Frederick H. Hartmann, Naval Renaissance: the U.S. Navy in the 1980s (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute 
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108 Thomas B. Buell, "The Education of a Warrior," US Naval Institute Proceedings, 107, no. 1, January 
1981; Alan T. Isaacson, Captain USN, "Comment and Discussion," US Naval Institute Proceedings, 107, 
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109 John T. Hayward, VADM, USN (ret), "Comment," US Naval Institute Proceedings, 107, no. 4, April 
1981, 21-22.   Hayward levied a spirited attack on Rickover and his legacy: "As an engineer, he (Rick) has 
few superiors.  As a man to fight a war or to prepare a Navy to fight a war, he has much too narrow a 
vision.  No one has been killed by a propulsion plant, nor have many ships been sunk by one.  A surface 
ship or a submarine is nothing but a vehicle to bring weapons into a position where they can be employed 
effectively.  He (Rickover) is right where he belongs, running a complex technical program and doing it 
well. However, few in the Navy hierarchy have challenged his forays in fields where he lacks the 
competence to make valid judgments.  ...Events have overtaken him.  The educational requirements of a 
modern professional naval officer have little relationship to his idea of what a 'nuke spook' should be. "     
Hayward went on to ask:  "Where are the Mitschers, Halseys, and Spruances of today?  Are 
they....maintenance people?" Hayward concluded:  "Admiral H.G. Rickover, one of our admirals least 
acquainted with war, is one of the Naval War Colleges severest critics.  The height of Adm Rickover's 
foolishness about preparing a Navy for war is the Senior Officers Ship Material Readiness course.  Let no 




adopted a new philosophy of specialization.  Technical specialization, as opposed to 
integration, was becoming deeply embedded in the ‘line’ profession’s role models, 
curriculum, career paths, books, and publications.  Getting Rickover to retire was no 
longer a solution to redirecting the officer corps, as subsequent events would show.   
Several senior officers, including successive war college presidents and leaders of 
the Navy,  perceived what they considered a disturbing shift in the ‘line’ to ever more 
narrowly technical and specialist orientation.  A handful of senior officers in a sign of 
unity removed their platform-warfare devices or pins, but at least one four star admiral 
was quietly chided by the CNO and ordered to resume wearing his specialist pin.110   
Others pointed to the war colleges and argued that, though the seats might be filled, the 
best officers still did not come.  But it was too early to say with certainty if the Navy's 
future leaders were being broadened or narrowed in their education and assignments.  
The ultimate evidence of the Navy's command culture would be the type of officer who 
rose to high command.  What type of officer was rising to command: the integrative 
officer or the technical expert and specialist?  With time the statistical analyses of the 
changing ranks of senior commanders did indeed show a shift in the model of those who 
rose to command.  Rickover's technical expert model of command gradually came to 
define the highest ranks of the surface, submarine, and aviation admirals.  
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Taking Stock: The Promotion of Technical Experts to High Command 
 
The changing qualifications and education of those who rose to high command 
showed a change in model: the generalist was replaced by the technical expert in 
command.  The King system of officer development as measured by its product, senior 
officers, had been eclipsed.  Despite the efforts of numerous admirals and even some 
political leaders, the techno-centric and platform-centric die that had been cast in the 
early 1960s determined the type of flag officer who rose to the highest ranks two decades 
later.  As Admiral Pride and his board of admirals observed in 1963, the creation of 
senior leaders takes a generation and "...as for potential flag officers....the education and 
training die was cast in the relatively distant past, more on the basis of the needs of the 
Navy at that point in time..." 111  
The first signs of change in output in the production of specialist commanders 
were detected in a study conducted in the 1970s by the Bureau of Personnel. The study 
analyzed promotion patterns and determined that by 1973 a discernible pattern had 
emerged wherein the traditional general line officer (distinguished by multiple platform 
experience and broad assignment variety) was being replaced in lower level decision-
making  positions by those identified through education and practice as specialists.112  
                                                 
111 Alfred W. Pride, ADM USN (Ret),"Criteria for Selection to Flag Rank in the USN, Report of Board 20 
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112 Richard Webster Hunter, “Developing the new decision-makers: a qualitative analysis of the Navy 
subspecialty system” (Thesis Ph D --American University, 1973), 220-221. Hunter concluded that by 1973 
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risen to flag rank, but they represented a shift in the model from generalist to specialist. The trend in 
'promotion marks' indicated the traditional general line officer (those officers who served on multiple 
platforms and had a broad range of experience) were being replaced by those identified by education and 
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The study was, however, conducted too soon after the change in model to discern the 
down-stream implications at the higher ranks of three and four star flag rank.  
An analysis of longer term trends was possible by 1990, and the evidence of a 
shift in senior officer models is persuasive.  The educational credentials of 'line' officers 
rising to high command (three and four star rank) reflect a shift in beliefs about how an 
officer should be educated and professionalized.  The shift had its origin in officer career 
decisions made in the second half of the 1960s and early 1970s.  The metric used to 
measure the shift was the propensity of elite officers (those who would rise to the top 
leadership ranks) to broaden their education and development beyond their specialty and 
beyond the Navy.  An indicator of shifting attitudes is the change in propensity of elite 
officers to choose to be educated at a non-technical, non-navy institution.   Attendance at 
the National War College was chosen as the metric: the college was a non-technical, non-
navy educational institution, most strongly associated with broad, general knowledge of 
warfare, yet advanced enough on the progressive educational sequence that an officer 
could not casually seek assignment to the year long course.113   
From the period 1948 to 1966, the Navy sent a steady stream of its best officers 
to the National War College as evidenced by two decades of prolific flag promotions 
                                                                                                                                                 
practice as specialists.  But interesting, the specialist education was in most cases NOT utilized in the 
specialist’s field.  Only 36% of officers used their education subspecialty in the related field. Instead, the 
majority of the ‘specialties’ were attained by training or experience, a model very much in line with 
Rickover’s approach which placed emphasis on technical training and certification through technical 
examinations (e.g. the engineers exam), a process that did not require graduate education, but in fact, came 
to displace graduate education for many officers.  
113 National War College was chosen over the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in part because the 
latter college attracted more staff and supply corps officers which would possibly detract from the focus on 
unrestricted line officers.  The Naval War College experienced a similar decline in both quality and 
quantity, the percentage of naval officers attending Newport falling to an all-time low in the classes of the 
later 1960s.  See John T. Hayward, VADM, NWC President,"Subj: "Quality of Officers for NWC", letter to 




from these classes.114  The pattern changed dramatically somewhere between 1967 and 
1970: the classes after 1967 produced a minimal number of senior flags.  In the first two 
decades following the Second World War, the period from 1948-1966, the National War 
College produced 21 four star admirals;  the next two decades, 1967-1987, the college 
produced only 3 four star admirals.  If measured over only a decade, the decline in 
integrative senior flag officers was still dramatic: from 1957-1967, National War College 
produced nine admirals of four star rank; between 1968- 1978, the college produced only 
two full admirals.  The change in three star admirals evidences a similar shift in values: 
from 1947 to 1966, only four classes produced less than two VADMs; after 1966, 17 of 
the next twenty years produced one or no vice admirals.   
Stated another way, 77 VADMs were promoted from the National War College 
classes between 1947-1966; in the next twenty years after 1966, only 17 VADMs would 
be produced from this same college.  In the decade from 1956-1966, 24 VADMs hailed 
from National; in the decade from 1967 to 1976, only 9 VADMs did.  If the three and 
four star promotion patterns are viewed together, it is apparent that, prior to 1970, almost 
every class produced two or three senior officers (either admirals or vice admirals).  For 
two decades after 1970, only a handful of senior officers would rise to senior rank out of 
combined output of twenty classes.115 (See Figure 7-1)  This data indicates that the shift 
in beliefs concerning an officer’s career came in the middle to late 1960s.  The best 
officers no longer sought to 'round out' their education at a joint war college.  What is 
especially significant is that the 'best' officers began to shun war college before the 
                                                 
114 Directory of National War College Graduates, (Washington, D.C: The National War College Alumni 
Association, 2003) Data compiled from year groups from 1947 to 1992.  
115 Ibid.  
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Vietnam War, and when hostilities ceased they never did return to attendance and 
promotion patterns characteristic of the 1950s and early 1960s.  The effect was 
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Figure 7-1:  Number of Senior Admirals Selected from National War College Classes.  




One possible explanation of the dramatic decline in education at the most senior 
joint war college may have been due to a change in attitudes toward that one particular 
institution.  To control for this possibility, an examination of the educational and career 
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patterns of all URL flag officers aggregated from all colleges was examined.  For the 
ranks of 0-7 to 0-10 combined, the attendance drop-off starting after 1966 is marked and 
clear.  In 1966, 88% of all URL flags were graduates of at least one of the war colleges.  
The percentage fell more or less steadily for the next quarter century: 1978 only 50% 
URL flags were graduates of any war college; 1984 only 39%, 1990 only 33% of URL 
flags were graduates of ANY war college.116  (See Figure 7-2)  For the most senior 
officers —predominantly four star admirals—the data show a strikingly similar trend if 
not a more dramatic collapse in matriculation rates.  As late as the middle 1970s, the vast 
majority of navy four star admirals had followed a rough approximation of the King 
pattern of progressive education (9 of 10 had attended either the Naval War College or 
one of the joint war colleges).  However, this type of career education and development 
rapidly fell out of favor for officers commissioned in the middle 1950s who would reach 
their first junior command and eligibility for war college in the 1960s.  For the most 
successful officers of these later year groups, those who promoted to four stars, few if 
any officers had attended any war college.  In 1990, the last year of the Cold War, only 
one of ten navy four-star admirals had attended any senior war college.117   
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Figure 7-2:   Percentage of all Unrestricted Line Flag officers who attended a war college. 
(Data for 1972 not available)118   
 
The transformation of the 'line' was by 1990 complete: naval command 
conformed to Rickover’s ideal of the technical expert and specialist.  The ‘line’ had 
experienced an almost complete inversion of the pattern that defined high naval 
command from the 1930s to the 1970s.   By the last decade of the 1990s, progressive and 
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figures, see  B.J. Semmes, Jr., VADM USN,"Policy on Education for Unrestricted Line Officers,  Memo 
from Chief of Naval Personnel, dtd 9 Feb 1966,  to all Unrestricted Line Flag Officers," Naval War College 




integrative education was no longer common in the professional experience of those who 
rose to the highest rank.   Those who would command in 1990 were by and large a ‘line’ 
of technical and platform specialists in the mold first articulated by Rickover in 1953.   
The “Rickover Effect" had perpetuated a technical specialized officer corps that survived 
the  Cold War and continued to mold leaders well into the post-Cold War period, an 
environment far different than that of 1963 when THRESHER sank.   The philosophy 
that informed the Rickover model was a philosophy of technocracy, in which technology 
drove history, in which man had to conform to the dictates of the machine.  By 1990, the 
Navy had entrusted its future to a belief in a new determinism, that of technology.  
Modern admiralship had been re-made by the 'discipline of technology', which required 









The Question of Technocracy in Command 
 
"Your profession is the art of war..." 
Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, USN (retired), 19111 
 
"The man of the future on whom we shall depend more and more is 
the technical expert..." 
Vice Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, USN, 19592 
 
"As for potential flag officers...the education and training die was cast 
in the relatively distant past, more on the basis of the needs of the Navy at 
that point in time..." 
Admiral Alfred W. Pride, USN (retired), Board Chairman, "Criteria for Selection to Flag Rank in 
the United States Navy," Report of Board, 20 February 19633 
 
 
Almost exactly one generation--thirty years-- after the first nuclear reactor went to 
sea, the Cold War ended and Admiral Rickover died.  However, the Cold War, nuclear 
reactors, and Rickover left a powerful legacy that persists to this day: a changed officer 
corps and a changed way of thinking about commanding men and machines.  
By the late 1980s, the fruits of a changed system of officer development had risen 
to dominate the naval high command.  Naval command had been profoundly 
transformed: a technical expert and techno-centric model of command had displaced 
King's favored generalist model.   
Such a transformation, however, was not fated or required by the dictates of 
science and technology. Through a remarkable and highly contingent sequence of events 
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and political interventions, Hyman Rickover had gained de-facto control of the Navy's 
system of officer education and professional development.  From this position, he was 
able to remake the 'line' in accord with an elite technocratic philosophy.  Using a strategy 
of personal interviews, demanding schools, and purposeful personnel shortages to 
eliminate a rival culture, Rickover transformed the submarine navy into a technical 
vanguard.  In need of young officers with which to man a rapidly expanding POLARIS 
fleet, he reconstituted the cradle of 'line' officer education at Annapolis into an elite 
polytechnic college.  More by momentum than design, the Navy's transformation was 
complete when Rickover's surface ship exemplars transferred technocratic norms and 
values to the larger, non-nuclear fleet.  
The cumulative effect of Rickover's unprecedented bureaucratic victories was the 
inversion of 'line' officer policy and priorities that had stood for half a century: technical 
knowledge became more valued than integrated operational knowledge and non-technical 
knowledge.  By the time senior leaders realized what was happening and acted to stop 
Rickover, it was too late.  The die had been cast for a generation of senior officers who 
would command the men and machines of the U.S. Navy in the 20th century and beyond.  
Important organizational pre-conditions established years earlier helped make 
possible Rickover’s transformation of the officer corps.   Before Rickover had gained 
senior flag rank and powerful political allies, he invoked navy history to justify his use of 
'line' officers (not EDOs) in the engine rooms of his nuclear ships.  The historical 
precedent he invoked was the 1899 engineer-'line' merger that had been predicated on the 
conviction of "every line officer is to be an engineer".  In the merged naval profession 
that resulted —the commander who was both ‘line’ officer and an increasingly scientific 
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engineer-- there was inserted a bias toward the material.  The precedent of 1899 would be 
used more than once to justify expanded technical education of the 'line' at the cost of 
time spent on the study of tactics, strategy, culture, and language.  
The tendency for the 'line' officer to identify his profession with engineering and 
machinery was reinforced by the rise of two new machines of war: the submarine and the 
airplane.  The machines began to draw to their periscopes and airframes the inquiring 
minds of young officers and thereby posed a threat to professional unity.  The promotion 
reforms of 1916, by empowering different social groups to replicate themselves through 
the promotion system, further inclined the profession toward fragmentation.   
Remarkably, unlike the Army and the Air Force, the Navy did not split by technological 
affiliation.   This outcome was not a matter of chance.  Naval leaders had anticipated the 
tendency of officers to become techno-centric and platform-centric and had taken action 
to forestall it.    
In the years immediately after the First World War, navy leaders acted to 
counterbalance the appeal of machine platforms.  The Navy adopted a system of 
education, assignment, and promotion that encouraged officers to adopt values of 
integration over specialization: a generalist model of command.  The plan, pioneered by 
Ernest J. King in 1919, had as its primary objective the development of officers of 
breadth, capable of integrated judgment in matters of operations and strategy.  A 
secondary, though important, objective was the ability of a ‘line’ officer to maintain and 
manage the technologies of war.  King's system was dominant for almost a half century 
and helped produce the enlightened leadership of the inter-war era, whose virtues were 
confirmed by the experience of the Second World War.    
447 
 
The validation of the 'generalist' model between 1941 and 1945 and the 
persistence of this model well into the Cold War is a finding that fills a void in recent 
scholarship on the officer corps.  In his study of the naval warfare in the 20th century, At 
War At Sea, Ron Spector devotes considerable attention to the rise of naval aviation and 
the cultural challenge it posed to the traditional navy and its concept of the general line 
officer.  However, Spector's treatment of the cultural challenge posed by nuclear power is 
less rigorous. To be sure, Spector acknowledges that nuclear technology was a critically 
important innovation in the second half of the century and brought with it a renewed 
priority on engineering knowledge.  However, Spector devotes only a few pages to an 
examination of the significance of the reactor and Rickover as a force for change in the 
non-nuclear officer corps.4  Without a detailed discussion of Rickover’s program, one is 
left to conclude that the shift from generalist to specialist model in the officer corps was 
in place by the end of the Second World War and was mostly the product of the rise of 
naval aviation and naval aviators.  The conclusion of this research is that aviators 
endorsed a modified form of the 'generalist' officer and that it was the actions of Rickover 
and the nuclear engineers in the 1960s that replaced the old model with a more techno-
centric alternative. 
Scholars who attempted synthetic inter-service studies have also tended to 
overemphasize the culturally transformative power of the Second World War and the 
technological and organizational changes associated with that conflict.  These scholars 
have also tended to minimize service differences as they strive to reach universal 
conclusions about the military profession.  Janowitz in his classic The Professional 
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Soldier appears to have underestimated the degree to which the Navy's professional and 
sociological evolution was unique among the military services.5  In the face of 
considerable pressure to conform to Air Force and civilian models of executive 
development, the Navy doggedly retained a unique system of officer development.  
Janowitz' argument that the military profession in the 1940s-50s was aligning more 
closely with civilian professional specialties underemphasized a critically important 
counter-current: the navy high command remained committed to the old 'generalist' 
model well into the 1960s.  Moreover, an explanation of how and why leaders changed 
the Navy could not be extrapolated from other service or civilian experiences.  The 
Navy's model changed as a consequence of events unique to the internal social structure 
of the navy officer corps, the result of aggressive group action by identifiable persons 
motivated by a set of unique concerns and beliefs.   These findings remind the scholar 
that each military service is culturally unique and is the product of a unique history.  
Consequently, each service should be studied closely before inter-service generalizations 
can be made with confidence.  
Instead of changing as a result of the Second World War, the King model of 'line' 
officer would survive until the 1960s.  In that decade the pillars of the integrative 
approach-- general education at Annapolis, assignment variation on multiple platforms, 
attendance at a war college, and common promotion exams-- would be supplanted by a 
model which emphasized  in-depth technical training on a single platform.  The 
technically trained URL officers would also be expected to replace large numbers of RL 
                                                 
5 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: a Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, Ill.,: Free Press, 
1960).  See also revised edition, 1971.   
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technical experts in their technical assignments ashore.6    The 'line' had indeed become a 
technical elite.  The single person most responsible for this transformation was Hyman G. 
Rickover.  
Rickover believed that advanced technical systems required more specially 
trained technicians.  His beliefs were consonant with the values and norms found in the 
civilian field of scientific engineering.   Modern engineering and advanced technology 
required intense study and a greater degree of specialization.  In the field of nuclear plant 
operations, Rickover's system has proven remarkably reliable, and his form of technical 
supervision remains the model for most civilian nuclear power plants.  However, where 
Rickover parted company with other advocates of technical specialization was his 
insistence that the top-level leaders--the combat leaders of the 'line'-- should also be 
engineers and technical experts.  Rickover's advocacy for a techno-centric type of leader 
derived not from his naval education or combat experience.  Rather, Rickover was most 
likely inspired by an aggressive variant of the activist engineering ideologies in the 
1920s, that of the Technocracy Movement.  Rickover had been a graduate student in the 
cradle of the Technocracy Movement, and it appears that he took for his own the values 
of the movement.  One of the most important values he carried back to the Navy, and 
which informed many of his reforms, was the belief that man must be conformed to the 
needs of technology.   
                                                 
6 The alternative to a more technically specialized 'line' could have been an expanded EDO corps.  But it  
remains a mystery why Rickover and Navy line officers did not expand the Navy's EDO corps to provide 
for the Navy's perceived needs of more technical expertise.  There is in the late 1950s evidence of renewed 
'line' hostility to the EDO community. Some line officers (VADM Semmes) would claim that the need for a 
'wet and dry' Navy had been solved by URL officers who could shoulder both technical and operational 
duties once they had acquired a technical  'subspecialty' after approximately two years of study, thus 
obviating the need for more EDOs.   The policies concerning EDO officers in the early 1960s deserve a 
dedicated study, which due to limitations of time and space was not possible in this work.  
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Rickover was convinced that the modern, 'artificial age' required the technical 
expert and specialist to command at the highest levels.  Rickover believed technology 
would drive history; men had to adapt to the technology, not technology to the man.  It 
followed that the technical expert and technical specialists should command at sea and in 
battle.  The technical expert earned this right to command because of his detailed 
technical knowledge of a single machine.  To Rickover, command in the field of battle 
that heretofore belonged to the tactical and operational officer was one "tradition that had 
to be broken".  However, for much of his career Rickover did not have the political 
power to mold the Navy to this belief system.     
In the early years of the nuclear navy, Rickover had been willing to compromise 
with the King model of integrative officer development. Consequently, the first 
generation of nuclear officers was the most broadly educated, integrative commanders to 
rise through the ranks of the Navy.  However, with the sinking of USS THRESHER and 
Rickover's bureaucratic victories that followed, he became an extremist in his advocacy 
for a deeper transformation of the navy officer corps.  His interpretation of THRESHER 
was that a naval officer, starting with his nuclear officers, was to be first and last a 
technical expert.  After THRESHER, Rickover insisted that the less scientifically capable 
officers, which included the mass of diesel submarine officers, be barred from nuclear 
training and command. Rickover sustained such a policy only with the aid of a massive 
transfusion into the nuclear submarine force of scientifically minded surface and aviation 
officers, most of whom possessed no tactical or operational experience in submarines.  
 Rickover's technical expert model of command diffused through the larger Navy 
aboard a fleet of nuclear-propelled surface ships and aircraft carriers.  In the 1970s, senior 
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navy educators and combat veterans who had experienced defeat in Vietnam opposed the 
techno-centric model of command.  But the physical presence and promotional 
advantages of machine systems proved more persuasive in the minds of young officers 
than arguments of combat veterans.  Even in the face of a counter-revolution by admirals 
Zumwalt, Stockdale, and Turner, the technocratic metamorphosis of 'command' 
continued.   The power of the technocratic idea grew so ascendant that by the late 1970s 
all commanding officers of ships, as well as many admirals, were required to study 
engineering systems at a nuclear installation in the Idaho desert.  Instead of studying war 
in the war colleges, senior leaders of the Navy studied the technical requirements of 
complex machines.  This policy of mandatory technical training for senior officers would 
become a fixture in the officer development system for almost two decades.  
The surface and aviation communities were troubled by the growing power of 
Naval Reactors to influence the selection and advancement of future 'line' commanders 
(the ship captains).  Both communities realized that Rickover's organization might 
marginalize those of their officers who did not become nuclear trained.  So persuasively 
did the idea of technical specialization appeal to these non-nuclear communities that, in 
their efforts to assert their independence, they adopted similarly specialized and 
technically narrow officer programs and strategies.  In essence, the community leaders 
declined to join Rickover's opponents who had advocated a return to the generalist, more 
unified model (e.g., Zumwalt, Turner, Stockdale), and instead embraced Rickover's 
model of deeper specialization.  Rickover's form of technical specialization of the 'line' 
became a model for social group action that brought with it substantial bureaucratic 
advantages, especially those of defensive protection.  Rickover's model, and his parochial 
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attitudes, engendered in the broader Navy what could be called a "defensive 
technicalization" of officer personnel, a tactic of bureaucratic competition.7   
 To defend itself against an expanding nuclear organization, the surface navy 
abandoned its long cherished identity of 'generalist' and replaced it with the identity of 
technical expert.  The heretofore generalist officer became a 'surface warfare' officer and 
in 1975 began to wear the insignia of a specialist.  Moreover, it was RADM Wayne 
Meyer, the EDO specialist who built AEGIS radars and the AEGIS community of 
officers, who did more to preserve the surface navy's independence than did Zumwalt.  In 
an effort to insulate aviation from Naval Reactors, aviators also embraced further 
specialization in their model of command.   To provide an alternative career path for 
aviators, the community created a model of narrow specialization known as commander 
of the carrier air group (CAG).  However, CAG as a path to flag was itself a solution 
based upon further specialization: an aviator rising to flag through this system avoided 
the study of nuclear physics, but the officer was no longer broadened by command of a 
surface ship.  
But Rickover’s legacy was not confined to the nuclear fleet and the platform 
captains.   In response to the urgent manning requirements of POLARIS, exacerbated by 
the collapse of engineering recruiting on civilian college campuses in the later 1960s, 
Rickover relied on the Naval Academy to be his primary source of nuclear officers.  The 
midshipmen curriculum was, however, insufficiently technical, and Rickover remade 
Annapolis into an elite polytechnic.  His reforms became deeply institutionalized in core 
                                                 
7 Jon Tetsuro Sumida, "Forging the Trident: British Naval Industrial Logistics, 1914-1918," in Feeding 
Mars:  Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present, ed. John A. Lynn (Oxford: 
Westview Press, Inc. , 1993), 234.   
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curriculum, quotas on academic majors, and even admissions metrics.  At a tender age of 
eighteen, the midshipmen were selected out, conditioned to think of themselves as 
technical specialists and experts, and then encouraged to become engineers.  The 
technocratic identity he stamped on the academy in the 1960s took on a unique 
permanence that persists a half-century later, after having resisted multiple attempts to 
rescind it.  
The continuation of the technocratic model in the Annapolis undergraduate 
program is not the result of the demands of the national security environment--the Cold 
War ended almost two decades ago-- but is an educational example of socio-technical 
momentum.  Two forces sustained the momentum of the academy's technical curriculum: 
an elite engineering faculty ranked as one of the nation's best, and the half-century 
longevity of the industrial technology of the pressurized water reactor.   Efforts to move 
the academy in the direction of a stronger program of social sciences and expanded 
language failed due to vigorous resistance by powerful technical organizations, in 
particular Naval Reactors, and the elite technical faculty.8   Efforts to place social 
scientists in the Dean's office and to rebalance admission's metrics to ameliorate the bias 
against verbal and linguistic candidates proved short-lived. 9   Evidence of this persistent 
technical momentum that drives the academy is the simple fact that engineers have 
dominated the dean's office, with only one relatively brief exception, since the position 
became civilianized almost a half-century ago.  The dominance of engineers in the dean's 
                                                 
8 Kinnaird R. Mckee, Admiral, USN, Interview with the Author, 18 September 2006. 
9 Frederick H. Hartmann, Naval Renaissance: the U.S. Navy in the 1980s (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute 
Press, 1990), 77.  See also Naval Reactors Office, "Nuclear Power Accessions briefing, dtd 22 August 
1990", Office of Institutional Research, Ward Hall, US Naval Academy, Folder: 1991 Nuclear Accessions.  
When the academy temporarily adjusted the admissions metrics to be more neutral--removed the bias that 
favored the technical candidates-- the graduates of the associated classes pursued fewer technical degrees. 
The technical bias in admissions was however reinstated and remains in place in the early 21st century.    
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office stands in stark contrast to the myriad of 'line' officers--technical and non-technical-
- who had served in an equivalent position prior to Rickover's intervention.   
The shift of 'line' officer graduate education toward the technical and away from 
the non-technical also coincided with the rise to prominence of Rickover's technocratic 
model of command.  A vivid example of this shift was manifest in the evolution of the 
high-profile scholarship program, the Burke Scholar program designed for both Navy and 
Marine Corps officers.  Originally intended for the study of either social sciences or 
technical subjects, navy administrators sometime in the later 1960s or early 1970s re-
interpreted the purpose of the scholarship.  The vast majority of Burke Scholars were no 
longer allowed to study social sciences, liberal arts, or language.  This distortion of the 
scholarship's original purpose provoked protest from the benefactor, a retired CNO, 
Admiral Burke, who complained that there "... was to be no restriction to education only 
in the hard sciences."10  As a consequence of this distortion of Burke's original purposes, 
many of the Navy's brightest officers for a generation were steered away from the study 
of language and culture.  
Admiral Burke was not alone in questioning why 'line' officers were being 
channeled to technical education and away from the social sciences and liberal arts.  
However, Burke and other like-minded officers were poorly equipped to reverse the 
techno-centric educational tide that was washing over the Navy.  The shift to more 
technical 'line' officer education was justified by the 'requirements' of the machine 
platforms.  The 'requirements' were, in turn, justified by highly detailed, statistically 
                                                 
10 Arleigh Burke, as quoted in Seth Powell, "Train for the Known, Educate for the Unknown: The Navy's 
Struggle for Clarity with Graduate Education in the Humanities, from Holloway to Rickover,"  (Annapolis, 
MD: US Naval Academy, 2004).  Source of quote is letter from Arleigh Burke, Bethesda, MD, to Captain 
Anthony Maness, Executive Assistant to the Chief of the Bureau of Personnel, 2 June 1983, Arleigh Burke 
Papers, Box 107, Naval Historical Center, Washington D.C. 
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impressive lists of qualification codes offered as evidence of the link between technical 
'line' officers and machine-related billets.   
While a specialized system of technical qualifications, training, and billets lent 
itself to quantification, the intuitive need for integrative and non-technical education 
defied easy quantification.   In the face of seeming persuasive statistical arguments for 
technical specialization, the advocates for social sciences, language, and general 
education had to resort to making historical arguments.  They invoked the wisdom of 
combat-tested commanders and pointed to the pre-1963 Annapolis traditions of universal 
language education.  They reminded audiences that the future was uncertain, that 
technological prowess and machines might not always be decisive in war.  As late as 
1960 a leading publication on officer development would assert, but could not 
statistically 'prove', that an over-reliance on specialization was dangerous and would "... 
stereotype the thinking faculties of a professional..."11  But the defenders of the 
integrative officer could not quantify their claims, and such arguments disappeared from 
later editions of the publication.   
In the intervening decades since 1963, the value of integrative education at war 
colleges had become tainted in the minds of young and mid-grade officers.  By the 
1980s-1990s, almost no policy, short of compulsion, could improve the quality of officers 
who would attend.  In 1982, Admiral James Watkins began to distance himself from 
Rickover's specialist philosophy and expressed concern that ‘line’ officers were 
                                                 
11 BUPERS-Navy edition of "Armed Forces Officer", NARA RG 24-470-54-25-6 Box 5. See also 
Department of Defense United States, Armed Forces Officer, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1960),  36-37. 
456 
 
becoming too narrow in their experience and education.12  Like CNO Thomas Hayward 
before him, Watkins supported new initiatives to encourage officers to attend the Naval 
War College.  Watkins put the usually persuasive power of the CNO’s office behind the 
reforms and even reduced staffing at training schools to free up additional  billets to 
increase attendance at the Naval War College.13  However, Watkins’ efforts to enhance 
the stature of the War College fell short as the ‘best’ officers continued to stay close to 
their specialized platform communities. 14  Admiral Trost, Watkin’s successor, found the 
aversion to the war colleges so strong that he personally intervened in captain detailing to 
ensure some of the rising stars had a year in Newport. 15    
  Admirals Watkins and Trost failed in their attempts to broaden the 'line' not 
because they did not try, but because young officers had prioritized platform values and 
needs over those of the larger Navy.  By the 1980s the 'line' came to possess a deeply 
engrained culture of technical specialization and platform-centrism that would not yield 
                                                 
12 By the late 1970s, when serving as BUPERS, Watkins expressed concern for the narrowing of submarine 
officers.  In the early 1980s as CNO, he was concerned about the fleet-wide phenomenon of narrow officer 
experience.   For his concerns about submarine officers see  Senate Armed Services Committee, 
Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, Statement of VADM James D. Watkins, USN, Chief of Naval 
Personnel  H.R. 10451, a Bill to Amend Title 37, United States Code, Relating to Special Pay for Nuclear 
Qualified Officers., 94th Cong., 2nd sess., 3 June 1976, 12.  Watkins wrote:   "The increased sea duty 
resulting from inadequate officer inventories is causing a spiraling retention decline.  Our officers are not 
receiving the educational and broadening staff assignments which are desirable for future leaders of the 
nuclear Navy."    
13 Frederick H. Hartmann, Naval Renaissance: the U.S. Navy in the 1980s (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute 
Press, 1990), 63.  In Admiral James D. Watkins' “Ninety Day Message of October 1982”, the CNO set as a 
goal to “…revitalize the Naval War College as the crucible for strategic and tactical thinking.  In the near 
term, rotate selected post-command COs through the senior course (or a portion of it) en route to 
subsequent assignments..."  See Appendix E. 
14 Admiral Watkins, upon his promotion to CNO, perceived the narrowing of the officer corps and called 
for a 500% increase in NWC attendance by post-command officers. See John Hattendorf, Sailors and 
Scholars: The Centennial History of the Naval War College (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 
1984),  318.    However, the best officers continued to hesitate to attend the NWC as evidenced in 
promotion statistics.  See Linda C. Cavalluzzo,"Navy Line Officer Advanced Education Requirements for 
21st Century", Center for Naval Analyses Report, 1998.  See also charts pg. 12. 
15 C.A.H Trost, ADM USN, Interview with the Author, 3 November 2007, 18 December 2007.  Trost 
explained that he personally directed at least one future four star be assigned to the CNO’s Strategic Studies 
Group, a group that was associated with the Naval War College and provided some modicum of  
broadening for an officers who were likely to promote to flag rank.    
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to exhortations from the highest rank admirals.   All three types of 'line' officers--surface, 
submarine, and aviator-- had been socialized to see themselves as specialists, not 
generalists or integrators.  As officer assignments became the exclusive purview of 
platform community managers, the best officers were quietly steered to the 'best' 
community assignments, which were typically those specialized by platform.  The needs 
of the larger organization--in this case, to have more war college graduates-- were 
discounted.   
The platform-centric model of 'line' officer grew so persuasive that the value of 
war college education had even taken on a negative connotation.  The generation-old 
Navy educational values were inverted: what once had been 'good' was considered 'bad' 
for a career.  Whereas in the early 1960s attendance at the war college could still be the 
deciding factor for promotion to flag,16 in later decades the bias was reversed: attendance 
at a war college could hazard an officer's promotion.  The group of officers who became 
the Navy's most senior admirals in 1990, if compared by war college attendance with the 
senior flags from 1938 to the 1970s, represented an almost complete inversion in officer 
models.  Furthermore, the new generation of flag officers was arguably less 'jointly' 
educated than the generation that had preceded them.   
The larger field of history and sociology of technology may have something to 
learn from this navy case study.  This navy case study explains in detail how a 
technology and a subordinate technological organization--the Naval Reactors office, 
whose personnel once numbered in the single digits--inverted the values of the naval 
                                                 
16 Carl Lavo, Slade Cutter: Submarine Warrior (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2003), 234.   Slade 
Cutter, a highly decorated submarine veteran, recounts that Admiral James S. Russell revealed the flag 
board deliberations to Cutter.  Russel said that Cutter’s failure to attend a war college had been a 
determinative factor in his failure to promote.   
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profession whose members numbered in the tens of thousands.  What does this inversion 
tell us about the capacity of technologies and technological organizations to repeat this 
feat, perhaps in other contexts?   
This inversion of values--where organizational values were radically modified 
through close association with technology-- provides an example of a phenomenon 
Siegfried Gideon, Mechanization Takes Command, and Langdon Winner, Autonomous 
Technology, observed decades ago.17   Winner wrote of the apparent capacity of 
technological systems to redefine, to "reverse adapt", the values of the human 
organization, where the "...artificial slave (machine) gradually subverts the rule of its 
(human) master."18  The detailed Navy study here shows that indeed technological 
innovation can be associated with an inversion of human-organizational values.  
However, the cause of the inversion was not, by any means, a "technology out of 
control."  Nor did the machine effect the inversion by some artificial means.  On the 
contrary, the inversion was the result of more human agency, not less.  Out of fear of the 
machine (the reactor) and in an attempt to more closely control technology--to prevent it 
from getting 'out of control'-- the technologists gained near complete control of the 
human operator's training, education, assignment, and promotion prospects.  Once in 
control, the technologists remade the operator’s values through these instruments of the 
personnel-education system and thereby produced an inversion in human values.  
In the Navy, a small group of technologists invoked the fear for 'reactor safety' as 
a not unreasonable justification to gain control over thousands of machine operators.  
                                                 
17 Siegfried Giedion, Mechanization Takes Command: a Contribution to Anonymous History (New York: 
Oxford Univ. Press, 1948);  Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as a 
Theme in Political Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977),  226-251. 
18 Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as a Theme in Political Thought 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977), 227. 
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Though vigorously opposed, Rickover ultimately won the bureaucratic battle for the 
control of 'line' officer education, assignment, and promotions and was able to inculcate a 
philosophy of the technocracy throughout the officer corps.  His ideology of technocracy 
inverted the old value system that had been in place for a half century.  The subtle yet 
profoundly important changes to the education, assignment, and promotion system 
produced a 'technical specialist' mindset wherein officers valued technical solutions over 
the non-technical, wherein officers' loyalty was first to the platform or technical 
community, secondly to the Navy.    
As platform and technical communities carved up the Navy's officer corps, the 
larger organizational values and needs were gradually discounted.  As community 
detailers became the supreme controllers of personnel assignments, those important Navy 
billets that were too far removed from the platform community tended to be filled by 
lower quality officers.  Moreover, young officers mindful that community officers 
controlled their careers became increasingly hesitant to criticize their platform 
community because they had no other community or refuge to which they could turn for 
support.  They certainly could not rely on the larger Navy to protect or promote them, for 
the larger navy no longer had the means to protect or promote personnel who had lost 
community support.  Such a condition was new for the Navy.  In the old generalist 
system, the 'Young Turks' had been able to criticize a dominant platform community and 
yet survive (as did submarine pioneers Nimitz, Stirling, Lockwood, and Rickover; 
aviation pioneers Reeves, Yarnell, Moffett, and Towers).  To be able to criticize a parent 
community and survive was significantly more difficult in the platform-centric officer 
corps of the later 20th century.   
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Officer cohorts socialized according to platform-centric norms and values 
eventually rose to high command and brought with them their trust in technology and 
their deeply engrained loyalties to their platform.  This cycle of techno-centric and 
platform-centric training and culling continued for a generation and produced officers 
increasingly loyal to the platform technology at the expense of the larger organization.  
This inversion of loyalties--platform and technology first, Navy second-- produced the 
impression that "technology was out of control."  This inversion was what Admiral Train 
observed: officers became "captive" of a particular technology.  
 It is clear from this study that such an inversion of values did not happen quickly 
and did not happen automatically, but was the cumulative result of years of educational, 
assignment, and promotion changes.  The techno-centric and platform-centric identity of 
naval command was thus not fated nor required by the dictates of technology. Rather, the 
Navy's current model of command is a product of unique historical conditions, sustained 
by the momentum of a socio-technical system and its associated ideology.  
A system of leader development sustained by technical and ideological 
momentum, however, may be particularly resistant to changing environmental conditions.  
If the personnel system successfully resists change for too long, evidence of declining 
officer performance may eventually emerge.  Critics of the officer corps have made such 
charges (as was discussed in the introduction).  However, a brief review of some 
examples of the costs of techno-centrism and platform-centrism may help illustrate the 
importance of understanding how officers are prepared to command.  While a techno-
centric and platform-centric model of 'line' command may be highly effective for 
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managing complex machine systems, it appears to carry costs that only in the later 20th 
century are becoming apparent.  
As noted previously, the Navy's senior leadership by 1990 was dominated by  
technical experts who were more platform-centric than they were integrative generalists.   
The technical expert commanders had risen to high command and brought with them the 
mindset of the specialist rather than the generalist.  Gone were the 'generalist' type of 
officers, the type of officer who in the inter-war period (1919-1941) built the carrier 
fleets that eventually displaced the battleship. Gone were the generalist types-- e.g. 
Admirals Carney and Burke-- who would in the 1950s champion radical new innovations 
of nuclear power, data links, and POLARIS even though the innovations threatened some 
established officer groups.   Whereas a 'generalist' CNO in the 1930s and 1950s could 
advocate the development of a new technology that eventually threatened the socio-
technical status of any number of officer communities,  a platform-specialist CNO in the 
later 20th century faced greater difficulty in making such radical recommendations. 
Moreover, since the changed navy culture had come to value the specialist over the 
generalist, only highly specialized officers were recognized as qualified to make 
decisions that might compromise or infringe on a technological system or platform.  
Thus, a proverbial "Catch 22" resulted: only a platform expert (surface, aviation, or 
submarine) had the knowledge and authority to make the 'hard decisions' about a 
platform, but these very experts were the least likely to be objective enough to make such 
decisions.  A respected 'generalist', loyal to the larger navy but conversant in a 
specialized technology, would have been an ideal type of officer to make the hard choices 
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required to keep an organization from becoming beholden to its constituent parts.  
However, by the later 20th century, the generalists had been retired from the Navy.    
The shift in officer models--the decline of the generalist and the rise of the 
specialist-- may thus help explain the difficulty the Navy has confronted when trying to 
adapt to radical innovations and changed political-military conditions in the later 20th and 
early 21st century.  It is perhaps no coincidence that, after the more specialized officers 
rose to high command,  the building and construction programs of the three platform 
communities have taken on the appearance of what Thomas Hughes called 'technological 
momentum'.19  After the specialist model became prominent at high levels of command, 
alternative technologies and programs which threatened to detract from the favored 
platforms-- such as unmanned aerial vehicles, cruise missiles, mine warfare, computer 
networks, smaller ships-- often survived only with outside  support or when disguised in 
platform-centric rhetoric.20  
The shift to a specialist model of commander may also help explain some high 
profile operational and integration problems the Navy experienced in the last decades of 
the 20th century.  When compared to Navy leaders' stunning success in joint operations in 
the Second World War, the ability of commanders to understand and operate jointly with 
the other services had atrophied by the later 20th century.  Senior navy officers would 
                                                 
19 Thomas Parke Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western society, 1880-1930 (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983); Thomas Parke Hughes, American Genesis : a Century of Invention 
and Technological Enthusiasm, 1870-1970 (New York, N.Y.: Viking, 1989). 
20 Terry C. Pierce, Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies: Disguising Innovation (London; New York: 
Frank Cass, 2004).  Pierce enjoyed unique access to several studies of innovation.   Though he does not 
make an explicit link between the rising difficulty of innovating in the USN and the decline of the 
generalist, the two events may be connected.  In discussions with VADM Jerry O. Tuttle, one the pioneers 
of advanced communication systems,  the admiral admitted to the author that he had to keep his knowledge 
and interest in communications system a secret during the early years of his career.  He feared that if it 
were known that he had interests outside aviation, his promotion prospects might be in jeopardy. J. O.  
Tuttle, VADM USN (retired), Interview with the Author, October 2005.  
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admit that in the 1991 Iraq War U.S. Navy commanders could have been better prepared 
and more knowledgeable concerning other services and joint plans and procedures.  At 
least one navy flag veteran of the first Iraq War in 1991 would attribute this deficiency in 
command to the rise of technical parochialism and narrowness in the officer development 
system.21   
In the first years of the 21st century, there is some evidence that the effects of a 
techno-centric system of officer development were beginning to be manifest at the 
highest ranks of Joint command, not just in the navy.  Some of the nation's highest joint 
commanders had come to define conflict in almost exclusively machine terms and placed 
what now appears in hindsight to be misplaced confidence in the power of their machines 
to win wars and protect the country.  An example of this techno-centric thinking is found 
in the writings of a naval officer who promoted to four stars and served as the Vice 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  In his capacity as the VCJCS, he led a forward-
looking body of officers--known as the JROC-- that was charged with anticipating future 
needs of national defense.  This senior admiral placed such a great degree of trust in 
technology that he predicted technology was on the verge of invalidating 200 hundred 
year-old Clausewitzian maxims.   Just months before the most successful surprise attack 
ever launched against the United States in 2001, this four-star admiral would speculate 
that technology was on the verge of "Lifting the Fog of War."22  The existence in the 
American high command of such a misplaced confidence in the efficacy of technology to 
                                                 
21 Ray Taylor, RADM USN (a senior Joint Component Commander during the 1991 Gulf War), Interview 
with the Author, 21 April 2007. 




win wars may help explain some of the faulty decisions and resultant difficulties later 
encountered in the second Iraq conflict.   
 
 
As today's leaders attempt to design the officer model of the future, the historical 
record provided by this study may be of use.  Rickover's arguments for advanced 
technical education were in some cases compelling.  It was true that officers charged with 
the design and maintenance of technical systems could no longer be a 'jack of all trades'.  
Rickover's emphasis on technical and platform expertise was in many ways an 
appropriate model for the Cold War, when large, isolated, strategic missile submarines 
held the fate of the world in their tubes.  As noted, he may well be remembered as the 
most important naval leader in modern times, especially if the world comes to rely 
increasingly on nuclear technology to meet human energy needs.  However, Rickover's 
model of the combat commander may have gone too far in the direction of the technical 
expert.   
When he was a senior admiral, Rickover faced the twin demands of the 
THRESHER disaster and the accelerated POLARIS construction program. In the 
pressure of the moment, he rejected forty years of navy wisdom as to how to develop 
leaders and embraced instead the technical elitism of the Technocracy Movement.  The 
unique large machines Rickover built and the deep cultural change he wrought combined 
to impart a momentum to leadership models that persist to this day.  VADM Calvert and 
Secretary Long warned that some day the Navy and nation might need a new model of 
officer.  Leading thinkers of military organizational change postulated as early as 2000 
that such a time has arrived:  the world environment of the 21st century requires a 
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different type of ‘post-modern' officer.23  The reality of a four dimensional battlefield (to 
include cyber-space), joint, interagency, and coalition warfare and counter-terrorism 
demand something different from Rickover's model of 1963.    
One could argue that a return to the King model may be in order.  King had 
encouraged 'line' officers, sixty years ago, to pursue an integrated understanding of navy 
capabilities, joint matters, and the larger socio-political-strategic environment.  However, 
King's model had a problem: he attempted to include in his model a 'line' officer who 
could also be part-time engineer or technical expert.  In hindsight, it is clear that King 
underestimated the educational demands scientific engineering and advanced weapons 
systems would place on the officer corps in the later 20th century.   
The operational commander in the 21st century is taxed by increasingly complex 
global operations.  For the commander to be able to refocus on operations and the non-
technical aspects of war may require, paradoxically, an increase in the number of 
restricted line, technically-expert officers who can assume greater responsibility for the 
machines of war.  What seems a paradox--that increases in operational complexity may 
require more EDOs-- has historical precedent.  The relationship between the line and the 
engineering specialists has been since 1899 symbiotic: the health of one group affects the 
other.  When the EDO community has not been 'healthy', when the numbers and quality 
of engineers declined, the 'line' has been required to compensate and thereby distract its 
attention from tactical and operational needs.   
It is beyond the scope of this study to suggest how to create a system wherein a 
corps of technical experts can free the operational 'line' from specialized technical duties, 
                                                 
23 Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, David R. Segal, ed., The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces 
after the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
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but history offers a cautionary note.  'Line' officers should substitute for the technical 
experts only in extraordinary circumstances, and then only with the support and 
cooperation of the EDO leaders.  When the 'line' officers displace EDOs, especially in 
technical leadership positions, the morale and professional security of the engineers may 
be damaged, the repair and healing of which may take decades.  In the interim, increasing 
numbers of 'line' officers are required to shoulder specialized technical duties.  Such an 
intervention occurred in the late 1950s when the Franke Board slated engineer specialists 
for possible elimination, their billets to be filled by URL officers with technical sub-
specialties. Some engineers believe their community has yet to regain the levels of 
professional pride and performance that characterized EDOs before the disruption of the 
Franke Board.  Contrary to the assertion of VADM Semmes (an assertion made when 
EDOs were slated for large reductions) that the URL sub-specialist concept had "solved 
the problem of the wet and dry navy", the history since Semmes' pronouncement is less 
sanguine.  It is not altogether clear that URL officers holding technical sub-specialties 
have been able to adequately substitute for an expanded community of experienced 
technical experts.   
This history may also prompt some to re-think the Annapolis curriculum.  The 
history shows that the curriculum reforms of 1960-70s were a unique product of history.   
Rickover's policy was inspired by the old philosophy of the Technocracy Movement and 
only gained access to the naval officer corps because of the contingent events of 
POLARIS and Vietnam-era recruiting problems.  The persistence of a large technological 
system combined with the power of faculty tenure has imparted a certain momentum to a 




of the Annapolis program should encourage leaders to be imaginative as they consider 
rebalancing curricular priorities.  As the events of the 1960s recede into memory, it may 
be time to reconsider the wisdom of a generation and evaluate the merits of reinstating 
the curricular program that existed prior to Rickover's intervention, one with a stronger 
component of general education, language, and non-technical education.   
END 
Appendix:   







A-1:  Career Pattern for submarine line officer in 1967.  Note commonality with surface 
officers before submarine training, and again after year 15.  Note also the chart's 
consistency with the King phases of officer development that is displayed under the 











A-2:  Career Pattern for two types of submarine line officer in 1970: submarine and 
nuclear submariner line officers.  Note that the top heading for traditional submarine 
officers is NOT identified by their engine type, whereas nuclear submarine officers are in 
fact define by their propulsion system.  Note also that the nuclear officers dispense with 
King's phases of development, and no longer admit to any commonality with the surface 












A-3:  Career Pattern for nuclear submarine officer in 1983 (9th edition). In this next 
version that followed the key change of 1970, the officer career path had become entirely 




A-4:  Naval Officer's Guide 1951 cover before the rise of the specialist identity.  The 
symbol shown is that of the 'line' officer, with a career progression defined by the rank 
structure on the left margin.  Images or markings that emphasize a specialty are entirely 




Figure A-5:  Cover of the 1970 Guide. The ascendancy of the technical specialist identity 
complete: the officer corps is represented by three specialties as defined by their 
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